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ABSTRACT
Scholars and journalists have criticised Israel’s governmental system as ineffective or 
unstable,  pointing  at  shortcomings  in  its  policy-making  capabilities.  However, 
explanations of what limits its performance have been partial, as they focus on formal 
attributes  of  government  institutions  or  the  characteristics  and  interactions  of 
individuals  and  groups.  They  have  neglected  the  causal  relationship  between 
institutional features, public policy decisions and capabilities.
The  study  seeks  to  address  this  gap  in  academic  literature  by  offering  an  in- 
depth view into the system’s workings.  It investigates the policy implemented by the 
Labour  government  in  the  defence  industry,  Israel’s  largest  manufacturing  sector, 
when  it  sought  to  streamline  and  reorganise  Israel  Military  Industries  (IMI),  Israel 
Aircraft Industries (IAI), and Rafael during their financial crises in the early 1990s.
In  each  case,  access  to  sources  and  documents  enabled  the  intricate  chain  of 
events to be traced and  disentangled.  The  study  shows how past policy  choices and 
institutional constraints can influence the government’s ability to implement a chosen 
policy  and  impose  financial  losses  on  organised  interests.  By  identifying  how  the 
institutional  framework  affects  the  actors  involved,  the  study  sheds  a  light  on  the 
constraints that shape policy outcomes. It argues that elected policy-makers preferred 
to maintain existing institutional arrangements, despite the serious impediments they 
posed  to  government,  rather  than  forcing  a  particular  policy  on  a  reluctant 
constituency. The result was that some government capabilities remained impaired.
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IDF Israel Defence Forces
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8INTRODUCTION
Time  and  again,  the  Israeli  governmental  system has been criticised  for not being 
effective  enough  or  for  not  being  stable  enough.1   A  leading  Israeli  commentator 
remarked  recently:  ‘In  Israel’s  56  years  of  existence,  there  have  been  thirty 
governments, and only two  have completed their terms.’  Some writers have noted 
that Israel is characterised by a reactive and crisis-driven policy-making style, which 
relies too much on politicians with short-term sectoral interests, rather than on well 
thought-out and  long-term professional  planning.  Others  have  argued  that there  is 
something  seriously  and  fundamentally  wrong  with  Israeli  democracy,  and  its 
governmental system is ‘malfunctioning’.4
Such  criticisms,  which  are  supported  by  findings  in  comparative  surveys,5  
reflect unease with the attributes and capabilities of this system. Yet explanations of 
what limits its performance have been partial, at best, focusing mainly on the formal
1  Avner Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1994), pp. 468-469 (Hebrew).
2 Yoel Marcus, ‘Do not drive this country up a wall’, Haaretz, 3 December 2004.
3  Dani Korn, ‘Policy Making in Israel: The Survival Imperative’, in Dani Korn (ed.), Public Policy in 
Israel: Perspectives and Practices (Lanham,  MD:  Lexington Books, 2002), p.  4; Yitzhak Galnoor, 
No,  Mr.  Commissioner:  Behind  the  Scenes  of Politics  and Administration  in  Israel  (Tel-Aviv: 
Yedioth  Ahronoth  and  the  Jerusalem  Institute  for  Israel  Studies,  2003),  pp.  168-172  (Hebrew); 
Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 471.
4  Ehud  Sprintzak and Larry Diamond,  ‘Introduction’,  in  Ehud  Sprintzak and  Larry Diamond (eds.), 
Israeli Democracy Under Stress (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 3.
5 Israel was graded in 2004 below the average of OECD countries in all governance indicators surveyed 
by the  World  Bank,  including government effectiveness  and political  stability (80.8  vs.  89.7,  and 
15.0 vs.  83.5, respectively).  Past rankings point to a steady decline in the quality of governance in 
Israel. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, ‘Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators  for  1996-2004’,  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  No.  3630 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2005); also  available on:
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/pubs/govmatters4.html (accessed 3 August 2005).attributes  of  government  institutions  or  on  the  characteristics,  attitudes  and 
interactions  of  individuals  and  interest  groups.6  What  such  explanations  have 
neglected is the institutional context in which these elements interact and the causal 
linkage  between  institutional  features,  policy  decisions  and  capabilities.  The 
relationship  between  institutions  and  policy  outcomes  needs  to  be  illuminated,
n
including the factors that influence government effectiveness.
This thesis examines the working of the Israeli governmental system during a 
policy process involving the nation’s biggest manufacturing sector -  the state-owned 
defence-industrial  base.  It  shows  how  institutional  constraints  and  the  particular 
mechanisms  relevant  to  the  outcome  of a  selected case  may  affect certain policy­
making  capabilities,  namely policy implementation and  the  imposition  of financial 
loss  on  organised  interests.  This  thesis  identifies  the  effects  of  the  institutional 
framework  on  political  decision-making  and  shows  how  a  given  institutional 
configuration  shapes  political  interactions  and  leads  to  policy  outcomes,  thus 
providing a better understanding of the Israeli governmental system. It also explains 
the operation of the political system as a whole in a specific policy sector.
6 Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Army in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983); Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press,  1999), Marcia Drezon-Tepler, Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1990).
7 Mark Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications: National Institutions,  Convergence and Change 
in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter Hall, ‘The Movement from 
Keynesianism to Monetarism:  Institutional Analysis and British Economic policy in the  1970s’, in 
Sven  Steinmo,  Kathleen  Thelen  and  Frank  Longstreth  (eds.),  Structuring  Politics:  Historical 
Institutionalism  in  Comparative Analysis (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  1992), pp.  90- 
113.
10State of Research
Current discussion of Israel’s  governmental policy-making  gives  some  insight into 
Israeli government decision-making.  Some  studies concentrate on a specific  policy 
sector; others focus on the style and methods of policy-making8  or offer a normative 
account  of policy  analysis  and  how  governments  should  structure  themselves  and 
address  their  policy  limits.9  Some  analyses  examine  Israel’s  policy-making  via  a 
broader  examination  of  political  communication  channels10  and  government 
formation.1 1
Many studies of Israel’s policy-making are primarily descriptive,  and do not 
offer an  explanatory  framework backed  by  empirical  evidence.  Some  describe  the 
Israeli  political  system,  or  certain  channels  of  operation,  without  providing  a 
conceptual analysis of the political system as a whole and its implications for policy­
making. The great majority of works on Israel’s policy-making focus on procedures
8 Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy of  Israel: Setting, Images, Process (London: Oxford University 
Press,  1972),  and Decisions  in  Israel’ s Foreign Policy  (London:  Oxford University Press,  1974); 
Abraham R.  Wagner,  Crisis Decision Making: Israel’ s Experience in  1967 and 1973  (New York: 
Praeger, 1974); Raphaella Bilski et al. (eds.), Can Planning Replace Politics? The Israeli Experience 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980); Yehuda Ben-Meir, National Security Decision Making: the Israeli Case 
(Boulder, CO:  Westview Press,  1986) and Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995); Kirsten Schulze, ‘Israeli Crisis Decision Making in the Lebanon War: Group 
Madness or Individual Ambition?’, Israel Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (1998), pp. 215-237.
9 See Yehezkel Dror’s works: Recommendations for Improving Governance, Policymaking and Public 
Administration  in  Israel  (Tel-Aviv:  Michlala  Leminhal,  1984)  (Hebrew);  Policymaking  under 
Adversity  (New  Brunswick,  NJ:  Transaction  Books,  1986);  Memorandum  to  the  Prime  Minister 
(Jerusalem:  Akademon,  1989)  (Hebrew);  Grand Strategy for Israel (Jerusalem:  Akademon,  1989) 
(Hebrew).
10 Yitzhak  Galnoor,  Steering the Polity:  Communication and Politics  in Israel (Beverly  Hills,  CA: 
Sage, 1982).
1 1  Gregory M. Luebbert, Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe 
and Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
1112 and structures,  concentrate on one aspect of the policy-making chain,  or examine
11 readily observable phenomena such as voting patterns and party election strategies. 
Only a handful focus on the practice of policy-making in defined sectors and policy 
domains, or assess the detailed formulation and implementation of policy choices,14 
although they do  not account for why a certain policy  in a defined  sector remains 
stable  or  is  changed.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  single  study  that  examines  policy 
change or continuity in the defence-industrial sector.
The  literature  on  Israel’s  defence  industrial  base  (DIB)  is  limited,  and 
dominated by descriptive works.  Several  studies  discuss  the  DIB  structure and the 
factors  that have  influenced  its operations and performance;1 5   some  accounts  offer
12 See, for example, David Nachmias and David H.  Rosenbloom, Bureaucratic Culture:  Citizens and 
Administrators in Israel (London: Croom Helm, 1978).
13  See, for example, Asher Arian, Politics in Israel:  The Second Generation (Chatham, NJ: Chatham 
House  Publishers,  1989);  Asher  Arian  and  Michal  Shamir  (eds.),  The  Elections  in  Israel  1999 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), 2002.
14 Fredrick  Lazin, Politics and Policy Implementation:  Project Renewal in Israel (Albany NY:  State 
University of New York Press,  1994); Ira Sharkansky, Policymaking in Israel: Routines for Simple 
Problems and Coping with the Complex (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press,  1997); Gila 
Menahem,  ‘Water  Policy  in  Israel  1948-2000:  Policy  Paradigms,  Policy  Networks  and  Public 
Policy’, in David Nachmias and Gila Menachem (eds.), Public Policy in Israel (London: Frank Cass, 
2002), pp. 21-44.
15  Imri  Tov,  ‘Israel’s  Defence  Industries  under  Changing  Circumstances  1984-1990’,  Economics 
Quarterly,  no.  151  (1992), pp.  636-658;  Imri Tov,  The Price of Defense Power:  The Economy of 
Defense -  the Case of Israel (Tel-Aviv:  Ministry of Defence Publishing,  1998) (Hebrew), pp.  170—  
208; Asher Tishler and Zeev Rotem, ‘The Reasons for the International Success of Israel’s Defence 
Enterprises’, Economics Quarterly, vol.  3 (1995), pp 468-496 (Hebrew); Yaakov Lifshitz, Defence 
Economics:  The General Theory and the Israeli Case (Jerusalem:  Ministry of Defence Publishing, 
2000), pp.  359-400 (Hebrew), Naftali Blumental,  ‘Investments in the Defence Industrial  Base and 
their Influence on the State Economy’, in Zvi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s: Its 
Politics and Economics (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishers, 1985), pp. 130-141 (Hebrew).
12historical perspectives on its growth and technological achievements.16 Other writers 
have examined the growth of the defence-industrial base as part of a broader analysis
17  18 of a specific policy area, such as Israel’s arms procurement  or arms exports.  These 
and other studies have highlighted important points about the main drives behind the 
Israeli defence enterprises and their operational attributes.
Research Design
Like most studies on the formulation and implementation of policies,19 this study is 
case-oriented  (the  figure  on  page  14  provides  a  visual  description  of how  it  is 
constructed and the analysis process).  It investigates the plans to reorganise Israel’s 
defence industry by restructuring and readjusting its three largest state-owned defence 
entities.  Israel  Military  Industries,  a  5,000-employee  company  specialising  in 
ammunition, missiles and engines, underwent a major financial recovery plan between
16 Yoseph Evron,  The Israel Defence Industry (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence,  1979) (Hebrew); Alex 
Mintz, ‘The Military Industrial Complex: The Israeli Case’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 6, no. 
3,  pp.  103-127;  Stewart  Reiser,  The Israeli Arms  Industry:  Foreign Policy,  Arms  Transfers,  and 
Military  Doctrine  of a  Small  State  (New  York:  Holmes  &  Meier,  1989);  Aaron  S.  Klieman, 
‘Adapting to a Shrinking Market: The Israeli Case’, in Efraim Inbar and Ben Zion Zilberfarb (eds.), 
The Politics and Economics of  Defence Industries (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 111-134.
1 7  Gerlad Steinberg,  ‘Israel’, in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), Arms Procurement Decision Making, vol.  1  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI,  1998), pp. 91-130 (hereafter Steinberg, ‘Israel’); Aaron 
S.  Klieman  and  Reuven  Pedatzur,  Rearming  Israel:  Defense  Procurement  through  the  1990s 
(Boulder, CO:  Westview Press,  1991);  Yehuda Ben Meir,  Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New 
York: Columbia University Press,  1995), and National Security Decision-making:  The Israeli Case 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
18 Aaron S. Klieman, Israel’s Global Reach -  Arms Sales as Diplomacy (Washington DC: Pergamon 
Brassey’s,  1985).
19 Kenneth Weaver and Bert Rockman, ‘Assessing the Effects of Institutions’, in Kenneth Weaver and 
Bert  Rockman  (eds.)  Do  Institutions  Matter?  Government  Capabilities  in  the  US  and  Abroad 
(Washington  DC:  Brookings  Institution,  1993),  pp.  1-41;  Thatcher,  The  Politics  of
Telecommunications.
131992 and 1995; Israel Aircraft Industries, a 15,000-strong firm and a world leader in 
manufacturing  satellites,  aircraft and missile  systems,  was  downsized  in  1993  and 
1994;  Rafael,  a  5,000-strong organisation within the Ministry of Defence,  was  the 
subject of a protracted restructuring process between 1994 and 1996 (which ended in 
2002, when Rafael became a state-owned company).
Thesis Structure
Explanatory Framework Chapter 1
Case Settings Chapter 2
Case Background Chapter 3
Policy Formulation and 
Implementation
IMI
1992-1993
1995
Chapter 4
IAI
1993-1994 Chapter 5
Rafael
1994-1996 Chapter 6
Comparison of Case Studies
Chapter 7
IMI IAI Rafael
Conclusions
14After  four  decades  of  sustained  growth  in  sales  and  workforce,  these 
enterprises  experienced a  simultaneous  drop  in domestic  and  foreign orders.  Their 
growing losses and hidden unemployment precipitated a financial crisis, which was 
addressed  through  a  series  of adjustment  and  restructuring  plans  ordered  by  the 
Labour government of the time. Their intended effect was to make these enterprises 
more flexible and efficient by reducing the workforce, lowering operational costs and 
relaxing managerial constraints.
Prime  Minister Yitzhak  Rabin  stated  as  early  as  November  1992  that  ‘the 
defence industries are too big for Israel’.20 He stressed that they needed to adapt to 
changing  circumstances  in  world  markets.  This,  he  believed,  was  necessary  to 
improve  the  management  of these  state-funded  enterprises  and  prepare  them  for 
privatisation.  Differences  in  the  enterprises’  legal  status,  work  force,  geographical 
dispersion and expertise created the appearance that the government treated each one 
differently,  but  all  three  episodes  (IMI,  IAI,  Rafael)  involved  the  same  process: 
implementing  an  industrial  policy  in  a  sector  while  imposing  financial  losses  on 
powerful organised interest groups.
Each of the three  episodes did indeed have a different outcome,  but on the 
whole the Rabin-led Labour government was unable to meet its policy goals in full. 
Furthermore,  although  the  industries’  workforces  were  significantly  reduced, 
especially in the cases of IMI and IAI,  the workers’  unions successfully fought off 
restructuring  plans  and  only  agreed  to  gradual  layoffs  and  temporary  pay  cuts  in 
exchange  for  expensive  packages  for  redundant  employees.  All  three  enterprises 
maintained  restrictive  labour  practices,  and  the  Rabin  government  effectively 
abandoned plans for their privatisation. By presenting the intricate chain of events in
20 Haaretz, 20 November 1992.
15each of the  three  episodes  and explaining why their outcomes  differed,  this  thesis 
seeks to draw inferences about some of the capabilities of the Israeli governmental 
system.
Using case studies to provide insight into substantive issues of politics requires 
a  historical  understanding  of  the  specific  episodes  involved  before  a  theoretical 
explanatory framework is applied. This study pieces together the story that accounts 
for  the  outcomes,  identifying  and  exploring  the  mechanisms  and  decisions  that 
generated them. It uses a wealth of information -  official texts and reports, interviews 
with senior officials, politicians and experts; declassified documents from archives in 
Israel,  the UK and the US, as well as secondary literature -  to help understand the 
actors’ preferences and perceptions, the information they possessed, the expectations 
they  formed,  the  strategies  they  adopted,  their  evaluation  of alternatives  and  the 
constraints limiting their actions.
The  narration  of the  restructuring  plans  provides  a  basis  from  which  the 
research can draw tentative inferences about governmental capabilities in Israel. The 
research also corroborates, evaluates and adds to generalisations made in Pierson and 
Weaver,  and Immergut21  on the effects  of veto points  and interest  groups’  access, 
which these  works  did not explore  in a  low-hurdles party government system  like 
Israel’s.
This study provides a useful reference to guide research on policy-making in 
Israel,  and  answers  sharply  posed  questions  geared  to  addressing  issues  in  the
21  Paul Pierson and R.  Kent Weaver,  ‘Imposing Losses in Pension Policy’, in Weaver and Rockman, 
Do Institutions Matter?, pp.  110-150; Ellen Immergut, ‘The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health 
Policy-making  in  France,  Switzerland  and  Sweden’,  in  Steinmo,  Thelen  and  Longstreth  (eds.), 
Structuring Politics, pp. 57-89.
16academic  discussion  of government  capabilities.22  For  instance:  how  does  Israel’s 
particular  institutional  configuration  affect  the  government’s  capacities  and 
effectiveness?  Is  that  configuration,  at  a  macro-institutional  level,  ‘systematically 
biased’ against certain policy capacities in the sphere of the military industrial sector?
More specifically: what is the impact of intermediate institutional mechanisms 
on  policy  implementation  in  Israel?  Do  they  hamper  the  government  system’s 
capacity  to  implement  policy  that  includes  imposing  financial  loss  on  powerful 
organised  groups?  Is  this  situation unique  to  the  defence-industrial  sector,  or is  it 
applicable in other policy areas that involved organised interests?
The Theoretical Framework
Answering  these  and  other  broad  substantive  questions  involves  analysing  actual 
experience.  This  requires  a  conceptual  approach  that  can  provide  the  appropriate 
framework and give theoretical guidance for collecting and analysing the empirical 
data.  In  public  policy  analysis  a  broad  range  of analytical  methods  can  provide 
convincing accounts,  including the new-institutional approaches, group and network 
approaches, rational-choice theory and idea-based approaches. (The different methods 
are  separated  here  for  convenience  of  exposition,  although  in  reality  they  are 
intertwined.)
Institutional  and  new-institutional  approaches  put  political  and  macro­
constitutional  elements  at  the  heart of the  analysis;  they view  these  as  structuring 
policy decisions and outcomes, hence they see institutions as affecting a government’s 
policy-making  capacities.  Group and network approaches  suggest  that associations
22 See, for instance, the case studies in Weaver and Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter, Robert D.
Putnam,  Making Democracy  Work:  Civic  Traditions  in  Modern  Italy  (Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton
University Press, 1993).and  informal  relationships,  within  and  outside  political  institutions,  shape  or 
determine decisions and outcomes. Idea-based approaches focus on ideas, knowledge 
and doctrines as sources of solutions to policy problems; they have a life of their own, 
circulate  and gain  influence  independently of interests  in  the  policy process.  Each 
method claims to be able to explain why policies differ across sectors and countries, 
and why some of them remain stable, change, or fail.
Here  it  is  argued  that,  notwithstanding  its  limitations,  the  new-institutional 
approach  is  a  suitable  explanatory  framework.  In  the  1970s  and  the  1980s  new 
institutionalism  ‘rediscovered’  institutions  as  a  central  subject  of political  research 
and  moved  away  from  the  study  of behaviour  as  the  main  element  of analysis. 
Mainstream behaviourist theories focused on informal distributions of power and on 
the attitudes and political behaviours  of individuals and groups  to  explain political 
outcomes, rather than on the formal attributes of government institutions. Hence they 
often missed crucial contextual elements, for example, the impact of the institutional 
landscape  on  the  capacity  of  non-state  actors,  such  as  interest  groups,  to  block 
policies. Concepts like ‘policy legacies’ or ‘path dependence’ (referring to the notion 
that  current  or new  policies  are  constrained  by  earlier policy  choices  which  often 
dictate the outcome of policy events23) provided a powerful corrective to the implicit
23  Douglas  C.  North,  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Peter A. Hall, and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and 
the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies, No. 44 (1996), p. 941; Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing 
Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review,  vol. 94, 
no.2  (June 2000), pp. 251-268.
18behaviourist  assumption  that  each  decision  constitutes  a  new  roll  of the  political 
dice.24
Institutional analysis can provide powerful insights into the policy process in 
the case  study at hand.  Whilst the accounts of IMI,  IAI  and Rafael relate to  state- 
owned enterprises with similar characteristics -  all three operate in the defence sector, 
employ  organised  labour  and  manufacture  weapon  systems  -   the  policy 
implementation and outcome of each episode was quite different. In IMI’s case, the 
Rabin government achieved most of its policy targets, albeit after much delay and at a 
higher financial cost than originally envisaged. In the case of IAI it made substantial 
compromises and gave up key policy objectives. With Rafael the government failed 
completely; its original objective was achieved only eight years later.
Here  then,  is  a  puzzle.  How  did  a  powerful  and  pervasive  governmental 
machinery,  whose  influence over the economy is unprecedented among democratic 
regimes25 -  the state controls or oversees most activities, from the labour market and 
infrastructure  to  the  credit  market  -   come  to  achieve  such  mixed  results  and  to 
demonstrate at times patchy and seemingly inconsistent decision-making?
Institutions may explain this. Embedded in the organisational configuration of 
the  polity,  they  surround  elected  and  appointed  decision-makers  and  structure
24  Margaret  Weir,  ‘Institutional  Politics  and  Multi-Dimensional  Actors:  Organised  Labour  and 
America’s Urban Problem’, paper prepared for Crafting and Operating Institutions Conference, Yale 
University, April 2003. See www.yale.edu/coic/weir.doc (accessed 22 February 2005).
25  Yakir  Plessner,  The  political  economy  of Israel:  from  ideology  to  stagnation  (Albany:  State 
University  of New  York  Press,  1994);  Ira  Sharkansky,  The  Political  Economy  of Israel  (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books,  1987); The Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel 
(Chatham,  NJ:  Chatham  House,  1998),  pp.  15,  67;  The  Israeli  government  controls  half of the 
economy and employs a third of the nation’s workers; it also has large civil service.
19relations  between  individuals  and  groups.26  Institutions,  therefore,  are  not  merely 
‘neutral arenas within which political behaviour, driven by more fundamental factors, 
occurs’;27  they are  themselves  a  factor,  influencing  both  behaviour and  outcomes. 
Furthermore,  by  structuring  the  processes  through  which  policy  decisions  are 
formulated and implemented and by constraining the choices open to the decision- 
makers,  institutions  strongly  affect  their  governing  capacity.  Their  effect  can  be 
direct or mediated by the broader socio-economic structure within which they operate.
The new-institutional approach has several important advantages. Institutions 
are  more  readily  identifiable.  In  their  simplest  definition,  they  are  the  formal 
structures of government, presidential or parliamentary, that persist over time. Hence, 
all variants of institutionalism rest on the assumption that  ‘the rules and systems of 
rules in any historically given society not only organise and regulate social behaviour 
but make it understandable, and in a limited conditional sense, predictable for those
90 sharing  in  rule  knowledge’.  Their continuity  creates  greater  regularity  in  human 
behaviour than would otherwise exist and enhances the  explanatory and predictive 
capacity of political  sciences.  Individuals appear to  be  the primary driving  force 
behind  policy  events,  but  they  are  not  a  permanent  feature  in  any  institutional
26  Peter  A.  Hall,  Governing the  Economy:  the politics  of state  intervention  in  Britain  and France 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), p. 19.
27 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political 
Life’, American Political Science Review, vol. 78, no. 2 (1984), p. 734.
28  James  G.  March  and  Johan  P.  Olsen,  ‘Institutional  Perspectives  on  Political  Institutions’, 
Governance, vol. 9, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 247-264.
29 Tom R. Bums, Philippe Deville and Thomas Baumgartner, Man, Decisions,  Society:  The Theory of 
Actor-System  Dynamics for Social Scientists  (New York:  Gordon  and  Breach  Science  Publishers, 
1985), p. 256.
30 B. Guy Peters, ‘Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects’, Political Science Series No.  69 (July 
2000), Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, p. 5.
20structure:  they  come  and  go,  change  positions,  resign  or are  ousted  from  office  -  
sometimes they are even assassinated.  Institutions,  on the other hand,  are  likely to 
remain,  and  their  presence  enables  researchers  to  predict  behaviours  and  to  test 
hypotheses that might not be possible without these structures. Indeed, following on 
from Huntington’s point about political development and the importance of structures 
that  mediate  between  society’s  demands  and  government,  institutions  create  the 
predictable, regular behaviour necessary for a peaceful and effective political system.
In  the  case  of  the  Israeli  defence  industry,  intermediate  institutional 
mechanisms -  particularly the number and location of veto points in the government 
system and their influence over the policy-making process -  determined when and 
how the government introduced and implemented policy regarding these enterprises. 
This study will show that policy outcomes can be explained by the opportunities and 
constraints created by the specific institutional configuration involved. These enhance 
and limit the options, perceptions and preferences of different actors, thus affecting 
some  policy-making  capabilities.  Certain actors,  like organised  labour groups,  can 
thwart  policy  implementation  and  the  imposition  of financial  loss  by  using  veto 
points,  which exist both inside and outside  the policy-making process.  Finally,  the 
Israeli governmental system’s capacity to implement policy and impose financial loss 
is  restricted  by  non-institutional  factors,  such  as  agenda  congestion,  past  policy 
choices and established practices of negotiation and settlement.
Critics point to  several weaknesses in the  institutional and new-institutional 
approaches. Actors and groups, for example, often circumvent institutions in pursuit 
of their interests, or use their resources to gain access to the decision-making process.
3 1   Samuel Huntington,  ‘Political Order and Political Decay, Chapter 1’ in Huntington, Political Order 
in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 1-9.
21Interest  groups  also  have  the  resources  to  ensure  that  politicians  and  bureaucrats 
respond to their interests, whatever the legal and constitutional hurdles are. In certain 
cases,  it is the realignment of political forces,  rather than institutions,  that explains 
new policies.  Another difficulty is how to measure and assess the effectiveness of a
'I 'j
given institutional set-up and its different elements.
Notwithstanding the  above,  institutions have a profound influence,  not only 
because  they  embody  legal  and  procedural  arrangements  and  act  as  the  formal 
apparatus of government, but also because they comprise norms and conventions of 
behaviour.  They represent normative aspirations,  which in turn affect the power of 
groups and individuals in the policy process. They are deeply rooted in a country’s 
history, largely inherited and are not open to easy modification.
The institutional structure, therefore, has a significant impact on the executive 
as  well as on the  interest groups who wish to  influence policy.  Within this  set-up, 
leaders and competing interests operate and are evaluated. Heads of states and leaders 
of interest groups  could choose  to  ignore  the rules,  try bypassing them or forcibly 
abolishing them (even though the last of these options would fall outside the realm of 
acceptable democratic politics).  The  institutional  structure of the polity is therefore 
crucial for understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of the policy process.
32 See, for example, Peter John, Analysing Public Policy, (London and New York: Continuum,  1998), 
pp.  49-53,  58-59;  Vivien  Lowndes,  ‘Varieties of the New  Institutionalism:  A Critical Appraisal’, 
Public Administration, 74 (Summer 1996), pp.  181-197; Mark Bevir,  ‘The Individual and Society’, 
Political  Studies,  44  (1996),  pp.  102-114;  Mark  Bevir,  ‘Prisoners  of  Professionalism:  On  the 
Construction and Responsibility of Political Studies’, Public Administration, 79 (2001), pp. 469-489.
22Policy-making and Government Capabilities
Before turning to the impact of national institutions on political actors in Israel, it is 
worth  considering  some  issues  related  to  policy-making.  Many  accounts  of how 
public policies are made divide the process into five phases: societal demand, political 
interaction, policy proposal, policy decision and policy implementation.  These can 
be viewed as a sequence set in a broader political, economic and social context which 
generates demands for policy. Policy means things that governments do or do not do: 
actions, inactions and proposals that affect people, values and financial resources. As 
policy is produced, so it has effects on that context, and these lead to other demands 
for policy or demands for a different policy, and so on. The way this sequence works 
in practice changes from one specific policy setting to another, and may vary between 
policy domains.
The actual policy process does not correspond to this linear model except in 
the  minimal  sense  that  a  formal  policy  has  to  be  proposed,  legislated  and  then 
implemented.  However,  the  distinction  between  phases  helps  to  identify  different 
kinds of activities and different types of actors involved with each, even if their role 
and  involvement  does  not  necessarily  start  or  finish  at  the  beginning  or  end  of 
particular phases.  The issues, bargaining patterns, and the structure of opportunities 
and constraints in each policy sector create a particular type of politics that may or 
may not resemble that suggested by national political traditions and norms.
The relative  influence  of politicians,  bureaucrats and  interest  groups  differs 
according to the nature and perceived importance of the policy sector, be it security,
33 Peter Deledon,  ‘The Stages Approach to the Policy Process’, in Paul A. Sabartier (ed.),  Theories of 
the Policy Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp.  19-32; Charles Jones, An Introduction 
to the Study of  Public Policy, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1984).
23health or education. Each sector should be studied in its own right; it has politics of its 
own,  a  unique  blend  of  attributes  and  problems,  and  different  combinations  of 
producer and consumer interest groups that conflict or co-operate to achieve common 
or group-based goals.  These relationships within policy  sectors  affect the  type and 
degree of party competition and the extent to which bureaucrats and ministers have 
and exercise power.
Between policy and politics causation works in both directions: the two affect 
and shape each other,  and are not only influenced by constitutional traditions.  The 
effects of institutions on policy-making can therefore be conceptualised in terms of 
what government can do in a coherent and co-ordinated way. In a thoughtful analysis 
of the effects of political institutions, Weaver and Rockman distinguish ten specific 
policy-making  capabilities,  regardless  of the  policy objectives  and  the  institutional 
structure of governments: the ability to set and maintain priorities; to target resources; 
to innovate when old policies have failed; to co-ordinate conflicting objectives into a 
coherent whole; to impose financial losses on powerful groups; to represent diffuse, 
unorganised interests; to ensure effective implementation; to ensure policy stability; to 
make and maintain international commitments; and to manage political cleavages.34
This list is not exhaustive, but it does capture most of the tasks expected of 
government.  Weaver  and  Rockman  also  note  that  these  capabilities  are  not 
independent of each other, nor should we assume that certain capacities fit, or relate 
to, some policy sectors better than others. Rather, they should be assessed as a whole
34 R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, ‘Assessing the Effect of Institutions’, in R. Kent Weaver and 
Bert A.  Rockman  (eds.),  Do Institutions Matter?  Government Capabilities  in  the  US and Abroad 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 6-7 (hereafter: Weaver and Rockman, ‘Assessing 
the Effects of Institutions’).
24(bearing in mind that in certain cases some capacities are more evident than others) in 
the light of the task at hand.
At the root of each capability lies the fusion or separation of executive and 
legislative power.  Parliamentary  systems  reflect more  fusion of power and  greater 
centralisation of decision-making  in the  cabinet.  Heads  of government  are  usually 
selected by the legislature, and their tenure depends on retaining its confidence.  The 
broader the legislative support, the stronger the concentration of executive power, and 
presumably the higher the chances of successfully implementing a policy.  However, 
more often than not, governments encounter difficulties in execution or discover that a 
policy is inadequate.  Tracking who participates in the decision-making process and 
assessing the attributes of decision-making and how they affect the way these actors 
make key decisions can help us understand (and later to explain) why policies change 
or fail. The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate some of the generalizations in 
Weaver and Rockman’s and Immergut’s studies by adding another case -  Israel -  and 
thereby to contribute to the study of public policy and comparative politics.
Why Israel?
Choosing Israel to illustrate the workings of political institutions has some limitations. 
The  country  is  relatively  small,  both  in  size  and  population,  and  has  distinctive 
characteristics and policy dilemmas which differ in detail and intensity from those of 
other countries.
Closer examination, however, suggests the distinctiveness argument is flawed. 
As a westem-style democracy, with freedom of political discussion, orderly changes 
of government and a highly developed economy, Israel is not significantly different 
from other countries in this category, like Australia or the countries of North America 
and  Western  Europe.  It  has  the  political  structure  and  formal  procedures  of  a
25parliamentary democracy, and its politicians and policy-makers cope with severe and 
pressing problems much like their counterparts in other democracies. Notwithstanding 
differences  in  priority  and  presentation  among  parliamentary  democracies,  several 
policy  issues  -   public  education,  health  services,  public  transport  and  housing,  to 
name a  few -  are  common to  all  these  countries,  and they reflect continuous  and 
usually consistent commitment by the state to the welfare of its citizenry.
This thesis is designed to allow for transnational comparison and offers some 
clear advantages as a multi-case study. First, the study focuses on policy-making and 
the relationship between institutions and policy-making capabilities in Israel, but its 
design -  a structured narrative of episodes, which, at the second stage, is assessed in 
terms  of a  theoretical  framework  -   makes  it  usable  for  comparisons  in  political 
science,  especially  comparisons  of  policy  implementation  between  nation  states. 
Secondly,  given  the  importance  of Israel  in  the  Middle  East,  an  insight  into  the 
working  of the  Israeli  institutional  set-up and policy-making process  is useful and 
important.  And  finally,  Israel  -   with  its  strong  organised  unions,  institutionalised 
labour protection and unstable political system -  offers a fascinating case study of the 
effects of political institutions and interest groups on policy-making capabilities. As 
Gitelman and Sharkansky note, Israel, with its numerous divisions (religious, ethnic, 
ideological)  and  unstable  geopolitical  conditions,  makes  a  useful  laboratory  for 
studying  how  a  democracy  functions  in  extreme  conditions.  And,  even  if one 
overlooks Israel’s particular characteristics, understanding how a government operates
35 Zvi Gitelman, ‘Comparative Politics and the Jewish Political Experience’ in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), The 
Quest  For  Utopia  (Armonk,  NY:  ME  Sharpe,  1992);  Ira  Sharkansky,  Ambiguity,  Coping,  and 
Governance:  Israeli Experiences  in Politics,  Religion,  and Policymaking (Westport,  CT:  Praeger, 
1999).
26in strained and intense circumstances provides insight into democratic institutions and 
into how democracy does and does not work, and why.
The specific case of restructuring Israel’s defence-industrial base is important 
as well. The Israeli government dominates the sector, controlling about 70% of it (in 
terms of output and workforce), compared to the European average of 15%.36 And the 
defence  enterprises  themselves  provide  an  exceptional  net  contribution  to  Israel’s 
economy;  a  recent  study  puts  the  overall  financial  input  of  the  Israeli  defence 
industrial base (DIB) at 3.3% of GDP in 2000, a far higher figure than applied in the 
US (1%), France (0.9%) and the UK (1.6%).37
The necessarily secretive nature of this sector puts substantial difficulties in 
the way of external scrutiny and has prevented a systematic examination of policy­
making  in  the  sector until  now.  Defence-industry  restructuring  was  also  the  most 
ambitious  industrial  policy  undertaken  in  Israel’s  history,  politically,  operationally 
and financially. There was no plan for such far-reaching structural reform in any other 
industry  during  the  1990s.  Furthermore,  those  affected  -   a  large  group  from  all 
segments  of  society  and  distributed  throughout  the  country  -   were  not  closely 
identified with a particular party. All parties sought the electoral support of defence- 
industry workers,  whose combined vote was equivalent to the electorate of three or 
more  of  the  Knesset’s  120  seats  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s.  This  made  it 
impossible to see mass redundancies and pay cuts in the defence industrial sector as 
politically costless.
36 Amos Yaron,  ‘The Industrial Policy of the Defence Establishment’  in Imri Tov (ed.),  ‘Defense and 
Israel’s  National  Economy:  Exploring  Issues  in  Security  Production’, JCSS Memoranda,  no.  62, 
October 2002, p. 118 (Hebrew).
37 Ibid., p. 127.
27Research Scope and Methodological Limitations
While research on the  Israeli  defence-industrial base has  increased in the past five 
years,  it is  still  limited  in  scope.  This  is  partly because  of certain  methodological 
challenges:  difficulty of access to research materials, and the risk of selecting cases 
that fit the author’s theories.
Security  reasons,  commercial  sensitivity  and  political  considerations 
determine  that  only  limited  information  is  publicly  available,  some  of it  heavily 
censored.  And  certain  material,  such  as  discussions  of the  Security  Cabinet  (the 
Ministerial  Committee  for  National  Security  in  Cabinet),  details  of  military 
programmes and investments in defence infrastructure remain classified and will not 
be released in the foreseeable future.  However, recent years have seen a noticeable 
change in attitude by Israeli authorities, with greater tendencies towards transparency 
and  accountability  becoming  apparent.  Defence  companies’  business  results  and 
details  of arms  exports  are  now  published  regularly,  and  companies  and  official 
bodies  reveal  far  more  about  themselves  and  their  activities  -   including  details 
regarded as state secrets only a decade ago, like details of the development of new 
weapon systems. This has helped to build up a more accurate picture of the defence 
sector’s activities,  and complements  the  wealth of information  obtained during  the 
author’s research in Israel and abroad.
Interviews and unpublished sources form the essence of this thesis.  Primary 
sources, including decision documents, internal memos and protocols of discussions 
at  various  levels  and  loci  of decision-making  have  been  consulted  and  analysed. 
Documents  have  been  collected  from  the  Israel  MoD  and  IDF  archive,  the  UK’s 
National  Archives  and  the  National  Security  Archives  at  George  Washington 
University,  Washington DC.  However,  even  in these places  it was  not possible  toobtain  unfettered  access  to  all  possible  material,  as  many  documents  are  still 
classified. Some documents were obtained through private sources.
Critical  paths  of decision-making  were  checked  through  multiple  sources. 
Senior  officials  and  prominent  personalities  who  took  part  in  the  policy  process 
during  the  period  of the  research  were  interviewed,  including  present  and  former 
politicians (among them former prime ministers), leaders of labour unions and former 
civil servants. The discussions, in the form of open-ended interviews, were grounded 
around the same themes, and the interviewees were free to express themselves in an 
unscripted manner.
Almost all the interviews were conducted after the events, when many of the 
interviewees had already retired or moved on to other positions.  One could assume 
that their views might therefore be skewed, geared to different audiences at different 
times, and so might differ from their original or real point of view. The author also 
accepts  that  some  interviewees  did  not  share  all  their  information,  nor  did  they 
divulge sensitive details -  either for personal reasons or out of concern that this might 
reveal tactics that could be employed in future political battles. With this in mind, the 
interviewees’  accounts  were  supplemented  and  cross-checked  against  secondary 
sources and selected literature, including pamphlets and personal memoirs. The author 
also  made  extensive  use  of  the  archives  of  newspapers,  differentiating  between 
opinion  articles  and  news  reports  for  the  purpose  of  gathering  as  much  factual 
information as possible. To ensure consistency in the interpretation of historical and 
documentary evidence, the author has heeded King, Keohane and Verba’s assertion
29that ‘the most important rule for all data collection is to report how data were created 
and how we came to possess them.’38
Some  critics  of  institutional  analysis,  and  especially  of  historical 
institutionalism,  claim  that  case  studies  and  small-n  comparisons  cannot  generate 
valid  knowledge,  because  cases  are  not  selected  randomly,  and  there  may  not  be 
enough statistical ‘degree of freedom’ to test all conceivable hypotheses rigorously. 
Others are concerned that the institutionalists’ proclivity for tackling significant issues 
predisposes  them to  ‘selection on the dependent variable’:  choosing cases where  a 
phenomenon of interest has occurred, while ignoring the instances where it has not.40 
Another criticism concerns the absence of an unproblematic ‘historical record’, when 
political scientists use history as a laboratory for theory development and testing 4 1
These are valid points, but one should consider that in all research traditions, 
whatever theories or research methods are deployed, individual works build upon one 
another, often extending lines of analysis, retesting arguments and correcting earlier 
assumptions and generalisations. Some historical institutionalist scholars have focused 
primarily on the theoretical characteristics of arguments about temporal causality, but 
their  reflections  also  set  empirical  standards  to  be  met  in  case  analyses  and
38 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 51.
39  Barbara  Geddes,  ‘How  the  Case  You  Choose  Affect  the  Answers  You  Get:  Selection  Bias  in 
Comparative Politics’, Political Analysis, no. 2 (1990), pp.  131-150; J.H. Goldthorpe,  ‘The Uses of 
History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent Tendencies’, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 42, 
no. 2 (1991)„pp. 211-230.
40  Geddes,  ‘How  the  Case  You  Choose  Affect  the Answers  You  Get’;  King,  Keohane  and  Verba, 
Designing Social Enquiry.
41  Ian S.  Lustick,  ‘History, Historiography and Political Science:  Multiple Historical Records and the 
Problem of Selection Bias’, American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 
605-618.
30comparative studies that aim to establish the presence of causally relevant processes 
or events.
Methodologically oriented works have also made the case for circumstances in 
which in-depth case  studies  and  small-n to  medium-n comparisons  are  an optimal 
research strategy.42 Random selection of cases is often not appropriate, and it is far 
from the only way to test hypothesis rigorously; hypotheses can be tested even when 
scholars  cannot  sample  large  numbers  of  truly  independent  cases.  Alternative 
strategies  for  causal  inferences  were  developed  and  applied  because  there  are 
important advantages,  intellectual  and practical,  to  focusing  research agendas  on a 
small number of cases, including instances of substantively compelling outcomes and 
arrangements that we want to explore and understand.43
The  choice  of  this  particular  multi-episode  case  study  stemmed  from 
professional interest in the subject matter. Personal considerations aside, though, the 
author argues that this study offers a multitude of empirical observations that can be 
used for formulating and testing hypothesis about the mechanisms that connect causes 
to effects. It offers a rare opportunity to examine and evaluate the Israeli government 
system in action, building on, and adding to, an explanatory framework that has been 
used in multiple case studies.
The thesis employs historical analysis to trace the evolution of policy over a 
long  period.  Notwithstanding  the  limitations  noted  earlier,  the  chronicle  of events
42  See  for  example,  Charles  C.  Ragin,  The  Comparative Method:  Moving Beyond  Qualitative  and 
Quantitative Strategies  (Berkeley,  CA:  University of California  Press,  1987);  Gerardo  L.  Munck, 
‘Canons  of  Research  Design  in  Qualitative  Analysis’,  Studies  in  Comparative  International 
Development, vol. 33 (1998), pp 18— 45; James Mahoney, ‘Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N 
Research’, Sociological Methods and Research, vol. 28, no. 4 (May 2000).
43 Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol  ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science’, in 
Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.), The State of  the Discipline (New York: Norton, 2002).
31presented in subsequent chapters should be treated as if it were, so far as is known, a 
description  of what  actually  took  place  in  the  past.  The  use  of this  method  was 
dictated by the  nature  of the  research problem:  government capabilities  cannot be 
observed  directly  but  must  be  inferred  by  looking  at  policy  outcomes,  and  this 
requires  retracing  the  decision-making  patterns  and  characteristics  through  which 
government capabilities are channelled. Choosing a single case, or a case with a small 
number  of episodes,  makes  the  analytical  inquiry  more  explicit  in  its  efforts  to 
demonstrate  how  institutions  influence  political  outcomes,  either  through  path 
dependence,  empowering certain actors,  or constraining the preferences of political 
actors.  It also  emphasises  the  causal  significance of institutional  arrangements  and 
structures.
As noted earlier, the main aim of the research design chosen here was to invite 
other scholars to evaluate, replicate and extend the analysis to other case studies in 
different policy areas. The measures and caveats specified here afford some protection 
against  biased  case  selection  and  a  skewed  interpretation  of  findings;  however, 
readers can decide for themselves after examining the case evidence.
32CHAPTER 1 
Assessing Israeli Government Capabilities
What enables or impedes policy-making has been a central concern in the literature of 
comparative  politics  and  public  policy  analysis.  Elected  leaders  are  expected  to 
address  their  publics’  demands  by  devising  and  implementing  new  policies  that 
replace outdated or defunct ones. However, their ability to do this depends as much on 
their  personal  traits  as  on  the  attributes  of  their  country’s  political  process  and 
institutions.
What, then, determines a society’s capacity to adjust its policies in the face of 
changed circumstances or the failure of previous policies? What determines the ability 
to sustain policies long enough to elicit adequate responses from political actors? This 
chapter attempts to provide a basis for answering these and related questions in the 
context of the Israeli government system. It proposes an explanatory framework that 
identifies the determinants of the country’s public policy-making and points at ways 
in which its political institutions shape and influence policy outcomes.
The first part of the chapter explores the usefulness of new-institutionalism as 
a conceptual tool that guides  the  study of government capabilities.  Then follows a 
discussion on determinants of policy-making, which highlights the factors that affect 
overall  policymaking  effectiveness  and  identifies  the  dependent  variables  for  this 
research.  The  second  part  of  the  chapter  discusses  the  formation  of  Israel’s 
institutional  landscape,  highlighting  the  significant  developments  and  factors  that 
influence  the  country’s  decision-making  processes.  The  final  part  compares  and 
contrasts the explanatory framework offered here with some alternative perspectives.
33The Theoretical Path: New-lnstitutionalism
The role of political institutions in the policy process is of central concern to political 
science. March and Olsen argue that
Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the 
design  of political  institutions.  The bureaucratic agency,  the  legislative committee  and 
the appellate court are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of 
standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests.  They are 
political actors in their own right.1
That institutions provide the strategic context in which political actors make policy 
choices  is  common  ground  for  both  major  analytical  traditions  within  new 
institutionalism  -   historical  institutionalists  and  rational-choice  institutionalists.
Institutional contexts, they argue, frame actors’ strategic choices and define the role of
*  0   policy entrepreneurs and organised interests, thereby shaping public policy.  Political
institutions influence the policy process by limiting the nature and scope of political
actions,  by  placing  constraints  (i.e.  rules  and  norms)  on  political  actors,  and  by
insulating  political  elites  from  public  pressures.  New-institutionalist  scholars  have
thus offered explanations both for variation in policy outcomes in several countries
and for policy continuity and change within countries.
1  March and Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism’, p. 738.
2  Sven Steinmo and Carolyn Tolbert,  ‘Do Institutions Really Matter?’  Comparative Political Studies, 
(April 1998) vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 165-187.
3  Hall,  Governing  the  Economy;  individual  essays  in  Steinmo,  Thelen  and  Longstreth  (eds.), 
Structuring Politics;  Ellen Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in  Western Europe 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Margaret Levi, Of  Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: 
University  of  California  Press,  1988);  James  G.  March  and  Johan  P.  Olsen,  Rediscovering 
Institutions (New York:  Free Press,  1989); North, Institutions,  Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance;  Kenneth  Shepsle,  ‘Institutional  Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions’  in  Herbert 
Weisberg (ed.) Political Science:  The Science of  Politics (New York: Agathon Press,  1986); Stephen 
Skowronek, Building a New American State:  The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities,
34Some institutionalist accounts concerned with explaining broad and enduring 
patterns of public policy show that conflicts over policy are  structured by political 
interests and institutions created as a result of earlier decisions.4  Such societal and 
state institutions  shape how political actors -  individual, collective and corporate -  
define  their  interests  and  structure  their  power  relationships  with  other  groups. 
Because  of the constraints  of rules and norms of conduct,  when making decisions 
these actors do not ask ‘how do I maximise my interests in this situation?’, as rational- 
choice scholars would argue, but ‘what is the appropriate response to this situation, 
given  my  position  and  responsibilities?’.  In  other  words,  rather  than  being  utility 
maximisers,  political  actors  are  utility  satisfiers.5   Another  insight  advanced  by 
historical institutionalists concerns ‘path dependency’ (the idea that, once a particular 
policy is chosen,  it is difficult to change it -  even when it outlives its usefulness -  
because of the expensive and laborious process of agreeing a new policy6) and the 
accumulation of historical commitments as defining future behaviour.
This dissertation,  therefore,  attempts to illuminate how  institutional analysis 
can account for policy-making effectiveness, assessing inter alia the extent to which 
competing institutional actors have the power to influence political decision-making. 
A  meso-level  account,  it  aims  to  explain  inter-  and  intra-organisational  relations
1877-1920  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1982);  George  Tsebelis,  Nested  Games: 
Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
4 See, for example: G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake and Michael Mastanduno (eds.),  The State and 
American  Foreign  Economic  Policy  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press,  1988);  Weir,  ‘Institutional 
Politics and Multi-Dimensional Actors’.
5  Thomas  A.  Koelble,  ‘The New  Institutionalism in  Political  Science  and  Sociology’,  Comparative 
Politics, 1995, pp. 231-243 (p. 233).
6 Stephen D. Krasner,  ‘Approaches to the State’, Comparative Politics, vol.  16, no. 2 (January 1984), 
pp. 223-246; Paul Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, (1996) pp. 123-163.
35within a single political system and in a particular policy area, specifying institutions 
as a central explanatory variable. However, as Thelen and Steinmo point out:
Institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole ‘cause’ of outcomes. 
Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate various theories 
of politics  ...  Instead, they point to the ways that institutions structure those battles and, 
in so doing, influence their outcomes.7
This  view  was  echoed by  March  and  Olsen,  who  contend  that  ‘while  institutions
o
structure  politics,  they  ordinarily  do  not  determine  political  behaviour precisely’. 
Policy outcomes, therefore, can be appreciated fully only by understating the complex 
interaction between political actors and the institutional framework.
A  policy  outcome  is  contingent  on  a  number  of  historically  embedded, 
country-specific  factors,  so  one  must  unravel  the  historical  episode  to  examine, 
explore  and  understand  the  process  and  the  causal  factors  that brought  about  that 
outcome. Despite Bismarck’s view that ‘Laws are like sausages -  it's better not to see 
them being made’, tracing the evolution and implementation of policies -  as discussed 
in  the  following  chapters  -   is  essential  for  assessing  the  effect  of institutions  on 
Israel’s policy-making capabilities.
Before  embarking on this,  though,  we need working definitions of two key 
terms used in this thesis: effective government (or governance) and institutions.
Governments  across  the  world  differ  greatly  in  their  ideologies,  political 
support  bases  and  policy  inheritances.  These  and  other  factors  affect  their 
performance -  but how one defines and measures governmental effectiveness has not 
been universally agreed. As Dunleavy and his colleagues note, when one attempts to 
assess  a  policy  outcome  it  is  almost  impossible  to  trace  exactly  what  is  due  to
7 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, in Steinmo, 
Thelen and Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics, p. 3.
8 March and Olsen, ‘Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions’, p. 252.
36government  action  and  what  to  other,  often  structural  and  institutional  factors.9 
Furthermore, there is no universally accepted standard for what constitutes effective 
governance. What is seen as desirable and effective by one scholar might be contested 
by another.
However,  the  academic  literature  suggests  some  criteria  for  measuring 
government efficiency.  One possibility is to determine a government’s effectiveness 
by its ability to implement the policies it advocated during the election campaign. If it 
has met its manifesto commitments,  then it has acted effectively.1 0 Another widely 
used way of evaluating government effectiveness is to measure the populace’s well­
being  via  acceptable  indicators  like  human development (literacy,  life  expectancy, 
infant and maternal mortality, access to safe water and basic care, etc.) or economic 
performance (gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, national debt, inflation 
and  balance  of  payments).  A  third  common  criterion  is  the  government’s 
responsiveness  to  the  will  of the populace  through particular policy outputs  -   for 
example, increased spending on public services -  while keeping other commitments 
intact. However, these specific outputs are a matter of political choice and therefore 
may vary across different countries.
For the  purpose  of this  study,  government  effectiveness  is  assessed by  the 
ability to perform and implement specific tasks. This thesis examines the performance 
of the Israeli governmental system and asks what it is that limits its ability to impose 
financial  losses  on  powerful  interest  groups  and  to  effectively  co-ordinate  and
9  Patrick  Dunleavy,  Helen  Margetts  and  Stuart  Weir,  The Politico’ s  Guide  to  Electoral Reform  in 
Britain (London: Politico, 1998), p. 23.
10 Andre Blais, ‘Criteria for Assessing Electoral Systems’, paper presented to the Advisory Committee 
of Registered Political Parties, Elections Canada, 23 April 1999, p. 7.
37implement a chosen policy in a specific  sector.  These capacities are  the dependent 
variables for this study.
Defining  institutions  has  also  caused  some  controversy  in  the  academic 
literature, as the term does not have any single, clear and consensual meaning. This is 
regarded  as  a  problematic  concept,  encompassing  norms,  practices,  rules  and 
organisations.1 1   Some  writers  tend  to  focus  narrowly  on  sanctioned  rules  that 
effectively change the costs and benefits that an actor can expect when following a 
certain course of action.1 2  Others stretch the meaning to include not only social norms 
or entities capable of purposive action1 3 but also things as diverse as the structure of 
labour-capital relations and the position of a country in the international economy.1 4  
In  all  cases,  an  institution  (some  scholars  use  the  term  structure15)  is  an enduring 
organisation or practice that allocates, or at least significantly affects the allocation of, 
important values like prestige, status, wealth and education.
In  this  thesis,  the  term  ‘institution’  encompasses  the  structural  framework 
through  which  a  state’s policy-makers  (elected  and  non-elected)  take  decisions.  It 
refers in particular to formal institutions of government (the executive, the legislature 
and courts),  as  well  as to  the  values,  norms and informal  conventions  that govern 
social exchanges between actors.  Arguably,  this definition is wide but nevertheless 
necessary, because values and norms ‘frame’ the way actors perceive the options open
1 1  Fritz Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 38; Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, The New Institutional Politics: 
Performance and Outcomes (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 2-3, 7-8, 23-27.
12 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
1 3  March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions.
14 Hall, Governing the Economy.
15 See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 
International,  1991), p. 23; Yehezkel Dror,  The Capacity to Govern: a report to the Club of Rome 
(London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 158.
38to them.  Dominant rules (like majority voting among cabinet members) or informal 
practices  (such as  the unwritten goal of seeking consensus whenever possible)  can 
mould the behaviour of national government representatives in ways that governments 
neither plan and envisage nor control. This argument might counter one of the main 
criticisms levelled at the new-institutional approach: that it crams too many aspects of 
political life into one category, to the point of making them indistinguishable.16
Assessing Institutional Influences in Israel
Political institutions structure the pathways via which policy decisions are made and
17 influence  their  characteristics;  these  characteristics  strongly  affect  the  polity’s 
governing capacity.  The institutional  structure of the polity is therefore particularly 
important  because  it  shapes  the  public  policy-making  process,  determining  which 
issues and problems are given consideration and in what order.
Weaver  and  Rockman  argue  that  varying  institutional  constraints,  such  as 
electoral  rules,  norms  of  government  formation  and  government  types,  lead  to 
decision-making processes that differ from one political system to another.1 8  These 
differences encourage or discourage certain types of attributes,  such as the level of 
party discipline in the legislature, the degree of centralisation of legislative power in 
the  cabinet  and  the  degree  of accountability.  These  and  other  factors  affect  the 
capacity of government to perform certain tasks (see Figure 1-1).
16 John, Analysing Public Policy, p. 64.
17 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
18 Weaver and Rockman, ‘Assessing the Effects of Institutions’, pp. 7-9.
39Figure 1-1: Determinants of Policy-making Capabilities
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The causal link between institutional characteristics and government policy­
making capacities has been demonstrated in various case studies.19 For example, it has 
been  argued  that  the  concentration  of legislative  power  and  party  discipline  in  a 
parliamentary  system  is  likely  to  enhance  governmental  capabilities  to  target 
resources effectively and co-ordinate conflicting objectives, by providing a centralised 
forum where alternatives can be compared directly and efficient trade-offs considered.
19 See the case studies in Weaver and Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter?-, Thatcher,  The Politics 
of Telecommunications.Another factor to play a part in determining policy-making capabilities  is  the geo­
political setting within which a polity emerges.20
Since this study examines the implementation of industrial policy, it is worth 
noting that the academic literature has identified several prerequisites for successful 
formulation and execution of such policy: a political context that includes consensus 
on the  goal  of promoting  economic  growth  through a  rational  industrial policy;  a 
relatively centralised, professional and cohesive policy-making process, and sufficient 
autonomy  from  partisan  political  pressures;  the  expertise  of the  bureaucrats  and 
government  agencies  involved,  and  the  co-operation between  the  government  and
societal  actors,  which is  essential  in times  of major policy  shifts  or organisational
91
changes.  Charting the historical circumstances pertinent to the case study, as well as 
the  institutional  set-up,  is  therefore  essential  in  assessing  any  polity’s  governing 
capabilities.
What,  then,  determines  the  Israeli  government’s  capacity  to  decide  on and 
apply effective industrial policies that affect major interest groups?  The hypothesis 
being tested here is that intermediate institutional features - the existence of multiple 
policy veto points inside and outside the executive, as well as the influence of broad 
institutions,  in  the  form  of the judiciary  and  the  bureaucracy  -   greatly  influence 
government  capacity  to  implement  policy  and  impose  loss  on  powerful  groups. 
Furthermore, the location of veto points in the course of the policy process affects the 
considerations  applying  to  different  actors  and,  ultimately,  the  policy  outcome. 
Interest groups  will  attempt  to  thwart a policy proposal,  first by  approaching  and
20 Weaver and Rockman, ‘Assessing the effects of institutions’, pp. 16-17.
2 1 Ellis S. Krauss and Jon Pierre, ‘Targeting Resources for Industrial Change’, in Weaver and Rockman 
(eds.), Do Institutions Matter?, pp. 151-156.
41applying pressure on political veto players;  if that fails,  and the policy proposal  is 
nevertheless approved,  they will approach an institutional actor (like the courts)  in 
order  to  block  or  delay  the  policy’s  implementation  as  for  long  as  possible  until 
political circumstances (for example, looming elections) render it null and void.
By ‘veto points’, we mean ‘areas of institutional vulnerability’  in which the
22 mobilisation of opposition can thwart policy innovation and implementation.  In such 
areas, the approval of institutional or political actors is necessary in order to adopt and 
implement  decisions  binding  on  the  polity.23  In  the  case  of Israel,  this  means  the 
Supreme Court,  the bureaucracy (in particular,  the Ministry of Finance) and senior 
non-elected  authorities  (like  the  Attorney  General’s  Office  or  the  Civil  Service 
Commission, which is an independent unit within the Finance Ministry), and specific 
political mechanisms like the inner cabinet. The power to veto political decisions is an 
institutional manifestation of political contestability; the more potential veto locations 
throughout  the  policy  process,  the  greater  the  opportunities  for  thwarting  policy 
innovation  and  implementation.  A multi-party  system  (like  Israel’s)  is particularly 
challenging: as the number of political parties in a coalition government increases, so 
does the number of potential veto points for policy decisions.  It is also argued here 
that the intent (perceived and real) to use these veto points, as well as their actual use, 
influence the tactics and choices of actors involved in the policy process; these veto 
points,  therefore,  may  impede  or  facilitate  several  policy  capacities  (for  example, 
innovation and implementation of policies).
22 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, in Steinmo, 
Thelen and Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics, p. 7.
23 Tsebelis describes them as ‘individuals or collective decision makers whose agreement is required 
for the change of the status quo’.  See:  George Tsebelis,  ‘Veto Players and Institutional Analysis’, 
Governance, vol. 13, no. 4 (October 2000), p. 442.
42In her study of health policies in three West European countries,  Immergut 
points to the fluid nature of these veto points in different political systems to explain 
why  interest  groups  (physicians)  with  similar  characteristics  and  resources  had 
different degrees of success in achieving their objectives in the three countries.  She 
argues  that  their willingness  to  compromise  was  motivated  or  influenced  by their 
expectations about the likelihood of successfully appealing against a policy decision 
beyond the legislature.24
This  study argues  that the  different  outcomes  of the  three  case  studies,  all 
taking  place  within  the  same  political  system,  might  stem  from  the  different 
characteristics -  in terms of size, resources and political clout -  of the interest groups 
involved and (crucially) from the use they made of lobbying and appeal avenues -  or 
veto points -  open to  them:  in court,  before  state  agencies and within cabinet and 
party settings.  It is argued here that the institutional configuration in Israel, with its 
numerous  veto  locations,  presents  a  number  of  opportunities  to  thwart  policy 
innovation and  implementation,  thus placing the state’s  actors -  elected executive, 
ministries and official bodies -  at a disadvantage. Non-institutional influences, such as 
past decisions  and policy  legacies,  also  limit and inhibit the  government’s  policy­
making capacities, including policy innovation and implementation and imposition of 
financial losses on powerful groups. In order to examine the validity of these claims, 
our next  task  is  to  chart  the  institutional  set-up  in  Israel  and  its  likely  impact  on 
policy-making.
24 Immergut, ‘The Rules of the Game’.
43Israel’s Institutional Evolution
Institutions  embody  cultures  that  are  distinctive  to  each  country  and  its  political 
system. The three organs of the State of Israel -  the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary -   operate  according  to  a  relational  system  designed  to  ensure  that  each 
branch should remain within the confines of its authority, and that no branch should 
wield unlimited powers. According to Chief Justice Aharon Barak, the prime purpose 
of this  constitutional  structure  was  not  to  ensure  government  efficacy  or political 
accountability; it was rather to ensure the liberty of the individual.25
The nature of executive-legislature relations in Israel looks similar to that in 
other parliamentary democracies.  The state’s organs are a product of Israel’s Basic 
Laws, and as such were assigned equal constitutional status.26 Other important actors 
in policy-making are the non-elected executive (the bureaucracy or civil service) and 
interest  groups:  business  organisations  and  professional  associations  representing 
private  or  public  organised  expressions  of policy  preference  by  a  segment  of the 
general  population.  (Examples  are  the  Reserve  Officers  Forum,  Israel  Women's 
Network,  and  the  labour  federation  the  Histadrut  and  affiliated  trade  union 
organisations, like the National Committee of the Electric Company Employees.)
The Pre-state Institutional Legacy
Israel’s institutional configuration has been shaped under strained conditions,  being 
adopted  in  haste  against  a  backdrop  of  existential  threats  and  pressing  needs, 
including  massive  immigration  and  nation-building.  The  Israeli  founding  elite  had
25 Chief Justice Aharon Barak, ‘The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy’, Israel Studies, vol. 3, 
no. 2, (Fall 1998), pp. 6-29.
26 Ibid.
44hoped to replace the transitional order with permanent political institutions enshrined 
in  a  written  constitution,  but,  faced  with  acute  challenges,  adopted  the  pre-state 
electoral and legal system that was in use under the British mandate.
This  pre-state  endowment  included  a  legal  and  institutional  framework, 
comprising  a  mixture  of Ottoman  Empire  rules,  English  common  law  and  British 
Mandate regulations (the last two also rooted in the doctrine of stare decisis, i.e. the 
pre-eminence  of  legal  precedent  within  the  Israeli  system)  in  addition  to  local 
representative bodies  that became part of the emerging Israeli polity.  The Jewish 
community under the British Mandate (known as the Yishuv) developed organs  to 
administer and supervise the community’s internal needs. One of them, the Executive 
of the Jewish Agency, functioned as a national government without sovereign status, 
comprising various departments similar to ministries.28
The  governing  bodies  of  the  Yishuv,  along  with  the  World  Zionist 
Organisation,  which represented the worldwide Jewish community,  were  similar in 
structure, with broadly-based elected assemblies in turn electing smaller bodies from 
their  own  membership.  Each  system’s  base  assembly  held  elections  according  to 
proportional  representation  of  parties  without  reference  to  geographical 
constituencies.
The  founding  elite’s  chosen  institutional  arrangement  -   a  single  national 
constituency and a pure proportional representation rule with a low threshold of 1% of 
the  national  vote  (1.5%  since  1992)  -   reflected  the  governing  arrangements  and
27 Nili Cohen, ‘Israeli Law as a Mixed System: Between Common Law and Continental Law’, Global 
Jurist Topics, vol.  1, no.  3, Article  1  (2001);  Ruth Levush,  ‘A Guide to the Israeli Legal System’, 
Law  Library  Resource  Exchange  (internet  site),  see  http://www.llrx.com/features/israel.htm 
(accessed 22 February 2005).
28 Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House,  1998), pp. 44, 
237-238.
45practices  of  the  pre-state  era:  a  multi-party  system,  in  which  each  organ  was 
structured in a pyramidal  hierarchy.  The  two  dominant  institutions -   the  Elector’s 
Council of the Yishuv and the Executive of the Jewish Agency -  thus became the 
basis  for the  legislature  (the  Knesset)  and  the  executive  (cabinet  and  government
29 ministries), respectively.
Such a configuration, inclusive and consensual in nature, catered well for the
plethora of organisations, movements and parties all claiming a stake in shaping the
new-born  Israeli  society  while  at  the  same  time  advocating  different,  even
diametrically-opposed agendas.30 In such a highly divided society, the emergence of a
consensual  and  consociational  government  structure  was  not  only  a  reflection  of
Israel’s  distinctive  historical,  social  and  cultural  circumstances,  it  was  also
11
instrumental  in  finding  common  ground  between  ideological  divides.  Reaching 
consensus  has  proved  to  be  a  workable  means  of  settling  internal  divisions  and 
confronting  geo-political  challenges  -   including  wars,  terrorist  attacks,  heavy 
immigration,  boundary  disputes,  economic  uncertainty  and  ethnic  and  religious 
clashes -  that Israel has suffered from ever since its inception.
Another  decision  taken  by  the  founding  elite  was  not  to  formalise  the 
fundamental political principles of Israel in a binding, written constitution or bill of 
rights, despite an explicit commitment to do so in the Declaration of Independence. 
As soon as the various parties started debating this topic, it became a contentious and 
highly  divisive  issue,  and  forcing  it  through  was  deemed  impractical  and
29 For a discussion on Israel’s transition from community to state, see David Vital, ‘From ‘State within 
State’ to State’, Israel Affairs, vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 32— 42.
30 Drezon-Tepler, Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel, pp. 17, 20.
3 1  Michael Shalev, Labour and Political Economy in Israel (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1992), p. 8 ; Lijphart, ‘Israeli Democracy and Democratic Reform in Comparative Perspective’.
46counterproductive.32  Instead,  in  1950  the  Knesset  adopted  a  piecemeal  approach, 
which meant that the constitution would be an uncodified one, comprising separate
33 chapters, in the form of individual Basic Laws of Israel.
Gradual Erosion of Legislature Authority
Coalitions  consisting  of several  independent parties  have  always  characterised  the 
Israeli parliamentary system. No party has ever won an absolute majority in national 
elections,  so  the head of the party with the most elected representatives  is usually 
asked to form a coalition government with one or several smaller and ideologically 
disparate parties34 and,  if eventually successful, to become the Prime Minister. This 
government coalition, which represents parties holding at least 61  seats in the  120- 
member single house, the Knesset, controls the parliamentary system.  The coalition 
partners agree on mutually acceptable principles and policies and divide up ministries, 
with the most important taken by the major party (or major parties, in the case of a 
national unity government).
The decision of the country’s founders to adopt the parliamentary procedures 
of Europe -  and, with its single electoral constituency and high number of competing
32  For  arguments  for  and  against  a  constitution  for  Israel,  see  the  Knesset  website: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/heb/heb  mimshal  hoka.htm (accessed 13 January 2006).
33  Eleven  basic  laws  have  been  approved  since  then,  covering  most  social,  judicial  and  political 
principles that govern the life in the State of Israel. A leading constitutional expert argued, however, 
that they lack some limiting clauses or provisions requiring that changes be made only by special 
majorities; these deficiencies, he asserted, rendered them unfit to be included in a future constitution. 
See Amnon Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in Israel (Tel-Aviv: Schocken, 1991), p. 449 (Hebrew).
34 Arian, The Second Republic, pp. 244-249; Asher Arian, David Nachmias and Ruth Amir, Executive 
Governance in Israel (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 41.
47parties,35 Israel is an example of a representative democracy that is more prevalent in 
continental Europe -  meant that it has skipped the protracted evolutionary process that 
in  other  countries  led  eventually  to  the  acceptance  of parliamentary  supremacy. 
However, even though the Israeli institutional system has many procedural aspects in 
common with parliamentary systems in Western Europe, it lacks certain checks and 
balances.  The  strong party  system,  from which the  legislature  and  executive  drew 
their legitimacy in the country’s first decades, created a unified force of power that 
institutionalised  and  centralised  decision-making  in  the  cabinet.  The  stronger  the 
legislative support, the greater the latitude of executive power.
This development was a result of a gradual erosion of the legislature’s role. As 
in other parliamentary democracies,  the only institution with popular legitimacy in 
Israel is the legislature, the Knesset; government derives its authority from having the 
confidence  of  the  Knesset,  or,  if  it  lacks  a  majority  there,  from  the  Knesset’s 
acceptance  of a minority  government  between elections.  In principle,  Members  of 
Knesset wield significant powers: they initiate bills, ratify the executive’s decisions, 
amend policies and,  through various committees,  oversee the work of the different 
ministries. Collectively, they appoint prime ministers; approve new governments and 
dissolve  ones  they  have  lost  confidence  in.  The  legislature  can  also  influence  the 
substance of policies via coalition and cross-party manoeuvrings.
In practice, however, Members of Knesset have seen their powers of control 
and  oversight  diminished  significantly.  First,  Members  are  not  empowered 
individually, and their discretionary powers are limited. They are expected to support
35  Israel’s proportional representation system of elections attracts many lists and parties to compete. 
The record was set in 1999, when 33 different lists and parties formally competed; it usually ranges 
between 20 and 27.
36 Arian, The Second Republic, p. 238.
48their party  leaders’  policies  (and  government policies,  should their party be  in the 
coalition)  or face sanctions -  and to  ensure party cohesion in the legislature,  party 
leaderships employ a wealth of incentives and disciplinary measures, from placement 
on  party  lists  (before  the  introduction  of party  primaries),  via  public  and  party 
endorsements, to promotion to ministerial positions or other coveted roles.
Secondly, the bureaucracy,  which has grown in size and scope,  has evolved 
into a power base in its own right, with strong vested interests in the public agenda 
and significant influence and control over the policy process,37 owing in part to its 
increased  expertise,  specialisation  and  longevity  compared  with  other  policy­
makers.38  Foreign  and  domestic  crises,  especially  the  economic  crisis  of the  mid- 
1980s, have reinforced the centralised power of the executive at the expense of the 
legislature,  either  through  administrative  decrees  or  through  legislation.  The 
autonomy and oversight capacity of Knesset members -  for example the vetting and 
authorisation of Finance  Ministry proposals  by members  of the  Knesset’s  Finance 
Committee  -   has  been  further curtailed  by  certain practices  which undermine  the 
ability  of legislators  and  cabinet  ministers  to  apply  sufficient  scrutiny  to  critical
39 issues.
37 David Nachmias and Itai Sened, ‘Governance and Public Policy’, in Nachmias and Menahem (eds.) 
Public Policy in Israel, p. 17.
38  Since  1992, for  instance,  there have been eight finance ministers and  14  interior ministers in  six 
governments. See: ‘Destroying Public Trust’, Haaretz, 8 March 2005, p. Bl.
39 A prime example is bills relating to the annual State Budget and the Economic Arrangements Law 
being delivered late by the Finance Ministry’s budget department to cabinet ministers and Knesset 
committees for review and approval. These bills and their accompanying notes run to thousands of 
pages  and contain  dozens  of smaller amendment  bills  and proposals  for  structural  and budgetary 
changes; nevertheless, they are submitted under a tight deadline -  the bills must passed no later than 
31  December -  which prevents proper scrutiny by cabinet, the relevant ministries and the Knesset. 
See:  ‘The Preparations of the Finance Ministry for the Legislation of the Economic Arrangements 
Law’,  State  Comptroller  Report  53B,  (Jerusalem:  Government  Printer,  2003),  pp.  33,  41-44
49Thirdly,  the  resources  under  the  control  of Israeli  prime  ministers  and  the 
powers conferred upon them by law are significant in view of their role as the head of 
the executive branch as well as the head of a major party. They may dismiss ministers, 
appoint new ones, reshuffle ministers and reorganise ministries. Their pre-eminence is 
further enhanced by access to administrative and professional units that assist them in 
official duties and day-to-day activities while providing them with a constant flow of 
comprehensive information, including data from privileged and classified sources (the 
two  intelligence  organisations,  the  external  espionage  agency  Mossad  and  the 
domestic security service  Shin Bet, report directly to  the prime minister).  With the 
help  of  aides  and  administrative  staff,  they  direct  and  maintain  control  of  the 
government  agenda,  and,  occasionally,  influence  the  public  discourse  through  the 
manipulation  of the  mass  media.40  These  abilities  and  resources  put  the  Knesset 
members, collectively and individually, at a disadvantage. The upshot of this and the 
other factors mentioned has been that the  executive branch and  its chief executive 
have become the locus of political power.
Rise and Demise of the ‘Party State*
A  feature  of the  institutional  makeup  of Israel  in  its  first  three  decades  was  the 
emergence of a single dominant party, the Labour Party (also called, at various times, 
Mapai  or  the  Alignment).  Its  rise  largely  followed  the  classic  party  state  model,
(Hebrew);  David  Dery  and  Emanuel  Sharon,  Bureaucracy and Democracy in  Budgetary Reform, 
(Jerusalem:  Israel  Democracy Institute,  1994), pp.  29-30,  32  (Hebrew);  Arieh Kaspi,  ‘Legislators 
Against Themselves’, Haaretz Magazine, 9 November 2001, pp. 12-13.
40 On the use and abuse of statutory rights regarding the mass media by prime ministers and senior 
officials and their manipulation of other arrangements aiming at curtailing and channelling the flow 
of information,  see  Moshe Negbi, Freedom  of the Press  in Israel:  The Legal Aspect (Jerusalem: 
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1995), pp. 37-52, 159-160, 190-193 (Hebrew).
50according to which an ideological party has a specific programme for governing.  In 
order to obtain and to hold this governing power,  the party organises participation, 
aggregates interests and serves as the link between social forces and the government. 
By  taking  the  initiative  and  organizing  groups  within  the  party  or  associated 
organisations,  it  assumes  the  role  of mediating  political  interaction  while  setting 
policy itself.4 1
In  this  case,  a  confluence  of  two  factors  helped  the  Labour  Party  to 
institutionalise  itself as  the  exclusive  prime  policy-maker,  monopolise  the  public 
agenda and permeate the policy process.  These were,  firstly,  the  strong  ideological 
dimension  of  Israel’s  political  culture  in  its  formative  years  and,  secondly,  the 
penetration of like-minded organisations, first and foremost the general federation of 
labour, the Histadrut, in almost all aspects of organised social and economic activities.
In general, the political elite saw Israel as a welfare state responsible for the 
well-being of its citizens. This world view, widely held in the state’s first decade, was 
complemented  and  reinforced  by  the  Histadrut,  which  before  the  declaration  of 
independence  played  an  instrumental  role  in  the  build-up  of  the  state-to-be. 
Universally acknowledged as the most important organisation in the country and a 
critical component of the ‘state-in-the-making’, the Histadrut allocated resources for 
absorbing  new  immigrants,  operated  cultural  and  educational  centres  and  built 
infrastructure.  After  sovereignty  had  been  gained  the  Histadrut  was  considered  a 
partner equivalent in standing with the state itself42
From the outset, the state’s leadership sought to provide a substantial array of 
social services and public goods, and this led to the creation of a significant public
41 For an elaboration on the party model see Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
42 Shalev, Labour and Political Economy in Israel, p. 23.
51sector.  Services,  ranging  from  education  to  electricity,  were  provided  by  both 
government ministries and agencies or by highly subsidised monopolies, which were 
established and controlled by political parties.43 The Histadrut, which was controlled 
by  the  Labour  Party  and  owned  powerful  business  and  financial  conglomerates, 
continued to provide health services to about three-quarters of the population after the 
establishment of the state.
In the early years of independence and the next two decades, the power of the 
political centre was enhanced by the state’s all-encompassing functions and activities. 
Membership  of  one  of  the  main  political  parties,  especially  Labour,  became  an 
essential  ‘admission  ticket’  for  securing  access  to  basic  services  and job  offers. 
Politicisation was rife, with administrative positions being nearly identical to partisan
-  •  44 positions.
As  in  other  democracies,  patronage  practices  played  an  important  part  in 
galvanizing the parties into action 45 The parties expanded their policy involvement 
and placed their supporters in positions in the government bureaucracy and in public- 
sector  enterprises.  Interest  groups  and  organisations  were  co-opted  directly  to  the 
party or indirectly in government policy-making, thus integrating the parties into the 
state.  Such  a  configuration  institutionalised  cooperative  arrangements  (with  the 
government, the Histadrut, the labour unions and manufacturers meeting to work out 
wage guidelines and national wage agreements46) that marked a departure  from the
43 Nachmias and Sened, ‘Governance and Public Policy’, p. 6.
44 Arian, Nachmias and Amir., Executive Governance in Israel, p. 33.
45  Fred  Riggs,  Administration  in  Developing  Countries:  The  Theory  of Prismatic  Society  (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 128.
46 Arian, The Second Republic, pp. 68, 285.
52consensual, consociational politics of the pre-state Yishuv era.47 In the event, the head 
of  the  dominant  Labour  Party  became  remarkably  powerful  in  policy-making, 
checked  only  by  the  need  to  reach  agreements  over  policy  issues  with  coalition 
partners and the head of the Histadrut. Indeed, the long period of Labour dominance 
ensured a high degree of coherence, stability and predictability in public policy at the 
expense  of  party  democracy,  government  accountability  and  effectiveness.  A 
predictable  institutional  setting  was  also  important  in  helping  individuals  form 
expectations about the behaviour of others and of governing institutions 48
This state of affairs did not last long, however. The political parties’  grip on 
public administrative positions has gradually lessened since bureaucratic reforms that 
were introduced by the political elite in the  1950s and  1960s. In formal state bodies 
and  institutions  more  merit-based,  professional  norms  have  slowly  replaced  party 
patronage  practices  -   a  process  which  continued  throughout  the  1970s  and  was 
accompanied by a series of lawsuits brought by the Attorney General’s office against 
senior directors and civil servants suspected of corruption.49
The prime goal of these reforms was to introduce more professional, impartial 
conduct in the civil service and to institutionalise regulations for political neutrality.50
47 Shalev, Labour and Political Economy in Israel, pp. 186-208; Shmuel Tzabag, The Confrontation of 
Powers: Histadrut and Likud Governments Relationship (Tel-Aviv:  Hakibbutz Hameuchad,  1995), 
pp. 33-34 (Hebrew).
48 Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
49 Gad Barzilay and David Nachmias, The Attorney General: Authority and Responsibility (Jerusalem: 
Israel Democratic Institute,  1998) (Hebrew); Avraham Weinrot, ‘Duality in the roles of the Attorney 
General’, Hamishpat, no. 6 (1995), pp. 54-58 (Hebrew); Dan Margalit, ‘The Annals of Corruption’, 
Maariv, 24 May 2005.
50 Nachmias and Rosenbloom, Bureaucratic Culture, pp. 46-56.
53Although doubt has been cast on the overall effectiveness of these,51   two important 
executive departments, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance, have been 
singled out as having outstanding authority and impact on the shaping of public policy 
in Israel.52 Gradually, the public bureaucracy has become a salient feature covering 
every  aspect  of  Israeli  life,  amassing  vast  independent  resources,  institutional 
33333expertise and professional prestige.
A further erosion of the Labour Party’s role and position in the Israeli body 
politic was noted after the experience of the  1973 Yom Kippur War, which led the 
public to question the aptitude of the political and military echelons.53 Tacit criticism, 
gradually intensifying over the years,  contributed to  the emergence of new parties, 
and finally culminated in the political upheaval of 1977, which removed the Labour 
Party from power after thirty years. This legitimised the Likud as a governing party, 
thus introducing party competition and a strong incentive for the two largest parties, 
Labour and Likud, to converge at the centre of the domestic policy spectrum, which 
had  been  increasingly  taken over by the  public  bureaucracy and  sectarian  interest 
groups.
51  In  1989,  an  official  public  enquiry  (the  Kubersky  Committee)  pointed  to  shortcomings  in  the 
workings of the Israeli civil service, suggesting that Israel does not have senior civil servants with 
sufficient experience.  See:  The Public-Professional Committee for the Comprehensive Examination 
of the Civil Service and State Budgeted Entities (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1989) (Hebrew).
52 Yitzhak Galnoor, David Rosenbloom and Alon Yironi, ‘Reform in Israel’s Public Administration’, in 
Nachmias  and  Menahem  (eds.),  Public  Policy  in  Israel  (Jerusalem:  Israel  Democratic  Institute, 
1999), p. 122 (Hebrew edition; the English edition cited elsewhere does not contain this chapter).
53 Stuart Cohen, ‘The Changing Nature of Relations Between the IDF and Israeli Society: Operational 
Implications’, in Studies in Middle East Security: A  Compendium (Ramat-Gan:  Bar-Ilan University 
Press, 2002), pp. 426-431; Tishler and Rotem, ‘The Reasons for the International Success of Israel’s 
Defence Enterprises’, p. 475.
54Empowerment of the Judiciary and Bureaucracy
Since the late  1970s the Israel has moved away from the party state model.  It has 
developed  instead  into  a  complex  and  pluralistic  society,  concerned  by  a  wide 
diversity of issues that has led to a crowded and disjointed public agenda.54 Smaller, 
sectarian  parties  increased  their  power  in  the  Knesset,  leading  to  a  significant 
redistributive  policies  aiming  at  advancing  and  aiding  their  direct  support  base.55 
Control of national resources by the political parties has weakened further as reforms 
of public  administration  have  replaced  the  partisan  sources  legitimising  executive 
power and  centralisation.  These  developments,  coupled  with  growing pluralism  in 
Israeli society and the failure of the main parties to effectively aggregate and integrate 
the  multiplicity  and  diversity  of interests,  have  led  to  a  marked  decline  in  party 
membership  during  the  1980s  and  the  1990s.56  In  response,  Labour  and  Likud 
introduced reforms  into  the  process  of selecting  their parties’  Knesset nominees - 
party primaries -  in an attempt to regain their membership base.57
As  in  other  parliamentary  democracies,  further  autonomous  centres  with 
policy veto  capacity emerged:  the judiciary and the  bureaucracy.  While  the  Prime 
Minister and the cabinet have still maintained control of the Knesset, and to a certain 
extent even over outcomes of cabinet decisions -  through partisan forums in the form 
of  inner  cabinets  (‘Our  Ministers’  in  Labour,  and  ‘Our  Colleagues’  in  Likud) 
established to ensure a co-ordinated policy stance and an agreed party line in cabinet
54 Arian, Nachmias and Amir, Executive Governance in Israel, p. 92; Arian, the Second Republic, pp. 
228, 245.
55 Nachmias and Sened, ‘Governance and Public Policy’, p. 7.
56 Arian, The Second Republic, pp. 160-161.
57 Arian, Nachmias and Amir, Executive Governance in Israel, p. 158.
55vis-a-vis other parties58 -  their powers have become more limited and constrained, 
requiring them to adjust to new forms of checks and balances.
The empowerment of Israel’s professional bureaucracy is closely linked to the 
successful handling of the economic crisis that engulfed the country in the mid-1980s. 
In July 1985 the government adopted the Economic Stabilisation Programme, which 
involved the  simultaneous  implementation of several  measures:  devaluation of the 
exchange rate, stringent control of domestic prices, wage stability in the public sector, 
a tax increase and a $750-million budget cut that included, for the first time, a major 
reduction  in  the  defence  budget  (see  Chapter  3).  Emergency  legislation,  with  the 
Economic Arrangements Law (Hok Ha-hesderim) at its heart, was passed by Knesset 
to  combat hyperinflation,  enabling the Ministry of Finance  to  keep a tight grip  on 
government  expenditure.59  The  central  bank,  Bank of Israel,  also  took part  in  the 
stabilisation efforts, exercising its overall responsibility for monetary policy through a 
series  of  measures  aimed  at  keeping  the  economy  in  check,  independent  of 
government policies.60
The Stabilisation Programme’s impact on the inflation rate, which had peaked 
at  445%  in  Fiscal  Year  1984,  was  significant.  By  the  end  of  1986  inflation  had 
stabilized at 20% -  the lowest rate since  1972 -  and fell still further in the  1990s. 
Many  factors  explain  the  plan’s  success,  but  its  execution  was  credited  to  the 
professional,  imperturbable  performance  of the  bureaucracy,  and  especially  of the 
Finance Ministry, which convinced the Cabinet that maintaining firm control over the
58 Ibid., p. 45.
59 The  Finance  Minister was put in charge  of the  law's implementation.  See:  Emergency Economic 
Arrangements  Law  -   1985, The  Official  Gazette:  Israel  Statute  Book  No.  1159 (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer, 1 October 1985), Clause 35 (Hebrew)
60 For a discussion on the Economy Stabilisation Programme see:  Dan Giladi,  The Israeli Economy 
(Jerusalem: Ministry of Education -  Publications Service, 1998), pp. 19-21,49 (Hebrew)
56national  budget  process  improves  its  effectiveness  and  efficiency.6 1   Although  the 
government  administration  had  conceived  this  program  as  a  short-term  one,  the 
emergency  legislation  remained  in  force,  despite  Israel’s  economic  recovery  and 
strong  reservations  of  members  of  Knesset.62  The  implications  of  this  were 
significant: the Ministry was able to maintain a tight grip on state finances and overall 
spending  allocations,  constraining  to  a  large  degree  prime  ministers’  power  over 
budgeting by ministries and individual Knesset members’ ability to promote sectarian 
interests.63
Except  in  the  case  of the  Ministry  of Defence,64  the  Ministry  of Finance 
actively monitors and oversees all financial-related activities of the other government 
ministries.  It has permanent representatives (accountants who are subordinate to the 
Accountant General, also known as ‘referents’) who participate in key deliberations 
throughout the public  sector before budgetary decisions are made,  at times vetoing 
plans and projects. In doing so, the Finance Ministry effectively reprioritises (and in 
some cases de facto dictates) other ministries’ agendas and policy goals.65
This development has made the Finance Ministry the most powerful ministry 
(alongside the Defence Ministry), equipping it with an intensive oversight capacity far 
exceeding  the  Knesset’s.66  Subsequent  legislation  -   for  example  the  Mandatory
61 Dery and Sharon, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Budgetary Reform, p. 20.
62  Law  of  Arrangements,  Knesset’s  website:  http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/heb/hesderim.htm 
(accessed 26 January 2005); Kaspi, ‘Legislators Against Themselves’.
63 Dery and Sharon, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Budgetary Reform, p. 19.
64 The Ministry of Defence agreed to the appointment of an external auditor -  a Ministry of Finance 
employee -  to monitor its budgetary affairs but with restricted access to information, as discussed in 
chapter  2.  See  Aviezer  Yaari,  Civil  Control  of IDF,  Jaffee  Center  for  Strategic  Studies  (JCSS), 
Memoranda 72 (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 2002), pp. 46-47 (Hebrew).
65 Arian, The Second Republic, p. 57.
66 Dery and Sharon, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Budgetary Reform, pp. 20-21, 31-35.
57Tenders  Law  of  1992,  which  stipulates  a  tender  process  for  services  and  goods 
procured by the public sector (purchases by the central government represent about 
12% of GDP67) -  has been initiated and promoted by the Finance Ministry in order to 
further  regulate  and  moderate  state-funded  expenses,  such  as  contracting  and 
outsourcing.
The strengthening of the Finance Ministry also meant that prime ministers, as 
heads of cabinet, and irrespective of their party’s ideology, needed close co-operation 
from  the  Finance  Ministry’s  bureaucracy  to  secure  budget  appropriations  and  the 
implementation of policies. The Ministry’s position became so entrenched, that it has 
successfully blocked proposals for internal restructuring, including the transfer of the 
important Budget Department to the Office of the Prime Minister.
Further adjustment of the division of power between judiciary, executive and 
legislature took place in the early 1990s, following the introduction of three important 
laws.  In  1992  the  Knesset  enacted  legislation providing  for  the  direct  election  of 
prime minister, to occur simultaneously with the election of the Knesset. This move 
came in response to the undue influence accorded to small factions which, in return 
for joining the ruling coalition, made demands  inconsistent with their relative  size. 
The legislation, which was to come into force in the next elections, vested substantial 
powers in the hands of the directly elected prime minister, largely at the expense of 
other Cabinet members and the legislature.69
Two  other  laws  -   The  Freedom  of Occupation,  and  Human  Dignity  and 
Liberty -  were  also  passed in  1992  but as  Basic Laws.  Their passage  through the
67 ‘Trade Policy Review: Israel’, a report by the World Trade Organisation published in August 1999, 
see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop  e/gproc  e/tnrisr.pdf (accessed 26 January 2005).
68 Arian, Nachmias and Amir, Executive Governance in Israel, p. 49.
69 Ibid.
58Knesset enshrined for the first time in Israeli law the pre-eminence of human rights 
such  as  liberty,  mobility,  privacy  and  property.  The  implication  of this  act  was 
significant.  For the  first time,  the  Supreme Court was granted explicit authority to 
overturn  any  law  that  violated  human  rights  and  to  strike  down  actions  by  the 
executive and the IDF. In practical terms, the Supreme Court was authorised to act, de 
facto,  as  a  constitutional  court,  an  evolution  which  greatly  enhanced  its  tendency 
towards judicial activism, which had already been evident in the mid-1980s.
Influenced by judicial traditions from the North American court systems, the 
Israeli Supreme Court adopted in the 1990s the doctrine of reasonableness, known in 
the US as substantive due process, to invalidate legislation or administrative action if 
it was unreasonable in the extreme.70 This doctrine signified that the Court had now 
come to perceive its role in the political system as going beyond adjudication to the
71 application of substantive criteria in reviewing law and policies.  By requiring public 
authorities to act reasonably and in good faith, the court also saw fit to examine the 
suitability of candidates for senior civil service posts as well as socio-political issues.
At the same time, the Supreme Court made itself more accessible to the public.
77 Its willingness to hear any petition it deemed to be in the public interest  stemmed in 
part from the public criticism of the executive’s judgement after the Yom Kippur War
70 Aharon Barak, Judicial Discretion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
7 1  For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s judicial activism, see: Gad Barzilay, ‘Courts as Hegemonic 
Institutions: The Israeli Supreme Court in a Comparative Perspective’, Israel Affairs, vol. 5, nos. 2-3 
(Winter-Spring 1999), pp. 15-33. For a critique see Evelyn Gordon, ‘Is It Legitimate to Criticize the 
Supreme CourtV, Azure, no. 3 (Winter 1998), pp. 50-89.
72 R. Adam, ‘Petitioning the Supreme Court as a strategy adopted by interest groups in Israel’, Kesher, 
no. 18 (1995).
59of 1973 and the Lebanon War of 1982.73 This pointed up the Court’s recognition that 
a  range  of  contentious  policy  issues  had  not  been  handled  adequately  by  the 
executive, and the Court’s attention and intervention was therefore required.
Enactment of the new basic laws ushered in a new era in judiciary-executive 
relations.  Hitherto,  the  Supreme  Court  had  usually  sided  with  the  view  of  the 
country’s  leadership,  and  many  of  its  decisions  had  been  reversed  by  statutory 
means.74 The new Basic Laws, however, were an important milestone in ensuring its 
independence. Chief Justice Barak has described their ratification as akin to equipping 
the  judiciary  with  ‘non-conventional’  weapons  vis-a-vis  the  legislature  and  the 
executive,  granting  it powers  similar to  those  of other  influential  Supreme  Courts 
(such  as  the  ones  in  the  US  and  Canada).75  With  the  power  of  constitutional 
interpretation,  which  cannot  be  overruled  by  legislation,  the  Supreme  Court  has
7 (\ become a veto player.  Chief Justice Barak has turned the  Supreme Court into the 
most activist judicial force in Israeli history, using the  1992 Basic Laws to second- 
guess  government  regulations  and  parliamentary  laws  that  infringe  human  rights,
73 Yaari.  Civil Control of the IDF, p. 62; Ehud Barak, ‘The Withdrawal from Lebanon’, in Ram Erez 
(ed.),  Civil-Military  Relations  in  Israel:  Influences  and  Restraints  (Jaffee  Centre  for  Strategic 
Studies Memoranda, no. 68 (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, November 2003), p. 35.
74 Pnina Lahav,  ‘Rights and Democracy: The Court’s Performance’, in Sprinzak and Diamond (eds.), 
Israeli Democracy under Stress, pp. 127-128.
75 Aharon Barak,  ‘The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights,’ Mishpat Umimshal (Law 
and Government in Israel) vol. 1, no. 1  (August 1992), pp. 9-35 (Hebrew).
76  Harvey  Feigenbaum,  Richard  Samuels  and  R.  Kent  Weaver,  ‘Innovation,  Coordination  and 
Implementation in Energy Policy’, in Weaver and Rockman (eds.) Do Institutions Matter?, p.  106; 
George Tsebelis,  Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), p. 226.
60while deterring members of Knesset from submitting sectarian or controversial bills 
that the Supreme Court might declare invalid.77
The empowerment of the Supreme Court gave the courts a central role in a 
wide range  of governance and policy-related issues.  Increased exposure to judicial 
scrutiny has  had  a  significant  impact  on the  executive  branch.  It  has  required  the 
Attorney General, as the senior independent counsel to the government on issues of 
law and legislation, to place further checks on potentially damaging or unlawful acts
no.  7 Q   q a
by the executive branch  , the legislature,  and in certain cases also the IDF.  This
development originated in part  in the  Supreme  Court  contention that  the  Attorney
General is the official interpreter of the law, and his or her position on the legal issues
81 in question is final and binds the government and its agencies.
77 Hillel Neuer, ‘Aharon Barak’s Revolution’, Azure, no. 3 (Winter  1998), pp.  13-49; see also Evelyn 
Gordon, ‘Criticising the Judicial Power’, Tchelet, no. 12 (Spring 2002), pp. 189-203 (Hebrew).
78 See, for example, the Attorney General’s decision in February 2005 to overturn a cabinet decision 
entitling  the  state  to  confiscate  without  compensation  all  East  Jerusalem  property  owned  by 
thousands  of West  Bank  residents;  Haaretz,  1   February  2005.  The  Attorney  General  considered 
revising of the law concerning appointments to the position of Central Bank Governor; Haaretz,  12 
January 2005. And he asked the Ministry of Finance to ensure that a decision to cut the state budget 
could stand a potential judicial review; Haaretz, 22 April 2003.
79 The Attorney General asked the members of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee 
to remove from a bill a clause permitting incitement to physically harm terror suspects; Haaretz, 21 
June 2001.  He also registered his objection to an initiative by Members of Knesset to enact a law 
allowing  candidates  without  special  skills  to  be  appointed  as  board  members  of  government 
companies,  presumably  to  pave  the  way  for  appointing  members  of the  main  parties’  Central 
Committees; Haaretz, 2 November 2001 and 8 November 2001.
80 Military operations that may have significant political and legal implications, especially in relation to 
human rights issues,  are also closely monitored by the Attorney General.  See  ‘[Attorney General] 
Mazuz examined IDF’s recommendations for the destruction of hundreds of houses in preparation for 
the disengagement plan’ (Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza strip), Haaretz, 13 January 2005.
8 1   Ruth Gavison,  The Constitutional Revolution: A Reality or a Self-fulfilling Prophecy? (Jerusalem: 
Israel Democracy Institute,  1998), p. 85; for a critique on the Supreme Court’s empowerment of the
61The strengthening of the judiciary after the passage of the Basic Laws in 1992 
did  not  pass  unnoticed.  Interest  and  pressure  groups  (including  anti-corruption 
organisations such the Movement for Quality Government, human rights activists like 
the  Civil Rights Association,  as well  as  other NGOs  including the  Society for the 
Protection of Nature) have  seized the opportunity to  challenge the authority of the 
executive  branch  in  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  taking  advantage  of  its  judicial 
activism.  They  have  succeeded  in  numerous  cases,  in  the  process  creating  legal 
breakthroughs  and  undermining  the  hegemony  and  authority  of significant  public 
agents,  including  the  powerful  defence  establishment.82  As  it  has  turned  out,  the 
appeal process could take several years,  which might result in de facto defeat of a 
policy,  due  to  the  relatively short electoral  cycles  in Israel;  in other cases  a court 
decision could force the government to reverse its policies.83
Interest Group Influence
The influence of interest groups in the policy-making process (and in particular, that 
of organised workers of major state-owned enterprises) has grown steadily since the 
1980s. Three factors contributed to this: social and legal changes, the introduction of 
party primaries, and interest groups’ entrenched relationship with the bureaucracy. In
Attorney  General  and  an  overview  of its  origins,  see  Evelyn  Gordon,  ‘How  the  Government’s 
Attorney Became Its General’, Azure, no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 75-116.
82 Udi  Lebel,  ‘Cracks in the Mirror of Military Hegemony:  The Courts and  the Media as Agents of
Civil Society’, in Korn (ed.), Public Policy in Israel, pp. 205-223.
83  See,  for example, the decisions of the  Supreme Court to ensure gender equality in the  admission 
process for combat pilot training courses and to force the MoD to discuss the location of military 
installations with representatives of municipal authorities. See, respectively, Supreme Court Decision 
4541/94: Alice Miller vs. the Minister of Defence and others and Supreme Court Decision 5827/98: 
Menashe Regional Council vs. the Ministry of  Defence.
62combination,  they  created  numerous  access  points  via  which  Israel’s  centralised 
decision-making structure might be influenced.
As  already  noted,  the  empowerment  of  the  judiciary  offered  organised 
interests (namely, trade unions) new opportunities to mitigate the executive branch’s 
increasing power, and applications to the courts were on the increase. Labour courts, 
known for their tacit pro-worker bias and slow response,84 did not hesitate to overturn 
government policies if they breached Basic Laws and other protected rights.85 Equally 
important,  though,  were  the  changes  in  the  party  system,  such  as  the  process  for 
selecting Knesset nominees (primaries), which allowed organised interests to extend 
their influence to additional structures of power.
Indeed,  interest groups could no longer rely on traditional party channels to 
advance  their causes,  or  on  the  diminished  influence  of the  Histadrut,  which  had 
experienced  organisational  and  financial  difficulties  and  a  steady  decline  in 
membership  since  the  mid-1980s.86  The  primaries  offered  a  different  way  of
84 See Maariv,  12 October 2003; Haaretz,  2 August 2004 and  14 February 2005.  In evidence to the 
Official Committee  for the  Restructuring of the  Labour Courts,  a  Finance  Ministry representative 
criticised the labour courts’ sluggish pace of deliberation. See minutes of sessions dated 16 May 2004 
and 13 June 2004, on the Israeli Judiciary website (http://elvonl.court.gov.il/heb/avoda/613.htm and 
http://elvonl .court.gov.il/heb/avoda/612.htm) [accessed  14 January 2006]  Similar views appear in a 
background  document  by  the  Knesset’s  Research  Division,  ‘Merger  between  the  Labour  Court 
System  and  the  Judicial  System’  (see:  http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/docs/m00739.doc. 
accessed 14 January 2006); see also Haaretz, 30 December 2004.
85 See, for example, the National Labour Court ruling that the Transportation Ministry acted illegally in 
introducing a second bus company in the city of Beer-Sheba in Haaretz, 3 March 2005.
86 Yael Yisahi,  ‘Interest Politics in a Comparative Perspective: The (Ir)regularity of the Israeli Case’, 
Israel Affairs, vol. 5, nos. 2-3, (Winter-Spring 1999), p. 80. The number of union members in Israel 
grouped under the Histadrut (renamed the New Histadrut in  1995) fell 75.7% from  1.85 million in 
1985  to 450,000 in  1995.  See ILO  [International  Labour Office],  World Labour Report  1997-98; 
Industrial Relations, Democracy,  and Social Stability (Geneva:  International Labour Office,  1997), 
pp. 235-236.
63consolidating their power. The main effect of the primaries was to marginalise party 
administration and weaken party unity, because individual candidates have a strong 
incentive to represent distinct policy interests within the party membership and, once 
elected, less reason to support leadership policy positions.
This  gave  organised  interest  groups  a  clear  opportunity  to  influence  both
87 politics and policy.  By enrolling in large numbers  and becoming party members, 
organised interests from the public sector and elsewhere established a support base 
inside the party,88 especially on the main parties’ Central Committees, from which a 
significant  number  of  the  appointees  recruited  for  the  boards  of  government 
companies, including the state-owned defence industries, were selected. As the State 
Comptroller noted in  1998,  about a third of the directors and almost half of board 
chairpersons  in  state-owned  enterprises  were  members  of,  or  affiliated  to,  the 
executive bodies of the main parties.89 Having acquired a foothold inside the parties, 
interest groups could gain access to decision-makers but, equally importantly, could 
also influence and secure the nomination of certain candidates, some of them former 
or present group members or senior activists (for example,  the employees  of large
87 Author’s interview with David Zookman (Chairman, Joint Forum of Rafael workers’ unions  1994- 
2000), 20 June 2002 (hereafter: Zookman interview). See also Yedioth Ahronoth, 1  April 2005.
88 In 1992, for example, 700 public-sector employees were selected as members of the Likud’s Central 
Committee, the party’s 3,093-strong upper institution,  which nominates its candidates for Knesset, 
see  Yedioth Ahronoth,  19 January  1992. Unions and employee organisations dominated registration 
for the Labour party’s primaries in 2005,  see Haaretz,  22  May 2005. On the allegedly corrupting 
influence of Central Committee members on the Likud party, see Shalom Yerushalmi, ‘The Courage 
to Ask for More’, Maariv, 27 May 2005.
89 State  Comptroller Report on Appointments to the Boards of State-Owned Companies  (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer,  1998),  p.  17.  In  1989, two-thirds of appointees to the boards  of state-owned 
enterprises were members of the main parties’ Central Committees. See: State Comptroller Report on 
Appointments to the Boards of State-Owned Companies (Jerusalem:  Government Printer,  1989), p. 
38; State Comptroller Annual Report no. 41 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1991), pp. 611-612;
64state-owned corporations). A simple transaction was thus struck: in exchange for the 
support of party members belonging to the  same organised interest,  the  employee- 
tumed-politician  would  maintain  and  advance  their  interests  during  the  legislative 
process.90 Organised interest groups were also in a position to punish politicians who 
had  initiated bills  running contrary  to  these  groups’  interests.9 1   Gradually,  interest 
groups have acquired an influential role in policy-making and the make-up of party 
candidate lists. The only salient disadvantage of this activity has been its increased 
visibility.  In Israel,  as  in  other countries,  interest  group  activity  is  usually  covert,
92 conducted behind closed doors and without much fanfare.
Another point of access to policy-making was made possible through the long­
term, entrenched relationship between the public bureaucracy and interest groups. The 
academic literature notes that civil servants and government ministries tend to foster 
direct and close relations with interest groups.  The Israeli bureaucracy has been no 
exception:  some  ministries  -   for  example,  those  in  charge  of defence,  energy  or 
agriculture policies -  have advocated the preference of interest groups as though they 
were the interest groups themselves. Indeed, one of the major bases of bureaucratic 
power is the external support of interest groups, which can be used in the politics of
90 This was evident in the case of the IAI employees’  leader, Yaakov Sheffi, who was elected to the 
Knesset in 1992. See chapter 5 for further discussion.
91  Gdalia Gal, the former chairman of the Knesset's Finance Committee, supported a bill to break the 
monopoly of the Israel Electric Company (IEC). The IEC workers were instructed by their union, the 
National Committee of the IEC Employees, to join the Labour party and not to vote for him in the 
1996 party primary. Thousands of IEC employees enrolled as party members and Gal subsequently 
lost his position on the party list. See: Tel-Aviv Newspaper, 26 July 2002; Haaretz, 9 July 2004.
92 Arian, The Second Republic, p. 285.
93  Johan P. Olsen,  ‘Integrated Organizational Participation in Government’,  in Paul C.  Nystrom and 
William H.  Starbuck (eds.) Handbook of Organizational Design (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. 492-516.
65policy-making.  Equally,  such  groups  are  directly  affected  by  the  ministries’ 
operations and available budget,  and so  the relationship between the two  is one of 
reciprocity.94 The study of interest groups also points to such government officials, 
their associations and their departments or agencies  as playing interest-group roles 
themselves,  lobbying on behalf of their own interests.95  (Official policy-influencing 
activity is often not very different from that of private interest groups,  for instance, 
when a senior official briefs members of Knesset in support of certain legislation.)
Israeli Government Capabilities: Tentative Propositions
The institutional make-up of Israel shows that many factors and actors participate in 
public  policy-making.  Inclusive  political  institutions  structure  a  non-zero-sum 
landscape  which  has  facilitated  compromise,  rather  than  confrontation,  between 
political  actors.  However,  the  prevalence  of coalition  governments  means  that,  in 
comparison with countries with single-party governments, Israel has a less cohesive 
government  elite,  because  the  parties  that  make  up  a  coalition  are  likely  to  be 
competing  against  one  another  in  the  next  election.  Cohesion  has  tended  to  be 
particularly  low  in  the  run-up  to  an  election,  when  parties  see  advantage  in 
establishing a distinctive political profile and so walk out of coalition agreements, as 
has happened several times in Israel’s history.96
Israel  has  become  a  society  characterised  by  individualism  and  economic 
liberalism, but the levers of power remain firmly in the hands of the executive and
94 Nachmias and Sened, ‘Governance and Public Policy’, p. 17.
95 Charles E.  Lindblom and Edward J Woodhouse,  The Policy-Making Process,  3rd ed.  (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), pp. 74-75.
96 In 1990 Labour’s Shimon Peres tried to replace the national unity government headed by the Likud’s 
Yitzhak Shamir; in 2004, the Shinuy party resigned from the coalition with the Likud.non-elected bureaucracy, and influential interest groups have been able to retain some 
leverage over the decision-making process. The highly fractionalised Knesset, which 
reflects  a  divided  electorate,  can  attempt  to  influence  the  substance  of  policies 
primarily through coalition politics, but it rarely initiates policies. Beyond the sphere 
of executive  and  legislative  power,  we  have  seen  also  the  important  role  of the 
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, in influencing policy.
How can this array of influences, actors and competing interests fit into the 
analysis of policy-making capabilities? Several factors are present at any given time, 
shaping  the  decision-making  processes  and  constraining  the  policy-making 
capabilities  of  the  governmental  system.  Before  proceeding  with  the  three  case 
studies,  it  is  helpful  to  establish  a  baseline  of  expectations  about  how  Israel’s 
institutional arrangements and political institutions are likely to affect both the policy 
capabilities examined here: implementing policies effectively and imposing financial 
loss on powerful interest groups.
Institutional  arrangements  that  separate  or  fuse  executive  and  legislative 
powers can have several effects on government’s capacities. As Weaver and Rockman 
argue,  the  higher the  concentration  of power,  the  greater  the  chances  of effective 
policy implementation.  On the face of it, then, parliamentary systems  in which the 
government enjoys wide coalition support -  and governments in Israel have formed 
oversized  coalitions  as  well  as  minimum  winning  coalitions  (the  minimum  size 
needed  to  have  a  parliamentary  majority)  -   should  be  better  able  to  implement 
policies effectively once the parliament (or Knesset,  in this case) has decided upon 
them. That said, considerable reliance on the bureaucracy for the execution of policies 
may  weaken  their  effective  implementation  if  career  civil  servants  oppose  the 
government’s policies or judge them infeasible, either because of insufficient fundingor because they were hastily agreed and adopted without adequate consultation. Such 
a scenario also increases the likelihood of policy reversals.  Another impediment to 
effective  implementation  might  be  too-independent  courts  that  are  likely  to  give
97 opponents of a policy more opportunities to block it.
The  prospects  for  governments  to  effectively  impose  losses  on  powerful 
groups  -   for  example,  forcing  through  a  significant  number  of  redundancies  or 
inflicting  other  financial penalties  -   seem  to  be  better  in  a parliamentary  system. 
Ostensibly,  the  concentration  of executive/legislature  power  lowers  the  number of 
effective  veto  points  for such initiatives;  governments  may therefore  stick  to  their 
proposals out of fear that to accept major amendments will make them look weak and 
vacillating.
However,  several  factors  may  undermine  a  parliamentary  government’s 
capacity  to  impose  financial  losses.  An  independent  judiciary  may  weaken  the 
concentration of executive/legislature power.  Also, especially where party primaries 
are  involved,  swings  may  occur  in  the  support  of individual  MKs  for  particular 
aspects  of party policy,  which  undermine  the party as  a  whole;  this  alone  makes 
governments in parliamentary systems more reluctant to take actions that could offend 
important constituencies.
Furthermore, concentration of accountability may weaken or offset many of 
the benefits associated with the concentration of legislative power. Opposition parties, 
for example,  are  far less accountable to  their voters than those  in government and 
more insulated from blame, and hence they are freer to cast blame on the government 
of the day.  This  situation may predispose  governing parties  to  a more risk-averse 
attitude  that would make  them forgo  loss-imposing opportunities  that concentrated
97 Weaver and Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter?, pp. 48— 49, 456-457.
68power would otherwise have allowed them to undertake.  In such cases,  governing 
coalitions can act to prevent groups from suffering losses or to indemnify them for 
those losses.
Alternative Explanations
What renders policy-makers and governing institutions less effective has been widely 
discussed in the academic literature.  A review of the political science  suggests that 
several  explanations  may  account  for policy-making  shortcomings  or  incapacities, 
four of which are presented below.
A  rationalist-choice  explanation  for policy-making  ineffectiveness  focuses 
on the actors who define the policies.  It assumes that the political system, which is 
made up of bureaucrats and politicians, has objectives which it is able to rank, and can 
then select the option that maximises its interest and delivers the greatest benefits at 
the least cost. Failure to achieve a certain goal is due to errors of execution: perhaps 
not all procedures were followed, or errors occurred when a certain step was taken.98
Rational-choice theorists consider that political culture may also determine the 
effectiveness of policy-making. A long history of co-operation in a society can create 
trust in government. If societies solve collective action problems at an early period of 
their history, they can continue solving them at a later date. In some societies, where 
there is little  ‘social capital’  (the level of individual investment in co-operation and 
networks),  governments  cannot  get  policies  implemented.  In  others,  maybe  by
98 Examples of rational advocacy can be found in Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy-making Re-examined 
(San  Francisco,  CA:  Chandler  Publishing,  1968)  and Policymaking  Under Adversity:;  Edward  S. 
Quade and Grace M. Carter, Analysis for Public Decision (New York: North Holland, 1989).
69historical accident, there are virtuous circles of co-operative behaviour that result in 
well formulated and implemented policies."
The suitability of rational choice as an explanatory framework for analysis of 
policy-making has been widely criticised.  Policy-makers  are unable to consider all 
possible  alternatives,  keep  them  simultaneously  in  their  heads  and  compare  them 
systematically, so as to choose the one that would meet their goal at the least cost.100 
Ample  evidence  suggests  that  human  beings  cannot  reach  an  optimal,  purposive 
decision, due to information-processing shortcomings and the tendency to incorporate 
certain  intangible  elements  (beliefs,  sentiments,  emotions,  etc.)  into  the  decision 
process.1 0 1   Some writers question the ability of rational-actor models -  which they 
deem too simplified -  to produce a credible stand-alone account of a policy-making 
event.102
The  organisational  explanation  focuses  on  the  tendencies  of government 
agencies to give top priority to their own interests and to oppose policy options that 
may advance the position of rival agencies. In the Israeli context, this usually takes 
the  form  of departmental  power  struggles  in  which  units  and  departments  within 
ministries  express  conflicting  points  of view  while  ministers  and  ministries  fight
99 In his influential study, Putnam examines southern and northern Italy, where the north developed a 
high  level  of social  capital  while  the  south  remained  trapped  in  an  untrusting  political  culture. 
Consequently, northern regional authorities were able to develop more solutions to collective action 
problems than their southern neighbours. See Putnam, Making Democracy Work.
100 James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 
Chapter 6: Cognitive Limits on Rationality;  James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making (New 
York:  Free  Press,  1994),  Chapter  1:  Limited  Rationality;  Charles  E.  Lindblom,  ‘The  Science  of 
Muddling Through’, Public Administration Review 14 (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88.
101  Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making (New York:  Free Press,  1977), pp.  23-25, 32-33; 
Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 13, 114-115.
102  See,  for example:  Graham T.  Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the  Cuban Missile  Crisis 
(Boston, MD: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 3-4, 247, 252-255.
70among themselves over policies. The result is that no clear policy is articulated,  let 
alone implemented.103 A case in point was the Lavi fighter aircraft project, which was 
cancelled in  1987. The Prime Minister and the Defence and Finance Ministers held 
diametrically  opposed  positions  on  this  matter  and  after  a  Cabinet  decision  was 
reached  did  not  present  guidelines  for  future  large-scale  projects  in  the  defence 
sector.104
Bureaucratic politics can provide another perspective on ineffective policy­
making.  If interactions within bureaucracies  explain policy-making as much as the 
intentions  of politicians,  then  policy  ineffectiveness  might  stem  from  competition 
between  bureaux  for  resources  and  influence  on  policy:  often  the  outcome  of an 
uncoordinated fight between government bureaux.105 Bureaucrats have the capacity to 
frustrate  the  goals  of policy-makers;  they  can  either promote  them  or delay  them 
indefinitely if their own preferences are not met.106 Interest-group politics models, 
which account for a group’s pursuit of its goals at the expense of other overriding 
national  interests,  could provide another explanation.  By responding to  the will  of 
interest  groups  and  sharing  power  with  them  through  mutual  arrangements  of 
collaboration, the state in effect cedes some of its bureaucratic control over decision-
107 making, thus making it potentially less effective.
These perspectives suggest that, in policy research, policy issues can rarely be 
fully appreciated through a single  ‘lens’.  Some of these alternative explanations do 
indeed  account  for  the  extent  to  which  competing  institutional  actors  influence
103 Arian, The Second Republic, pp. 339-340.
104 Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel, pp. 167-168.
105 Allison, Essence of  Decision, pp. 89, 93, 146.
106 Judith E. Gruber, Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1987).
107 Yisahi, ‘Interest Politics in a Comparative Perspective: The (Ir)regularity of the Israeli Case’.
71political decision-making -  for example, the bureaucratic explanation. However, they 
are  mostly  one-dimensional  and  static,  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not  capture  the 
interplay between actors or the conditionality that institutional norms impose upon 
them.  These norms  not only define  the  actors’  competencies  and action resources, 
they  also  specify  particular  purposes  and  shape  their  associated  cognitive 
orientations.108
Another weakness of these alternative explanations is their little attention to 
institutional influences on policy outcomes. Such explanations do not account for the 
effects that formal arrangements have on policy through their capacity to influence the 
formulation, co-ordination and implementation of public decisions. Crucially, none of 
the  above  perspectives  explains  the  empirical  difference  in  the  ability  of Israel’s 
executive and bureaucracy to apply a specific policy consistently in the same sector 
area, as the following three case studies demonstrate.
The  explanation  offered  in  this  thesis  focuses  on  the  interaction  among 
purposeful  actors  -   organised  interests,  the  bureaucracy  and  the  like.  As  Scharpf 
points  out,  even  though  only  individual  human  beings  are  capable  of intentional 
action, interaction-oriented policy research would be impossible if explanations had to 
be sought at the individual level in every case and at every juncture.109 The actors are 
typically  acting  in  the  interest  of,  and  from  the  perspective  of,  larger  units  than 
themselves.  This allows us to simplify the analysis by treating a limited number of 
large  units  as  composite  actors  with  relatively  cohesive  action  orientations  and 
relatively potent  action resources,  thus  making  the  analytical  task altogether more 
manageable.
108 Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, p. 12.
109 Ibid.
72CHAPTER 2 
Actors and Structures in the Defence Industrial Base
Each policy sector has a unique blend of attributes:  specific patterns of bargains and 
negotiations, varying degrees of interest-group participation, and certain instruments 
and  resources  that  are  available  to  decision-makers.  These  characteristics  create  a 
distinct  interaction  between  the  actors  involved  in  each  sector’s  policy-making 
process, which in turn may affect some government capabilities.
The Israeli defence sector is a case in point. Because national defence is the 
most valued of public goods and is perceived as fundamental to the collective survival 
of an emerging community,  the Israeli defence establishment has been incorporated 
into the pervasive collectivist Zionist ethos and protected by it.1  No other policy area 
is therefore more endowed with resources and attention from decision-makers.
The  large  share of GNP devoted to  defence expenditure and the  significant 
defence-related production have given rise to strong and influential interest groups, in 
the form of the Israel Defence Forces’  (IDF) career personnel and the workforce in 
the  state-owned  defence  enterprises.  The  sheer  size  of the  sector and  the  secrecy 
surrounding  defence  matters  produce  a  certain  type  of  relationship  between 
politicians,  officers,  bureaucrats  and  interest  groups  that  is  not  obvious  to  those 
outside the inner circle of decision-making.
This chapter, therefore, seeks to identify the considerations and attitudes of the 
key government actors in this policy area:  the Defence and Finance Ministries,  the
1  Lebel, in Korn (ed.), Public Policy in Israel, p. 206; Yair Aharoni, The Israeli Economy: Dreams and 
Realities (London: Routledge,  1991), pp.  197-198, 245-247; Israel Tal, National Security:  The Few 
Against the Many (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), pp. 103-104 (Hebrew).
73IDF,  and  the  three  state-owned  firms,  Israel  Aircraft  Industries,  Israel  Military 
Industries and Rafael. Building on the previous chapter, which offered an overview of 
the  main  institutions  in  the  Israeli  policy-making  process,  this  one  presents  the 
framework  that  governs  policy  formulation  and  implementation  in  the  defence 
industrial base (DIB). It starts with a characterisation of this sector, and then outlines 
its actors, their roles, responsibilities and core objectives. The second section charts 
the patterns of interaction between the main actors, highlighting their areas of decision 
autonomy.  The  chapter  ends  with  some  observations  on  the  influences  of  these 
relationship subsets on setting and implementing policy.
Main Components of the DIB
Before  delving  into  the  issues  surrounding  the  defence  industrial  base  in Israel,  it 
would help to establish a common understanding of what it stands for. The academic 
literature  suggests  that  there  is  no  universally  accepted  definition  of  the  terms 
‘defence industrial base’  and  ‘defence enterprises’.  One  school of thought suggests 
that there is no  such thing as a  ‘defence industrial base’  as a stand-alone  sector:  a 
country has a single industrial base, and those who meet its defence needs comprise a 
small part of the  larger,  more comprehensive whole.2  Official  Israeli  statistics,  for 
example,  do not categorise defence-related enterprises under a separate heading,  as 
these are usually included in the broader industrial segment of the economy. On the 
other hand, the literature of defence economics points to various factors that may be 
used to classify an enterprise as a defence company,  including the type of product 
(e.g.  artillery,  submarines,  missiles)  and  end  user  (e.g.  armed  forces,  ministry  of
2 James R. McGillicuddy, Defense Industrial Base Strategy for the 1990s, Executive Research Project, 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington DC (1993), p. 4.
74defence) or the percentage of turnover generated from defence and security-related 
sales.3
In the Israeli context, the term defence industrial base has been defined as ‘the 
amalgamation  of  capabilities  in  the  areas  of  development,  production  and 
maintenance  which  are  designed  for  and  are  capable  of  supporting  the  defence 
establishment’s efforts in war (or in crisis) and in its preparations for such scenarios’.4 
It can be divided into three broad components, which differ from each other in terms 
of  operation,  function  and  ownership.  These  are  a  research  and  development 
component, a production component, and a maintenance and repair component, each 
of which includes private- and public-sector employees and facilities. The base can 
also be divided into three tiers: prime contractors, subcontractors, and parts suppliers.
In this multi-layered structure,  one  can find  state-owned  firms,  privately or 
publicly  owned  companies,  military  logistic  and  maintenance  depots,  academic 
research  laboratories,  and  autonomous  units5   that  operate  within  the  Ministry  of 
Defence.  From  the  perspective  of the  defence  establishment  (a  term  which  refers 
jointly to  the MoD  and the IDF),  this  infrastructure  serves  three critical  purposes: 
keeping a  logistical back-up  for the  Israeli military  in peace  time,  maintaining  an 
overall  deterrent posture against threats,  and ensuring the availability of immediate 
operational means during conflict.6
3  For a discussion about the scope and limits of definitions of defence enterprises, see Lifshitz, Defence 
Economics, pp. 263-266; Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley,  The Economics of Defence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 182-183.
4 Tov, The Price of  Defence Power, p. 170.
5  Autonomous unit refers to an organisation within a government ministry with a degree of financial 
and  managerial  freedom.  See  State  Comptroller Annual Report no.  50A  (Jerusalem:  Government 
Printer, 1999), p. 43, footnote 4.
6 Tov, The Price of  Defence Power, pp. 170-172; Tal, National Security, pp. 71-72.
75Surprisingly  for  such  an  essential  sector,  the  defence  industrial  base  has 
evolved without government guidance on its roles and objectives. David Ben-Gurion, 
the  country’s  first  prime  minister  and  defence  minister  assigned  the  Ministry  of 
Defence  to be  the  chief co-ordinator and controller of this  base.7  However,  partly 
because of bureaucratic in-fighting between the MoD and the IDF8  and partly because 
of the  almost  complete  autonomy  the  defence  establishment  enjoys  in  respect  of 
budget  allocation,  human  resources  and  arms  procurement,9  none  of  the  official 
bodies publishes binding guidelines or objectives for this sector.  (In May  1993,  the 
ministers of defence and finance approved a draft for a defence industrial policy in the 
defence  industrial  base1 0  but  it  was  neither  discussed  nor  accepted  as  an  official 
government strategy by Cabinet.)
Instead, the defence establishment has relied on a collection of ‘tried and true’ 
rules, arrangements and principles aimed at meeting the operational needs of the IDF
7 Yitzhak Greenberg, Defence Budgets and Military Power: the case of Israel 1957-1967 (Tel Aviv: 
Ministry of Defence Publishing,  1997), pp.  135-136, 139 (Hebrew); Amnon Barzilay, ‘The Weapon 
of the Economy’, in ‘One Hundred in Economics’ supplement, Haaretz,  15 December 1999, pp. 50- 
54 (hereafter: Barzilay, ‘the weapon of the economy’)
8 An attempt by the then MoD Director General David Ivry to define the vital industrial infrastructure 
that needs to be protected and subsidised through the defence budget was blocked in  1991  by the 
IDF.  See: Zeev Bonen,  ‘The defence industry -  Sholem Aleichem’s mare?’  in The Israeli Defence 
Industry, Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, Studies in National Security no. 9 (Bar- 
Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 1995), p. 40 (Hebrew).
9 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, pp. 71, 97, 203-204; Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, pp. 193-231; 
Imri Tov,  ‘The economic aspects in the civil-military relations’,  in Ram Erez (ed.)  Civil-military 
Relations in Israel: Influences and Restraints, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Memoranda no. 68 
(Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, November 2003), pp. 53-60 (hereafter: Tov, ‘The economic aspects 
in the civil-military relations’); Tal, National Security, pp. 108-109, 111.
10  State of Israel -  Ministry of Defence, Policy for Defence Enterprises and Defence Production: A 
Recommendation, 9 May 1993; interview by the author with David Ivry, 7 October 1997 (hereafter: 
Ivry  interview,  1997).  Maj.-Gen.  (res.)  Ivry  was  Air  Force  Commander-in-Chief  and  Director 
General of MoD (1987-1996).
76and other security services.1 1  These practices, which have been changed from time to 
time,  have  been  applied  to  two  components:  the  defence  firms  (both  state  and 
privately owned) and the military logistic centres. (Suppliers of non-military goods or 
goods  that  are  easily  replaceable  have  not  been  regarded  as  part  of the  defence
i ^
industrial base.  )
Without  a  binding  government  strategy,  the  approach  of  the  elected 
representatives  towards  the  DIB  has  at  times  been  inconsistent.  In  some  cases, 
decisions  on major  industrial  reforms  taken  by the  Defence  Minister or the  MoD 
Director General have been reversed by their successors.1 3  Sometimes, the attitude of 
policy-makers has seemed chaotic and short sighted. On two separate occasions, for 
instance, Prime Ministers Peres and Netanyahu decided to transfer the responsibility 
for the defence industry from the MoD to other ministries as part of political wheeling
1 1  Gerald Steinberg, ‘Israel’, in R. Singh (ed.), Arms Procurement Decision Making Processes: China, 
India,  Israel, Japan,  South Korea and Thailand (Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  1998), pp.  91- 
130; Tov, The Price of  Defence Power, pp. 139-169.
1 2  Author’s interviews with Haim Adar, head of Procurement Directorate at the MoD,  18 January 1998 
and 25 June  1998; Ministry of Defence, How to work with the MoD’ s Procurement and Production 
Directorate  (November  1997)  (Hebrew,  internal  booklet);  Ministry  of Defence,  The Procurement 
and Production Directorate (April 1995) (Hebrew, internal document).
1 3  Defence Minister Arens decided in August  1984 to turn IMI into a state-owned company;  Defence 
Minister Rabin reversed this decision in September 1985. IMI eventually became a company only in 
1989.  See  State  Comptroller  Report  on  Organisations  connected  to  the  Defence  Establishment, 
(Jerusalem: Government Printer,  1994), p. 60 (hereafter: State Comptroller special report on IMI’s 
incorporation)',  MoD  Director  General  Pinhas  Zussman  recommended  incorporating  Rafael  and 
turning it into a government company.  His successor, Joseph Maayan, cancelled this plan in  1978. 
See Zeev Bonen, Rafael: From the Laboratory to the Battlefield (Haifa: NDD Media, 2003), pp. 42- 
43 (Hebrew).
77and  dealing;  these  decisions  were  quickly  abandoned  following  strong  objections 
from the defence establishment and the media.1 4
The absence of a binding governmental strategy has given the industry greater 
freedom, and indeed much of the growth in this sector originated from within, as a 
result of commercial initiatives or new technology-driven ideas.1 5  Indeed, the extent 
of the enterprises’  growth has been influenced, to a large extent, by the preferences 
and management styles of Defence Ministers and MoD Directors General. However, 
the  latter’s  attitudes  have  varied greatly,  zigzagging between low-key involvement 
and intensive intervention in day-to-day operations of the DIB. At times, the Minister 
or the Director General has favoured a centralised style of management, dictating not 
only which projects would be developed but also where and for how much;1 6  at other 
times, the MoD has taken a hands-off approach, acting only as a regulator with the
14 Prime Minister Peres planned to transfer the ministerial responsibility for the Home Front Command 
and the state-owned defence enterprises from the MoD to the Interior Security Ministry for internal 
political  considerations;  the  planned  was  shelved  following  strong  objections  by  the  MoD.  See: 
Haaretz,  23  and 27 November  1995.  See  Reuven  Petazur,  ‘Industries  as  a  leftover4,  Haaretz,  27 
November 1995, and ‘Hasty and unnecessary reform’, Editorial, Haaretz, 27 November 1995. Prime 
Minister  Netanyahu  planned  to  shift  responsibility  for  the  DIB  to  the  newly  formed  National 
Infrastructure Ministry, headed by Ariel Sharon. The plan was cancelled after objections by Defence 
Minister Yitzhak Mordechay; see Haaretz, 1  July 1996.
15 Author’s interview with Brig.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Eilam (Head of the MoD’s R&D Directorate,  1985—  
1997,  IAI board member,  1987-1996),  14 September  1999 (hereafter:  Eilam interview,  1999), and 
author’s interview with Col. (res.) Dr. Aviem Sela (former Head of Operations, Israel Air Force and a 
consultant to the MoD),  5  July  1998  (hereafter:  Sela interview);  Aviem Sela,  ‘The battle over the 
defence  industry’,  Haaretz,  5  August  1994;  Zeev  Schiff,  ‘No  panacea  for  deterrence’,  Haaretz, 
interview with Eilam, 6 February  1998; Yoram Peri and Amnon Neubach,  ‘The Military Industrial 
Complex’,  in Binyamin Neuberger and  Ilan Ben-Ami  (eds.)  Democracy and National Security in 
Israel  (Tel  Aviv:  Open  University  Press,  1996),  pp.  219-228  (Hebrew).  (Hereafter:  Peri  and 
Neubach, ‘The Military Industrial Complex’).
1 6 Bonen, Rafael, p. 39.
78minimal possible  interference  in the  firms’  affairs.1 7   Some  Directors  General have
1  ft
openly pushed for accelerated expansion of the DIB (whether state-owned or not), 
while others encouraged investments in duplicate infrastructure to ensure competition
among several suppliers, at home and abroad.1 9 Their successors, though, have been at
20 pains to reverse this, advocating industrial cooperation, mergers and joint ventures.
Indeed,  the  rise  of a  competitive  privately  owned  defence  sector  led  to  a 
greater  awareness  of the  differences  in  financial  performance  between  state  and 
privately owned defence firms. Privately held companies are judged by one yardstick: 
they must bring  added value  and a high return on investment to  their owners and 
shareholders.  Profits  and  positive  cash  flow  are  the  main  criteria  by  which  their 
managements are assessed.
In state-owned enterprises the situation is different, and in some respects more 
complicated.  State ownership means that several government actors are involved in 
this sector at any given time.  On the operational side, the structure and relationship 
between the various components within a state-owned defence company are governed 
by the 1975 Government Companies Law, which also specifies the responsibilities of 
the board and management of the firm, the government bureaucracy, and the defence
1 7  Ivry interview, 1997.
18 Bonen, Rafael, p. 199; Greenberg, Defence Budget and Military Power, p. 154.
19 Bonen, Ibid, pp.  162, 199.
20  Ibid.,  pp.  39,  66-67,  103;  Peri,  Between Battles  and Ballots',  speech by Moshe  Keret,  IAI  Chief 
Executive, in ‘Balance of National Strength and Security’, The Fourth Annual Herzliya Conference, 
16  December  2003;  Barzilay,  ‘The  weapon  of the  economy’;  Yitzhak  Greenberg,  ‘Placing  the 
foundations  for  military  production  and  R&D:  policy  and  budgeting  aspects’,  lyonim  Betkumat 
Israel, vol. 9 (1999), pp.  167-186 (Hebrew); Ivry interview,  1997 and author’s interview with Ivry. 
28 June  1998 (hereafter:  Ivry interview,  1998); author’s interview with Maj.-Gen (res.) Menachem 
(Mandy)  Meron,  MoD  Director  General  1983-1986,  27  December  1999  (hereafter:  Meron 
interview).
79establishment.21  These  components  are,  in  effect,  three  separate  but  nevertheless 
representative organs of the same body, the Government of Israel.
In addition to government decision-makers, one can also find that the major 
employees’  organisations, which represent the workers in each industrial entity,  are 
significantly involved in the operations of defence enterprises. Over the years, leaders 
of these interest groups have extended their influence to such a degree that they have, 
de facto, been co-opted into the firm’s decision-making, as discussed later. Additional 
actors  include  the  State  Comptroller  and  the  Bank  of Israel,  which  are  involved 
indirectly in the state-owned industrial base, while other entities, like the courts, may 
take part during disputes between the main players. Some non-state actors, such as the 
mass media and academic think tanks, are also involved, albeit indirectly.
State Ownership and Control in the DIB: Vision vs. Reality
The Israeli Government conducts its commercial activities through three major types 
of organisation -  departmental undertakings (departmental sub-units or autonomous 
units  that  organisationally  are  part  of  a  ministry),  statutory  authorities,  and 
government corporations established by company legislation.  Public  enterprises are 
incorporated as limited companies in which the State owns part or all of their shares.
Government companies  are required to  follow  laws  and regulations -   state 
laws, ad hoc government decisions and internal procedures of the ministry in charge -  
that specify their objectives  and regulate  their activities.  Chief among them is  the 
1975 Government Companies Law, whose article 4(a) stipulates that ‘a government- 
owned company should operate in accordance with the same business considerations
2 1   Government Companies Law -  1975,  The Official Gazette: Israel Statute Book no.  770 (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer, 4 July 1975), clauses 32, 39, 54, 59(H) (Hebrew).
80as a non-govemment-owned company, unless instructed otherwise by the government 
with the approval of the [Knesset’s Finance]  committee’.22 In other words,  a state- 
owned company is expected to operate on a commercial basis, and to post profits and 
increase its revenues in the same way as any other company.
This, however, was not the initial goal of the Israeli arms producers. From the 
outset, their purpose was to respond to clear defence needs, such as non-dependency 
on foreign suppliers and the development of new weapons for the IDF. This was why 
the  three  main  enterprises  were  established  initially  as  autonomous  departmental 
units, operating within the Defence Ministry.23 The primary goal of an autonomous 
unit was not to post profits at the end of the fiscal year, but to meet annual work plan 
targets within the time and budgetary limits set for it by the government. Furthermore, 
workers in these defence entities were employed on a tenured basis and governed by 
the  Civil  Service  Regulations.  Historically,  then,  the  profitability  of the  state-run 
defence enterprises was not a prime consideration.24
22 Government Companies Law - 1975, clause 4 (A). Before this Law was enacted, government-owned 
companies were incorporated according to the Companies Ordinance,  but, after public outcry over 
losses  and  significant  irregularities  in  some  companies,  more  rigorous  legal  checks  and 
responsibilities were imposed upon senior office-holders.  For a comparative overview of the legal 
bases of government-owned companies  in Israel  and abroad,  see Avraham Weinroth,  Government 
Companies: The Application of  Administrative Law (Tel Aviv: Bursi, 1995) (Hebrew).
23 In a rare public visit at Rafael, on 23 July 1959, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister David Ben- 
Gurion praised the work carried out  in this unit:  ‘You  are engaged  in  work which many people, 
perhaps almost all of the people, know nothing about.  But perhaps there is no other job that is as 
important as yours.’ See Monia M. Mardor, ‘Rafael’, in Ilan Kfir and Yaakov Erez (eds.), IDF in Its 
Strength, vol. 17: The Defence Industry (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1982), p. 47.
24 Autonomous units were not required to submit their accounts for audit by independent accountants 
and therefore did not monitor their performance in a business-like manner. This was evident in IMI 
and Rafael, which started their export activities in the  1960s while being run within the MoD; their 
annual  statements  were  widely  criticised  as  insufficient  by  the  MoD  and  the  MoF.  See  State
81As  their  business  activities  grew  further,  the  main  defence  manufacturers 
sought greater administrative and operational leeway.  But even after they had been 
incorporated  and  officially  become  profit-driven  companies  -   Israel  Aircraft 
Industries  in  1966,  Israel  Military  Industries  in  1989  and  Rafael  in  2002  -   their 
activities  remained  heavily  restricted  and  regulated.  Their  wage  agreements,  for 
example, were tied to the national wage agreements negotiated between officials of 
the  Finance  Ministry,  the  Histadrut’s  Trade  Union  Division  and  the  Coordinating 
Committee  of  the  Employers.  These  agreements  obliged  management  to  index 
workers’  salaries  to  other  sectors  of the  economy,  as  agreed between the  Finance 
Ministry and  the  Histadrut,  and to pay them wage  supplements  irrespective  of the 
company’s actual financial performance.
State-owned companies also needed to take other factors into account in their 
decision-making,  including  regional  development  (providing  employment  and 
promoting economic development according to  government policies,  particularly in 
peripheral and rural areas of the country26) and maintaining industrial infrastructure 
designated for state purposes only. This was in sharp contrast to public and privately- 
owned companies, which faced far fewer administrative and operational requirements.
Duties and Roles of Main Actors
Israeli law uses two parameters to determine the extent of government involvement in 
an  enterprise:  participation  in management,  and  financial  support  required.  In  this
Comptroller special report on IMI’ s incorporation, pp. 28-31; State Comptroller Annual Report no. 
45, (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1995), pp. 822-823 (on IMI), 847-848 (on Rafael).
25 State Comptroller special report on IMI’ s incorporation, p. 42; State Comptroller Annual Report no. 
45, p. 819 (on IMI), pp. 878-879 (on IAI).
26 Steinberg, Arms Procurement Decision Making Processes, p. 98.
82respect, the Israeli government’s involvement in the country’s defence firms is direct 
and significant.  It is exercised through the  firm,  the defence  establishment and the 
government  bureaucracy,  each  with  its  own  functions  and  powers  of control  and 
oversight (see Table 2-1).
State owned enterprise
During the period covered by this study, the government bureaucracy oversaw two 
types of commercially-oriented defence enterprises: a departmental undertaking -  an 
autonomous unit within the MoD (Rafael) -  and two companies (IAI and IMI).  An 
autonomous unit is an integral part of the state administration, and is therefore subject 
to all Civil  Service rules and regulations,  which are  governed by the Civil  Service 
Commission (an independent unit within the Ministry of Finance). In budgetary terms, 
a  departmental  undertaking  like  Rafael  operated  and  was  governed  as  a  closed 
economic entity with its own dedicated budget, which gave it greater autonomy and 
flexibility than ordinary government departments. However, since the budget of such 
an undertaking is dependent on funding  from its parent ministry -  in this case,  the 
MoD -  the undertaking is also subject to the Foundations of the Budget Law.27 The 
organisational  form  of  the  departmental  undertaking  is  particularly  suitable  for 
enterprises that are largely concerned with providing public services and in which the 
profit  motive  is  not  paramount.  In  the  period  covered  by  this  thesis,  Rafael  was 
referred to and handled as such a departmental undertaking. Even after it was turned
27  Foundations  of  the  Budget  Law  -   1985, The  Official  Gazette:  Israel  Statute  Book  no. 
1139 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 3 April 1985), Clause 18 (Hebrew).
83into  a  government  company  in  2002,  about  a  third  of its  workers  remained  civil
*  28 servants, regulated and bound by Civil Service regulations.
Table 2.1: Areas of responsibility of actors involved in the DIB
Actor Domain/Responsibility Affected actor(s)
Cabinet Approves arms deals and, at 
times, restructuring or 
privatisation plans of 
government-owned 
enterprises in the DIB
Defence industry 
Bureaucracy
Knesset and its committees
(particularly Finance 
Committee)
Approves state budget and 
requests for financial 
assistance by cabinet and 
state-owned defence 
enterprises
Cabinet
Defence industry
Ministry of Finance Sets and monitors fiscal policy; 
prioritises allocation of 
budget; inter-departmental 
oversight
Other ministries (except 
MoD)
Ministry of Defence Prioritises defence budget uses; 
oversight and regulatory 
powers (export activities; 
technology declassification)
Defence Industry 
(management)
Attorney General Law interpretation Cabinet
Bureaucracy
Government Companies 
Authority
Privatises and monitors 
government companies
Defence industry
Bank of Israel Sets monetary policy (affects 
borrowing costs, interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates)
Defence industry
State Comptroller Comprehensive audits at 
ministries and public 
enterprises
Bureaucracy 
Defence industry
Supreme Court Law interpretation; policy 
overrule
Cabinet
Bureaucracy
Labour courts Settle labour disputes; interpret 
labour laws
Employees’ organisations 
Firms’ managements 
Ministries
28 See: Government Companies Authority Report  for 2003, p. 136.
84Government companies, on the other hand, enjoy greater autonomy in matters 
such as budgeting arrangements, appointments, dismissals and conditions of service 
(subject to the government’s general policy guidelines and the terms laid down in the 
firms’ collective bargaining agreements). The board of directors, which is confirmed 
by Cabinet and includes several senior officials, is responsible for the general policy, 
corporate plan and annual budget of the particular enterprise.  Once  appointed,  the 
board members are required by law to pursue the company’s interests and not those of 
the government (and this applies also to board members who are also state officials). 
They cannot be replaced before their tenure is up, usually after three years,  save in 
exceptional circumstances.29 The  specific  powers of the management and board of 
directors  are  laid  down  in  Government  Company  Law,  but  these  bodies  are  also 
required  to  follow  the  guidelines  of  the  Government  Companies  Authority,  a 
government agency which supervises companies in which the state holds over half the 
shares.  For  security reasons,  the  Israeli  Government  holds  all  the  shares  of state- 
owned defence companies.
Despite the financial independence a government-controlled company enjoys, 
it needs state approval for a wide array of decisions. Changes of objectives, increases 
in registered capital, export deals, changes in the holding rights of shares, closure or 
merger with another company -  all require the approval of monitoring and regulatory 
bodies in the defence establishment, the government bureaucracy and the legislature.30 
Board directors are appointed jointly by the Defence and Finance ministers, and they 
must  approve  the  nomination  of candidates  for the  positions  of CEO  or  Director
29 Government Companies Law -  1975, clause 22.
30 Ibid., clauses 10, 11.
85General. The ministers must also be kept informed of the decisions of each company’s 
Board of Directors.3 1
Defence Establishment
The  second major institutional actor in the defence  industrial  sector is  the  defence 
establishment,  which  comprises  the  political  echelon  (the  Minister of Defence),  a 
civilian arm (the Ministry of Defence) and the military (the IDF). The primary task of 
the  MoD  has  been to  attend to  the  IDF’s  needs  in manpower,  arms  and  financial 
resources, to enable it to carry out its mission of ‘defending the existence, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the State of Israel’.32 The two components, the IDF and
the MoD, are perceived as a unitary body, a fa9ade which they present vis-a-vis other
'*'1
government units and the public even though their interests do not always overlap.
The defence establishment exercises several roles with respect to the defence 
industrial sector, in its capacity as a supplier of a public good (national defence and 
security).  First,  it is a major buyer of technologies,  weapon  systems  and services. 
With an annual spending budget of about 5-6 billion shekels ($1.5 billion), the MoD 
is one of the most important sources of income for the domestic enterprises. Secondly,
31 Appointing suitable directors and chairpersons for the boards of IAI and IMI ran into difficulties in 
recent years. The ministers in charge failed to reach consensus on agreed candidates,  leaving both 
companies without the minimum number of directors required by law for prolong periods.  IMI did 
not have a board chairperson for almost a year and IAI did not have one for more than three years. 
See Haaretz, 30 July 2001, 2 September 2001, and  17 December 2004.  See also State Comptroller 
Annual Report no. 56A (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 2005), pp. 327-328.
32 Israel Government  Yearbook 1993-1994 (Jerusalem:  Government Printer,  1995),  p.  138;  See also 
IDF’s website, http://wwwl.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=31 (accessed 28 July 2005).
33 See, for example, the reference to the defence establishment as it appears in an official booklet: State 
of Israel -  Ministry of Defence, Guidebook  for Exporters of  Defence Equipment and Know-how, (Tel 
Aviv:  MoD Publishing, March  1996), p. 36 (Hebrew); see also:  Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, 
pp. 192-193; Aluf Benn, ‘The reform’s first steps’, Haaretz, 12 August 1993.
86as  the executor of the national  security policy,  the  defence establishment sets and 
defines  the  requirements  and  expectations  of the  defence  industrial  base  and  its 
military-affiliated components.  It also invests in maintaining strategic  infrastructure 
and earmarks a portion of the defence budget for R&D and long-term projects.  In 
addition,  it  acts  as  a  regulator,  issuing  export  permits,  monitoring  contacts  with 
officials  and declassifying  technologies  for export purposes.  As  the official  export 
licensing authority, the MoD is also authorised to block negotiations and major deals, 
even  if they  were  given  initial  approval.34  In  addition,  it  monitors  contacts  with 
foreign clients (including visits),35 and sanctions mergers and acquisitions, including 
in the private sector.36
Thirdly, the defence establishment owns the state-owned defence enterprises, 
even though the exact responsibilities attached to  this  status  were not specified by 
law. When the need arises, and as long as it has sufficient means at its disposal, the 
MoD offers credit lines, underwrites loans and provides advance down payments. It 
also acts as a sales promoter through a dedicated export division within the ministry 
(SIBAT).
During  the  period  covered  in  this  dissertation,  the  MoD  also  acted  as  the 
employer of Rafael, and was therefore required to satisfy statutory requirements, such 
as health and safety regulations at the  workplace,  and to provide  its workers with 
fringe benefits and other services as set out in their employment agreements. In fact, it 
employed three different populations, each with its own set of terms and professional
34 Ministry of Defence, Guidebook for Exporters of  Defence Equipment and Know-how, pp.  12, 18; the 
MoD banned IAI from selling satellite-related technologies and products because it contravened a 
prior understanding with the US (Ivry interview, 1998).
35 Ibid., pp. 36-39.
36 Amos  Yaron,  MoD  Director General  (1998— 2005),  in speech at the  Fisher Institute,  Herzliya,  12 
September 2004, http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/ (accessed 9 May 2005)
87affiliations:  IDF  soldiers  (career  officers  and  regular  conscripts,  paid  for  by  the 
military),  civil employees at military logistic and maintenance depots, and Rafael’s 
employees. All were funded from a single budgetary source, the defence budget. By 
wearing several  hats  simultaneously -  buyer,  owner,  regulator and employer -  the 
defence establishment was potentially in a conflict of interests.37 This multiplicity of
38 roles also illustrated the complex decision-making within government.
Government Bureaucracy
The  third  component,  government  bureaucracy,  is  spread  across  a  number  of 
ministries  and  state  agencies  with  different  interests  and  areas  of responsibility. 
Bodies within the executive, such as the Finance Ministry, Justice Department, Office 
of the State Attorney, Government Companies Authority, and Authority for Industrial 
Cooperation,  are involved to a varying degree in the day-to-day affairs of the state- 
owned  enterprises.  Statutory  authorities,  such as  the  State  Comptroller Office  (the 
supreme  audit  institution,  which  is  empowered  to  examine  the  financial  and 
administrative  activities  of public  enterprises,  and  to  refer  cases  to  the  Attorney 
General for criminal investigation) and the Bank of Israel  (the  independent central 
bank,  which  sets  interest  and  exchange  rates  that  affect  borrowing  and  export 
transactions) are also influential, albeit indirectly. As part of its responsibility for an 
effective allocation of budgets and resources, the government bureaucracy monitors
37  Tov,  The  Price  of Defence  Power,  p.  190;  author’s  interview  with  Yaakov  Neeman  (Finance 
Minister,  1997-1998),  12 March 1998 (hereafter: Neeman interview) and with Tzipi Livni (Director 
of Government Companies Authority, 1996-1999), 13 March 1998 (hereafter: Livni interview).
38  Yaron Yaakovs,  ‘Desired  Structure and Ownership  for the  Defence  Industry’,  in  Imri  Tov  (ed.), 
Defence and Israel’ s National Economy: Exploring Issues in Security Production, Jaffee Centre for 
Strategic  Studies,  Memoranda  no.  62  (Tel  Aviv  University,  Tel  Aviv,  October  2002),  p.  121 
(Hebrew).
88the performance and the activities of state-owned enterprises.  However, rather than 
profit maximisation, its main concern is to ensure that these entities adhere to formal 
rules and regulations and do not register losses.
The most influential of these actors is the Ministry of Finance (MoF), which 
has been guided,  since the mid-1980s, by three objectives: devising and executing a 
disciplined  macro-economic  policy  that  meets  internationally  recognised 
benchmarks;39 ensuring the efficient use and allocation of public funds by government 
bodies;40 and moving towards greater competition and transparency in the economy 
(through trade and financial liberalization, privatisation and domestic deregulation).4 1
The broad and complex nature of the Finance Ministry’s remit requires close 
cooperation and  coordination between its  main policy and oversight  divisions:  the 
Accountant General’s Department, the Budget Department and the Wage and Labour 
Accord Unit,  which have  garnered  significant power within the  civil  service.42  So 
great is their authority that even prime ministers need the close cooperation of the 
heads  of  these  departments  to  secure  budget  appropriations  for  their  policy 
initiatives 43 According to a former MoF official, as each department has its own set
39 Prime Minister Sharon’s address at the event marking the 50th anniversary of the Bank of Israel, 29 
November  2004  (http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speach291104.htm, 
accessed 26 April 2005).
40 Tov, ‘The economic aspects in the civil-military relations’, p. 58; author’s interview with Nir Gilad, 
(Deputy  Director of Budget  Department,  Ministry  of Finance  1992-1996,  IAI  Vice  President  of 
Finance  1996-1999, and Accountant General, MoF  1999-2003), 9 October  1997  (hereafter:  Gilad 
interview, 1997).
41  Comments  by  the  Director  of  the  Budget  Department,  Ministry  of  Finance,  quoted  in  State 
Comptroller Annual Report no. 53B, p. 36.
42 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 507.
43  Arian  et  al,  Executive  Governance  in  Israel,  p.  49.  On  the  Israeli  bureaucracy’s  position  and 
interests, see: Nachmias and Sened,  ‘Governance and Public Policy’, p.  17; Arian et al., Executive 
Governance in Israel, p. 152.
89of responsibilities and practices -  and as each head of department was equal in rank 
and salary to the Ministry’s Director General44 -  they operate rather independently 45 
(The  former Economic  Adviser to  the  MoD  observed  that,  unlike  the  hierarchical 
structure of the  Defence Ministry, the MoF resembled a federation of departments 
whose  co-ordinating  mechanisms  were  rather  weak,  and  there  was  little  effort  to 
synchronise and integrate its policy output.46)
Founded in the 1950s and modelled after the budget department in the Dutch 
government,47  the  Budget  Department  is  grounded  in  the  universal  principles  of 
market  economy  and  disciplined  government  spending.  The  department  plays  a 
leading role in planning the state budget and presenting it to the Government and to 
the  Knesset.  It  attempts  to  improve  efficiency  and  economy  in  government 
administration through better budgeting techniques and by increasing awareness of 
the  importance  of budgeting  on  the  part  of the  Ministries.  It  is  responsible  for 
examining and evaluating proposed projects to be financed out of the state budget. As 
all changes in the authorised budget during the financial year must first be approved 
by the  Budget Department before being  referred to  the  Finance  Committee  of the 
Knesset,  the Department in effect follows up on the  implementation of the budget 
throughout the year.
The  Accountant General’s  Department acts  as  the national  treasurer and  is 
responsible for implementing the state budget. It releases budget funds to government 
ministries over the course of the year and is in complete charge of their accounting
44 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 216.
45  Author’s  interview  with  Shalom  Granit  (Head  of Wage  and  Labour  Accord  Unit,  Ministry  of 
Finance, 1991-1994), 7 July 1998 (hereafter: Granit interview, 1998).
46 Author’s interview with Imri Tov (Economic Adviser to MoD, 1988-2000), 23 June 2005 (hereafter: 
Tov interview, 2005).
47 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, pp. 116-117.
90systems -  the accounting officers (also known as referents) in each ministry are the 
Department’s employees and therefore report directly to the Accountant General. The 
Department draws up the national accounts that are submitted to the Knesset and the 
State Comptroller. It is also responsible for paying the wages, salaries and pensions of 
all  civil  servants.  Its  other  functions  include  managing  loans  received  by  the 
Government other than those managed by the central bank.48
The  Accountant-General  is  bound  by  the  Foundations  of the  Budget  Law 
(1985), which was designed to increase budget control by stipulating in detail, among 
other  things,  the  structure  of the  annual  budget,  the  manner  in  which  it  may  be 
updated and otherwise changed in the course of the financial year, and the instances in 
which the approval of the Finance Committee of the Knesset must be obtained (for 
example,  approval  of  emergency  appropriation  of  funding  for  state-owned 
enterprises).  In addition, the Law places limitations on the borrowing power of the 
local authorities, and other restrictions on both them and bodies directly or indirectly 
supported out of the State Budget, including the state-owned defence industries, thus 
strengthening  Government  control  over  their  finances,  manpower and  wages.  The 
Law also restricts the right of the Government to borrow from the Bank of Israel and 
from other banking institutions 49
In an explicit effort to enforce stricter compliance with budgetary ceilings, the 
Law calls for the cessation of activities started, cancellation of contracts signed, and 
dismissal of workers hired where adequate coverage in the budget is lacking, and it 
makes it a disciplinary offence for civil servants not to abide by the restrictions set in
48  For further discussion on the  structure  and responsibilities  of the  Ministry of Finance,  see Israel 
Government Yearbook 1993-1994, pp. 93-116.
49 Ibid.; see also Foundations of the Budget Law -  1985; see, e.g., clauses 6, 11, 12, 20, 29, 43 and 45; 
Government Companies Authority Report 2001, pp. 5-6.
91the  annual  Budget Law.  It also  requires  that the  source  of financing be  explicitly 
designated  in  all  bills  tabled  in  the  Knesset  and  in  all  administrative  regulations 
issued.50
Because of these statutory limitations,  the Accountant General is entitled to 
override or simply ignore agreements that were signed or otherwise approved by the 
Budget  Department,  the  Wage  and  Labour  Accord  Unit,  and  other  ministries.  In 
recent years, the MoD and defence companies such as IMI have complained that the 
Accountant General did not release funding agreed by the two other divisions at the 
MoF, resulting in financial loss or other material damage to them and to suppliers and 
individuals with whom they had contracts or prior contractual commitments.5 1   This 
kind of decision underline the different concerns of each MoF department: while the 
Accountant  General  views  itself  as  the  gatekeeper  of  public  funds  and  acts 
accordingly (that is, it strives to improve the state’s balance sheet and raises as much 
funding as possible), the Budget Department is interested in meeting macro-economic 
objectives, improving efficiency in state-owned enterprises through structural changes 
and reducing government expenditure in any way possible.  The Wage and Salary 
Accord Unit, on the other hand, wants to achieve and maintain labour relations that 
are as stable and cooperative as possible, so as to minimise disruptions to the national 
economy.53
50 Foundations of the Budget Law - 1985, Clauses 24, 34-36, 39(a), 42, 43, 46, and 49.
5 1  See for example: ‘Ministry of Finance stopped funding for pensioners of IMF, Haaretz, 5 September 
2000.
52 Author’s interview with Imri Tov, 6 July 1998 (hereafter: Tov interview,  1998);  Granit interview, 
1998; Livni interview.
53 Granit interview, 1998.
92Interest Groups
The fourth participants involved in decision-making are interest groups in the form of 
large national shop committees (commonly referred to as ‘workers’ organisations’ or 
‘employees’  organisations’)  in  the  state-owned  enterprises,  which  represent  the 
employees  through  the  Histadrut.  Although  not  part  of  the  Histadrut’s 
administration,54 these associations nevertheless have become significantly influential, 
not least because the state has granted them formal rights, such as negotiations over 
salary terms;55  in the case of major disputes with management  or the  state  (as  an 
employer),  the  organised  interests  were  entitled  to  seek  recourse  from  the  courts 
(Labour Courts and the Supreme Court).56 This ‘integrated participation’ in decision­
making,  a  characteristic  of the  arrangements  prevalent  in  Israel,  has  been  further 
strengthened by the involvement of committees’ representatives in the Histadrut and 
as a result of close association between employees in state-owned defence enterprises 
and the defence establishment itself.
Over the  years,  the  role  of the  employees’  organisations  has  evolved  from 
merely representing employees in order to promote narrow interests, such as increased 
salaries,  welfare and fringe benefits  to  non-official  involvement in the  enterprises’ 
day-to-day managerial affairs.  Shop committee leaders proved useful intermediaries 
between  management  and  employees,  and  so  have  become  privy  to  commercially
54 Roby Nathanson and Associates, Union Responses to a Changing Environment: The New Histadrut -  
The  General Federation  of Labour in Israel  (Geneva:  International  Institute  for  Labour  Studies, 
1999), p. 3.
55 Some of these privileges were outlined in collective agreements, for example, in Special Collective 
Agreement for the Employees of IMI, 31 October 1990, pp. 52-53.
56 Evelyn Gordon, ‘Judgment day economy’ (Meshek Yom Hadin),  Tchelet, no.  16 (Winter 2004), pp. 
87-111 (Hebrew; English version: ‘Strikes Again’, Azure, no. 17 (winter 2004), pp. 58-87); Galnoor, 
No, Mr Commissioner, pp. 180-182.
93confidential  discussions,  asked  to  give  their  consent  for  structural  and  strategic 
initiatives, and to take part in meetings with politicians, ministerial advisers and high- 
ranking  guests,  sometimes  alongside  management  representatives.57  In  some  other 
instances they have approached ministers directly to advance issues that are usually in 
the domain of management, such as soliciting for state aid.  Finally, the independent 
standing of the employees’ organisations was maintained by having their own budget 
(in  the  form  of annual membership  fees,  deducted  at  source  from  the  employees’ 
salaries  by  management).  This  budget  -   in  the  case  of  the  IAI  Employees’ 
Organisation, it amounted to about $3 million a year -  was used towards payment of 
the union leaders’ salaries, legal services, special operations (lobbying activities, ads, 
etc.),  and  welfare  and  recreation  activities.  Some  money  also  went  to  relief and 
assistance funds.59 That the management collected the fees for and on behalf of the 
employees’ union was a further proof of the trust and close cooperation between the 
two in the state-owned defence enterprises; it also manifested the institutionalisation 
of interest group autonomy.
57  Author’s  interview  with  Haim  Katz  (Secretary General,  the  IAI  Employees’  Organisation  1993- 
Present),  29  June  1998  (hereafter:  Katz  interview);  the  IAI  employees’  organisation  consistently 
blocked plans for joint ventures with rival companies. See Yedioth Ahronoth, 5 November 2001  (on 
IAI/Elisra collaboration in marketing electronic warfare systems), Globes, 19 July 1998 (on IAI/Elbit 
collaboration in aircraft upgrades), Haaretz, 9 July  1997, 31  July  1997 (IAI/Silver Arrow proposed 
collaboration in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles).
58 See further discussion in chapters 4 and 5.
59 Haaretz, 3 May 1996; ‘From the Lavi aircraft to Summer Camps’, Davar, 18 August 1991 (interview 
with Yaakov Sheffi, then Secretary General of the IAI Employees’ organisation).
94Relational Patterns among Main Actors
The interests and roles of the various actors are illustrated in relationship subsets that 
have  evolved  over  the  years  within  the  DIB.  This  section  presents  the  main 
characteristics of three subsets -  IDF vs. MoD, IDF/MoD vs. Ministry of Finance, and 
MoD vs. state-owned enterprises -  in the context of the defence industrial base. This 
overview  serves  as  a  lens  through  which  to  explore  the  main  developments  and 
interactions to be discussed in subsequent chapters.
IDF vs. MoD: Dilemmas of Preparation and Preparedness
In the early years  of the  state  it was  David Ben-Gurion,  Israel’s  first Premier and 
Defence Minister, who set the precedent for the MoD’s superiority within the national 
security  establishment.60  Since  then,  the  MoD  has  become  the  most  powerful 
ministry, dominating all other government bodies in defence issues.6 1  However, over 
the years it has become apparent that the Ministry exists in the heavy shadow of the 
IDF,  usually  following  its  recommendations  in  formal  decisions  and  planning 
documents.  Furthermore,  even  in  those  spheres  in  which  the  Ministry’s  formal
authority was  recognised -   for  example,  budget oversight -   it  did not  succeed  in
62 exerting it.  The MoD’s weakness was further demonstrated in the power struggle 
with  the  IDF  over the  control  and  allocation  of the  defence budget,  which had  a 
significant impact on local defence enterprises and especially the state-owned ones.
60 Greenberg, Defence Budget and Military Power, pp. 139-147.
61 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 204.
62 Technically, the MoD is supposed to supervise the IDF budgeting process, but an attempt to appoint 
the head of the MoD Budget Department (who also serves as Financial Adviser to the IDF’s Chief of 
Staff)  to  monitor  implementation  of the  defence  budget,  as  the  Foundations  of the  Budget  Law 
requires,  was  blocked  by  the  IDF.  See  State  Comptroller  Annual  Report  no.  46  (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer, 1996), pp. 890-894; Tal, National Security, p. 106.
95The  division  of responsibilities  between  the  MoD  and  the  IDF  was  first 
demarcated by Ben-Gurion. He differentiated between civil functions to be carried out 
by the Ministry and military functions to be performed by the IDF’s General Staff. 
The  separation  of  functions  was  defined  in  1960s,  during  Prime  Minister  Levi 
Eshkol’s time, as follows: ‘The IDF determines what is needed, how much and when;
63 the MoD decides how, where from and for what price’.
Such a distinction, however, was not precise enough to settle concerns about 
the  practical  division  of  functions  between  the  two  bodies  that  fuelled  periodic 
disputes and disagreements.  For example,  who was to  decide how much money to 
allocate  for training and how much for arms development?  Who  should deal  with 
long-term planning and the purchase of new weapon systems? Did they fall within the 
realm of the civilian arm, because of the financial and technological considerations 
involved, or that of the military as the ultimate end-user?
These conundrums were settled following the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The 
Agranat Committee report,  the national  commission of enquiry which investigated 
who was responsible for Israel’s lack of military preparation for the war, exonerated 
the political echelon but placed the blame  firmly on the shoulders of the IDF.  The 
report’s conclusions led to a major overhaul of the army’s doctrine and operations, a
63 Greenberg, Defence Budgets and Military Power, pp.  147-148; Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, p. 
200; Ministry of Defence, How to Work with the MoD’ s Procurement and Production Department, p. 
2;  author’s  interview  with  Pinhas  Zussman  (MoD  Director  General,  1975-1977),  6  July  1998 
(hereafter: Zussman interview). Zussman was once told by a senior army officer that the difference 
between the two bodies was ‘the IDF determines its needs and the State of Israel signs the cheque’; 
he concurred.
96process which was accompanied by a substantial allocation of state resources for arms 
acquisition.64 According to Assistant Defence Minister, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Moshe Peled,
following the publication of the Agranat report, the IDF became far more dominant than 
the  MoD  with  respect  to  procurement  issues,  determining  where  to  buy  [military 
supplies], how to buy them, when and for how much; in fact, the balance of power has 
definitely tilted in favour of the IDF at the expense of the MoD.65
This shift was formalised in 1975, when the then MoD Director General, Prof. Pinhas 
Zussman, decided to give the armed forces authority to determine the size and uses of 
the defence budget.
Zussman,  who  had  previously  served  as  Economic  Adviser  to  the  MoD, 
argued  that  the  end-user  is  ‘best  placed  to  efficiently  allocate  and  invest  its 
resources’,66  echoing  similar views  expressed earlier by chiefs-of-staff Mordechay 
Maklef and Yitzhak Rabin.67 Zussman concluded that the General Staff, as the body
64 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, pp. 286, 287, 300-301, Evron, Shield and Spear, pp. 219-222; 
Zeev  Schiff and  Eitan  Haber  (eds.), Israel,  Army and Defence:  A  dictionary  (Jerusalem:  Zmora, 
Bitan, Modan Publishers, 1976), p. 251.
65 Ministry of Defence -  the Office of the Economic Adviser, Collection of  Lectures from a Seminar on 
Make-or-Buy  (August  1993),  p.  85  (internal  document);  also  keynote  speech  by  Nir  Gilad,  in 
‘Balance of National Strength and Security’, The Fourth Annual Herzliya Conference,  16 December 
2003 (Hebrew) (hereafter: Gilad’s speech at the Herzliya Conference).
66 Zussman interview.  An independent committee,  which was appointed by the  Defence  Minister to 
investigate the procurement practices  of the defence establishment,  concluded that the  decision to 
transfer the responsibility for central budgets from the MoD to the IDF ‘did not prove itself for many 
reasons’. The committee discovered that this arrangement has yielded undesired consequences, such 
as the creation of concealed and deliberately underused reserves in the defence budget, and called for 
this situation to be reversed. See Ministry of Defence, Final Report of the Public Committee for the 
Examination of the Lessons from  the Dotan Affair (July  1991), pp. 6-7, 22;  former MoD Director 
General David Ivry also thought that Zussman’s decision was a mistake ‘because he did not envision 
the far-reaching consequences of that step’ (Ivry interview, 1998).
67 Greenberg, Defence Budget and Military Power, 143-146, 152-153. General Maklef insisted that ‘If 
the General  Staff prepares  the annual  work plan which is then  submitted  for the  approval  of the 
Defence  Minister,  it  must  also  prepare  the  budget.  The  General  Staff must  be  able  to  set  and 
determine its priorities within the budget’  (said  in the  Government  Session,  15  November  1953).
97that sets the IDF’s requirements and operational parameters -  which include its build­
up and structure, the specifications of its weapons systems, and its combat doctrines -  
should  be  vested  with  the  ability  to  determine  its  needs  as  well  as  the  scope  of 
consumption, a principle otherwise known as ‘consumer sovereignty’. Consequently, 
he  transferred the budgetary responsibility  for almost all  the  development projects 
from the MoD to the IDF, save for a small central budget.68 The lion’s share of the 
defence budget was placed in the hands of the Chief of Staff, who, with the consent of 
the  Defence  Minister  and  the  MoD,  divided  it  amongst  the  three  main  branches: 
Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force (otherwise known as  ‘the budget-owners’) for 
their uses.69 This shift granted the military significant resources, putting it in control 
of both ends of the warfare spectrum: battle preparation (augmenting future military 
capabilities) and preparedness (immediate operational readiness).
With this development, the question of weapons development came to a head. 
Historically, the military has given a higher priority to short-term threats, emphasising 
the  need  for  off-the-shelf  arms  supply  and  available  funding  for  operations, 
maintenance and upgrades. The General Staff and heads of branches have thus given 
higher priority  to  ready  access  weapons  and  lower priority to  the  development of 
long-term R&D programmes involving a high degree of uncertainty. In contrast, the 
MoD  has  tended  to  reverse  these  emphases,  giving  priority  to  R&D  and  the 
development of industrial infrastructure in response to long-term threats.70 According
Maklef failed in his attempts to persuade Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who favoured the view 
of the then Acting Defence Ministry Director General, Shimon Peres.
68 Bonen, Rafael, p. 39.
69  Author’s  interview  with  Zvi  Trop  (Economic  Adviser  to  the  MoD,  1983-1988),  24  June  2001 
(hereafter: Trop interview, 2001).
70 Ivry interview, 1998.
98to  Shimon  Peres  (who  served  both  as  Defence  Minister  and  the  MoD  Director 
General),
the role of the MoD is to face the  future, not the present.  The  [IDF’s]  Chief of Staff 
serves three or four years, at most; I, on the other hand, need to think ten years ahead.7 1
The marked difference in the preferences of the MoD and the IDF was further 
underlined by the  ‘consumer sovereignty’ principle.  Its implementation reduced the 
MoD’s scope of responsibilities, initially relegating it to little more than ‘a supplying 
ministry for the army’ as the IDF had preferred it to be.72 By giving the IDF overall 
budgetary authority  for build-up  as  well  as  for operational  matters,  gradually  less 
money  was  channelled  into  R&D  and  indigenous  weapons  programmes.  More 
budgets, on the other hand, were assigned to salaries and pension schemes, partly in 
order  to  ensure  the  IDF’s  competitive  position  vis-a-vis  the  civil  job  market. 
(Throughout the years this preference was closely guarded by defence ministers, most 
of whom were former army officers themselves.  Prime Minister Rabin, for example, 
vetoed many attempts by the treasury to cut the salaries of career IDF officers.74)
Consequently, the share of salaries and pensions in the defence budget shot up 
from 25% in 1980 to 50% in 1992 (according to the Ministry of Finance; IDF insists 
on a slightly lower figure of 33%), while the number of career officers remained the 
same, as did the size,  in real terms, of the defence budget itself.75  So worrying was 
this trend that Defence Minister Moshe Arens instructed in  1992 that nu800 million
71 Shimon Peres, quoted in Greenberg, Defence Budget and Military Power, p. 153.
72 Yitzhak Rabin, quoted in Arian, Second Republic, p. 297.
73 Trop interview, 2001; Telegraph (Israel), 17 October 1995.
74 Author’s interview with Ilan Flato, Economic Adviser to Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres (1992- 
1996), 21 June 1999 (hereafter: Flato interview).
75 Ilan Suliman and Stuart Cohen,  ‘IDF:  From the people’s army to a professional army’, Maarachot, 
341 (May-June 1995), pp. 2-17 (Hebrew).
99(about $330 million) should be designated for maintaining the spending level in the 
domestic defence industries;76 a year later the Cabinet allocated further nu3 billion for 
military purchases from domestic suppliers.77 However, the IDF had other preferences 
and it consequently cancelled weapon orders from IMI, froze missile purchases from 
Rafael and reduced its spending with other local firms.78 According to the Ministry of 
Finance and the  State  Comptroller,  IDF  procurement  from  local  suppliers  actually 
halved between 1983 and 1995.79
Over the years, the MoD has persuaded some defence ministers of the need to 
lessen the IDF’s budgetary grip. Strategic and long-term projects funded through the 
defence budget became managed through separate directorates. These were formed as 
part  of the  civilian arm -  the  MoD -   and reported  directly  either to  the  Defence 
Minister or to the Director General. In this way, they were spared arbitrary cuts at the 
hands of the General Staff.80 In addition,  the MoD has found ways  to  increase the 
R&D  budget  from  sources  outside  the  defence  budget,  including  joint  research 
ventures with foreign armies,  special agreements with the Ministry of Finance,  and
76 Telegraph (Israel), 17 October 1995.
77 Nachum Bamea,  ‘The man who exposed the pay slip’, Saturday supplement,  Yedioth Ahronoth,  18 
August 1995, p. 6.
78 See, for example, letters by the MoD Procurement Directorate (which handles weapons acquisition 
for the military) to IMI announcing the IDF’s decision to terminate further orders of certain types of 
ammunition  from  the  company.  See  letter  from  MoD  Procurement  Directorate  to  IMI  Director 
General, headed ‘Acquisition of 5.56mm ammunition from IMI’, 30 January  1992; and letter from 
MoD  Procurement  Directorate  to  IMI  Director-General,  headed  ‘IMI  -   acquisition  of  155mm 
artillery ammunition’, 30 January 1992. At Rafael, the Air Force purchased Popeye missiles between 
1985 and 1988, but did not renew its orders until 1997. During that nine year period, Rafael was able 
to keep the production line running through  foreign orders.  Author’s interview with Yitzhak  Gat 
(Rafael Director General, 1992-1998), 29 January 1998 (hereafter: Gat interview).
79 Yedioth Ahronoth, 18 August 1995; see further discussion in chapter 4, 5 and 6.
80 Trop interview, 2001; a salient examples was the Merkava battle tank, which is partially funded by 
US annual military aid given to Israel and handled by a separate directorate within the MoD.
100arrangements with the United States.8 1  These steps helped to offset cuts in the locally 
funded military  R&D,82  as  well  as  overriding  objections  raised  by  the  IDF  about 
certain  programmes  promoted  by  the  MoD,  such  as  the  reconnaissance  satellites 
project and the ballistic missile defence programme;83 the IDF later admitted it had 
erred in opposing both.84
Former MoD Director General David Ivry maintains that ‘the IDF has been 
accorded a disproportionate influence which destabilised the delicate balance between 
short-term  and  long-term  military  requirements’.  Ivry  believes  that  because  of 
pressing needs and the high intensity of security-related events in Israel, ‘no Defence 
Minister  had  dared  to  confront  or  challenge  the  dominance  of  the  IDF’.85  The 
budgetary autonomy of the military has therefore remained intact.
81 These arrangements included scholarships to gifted scientists, tentative agreements with MoF for the 
increase  in  the  military’s  R&D  budget,  and  a  $55-million  special  annual  budget  earmarked  for 
Rafael’s R&D infrastructure.
82 Ivry interview, 1998.
83  Ivry interview,  1997; author’s interview with Moshe Arens (Defence Minister,  1983-1984,  1990- 
1992,  1999;  Foreign  Minister,  1988-1990),  24  June  1998  (hereafter:  Arens  interview);  author’s 
interview with Uzi  Rubin  (Head of Arrow-Homa Anti-Missile  Defence  Programme,  MoD,  1991—  
1999),  14 March  1998.  See, for example:  ‘the Air Force prefers to cancel the Arrow (anti-ballistic 
missile defence programme) in exchange for offensive weapons’,  Yedioth Ahronoth, 4 March 1991; 
‘disagreement between the IDF and MoD over the future of the reconnaissance satellite, Merkava 4 
tank, and the Central Project’, Haaretz, 10 September 1993.
84  Moshe Arens,  ‘Lavi,  Ofek,  Arrow’, Haaretz,  5  August 2004;  Tov,  ‘The economic  aspects in the 
civil-military  relations’,  p.  57.  Arens  insisted  that  the  army  would  allocate  funding  for  the 
development of a radar system for the Arrow anti-ballistic missile project.  When the Arrow radar 
system’s development was completed, it succeeded in detecting hostile missile launches. See: Israel 
Air Force Magazine, no.  140, August 2001; Haaretz, 3 July 2001. Prime Minister Barak admitted he 
had made a mistake opposing the decision to develop the Arrow radar when he served as Chief of 
Staff and thanked Arens for his persistence. See: Haaretz, 30 October 2000.
85 Ivry interview, 1997.
101Defence Establishment vs. Treasury: Bureaucratic Turf Wars
Government  policy-making  in  the  DIB  is  overseen  and  directed  primarily  by  the 
defence establishment (which consists of both the IDF and the MoD) and the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF). In addition to the dialogue between these bureaucracies, MoF and 
MoD officials conduct a separate, parallel and simultaneous discourse with the elected 
echelon. This four-cornered relationship between MoD, military, Ministry of Finance 
and the political echelon can be characterised by a vertical and horizontal division of 
duties and functions (for a schematic illustration see Figure 2-2).
Within this institutional hierarchy, the interaction between the participants is 
shaped largely by their spheres of responsibility and resembles what Aberbach et al. 
describe as image three: politicians and bureaucrats involved together in the policy­
making process.86 Cabinet and  individual  ministers  bound by coalition agreements 
and government guidelines, and further constrained by political cost calculations and 
chronic agenda congestion, only rarely initiate potentially confrontational reforms.87 
Instead  they  are  urged  by  the  public  bureaucracy  to  consider changes  to  existing 
policies, which are proposed and advanced mostly by the bureaucracy.88 In the case of 
the defence industrial base,  this bureaucracy is comprised of two components.  One 
integrated structure, the defence establishment, consists of civil and military arms and 
is  responsible  for  producing  a  public  good  (national  security);  a  separate 
organisational structure,  the  Finance Ministry  and its  associated units  (such as  the 
Civil  Service  Commission),  is  responsible  for matters  relating  to  national  finance, 
including budget and resource allocation.
86 Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western 
Democracies (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 9.
87 Granit interview, 1998; Gilad interview, 1997.
88 Tov, ‘The economic aspects in the civil-military relations’, p. 54.
102Figure 2.2: Functional and hierarchical divisions in the DIB
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103The  literature  of civil-military  relations  in  Israel  suggests  that  these  two 
bureaucracies appear to behave more as competing units  struggling  over authority,
OQ
power and influence than as integrated parts of a coordinated machine.  The mam 
bone of contention is the defence budget. Unlike the budgets for civil ministries, in 
which the  MoF  decides both the  overall  allocation and the  internal  distribution of 
funds, the defence budget has been an exception. Under instructions from successive 
prime ministers, the MoF has refrained from interfering in the internal structure of the 
defence  budget,90  reducing  itself  to  being  merely  ‘the  cashier  for  the  defence 
establishment’.9 1   It  has  simply  set  an  overall  spending  ceiling,  which  it has  been 
unable to impose effectively, and left it at that.
This  approach changed  following  the  growth  of the  defence  budget  in  the 
second  half of the  1970s.  After the  near defeat  in  the  Yom  Kippur  war,  defence 
spending  rose  from  11%  of GDP  in  the  mid-1960s  to  over 30%,92  in some  years 
consuming up to 50% of the state budget.93 Since then, the MoF has been striving to 
keep the defence establishment in check,  stepping up calls  for internal reforms and 
pay  cuts  in  the  wake  of  the  financial  crisis  of  1985,  which  led  to  emergency 
legislation that included a substantial one-off cut in the defence budget.
The  defence  establishment  has  fended  off countless  attempts  to  place  the 
internal distribution of the defence budget by the IDF under closer scrutiny,  and to
89 Aviezer Yaari, Civil Control of the IDF, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Memoranda no. 72 (Tel 
Aviv University, Tel Aviv, October 2004), pp. 41-50; Peri, Ibid, pp. 213-231.
90 Dery and Sharon, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Budgetary Reform, p. 21.
9 1 A quote attributed to Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir in 1968; see Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, p. 
221.
92 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 287; ‘Appendix A: The Defence Budget’, in Zvi Offer and 
Avi Kober (eds), The Price of  Power (Tel Aviv: MoD Publishing, 1984), pp. 81-86.
93  Zvi  Shor,  ‘Military power in the grip of budget’  in Zvi  Offer and Avi  Kober (eds),  Quality and 
Quantity in Military Build-up, (Tel Aviv: MoD Publishing, 1985), p. 308 (Hebrew).
104curtail  the  many  perks  conferred  upon  the  career  personnel  over  the  years.  This 
pressure was part of a deliberate MoF strategy to encourage government ministries 
towards  greater efficiency and cost cuts;  a more  disciplined and  economical MoD 
could  have  set  an  example  and  contributed  greatly  towards  that  aim.94  (One 
interviewee also  suggested that  self-serving  considerations  were  at play,  as  certain 
MoF  officials  owed  their  career  advancement  to  successfully  placing  budgetary 
hurdles in the path of the Defence Ministry.95)
A partial break in this stand-off was noted in  1993, when the IDF agreed to 
examine the operations of its logistic and maintenance depots, which the MoF viewed 
as costly and in many cases utterly redundant, compared to the industrial capabilities 
outside the army.96 The defence establishment appointed a committee to examine how 
much infrastructure inside and outside the defence establishment was duplicated and 
to recommend policy guidelines for using it more efficiently. Implementation of the 
committee’s  recommendations,  however,  was  fraught  with  difficulties  and  only
07 partially executed.  The IDF also rejected a proposal for external defence companies 
to  run its manufacturing and logistic  centres,  which could have yielded significant 
economic advantages.98
94 Tov, ‘The economic aspects in the civil-military relations’, p. 58.
95 Author’s interview with Haim Zweig (Chairman of IMI  workers  organisation  1993-1999),  15-16 
March 1998 (hereafter: Zweig interview, 1998a).
96 Gilad’s speech at the Herzliya Conference; Haaretz, 17 August 2004.
97  State  Comptroller Annual  Report  no.  51A  (Jerusalem:  Government  Printer,  2000),  pp.  23-33; 
comments by Hemda Mark, Economic Adviser to the MoD, Fischer Institute conference,  Herzliya, 
12 September 2004.
98 Gilad’s speech at the Herzliya Conference. IMI, for example, suggested in 1994 that it should lead a 
consortium of companies that would manage the IDF-controlled Merkava battle tank plant, but the 
military turned down the offer on the basis of operational considerations.
105A further compromise was reached in July 2002,  when the MoD agreed to 
appoint  a  representative  from  the  Accountant  General’s  office  to  monitor 
implementation  of the defence  budget."  The  MoF  agreed  in return not to  oversee 
certain  key  areas,  including  the  administration  of salaries  and  expenses,  which  it 
normally monitors in other ministries.100
The defence establishment’s insistence on the last concession was no accident: 
such  autonomy  in  budgetary  matters  was  crucial  for  meeting  intense  operational 
needs, but at the same time it also facilitated the introduction of many fringe benefits 
which, under the veil of secrecy, were shielded from the prying eyes of other elements 
of the public  sector.1 0 1   For example,  the defence  establishment has  a  separate pay
107 scale,  on  average  about  80%  higher  than  that  of other  government  ministries.
Moreover,  IDF  career officers  are  offered  many  perks  not  available  to  other civil
101 servants and can retire at 40 on full pension (statutory retirement age is 67).  And, 
unlike the practice in other parts of the civil service, appointments to senior positions 
in the defence establishment are handled internally and not opened to public tender.104
99 MoF spokesperson press release, 29 April 2003.
100  Tov,  ‘The economic  aspects  in the civil-military relations’,  p.  57;  Yaari,  JCSS  72,  p.  47.  In an 
illuminating  example,  the  IDF  prevented  Income  Tax  Authority  inspectors  from  visiting  its 
Paymaster General’s Office. Maariv, 6 December 1992.
1 0 1  Haaretz, 14 March 2003; Globes, 23 August 1996; Gilad interview, 1997.
102 Haaretz, 15 September 1997.
103 These perks include summer camps for children, free medical care (including dental treatment), free 
holidays and heavily discounted goods. See Reuven Pedatzur,  ‘the truth about the defence budget’, 
Haaretz, 30 January 1995. Many career officers have also taken advantage of cheap quality housing 
in new towns that were planned by the defence establishment for the purchase and use of selected 
career personnel.  See Suliman and Cohen,  ‘IDF:  From the people’s army to a professional army’, 
Maarachot.
104 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, pp. 71, 204.
106Indeed, the centrality of the security issue in Israel has allowed the defence 
establishment to torpedo any attempt to reform the preparation and implementation of 
the defence budget, and also to resist efforts to subject it to wider civil supervision.105 
Reflecting on this,  Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu noted in 2005  that such 
external  control  had  become  practically  impossible  because  ‘the  defence 
establishment, with its workers and generals, is the strongest union in the country.’106 
The MoF’s  long-held view on the preferences of the defence  establishment 
(Finance  Minister  Yaakov  Neeman  claimed  in  1997  that  ‘the  IDF  neglected  its 
military build-up  for the  sake of better salaries’107)  was  rejected by  former Prime 
Minister,  Shimon  Peres,  who  also  headed  the  Finance  Ministry  in  the  1990s. 
According to Peres, the MoF world view is dominated by short-term considerations: 
‘They  [MoF  officials]  had their own  calculations,  and these  calculations  were  not 
always objective’.108 Nevertheless, former senior MoD officials -  one served as IDF’s 
Chief of Staff -   maintained  that  the  IDF,  with  its  exclusive  benefits  and  closely
105 The Knesset’s powers of oversight in the areas of the defence budget and security policy are limited. 
Only a handful of carefully vetted MKs are authorised to examine the defence budget in its entirety 
and most of the deliberation were done behind closed doors.  See Haaretz, 28  December 2004,  29 
December 2004; Dery and Sharon, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Budgetary Reform, p.  21; Peri, 
Between Battles and Ballots, pp. 175-192, 225-227; Yaari, pp. 23-30.
106 Interview with Haaretz-The Marker, 21 April 2005.
107 Finance Minister Yaakov Neeman, in an interview with Haaretz, 12 September 1997.
108  Author’s  interview  with  Shimon  Peres  (Prime  Minister  1984-1986  and  1995-1996,  Defence 
Minister  1974-1977  and  1995-1996,  Finance  Minister  1988-1990),  2  December  1997  (hereafter: 
Peres interview).  Similar views were expressed by Civil  Service commissioners  Shmuel  Holander 
and Yitzhak Galnoor;  see Haaretz,  27 June  1997, p.  22, and Galnoor, No,  Mr Commissioner,  pp. 
116-121, respectively.guarded privileges, has an inward-looking approach that is predominately focused at 
furthering its own material advantage.109
The  defence  establishment  found  itself increasingly  competing  with  other 
policy  areas,  especially  from  the  early  1990s  onwards,  when  national  priorities 
changed, and social and welfare sectors were allocated significantly more resources 
(reflected by in-kind services and transfer payments) -  up from 15% of GDP in 1991 
to  21.3%  in  2001.11 0  This  shift,  which  was  also  enshrined  in  legislation  and 
accompanied by pay rises ranging from 20% to 70% in the public sector (especially 
for those in education, health and academia), reversed the spending restraint of earlier 
decades.11 1   Furthermore,  the  Budget  Deficit  Reduction  Law  of  1992  required  the 
government’s  overall  budget  deficit,  as  a  percentage  of GDP,  to  decline  year  by 
year.112 This meant that the sheer size of the defence budget (about $8-10 billion per 
year) singled it out, year in year out, as an easy target for MoF demands for budget 
cuts.113
These attempts were vehemently resisted by the defence establishment.  One 
way of deflecting the pressure for cuts was for the MoD to threaten that any further
109  Interviews  by the author with  Lt.  Gen  (res.)  Zvi  Zur  (IDF  Chief of Staff 1961-1963,  Assistant 
Defence  Minister  1967-1973,  IAI  Chairman  1992-1995),  21  December  1999  (hereafter:  Zur 
interview); interview by the author with Zvi Trop, 6 July 2000 (hereafter: Trop interview, 2000), and 
Trop interview, 2001; remarks by Assistant Defence Minister, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Moshe Peled, quoted 
in Make or Buy, p. 85.
110 Yaakov Kop (ed.), Israel’ s Social Services 2004 (Jerusalem: Taub Centre for Social Policy Studies 
in Israel, 2005), p. 74; Nechemia Strasler, ‘Orwell is back’, Haaretz, 19 December 1997.
111 Gilad interview, 1997; and Granit interview, 1998.
112  Budget  Deficit  Reduction  Law  -  1992, The  Official  Gazette:  Israel  Statute  Book  no.  1378 
(Jerusalem:  Government  Printer,  8  January  1992)  (Hebrew);  Ministry  of  Finance’s  website  (in 
Hebrew), http://www.mof.gov.il/chov/general/milon.asp (last accessed 1  November 2005); see also: 
Ministry of Finance -  Budget Department, State Budget 1995 -  Main Parts (Jerusalem: Government 
Printer, October 1994), p. 27 (Hebrew).
113 See Yaakov Toren speech, Herzilya conference 2004.
108damage  to  the  defence  budget  would  affect  IDF  purchases  of advanced  weapons 
systems from local defence enterprises.114 The MoF retorted by accusing the defence 
establishment of treating  the  defence  industries  as  if they  were  its  ‘stepchildren’, 
sacrificing their interests in the  interest of ‘short-term,  self-serving calculations’.115 
The MoF had long advocated privatisation and restructuring of the defence industry as 
a means to raise income and reduce the government’s exposure to potential losses in 
this sector.116 It therefore viewed the fall in IDF orders from local industry and the 
simultaneous increase in career officers’ salaries (over which the MoF had no control)
117 as  ultimate  proof  of  the  need  for  an  external  check  on  the  defence  budget. 
Nevertheless, it regarded the state-owned defence industries as part and parcel of the 
defence establishment -  and, as such, mainly the responsibility of the MoD.
MoD and State-owned Defence Enterprises: Dilemmas of Divided Loyalty
The founding fathers of the state assigned the defence enterprises to the control and 
guidance  of the  Defence  Ministry,  because  they perceived their activities to  be  of 
national importance rather than commercial value.118 The history of relations between 
the MoD and the state-owned enterprises broadly divides into two periods: before the 
national financial crisis of the mid-1980s and afterwards. Until  1985, the MoD was 
the  prime  powerhouse  behind  the  enterprises,  encouraging  their  growth  and 
influencing  their  industrial  development.  Relations  between  the  state-owned 
enterprises  and  the  MoD  were  strong,  both  in  terms  of  contracts  and  overall
114 Haaretz, 17 August 2004.
115 Gilad’s speech at the Herzliya Conference.
116 Neeman interview.
117 Gilad interview, 1997; Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 310-311.
118  Affidavit by Michael  Shor (IMI  Director General,  1972-1990,  IMI  Chairman  1990-1991)  at the 
High Court of Justice, case no. 991/96, p. 15 (hereafter: Shor’s affidavit).
109preferential  treatment.  This  preference  was  explained  as  necessary  on  grounds  of 
security  and  operational  requirements,  but  also  on  the  basis  of these  enterprises’ 
technological  achievements  and  price.119  There  were  also  significant  financial 
incentives at play:  the MoD used part of the revenues and advance payments from 
foreign clients to firms under its direct control (e.g. IMI and Rafael, when these were 
autonomous  units  within  the  MoD),  as  a  means  to  increase  its  disposable  budget 
beyond its nominal one.120 At times, political and personal considerations affecting 
the  incumbent  Defence  Minister  -   most  of them  viewed  the  defence  firms  as  a 
political base1 2 1  -  also played a part in perpetuating favouritism. This attitude helped 
nurture a perception of the MoD as the ‘guardian angel’ of the state-owned industry.
The national financial crisis of 1985 marked a sea change in the relationship 
between the  MoD and its  enterprises.  It forced the  defence  establishment  to make 
major budget cuts  and  to  re-examine  budgetary  resources,  a reassessment  that  led 
eventually to the cancellation of the Lavi aircraft project and to a gradual shift of arms 
orders from local producers to the US (see further discussion in Chapter 3).122 This
119 Tov,  The Price of Defence Power, pp.  188-189; Zeev Bonen,  ‘Mixed basket of products’, in Zvi 
Ofer and Avi Kover (eds.), Price of Power, pp. 235-237 (Tel Aviv: Maarachot,  1984); MoD bought 
equipment from companies under its direct control, such as IMI, at discounted prices. See:  Globes, 
25 October 2001.
120 Author’s interview with Aharon Fogel (Director General, Ministry of Finance 1992-1994), 26 June 
2001 (hereafter: Fogel interview).
1 2 1   Two notable examples were Shimon Peres and Moshe Arens who kept close relations with IAI’s 
management and employees. Defence Minister Peres awarded IAI budget for a provisional study of a 
future combat aircraft, which later became the Lavi, see Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 290 
and  Reiser,  The  Israeli Arms  Industry,  p.  172.  The  IAI  Employees’  Organisation  assisted  Peres 
during election campaigns.  Author’s interview with Eitan Haber (Head of Prime  Minister Rabin’s 
Bureau,  1992-1995), 21 December 1999, Ramat-Gan (hereafter: Haber interview). Defence Minister 
Arens sought asked the IAI management to promote several pro-Likud activists, who worked in the 
company. See Al Hamismar, 30 April 1991.
122 Ivry interview,  1997.
110change  soon  showed  in total  orders  from domestic  suppliers,  which dropped  from 
mi7.4 billion in 1984 to raj 3 billion in 1995, and stabilised at a level of roj5 to 6 billion 
per annum.123 Weapons and ammunition previously purchased locally, such as rifles, 
artillery shells  and radio  systems,  were  ordered instead in the US.124  Furthermore, 
certain Israeli-made weapon systems that the IDF could not buy from its own local 
budget were relabelled as American-made -  through joint ventures between a local 
producer and an American firm -  and then paid via the US annual military aid given 
Israel.1 2 5
Contractual  practices  also  underwent major reform.  The  MoD  hardened  its 
purchase terms for local industries, which were now expected to absorb the majority 
of R&D  costs  even  if the  customer (IDF)  changed  its  specifications  (an  approach 
known as ‘Fly before Buy’).126 It also tied purchases of new weapon systems to export 
deals in which the development costs were borne mostly by the foreign customer, and 
insisted on buying  equipment  from later production batches to  ensure  the  cheapest 
possible unit price (this falls as the production cycle progresses). A later development, 
in the form of the Mandatory Tenders Law of 1992, introduced competitive bidding 
for government contracts and transparent selection methods by government ministries,
123 Reuven Pedatzur, ‘The truth about the defence budget’, Haaretz, 30 January 1995; Tov,  The Price 
of  Defence Power,?.  189.
124  The  IDF  stopped  buying  the  Galil  assault  rifle  and  ordered  the  US-made  M-16  rifles  instead. 
Author’s  interview  with  Shlomo  Milo  (IMI  Chief  Executive,  1995-2000),  18  January  1998 
(hereafter: Milo interview); Globes, 26 February 1998; Haaretz, 2 July 1998.
125 The Israel Air Force purchased 45 Israeli-made Popeye missiles via a US company, jointly-owned 
by the missile’s Israeli manufacturer, Rafael, and its US partner,  Lockheed-Martin; the deal, worth 
some $41 million, was paid by the US military aid to Israel. See Haaretz, 25 December 1997. It also 
planned to buy Rafael’s air-to-air missiles through the same American company. See Globes, 17 May 
1998.
126 Gilad interview, 1997 and Milo interview.
Illincluding  the  MoD,  thus  effectively  ending  any  ostensible  preference  for  single-
127 source agreements with state-owned suppliers.
These  developments  unveiled  the  conflict  of  interests  inherent  in  the 
multiplicity of roles the MoD assumed vis-a-vis the main defence enterprises under its 
control.  On at least two  occasions,  senior MoD  officials  tendered their resignation 
from  the  IAI  board  of  directors  when  they  realised  board  membership  was 
incompatible with their official duty.  In the first case, the Economic Adviser to the 
MoD, Zvi Trop, resigned in  1987 when he was assigned to negotiate the severance 
packages awarded to IAI’s workers following the cancellation of the Lavi project. On 
earlier occasions he had rejected pressure from the then IAI Director General,  who 
‘reminded’ him of the MoD’s legal obligation for the company’s finances.  Then, in 
1991, the MoD Director General David Ivry decided to leave the board of IAI because 
of pressure by the  company  for preferential  treatment:  ‘Workers  and  management 
assumed that just because I was serving on the board, I was automatically biased in 
their favour. They simply refused to accept that I was capable of separating my role as 
MoD Director General from my role as board member of IAI; when I was sitting in 
the  office of the MoD Director General  I  employed the considerations of a client; 
when I was sitting on the board of IAI, I was acting in the capacity of an owner.’129 
According  to  Ivry,  the  way  to  entertain  both  objectives  was  by  addressing  the 
enterprises’  problems  pragmatically.  For  example,  by  issuing  export  permits  for 
weapon  systems  the  MoD  helped  to  increasing  the  enterprises’  order  book  and
127  State  Comptroller Annual  Report  no.  43  (Jerusalem:  Government  Printer,  1993),  pp.  747-749 
(Hebrew); this law, for all its merits, created some complications for the MoD and slowed down its 
acquisition processes. See Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 203.
128 Trop interview, 2000.
129 Ibid.
112revenues, which in turn helped to keep employment levels up and reduced production 
costs  (and  also  helped  to  push  down  the  prices  paid  by  the  IDF  for  the  same 
weapons).130
However, the MoD’s pragmatism did not sit well with the employees’ unions. 
During disputes and periods of tension over financial losses and redundancies, violent 
behaviour by workers became commonplace.  Managers and directors at Rafael, IMI 
and  IAI  were  subject  to  abuse,  humiliation  and  intimidation,  accompanied  by 
deliberate acts of damage, mostly to their offices and cars. At times, the concern for
1  7  1
their personal safety was such that they were accompanied by bodyguards.  These
incidents, which were hushed up and left mostly unchallenged, gave the impression of
a weak MoD and  indecisive management, unwilling or incapable of standing up to 
1
unruly unions.
Conclusions
In  Israel,  the  very  nature  of the  executive  authority’s  involvement  in  the  defence 
industrial  base  suggests  that  the  conflict  of interests  built  into  the  framework  of 
decision-making renders any attempt at structural reform in this sector politically and 
financially costly,  if not impossible.  In other words,  its execution,  including policy 
implementation  and  imposing  financial  penalties  on powerful  organised  groups,  is 
likely to face great difficulties. The multiplicity of government actors involved in the 
sector  also  suggests  that  there  is  no  single  point  of contact,  in  the  form  of one 
department that assumes overall responsibility for the state-owned defence industries.
130 Ibid.
1 31 See specific examples in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
132  The  MoD  discussed  in  1987  a  suggestion  for temporarily  shut  down  Rafael  in response  to the 
workers’ behaviour. After much deliberation the idea was rejected. Trop interview, 2001.
113This state of affairs has been exacerbated by prime ministers who seemed to view the 
defence industries at times as if they were merely chattels, a sort of consolation prize 
to pacify disgruntled political allies.
The main government bodies, the Ministries of Finance and Defence, perform 
different tasks and hold diametrically opposed positions that influence their relations 
with the defence enterprises -  epitomised in the battle over the defence budget. This 
long-lasting  conflict  suggests  that  the  ministries’  deeply  entrenched  views  stem 
largely from their organisational roots as well as from traumatic events in the history 
of the state. The Yom Kippur war of 1973, in the case of the IDF, and the national 
financial crisis of 1985, in the case of the MoF, were formative experiences that were 
accompanied by internal reforms and wide-ranging legislation. The introduction of the 
1975 ‘consumer sovereignty’ directive in the defence establishment and the enactment 
of two major laws in 1985, which vested the MoF with new powers, shaped the course 
of action  and  strategic  preferences  of both  actors  for  many  years  to  come,  thus 
pointing to a certain ‘path dependency’. The IDF showed a clear bias towards having 
readily available resources for short-term objectives, a view it was able to assert by 
virtue of its sheer dominance. The Budget Department and the Accountant General’s 
office, on the other hand, favoured strict enforcement of budgetary discipline, to be 
achieved  by  placing  as  many  checks  as  possible  on  government  spending.  These 
contrasting views inevitably led to bureaucratic in-fighting, in which the state-owned 
defence  firms  at  times  became  embroiled  in  the  power  struggle  over  budget 
allocations between MoD and MoF.
While  this bureaucratic  in-fighting was  gaining momentum,  the  employees’ 
organisations  discreetly  augmented  their  own  power.  Increasing  involvement 
embedded the employees’  leadership in the corporate affairs decision-making chain,
114and they became protagonists of equal importance in the policy process, protected by 
legislation and the courts. The influence of these interest groups was further boosted 
by  exploiting  emerging  opportunities  in  the  political  arena:  first  and  foremost  the 
introduction  of primaries  in  the  main  parties.  This  enabled  the  organisations  to 
establish a formidable power base at the heart of the political system. The combined 
effect  of these  developments  equipped  the  workers  with  an  effective  capacity  to 
undermine, and possibly even to thwart, government policy initiatives.
115CHAPTER 3 
The Path from Success to Crisis
The Israeli defence industry owes its remarkable growth to a combination of policy 
and  circumstances.  In  Israel’s  early  days,  its  policy-makers  encouraged  rapid 
expansion  of  the  defence  industrial  base  due  to  recurring  arms  embargoes  and 
pressing  security  needs.  Over  the  years,  however,  Israel  came  to  realise  that  for 
economic and technological reasons it was unrealistic to strive for self-sufficiency in 
arms production.  Furthermore, the Israeli armed forces ceased to view the domestic 
industry as their preferred supplier, which forced the local industry to direct most of 
its output abroad.
This chapter explores the evolution of the defence industry, starting with the 
security considerations and factors that affected its inception, continues by examining 
the  industry’s  rapid  build-up  during  the  1960s  and  the  1970s,  until  the  domestic 
financial  crises  in the mid-1980s  and  the beginning of the  1990s.  It concludes by 
discussing Yitzhak Rabin’s election as Prime Minister in  1992,  the implications of 
this  for the  domestic  defence  industrial  base  and  the  response  of the  government 
bureaucracy to the enterprises’ looming crises.
Seeking Self-sufficiency in Arms Production
The circumstances that led to Israel’s establishment, its constant struggle for survival 
and  disappointments  with  foreign  suppliers  dictated  the  development  of domestic 
arms  manufacturing  capabilities.  During  the  pre-state  years  and  afterwards  Israeli 
leaders were acutely aware of the imbalance between Israel and its Arab neighbours, 
resulting  from  its  small  territory  and  population,  as  well  as  its  lack  of  natural
116resources. The constant threat to national survival forced the country to seek external 
sources  of weapons  and  military  technology.  It  did  not  have  much  faith  in  the 
goodwill  of  the  international  community,  but  it  sought  to  balance  the  resource 
asymmetry  vis-a-vis  Arab  rivals  by  securing  support  from  big  powers,  and  so 
successive  governments  sought  either  alliance  with,  or  guarantees  from,  major 
Western powers like Britain, France and the US.1
However, initial attempts to buy weapons and warfare-related equipment were 
fraught  with  difficulties,  as  arms  suppliers  were  reluctant  to  develop  a  steady 
relationship. Most of the major arms-supplying countries preferred to sell to the Arab 
states -  mainly for geostrategic reasons, and because of their growing dependency on 
oil -  while Israel lacked both political and economic resources as well as an adequate 
defence industrial infrastructure.
The US, for instance, refused to sell non-defensive equipment to Israel until 
1968 and imposed selective embargoes as part of a policy of neutrality in the Middle 
East, which meant that for many years Israel could not rely on unreserved supply from 
the US.  That policy was reversed during the presidency of John Kennedy, and more 
evidently in the 1970s during the administration of President Richard Nixon, who saw 
the Arab-Israeli conflict through a Cold War prism, with the Middle East as a place to 
win client states and avoid superpower war.3
1   Aharon  Klieman,  ‘Israel  Diplomacy  in  the  Thirtieth  Year  of the  Statehood:  Some  Constants and 
Discontinuities’, in Asher Arian (ed.), Israel a Developing Society (Assen: Van Gorcum,  1990), pp. 
30-49.
2  Rephael  Yakar,  Israel— US  Relations:  The  Aspect  of Arms  Procurement  1955— 1967  (Tel-Aviv: 
Ministry of Defence Unit of Historical Records and Research, 1995) (Hebrew).
3 Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut (‘service notebook’) (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth,  1979), pp. 394-395 
(Hebrew); ‘The Unblessed Peacemaker’, Economist, 4 October 2001.
117In many cases,  dealing with foreign arms suppliers  showed Israel that arms 
sales are largely a continuation of diplomacy by other means. Western governments, 
especially those with a global or regional agenda like the United States, Britain and 
France,  have  all  attempted  to  use  arms  supplies  to  gain  diplomatic  and  political 
concessions. In more than one case, supplying countries have ignored (or sometimes 
unilaterally cancelled) written agreements with Israel, proving yet again that,  when 
challenged by different or new circumstances, governments are committed first and 
foremost  to  their  own  interests.4  Furthermore,  Israel  was  sometimes  trapped  in 
disputes  between  rival  ministries  of  the  same  foreign  governments  over  arms 
procurement deals.5
Frequent  rejections  of Israel’s  requests  for both weapons  and  technologies, 
recurrent  arms  sanctions,  and  intensified  rearmament  by  Arab  nations  during  the 
1960s worried Israeli  decision-makers.  A growing fear that the needs  of the  Israel 
Defence Forces (IDF) could not be met convinced the Israeli leadership to embark on
4 The United States, for example, has reneged  12 formal, binding commitments on arms supplies to 
Israel -  five of them in the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s -  mostly in response to Israeli 
military  and  intelligence  operations.  Source:  Planning  and  Control  Division  -   Israel  Military 
Industries,  ‘The  need  for technological  and manufacturing infrastructure  of heavy ammunition  in 
Israel’, July 1994, annex A (internal briefing document).
5 Three well known cases demonstrated Israel’s difficulties: the Eisenhower administration’s reluctance 
to  sell  arms,  and  specifically Hawk anti  aircraft missiles,  to Israel  in  1960;  the cancelled sale  of 
British Chiefiain tanks in 1969, and France’s refusal to supply high-speed torpedo boats bought by 
Israel  (they  were  smuggled  from  the  Cherbourg  shipyard  at  Christmas  1969).  On  Eisenhower’s 
position and discussions with Ben-Gurion, see Michael Bar Zohar, Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 
1977),  p.  1366  (Hebrew).  On  the  British case,  see  Richard  Crossman,  The  Dianes  of a  Cabinet 
Minister, vol. 3 (London: Trinity Press,  1977), pp. 251, 255, 466-467, 513, 685-686; on the French 
case see Abraham Rabinovich, The Boats of Cherbourg (New York: Seaver Books, 1990).
118developing a broadly based indigenous arms production capability.6 This realisation 
was reinforced by the French decision to halt weapon supplies to Israel in 1967.
The French embargo led the Israeli government to conclude that ‘it would be 
virtual suicide to leave production of vital equipment in non-Israeli hands’,7 and that, 
if Israel wished to retain sufficient political leverage and to do everything necessary 
for its survival, including exercising the right to exercise self defence, it should strive 
for  self-sufficiency  in  arms  supply.  This  led  on  to  a  programme  for  indigenous 
production of advanced aircraft, tanks and naval craft, as well as missiles, electronics
o
and other subsystems.
This decision temporarily settled a debate that had been going on inside the 
Defence Ministry in the  1950s and  1960s.  One camp,  headed by the then Director 
General of the Defence Ministry Shimon Peres and Chief of Staff Lt. General Zvi Zur, 
stressed the importance of self-sufficiency and insisted that most, if not all, necessary 
equipment, including platforms and battle systems, should be produced indigenously.9 
The  other  camp,  led  by  Maj.  General  Yitzhak  Rabin,  preferred  buying  foreign 
equipment that was already available abroad, preferably from the US, and insisted that 
‘the decisive viewpoint in building up a military force must be that of the men who 
employ the arms, not the men who buy or manufacture them’.10 He also held the local 
industry’s achievements in low regard, referring to them as the product of ‘copying,
6 Declassified Foreign and Commonwealth Office/JIC paper, Israel’s Defence Industries, Paragraph 15, 
dated 6 May 1970. Source: Public Records Office, London, Ref. FCO 17/1315.
7 Aviation  Week,  8 October  1979; Dov Goldstein, interview with Gabriel Gidor,  ‘Israeli Aeronautics: 
Thanks to de Gaulle’, Israel Yearbook 1982 (Tel Aviv: Israel Yearbook Publishing,  1982), pp. 255- 
263.
8 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 217.
9 Arens interview; Peres interview; Zur interview.
1 0 Yitzhak Rabin,  The Rabin Memoirs (expanded edition)  (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 
1996), p. 59.
119imitating  or  stealing  foreign  technology’.1 1   Indigenous  defence  industry,  he 
maintained,  should focus on low-risk R&D programmes and be confined mainly to 
maintenance and improvement of subsystems,1 2 a view which was also accepted by 
Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir.1 3
Over the years, Israel developed a dual-track defence procurement policy.  It 
continued  taking  every  opportunity  to  buy  weapons  abroad,  but  it  also  invested 
heavily in establishing a sophisticated defence industry, mostly via hidden reserves in 
the defence budget kept for this purpose outside the reach of the military.14 Several 
considerations were at play: defence equipment manufacturers and associated research 
laboratories  could  give  valuable  logistic  back-up  for  the  IDF  and  could  provide 
solutions for operational problems that were also useful in furthering Israel’s relations 
with  foreign  armies.1 5   In  addition,  advanced,  defence-oriented  research  and 
development  facilities  would  enable  the  defence  industrial  base  to  tailor  existing 
weapons to specific IDF needs and develop new ones not available elsewhere.  Such 
an industry would also generate employment and export income, inspire innovation in 
related civilian fields (see Table 3.1) and help urban development in certain parts of
1 1  Quoted in Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’ s National Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), p. 80.
12 Greenberg, Defence Budget and Military Power, pp. 98-99; Zur interview; Peres interview.
1 3  Zur interview; Inbar, Rabin and Israel’ s National Security, p. 79.
14 Greenberg, Defence Budget and Military Power, p. 152; Yaakov Lifshitz, Defence Economics -  The 
General Theory and the Israeli Case (Tel Aviv: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and Ministry of 
Defence Publishing, 2000), p. 359 (Hebrew).
15 Israel Aircraft Industries developed special insulators for the fuel tanks of the French Mirage aircraft, 
following a leakage problem that forced the Israel Air Force to ground its entire Mirage fleet in 1962. 
Israel  passed  information  on  the  new  product  to  the  French  authorities.  See:  Michael  Meron, 
Memories of the Past (Tel Aviv: self-published, 1999), p. 49 (Hebrew).
120the  country,  contributing  to  the  government policy of population dispersal.1 6  Most 
importantly, reducing dependence on arms imports would make Israel less susceptible 
to embargoes and give it greater operational leeway.1 7  As David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s 
first  Prime  Minister,  asserted  in  his  address  to  Rafael  (the  National  Armament 
Development Authority) employees on 27 June 1963:
We could not put our trust for our existence, security and well being on others. We could 
only do so upon ourselves. And the only way to assure our safety and prevent war is by 
having effective weapons that deter our enemies.1 8
Four considerations guided local development and manufacture of weapons:1 9
•  Political: The refusal of foreign powers to sell critical weapon systems (or the 
breach of contractual commitments to supply battle systems).
•  Economic: The lower cost of domestic production compared to imports, and 
the  ability to  prolong  the  service  life  of combat systems  through upgrades. 
Also, the potential contribution to the national economy of increased domestic 
production volumes and efficiency, which would lead to higher employment 
and contribute to the balance of payments.
1 6 David Ben-Gurion, ‘Army and State’, p.  11; Bonen, Rafael, pp.  152-154; State Comptroller Annual 
Report no.  40 (Jerusalem:  Government  Printer,  1990),  pp.  892-893,  899-900.  In  1967  the  MoD 
bought a defence company -  Ashot,  which  later became  a subsidiary of IMI -  in order to create 
workplaces in the developing coastal city of Ashkelon. See State Comptroller special report on IMI’ s 
incorporation, p. 63. IAI opened a factory in the Golan Heights in the early 1980s, funded by a group 
of investors with backing from the MoD. See Haaretz, 3 June 1999.
17  Peres  interview;  Zeev  Bonen,  The Israeli  Defence  Industry -  Past  and Future,  (Technion,  Yad 
Neeman, 16 February 1994), Lecture transcript, p. 35.
18 Quoted in: Monia Mardor, Rafael (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence Publishing, 1981), p. 353.
19 Declassified official report: Ministry of Defence -  the Office of the Economic Adviser, The Defence 
Industry, 21  November  1972, p. 5, hereafter: The MoD’s  1972 assessment on the defence industry. 
Source:  The  Israel  Defence  Forces  and  Defence  Establishment  Archive,  Tel  Aviv;  Tal,  National 
Security, p. 72; Inbar, Rabin and Israel’ s National Security, p. 79.
121•  Military:  Achievements  of Israeli  developers  that helped  the  IDF  acquire  a 
decisive advantage on the battlefield: for example, in electronic warfare.
•  Strategic:  The  production  of special  weapon  systems  needed  to  facilitate  a 
regional deterrence posture, and which were unavailable from other sources.
Table 3.1: Military research areas that facilitated civilian applications in Israel2 0
Field Subject Contribution/Application
Aeronautics
Electronics
Communication
Electro-optics
Control
Micro-electronics
Computing
Agricultural engineering
Structure and aerodynamics
Radar
Encoding
Image processing
Gimbals control
Sensors & signal processing
Software
Rapid entrenchment
R&D of business jets 
Air traffic control radar 
Cellular phones and networks 
Image processing for printers 
Medical scanners 
Medical equipment 
Internet software 
Mechanized digger
Consequently,  the  Israeli  government  allocated  many  resources  in  order  to
1
establish an independent military industrial base.  A comprehensive knowledge base 
was set up in universities and government laboratories through global networking and 
by applying practices such as reverse engineering, industrial espionage and smuggling 
of specialists and equipment in covert operations.  A classified report, written by the 
US Department of Defence, stated:
The  Israelis  have established  an  intelligence  service  capable  of targeting  military and 
economic targets with equal  facility.  The strong ethnic ties to Israel  present  in the  US 
coupled with aggressive and extremely competent intelligence personnel has resulted in a 
very  productive  collection  effort.  Published  reports  have  identified  the  collection  of
20 Zeev Tadmor, Lecture transcript, Yad Neeman Institute, Technion, September 1997.
2 1  Interview by the author with Maj. Gen. (res.) Israel Tal (Assistant Defence Minister, 1975-2000), 14 
January  1998  (hereafter:  Tal  interview);  interview  by the  author with  Michael  Shor  (IMI’s Chief 
Executive 1972-1990, IMI Chairman, 1990-1991), 30 June 1998 (hereafter: Shor interview).
2~   Amnon  Barzilay,  ‘The  weapon  of the  economy’,  in  ‘One  Hundred  in  Economics’  supplement, 
Haaretz, 15 December 1999, pp. 50-54.scientific  intelligence  in  the  US  and  other  developed  countries  as  the  third  highest 
priority  of  the  Israeli  Intelligence  after  information  on  its  Arab  neighbours  and 
information on secret US policies or decisions relating to Israel.23
The impact of growing investment in the domestic industrial base was quickly 
felt. Local enterprises supplied 62% of Defence Ministry requirements between 1967 
and  1972.24 Over the years,  though,  Israel realised that maintaining a sophisticated 
defence industry base requires significant additional funding, which was beyond the 
nation’s financial ability. This recognition, and the rising costs of new developments, 
highlighted  the  attractions  of  exporting  arms.  Israel  was  quick  to  offer  foreign 
customers operational solutions, based in part on the IDF’s combat experience. These 
proved  highly  successful,  due  to  three  factors:  considerably  shorter  development 
cycles,  involvement  of the  end  user  (IDF  or  foreign  client)  in  the  development 
process, and ground-breaking concepts that revolutionized warfare operations.25
The rapid rise in export revenues -  from $40-70 million in the 1970s to about 
$2.2 billion at current prices, which amounted to about 8% of Israel’s total exports in 
the  late  1990s26 -   subsidised the  R&D  costs  of new  weapons27  and  increased the
23 The report of the US Department of Defence’s Investigations Service (DIS) on Israel appeared with a 
picture of the original document in Haaretz, 31 January 1996.
24 The MoD’s 1972 assessment on the defence industry, p. 1.
25 Yoseph Evron, Defence Industry in Israel (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence Publishing,  1980), p. 336 
(Hebrew);  Eliot Cohen et al., Knives,  Tanks  and Missiles,  (Washington:  Washington  Institute  for 
Near East Policy, 1998), p. 44.
26 Defence News (US) ranked Israel third among top defence exporters, after the US and Russia.  See 
Associated  Press,  19  November  2003;  Yossi  Ackerman,  ‘The  policy  from  the  viewpoint  of the 
privately and publicly owned industry’, in Tov (ed.), Defence and Israel’ s National Economy, p.  128; 
Yaakov Toren, 'The impact of US military assistance on industrial policy', Ibid., p. 104.
27 Author’s interview with Yekutiel Mor (Deputy Director General for international relations,  MoD, 
1992-2003), 9 October 1997.
123MoD’s  disposable  income.28  Strategic  weapons,  including  satellites and long-range 
ballistic missiles, were funded from revenues generated by arms sales to Iran (under 
the  Shah),  South  Africa,  China,  Singapore  and  Chile.29  In many  instances,  export
30 agreements included technology transfers and joint development of weapons.  Such 
cooperation was  risky:  some joint projects resulted in heavy losses,3 1   and  in other 
cases the Israeli MoD discovered that technological knowledge transferred to foreign
32 firms was later used by them to compete against the original Israeli designs.
In most cases, though, Israeli arms exports were highly profitable. Not only 
were  they  important  in  offsetting  Israel’s  trade  imbalance,  they  also  extended  its 
clandestine reach.  Arms sales helped to save Jewish communities  and to maintain 
contacts  with  countries  that  refrained  from  open  relations.  India  and  China,  for
28 Export deals constituted 52% of the MoD’s revenues in 2000. See State Comptroller Annual Report 
no. 52A (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 2003), p. 79.
29  Declassified official reports:  US Central  Intelligence Agency -  Directorate  of Intelligence,  'Africa 
Review',  report dated  8  December  1989, p.  7;  US  Defence Intelligence  Agency -   Directorate  for 
Current Intelligence, 'Defense Intelligence Summary', report dated 6 July 1989 (both obtained in the 
National Security Archive, George Washington University,  Washington DC, section 'South Africa: 
The Making of US  Policy,  1962-1989',  items reference 2566; copies held by author); Haaretz,  17 
July 1994, 23 December 1994, 5 February 1999, 19 October 2000, 16 July 2004;
30  For example,  China was  co-developing its  future  combat  fighter  based  on the technology  of the 
cancelled  Israeli  Lavi  fighter,  see Aviation  Week,  13  March  1995,  pp.  26-27;  Defence  News,  2 
September 1996, p. 6.
31 For example, the 1989 contract to develop the Phalcon Aerial Early Warning aircraft for the Chilean 
air force which brought a $120  million loss to IAI;  see:  Haaretz,  25  April 2000;  Sales of IMI to 
several countries, such as Thailand, were done at a loss were done at a loss. See author’s interview 
with  Brig.-Gen.  (res.)  Yossi  Snir,  IMI  Vice  President  for  Strategy (1992-1996),  30  August 2005 
(hereafter: Snir interview, 2005b)
32 South African firms that received Israeli know-how later used it to compete with equivalent Israeli 
products or as part of systems sold to Arab countries.  See Zeev Schiff,  ‘good and dubious deals’, 
Haaretz, 17 June 1997, and Haaretz, 1 April 1997 and 25 April 2000.
33  Klieman,  Israel’ s  Global Reach: Arms as Diplomacy,  p.  35;  Israel  paid  Sudanese  and  Ethiopian 
leaders with arms to countenance operations to rescue Ethiopian Jews in the 1990s.
124example, established diplomatic relations with Israel only in  1992, after decades of 
secret relations.34 Countries like Yemen,35  Indonesia,36 and  Sri Lanka,37  which still 
have  no  formal  relations  with  Israel,  were  supplied  with  military  systems,  which 
helped  to  maintain  a  level  of dialogue.  Israel  Aircraft  Industries  (IAI)  alone  has 
reported that its client-base reaches over 80 countries, while Israel Military Industries 
(IMI), in its prime, supplied more than 60 foreign armies.38
The availability of foreign weapons sold to Israel was also influenced by its 
technological and industrial capabilities. The more advanced they became, the fewer 
restrictions on arms transfers were imposed, especially by the United States. Although 
Israel gained greater access to the American arsenal as time went by, the US refused 
many Israeli requests  for technology transfers,  on commercial,  political or security 
grounds: electronic warfare systems, advanced-generation air-to-air missiles, infrared
34  Moshe Yegar,  ‘Basic  Factors in Asia-Israel  Relations’,  in Moshe Yegar,  Yosef Govrin and Arye 
Oded (eds), Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  The First Fifty Years (Jerusalem:  Keter Press, 2002), pp. 
534-535. Israel supplied arms to India from 1962. See Haaretz, 6 September 2004.
35 Yemeni soldiers came to Israel for training in the  1960s and were supplied with arms as part of a 
secret pact involving the Yemeni monarchist authorities (who were fighting Egyptian-backed rebels), 
the  Israeli  government  and  also  Britain.  See:  Michael  Bar  Zohar,  Yaacov Herzog:  A  Biography, 
(London: Halban Publishers, 2005), pp. 237-241.
36 Israel sold dozens of Skyhawk aircraft and armoured personnel carriers to Indonesia and carried out 
military  upgrade  programmes.  The  relationship  was  first  acknowledged  publicly  when  Prime 
Minister Rabin visited President Suharto in Jakarta in October 1993; the then energy minister, Moshe 
Shachal, also revealed that Indonesia sold oil to Israel. Another meeting took place between Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres and President Abdurrahman Wahid in Jakarta in August 2000. Indonesia has 
been for many years one of Israel’s main coal suppliers and maintains active commercial links. See 
Yedioth Ahronoth, 22 October 1993, 29 March 2000, 3 November 2003; Michael Shannon, ‘Israel’s 
Asian friend’, Australia-Israel Review, 6 June 1997; Haaretz, 22 May 1998, 17 August 2000.
37 Israel sold Sri Lanka five Kfir combat aircraft and six Dvora patrol boats during the late 1990s; the 
Israeli President, Haim Herzog, visited Colombo in 1986. See: Haaretz, 3 February 1998.
38 1998/1999 IAI’s official calendar; Shor interview.
125detectors and other sensitive components were denied.39 In some cases, like that of the 
MLRS rocket system sold to Israel, the Americans attached operational restrictions.40 
However, as soon as Israel demonstrated it had developed the technology to produce 
similar  weapon  systems,  the  US  lifted  its  export  objections.  Previously  refused 
systems, such as advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (am raam), were offered 
to Israel once the US realised that Israel had similar or better weapon systems 4 1
Patterns of Accelerated Growth
Imported  technology  and  Israeli  innovation jointly boosted  the  defence  industry’s 
growth, which evolved through several stages. It started with small-arms production 
and the maintenance of more complex weapons, followed by licensed production and 
joint ventures, the adoption and upgrading of licensed systems, and local production 
and design of components (see Table 3.2). The French arms embargo of 1967 and the 
aftermath of the 1973 war served as a catalyst for the next phase, namely independent 
design and the production of major weapons systems and platforms, accompanied by 
a significant increase in production capacity. This rapid progress backfired during the 
1990s, as a sharp fall in domestic and foreign demand led the industry to contract and 
focus on producing niche systems and components.42
39 Bonen, Rafael, p. 98; Zur interview.
40 The US banned Israel from using the MLRS system in Lebanon. See Haaretz, 11 February 2000.
41  Interviews  by  the  author  with  Zur,  Dov  Zekheim  (US  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of Defence  for 
Planning and' Resources,  1985-1987, US Under Secretary of Defence, 2001-2004),  19 March 1999 
(hereafter: Zekheim interview), Tal, and Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Horev (Chairman of Rafael,  1995—  
2001), 30 June 1999.
42 The gradual evolution of the Israeli arms industry was a step by step process which resembled that of 
other emerging economies.  See:  David J.  Louscher and Anne Naylor Schwartz,  ‘Patterns of Third 
World  Military Technology  Acquisition’,  in  Kwang-il  Baek,  Ronald  D.  McLaurin  and  Chung-in
126The origins of the Israeli defence industries go back to the  1930s, when the 
Jewish  community  in  mandate  Palestine  was  clandestinely  making  and  repairing 
rudimentary  weapons.  This  secret  network  of  small  factories  was  established  to 
support underground paramilitary organizations opposing British rule in Palestine.43
Table 3.2: Israel’s progress in weapons and military technologies
Decade Product
1940s Hand grenades; submachine guns; mortars, armoured cars
1950s Uzi submachine guns; small arms and ammunition
1960s Fouga Magister jet trainers (licensed production); Gabriel anti-ship 
missiles, Jericho intermediate-range ballistic missiles; first- 
generation non-conventional capabilities
1970s Unmanned aerial vehicles; laser range-finders and designators; Galil 
assault rifles; Reshef  missile boat family; Kfir fighters; 
Merkava tanks; Barak surface-to-air missiles; Popeye air-to- 
ground missiles
1980s Electronic-warfare systems, electronic intelligence and
communication intelligence systems; thermal imaging and 
electro-optical systems; Ofeq reconnaissance satellite family; 
Jericho Mk 2 ballistic missiles; Harpy attack u a v ; Lavi 
fighter (cancelled); secure communication systems; 
deciphering and encoding equipment; short and medium 
range air-to-air missiles; directed-energy weapons; advanced 
armour techniques
1990s Multi-purpose attack UAV; complex composite structures; cyber­
warfare; Arrow anti-ballistic missiles; simulators; electronic- 
warfare systems; communication systems; remote sensing; 
anti-tank guided missiles; cruise missiles; upgrade 
programmes; Merkava tanks (Mks 3 and 4)
Sources: Eliot Cohen et al., Knives,  Tanks and Missiles, p. 44; Kfir and Erez (eds.), Defence Industry; 
Haaretz-, US Institute for Defence Analyses (IDA)
From the late  1940s until the mid-1950s local production focused largely on 
small arms  and  ammunition and  the  refurbishing  of old  weapons -  World  War II
Moon  (eds.),  The  Dilemma  of Third  World  Defence  Industries:  Supplier  Control  or  Recipient 
Autonomy? (Boulder CO: Westview Press,  1989), p. 51.
43  Yoseph  Evron,  Shield and Spear:  The Story of Israel Military Industries  (Tel  Aviv:  Ministry  of 
Defence Publishing,  1992), pp.  13-30.
127surplus -  for use by the IDF. The practice of using available materials for upgrades 
and  for extending  the  life  of weapons  at relatively low  cost was  established,  as  a 
small-arms industry slowly began to take shape. The pre-State underground network 
of arms manufacturing was grouped together as a department within the Ministry of 
Defence  named  Israel  Military  Industries  (IMI).44  At  the  same  time,  an  aircraft 
maintenance facility,  Bedek, was founded in  1953  and became a department in the 
Ministry  of Defence,  specializing  in  maintaining  and  repairing  military  aircraft.45 
Shortly afterwards, the workforce in defence facilities had reached 5,000.46
The second phase, involving licensed production, lasted from 1955 to 1967. A 
confluence of political and military interests led to close cooperation between Israel 
and France, which culminated, among other things, in the Sinai-Suez War of 1956. 
During this period France sold Israel advanced aircraft, armoured vehicles, naval craft 
and other weapons. In addition, it provided the Dimona nuclear reactor, complete with 
a supply of natural uranium to fuel it and the technological knowledge for the Israeli 
ballistic missile programme.  France also agreed to provide technological assistance 
for license production of combat fighters and jet trainers. And all this brought about a 
major advance in local arms capabilities.47
The  Sinai  War  of  1956  brought  a  rapid  increase  in  the  IDF  inventories. 
Additional tanks, jet fighters,  helicopters and new communication systems  led to a 
swift growth of maintenance facilities. The responsibility for R&D was transferred in 
1958 from the Research and Planning Branch of the Ministry of Defence to a separate
44 Evron, Shield and Spear, pp. 100-101, 109-110.
45 Evron, Defence Industry in Israel, p. 407.
46 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 145.
47  Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace (London:  Weidenfeld and Nicholson,  1995), pp.  120-121,  130; 
Evron, The Defence Industry, pp. 389,437.
128unit, Rafael, but it remained part of the Defence Ministry.48 As a national laboratory, 
Rafael was required to address the critical demands of the IDF, including top secret
49 projects.
At the same time, Israel Military Industries (IMI), once a small manufacturer 
of  relatively  simple  components  and  light  arms  embarked  on  new  projects  for 
upgrading artillery platforms  such as battle tanks and self-propelled guns.50  Bedek, 
which changed its name to Israel Aircraft Industries in 1960, turned from an aircraft 
maintenance  and  repair  workshop  into  a  full-scale  manufacturer,  specializing  in 
avionics,  missiles  and  the  assembly  of French jet  trainers.  The  MoD,  meanwhile, 
decided to help in setting up a defence electronics industry.
Under the  guidance  of the  then Director  General,  Moshe  Kashti,  the  MoD 
gave  financial  assistance  to  new  private  companies.  These  focused  at  first  on 
upgrading imported systems and on low-tech products, such as lamps and batteries, 
but soon started developing more sophisticated components.5 1  One of them, Tadiran 
(set up and partially funded by the MoD,  with Koor Industries  as a partner),  later 
became the fourth-largest defence firm after IAI, IMI and Rafael.  Other companies 
greatly assisted by the MoD included El-Op (a small plant that specialised in electro­
optics);52  Elbit  (a joint  venture  established by  Elron  Electronic  Industries  and  the 
MoD  to  supply  electronic  equipment  for  aircraft)  and  ISCAR  (Israel  Carbide),  a
48 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 842.
49 Jane’ s Intelligence Review analysed Rafael’s roles and asserted that it assembles nuclear warheads. 
See  Haaretz,  13-14  November  1994.  In  the  1950s  Rafael  had  already  been  involved  in  secret 
unconventional  projects.  See  Monia  Mardor,  Rafael  (Tel  Aviv:  Ministry  of Defence  Publishing, 
1981), pp.  120-129, and Aluf Benn, ‘The project before the nuclear option’, Haaretz, 2 March 1995, 
p. B3.
50 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 145.
51 Bonen, Rafael, p. 73.
52 Klieman and Pedatzur, Rearming Israel, p. 72; Bonen, Rafael, p. 101.
129company that specialised in metal-working and metal-cutting tools and was contracted 
to  provide jet engine  turbine  blades.53  The  expansion of the  defence  industry was 
reflected  in  the  number  of employees,  which  by  1967  had  increased  to  14,000, 
including 1,700 at IMI and 3,000 at IAI.54
Israel’s  search for qualitative  superiority over its neighbours underlined the 
need for technologically advanced systems. This led to greater resources being made 
available  to  the  defence  sector,  which  quickly became  a major  component  of the 
emerging Israeli economy. In 1966 MoD Director General Kashti presented a detailed 
plan for long-term platform development that was  initially rejected by the General 
Staff, headed by Rabin,55 but it was later accepted after the 1967 French embargo and 
the accelerated expansion of the defence establishment that followed victory in the 
Six-Day War.
The euphoric atmosphere that gripped Israel in those years and the difficulties 
in arms procurement inspired the government to ambitious plans. In 1969 the Cabinet 
decided to produce a locally made fighter aircraft, and in 1970 it approved a plan to 
manufacture an indigenous battle tank (the latter decision being taken after the British 
government in 1969 rescinded its consent to the sale of Chieftain tanks to Israel and 
their license production in its factories.56)
Also  in  1970,  the MoD bowed to  pressure  from  Rafael’s  management and 
changed its designated role  from a predominantly military R&D centre  into a full- 
scale  manufacturer  of  weapon  systems.  This  change  obliterated  the  previous
53 Barzelay, ‘The weapon of the economy’.
54 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p.  146; Foreign and Commonwealth Office/JIC paper, Israel’ s 
Defence Industries, Paragraph 1, 6 May 1970.
55 Greenberg, Defence Budgets and Military Power, pp. 79-80.
56  Ibid.,  p.  81;  Uzi Eilam, L ’ Europe de la Defense,  JCSS  Memoranda no.  75  (Tel Aviv University, 
March 2005), pp. 86-87 (Hebrew).
130horizontal division of function within the  state-owned industrial base,  under which 
Rafael focused on design and research, while IAI and IMI concentrated on production 
and maintenance. Turning Rafael into an arms producer heralded a new era, in which 
the  defence  industrial  base  evolved  vertically,  with  each  of  the  main  defence 
enterprises specialising in certain areas of expertise and taking charge of the whole 
life cycle of their products,  from design,  through production to after-sales care and 
maintenance. Nonetheless, even though Rafael became a producer, competing against 
other firms, it remained under the auspices of the MoD and therefore operated under 
the guidelines of a government department and not as a business entity.57
The combined effect of Rafael’s new status and a steep  rise  in government 
investment  was  a  significant  increase  in  industrial  production  capacity.  The 
expenditure allocated for indigenous production in the metal and electronic  sectors, 
especially within MoD-controlled facilities, increased by 40% year on year between 
1967 and 1971.58 Consequently, the defence industry workforce soared from  14,000 
in  1966 to 34,000 in  197259 -  a rise particularly pronounced at IAI and IMI, which 
grew, respectively, from 4,461  in 1966 to  13,616 in 1972, and from 4,521  in 1967 to 
9,465 in 1972.60
This injection of funding also facilitated the creation and expansion of several 
defence-related companies during this period, most of them privately owned. This was 
part  of a  deliberate  attempt  by  the  MoD  to  increase  the  overall  capability  of the 
defence  industrial  base  to  meet  IDF  operational  demands  that  the  state-controlled 
enterprises were struggling to meet on their own. At the same time, the MoD realised
57 Bonen, Rafael, pp. 43, 83-84,198-199.
58 The MoD’s 1972 assessment on the defence industry, p. 5.
59 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 218.
60 Evron, Defence Industry in Israel, p. 486; Evron, Shield and Spear, p. 178.
131that some defence firms, most notably IMI, had overcapacity problems, as the IDF no 
longer  required  certain  types  of  munitions.  It  therefore  decided  to  offer  excess 
products  to  foreign  customers  through  a  dedicated  export  division,  SIBAT, 
established in  1971.  The new division had two roles: to find prospective clients for 
Israeli weapons and to connect them to Israeli producers.6 1
The defence  firms continued to  expand after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, 
alongside  the  IDF’s  accelerated  process  of  weapons  acquisition  and  personnel 
expansion.  From  1975  the MoD instituted a new policy of competitive bidding for 
development projects, and this spelled a marked change in its attitude to local defence 
firms. An interventionist, central planning approach, in which the MoD directed and 
assigned projects  and  budgets  to  companies,  gave  way  to  the  more  commercially 
oriented  practice  of  approaching  more  than  one  companies  and  encouraging 
competition among several bidders. As more companies offered the same expertise, 
the then MoD Director General, Prof. Pinhas Zussman, believed that by introducing a 
competitive  bidding  process  the  MoD  would  benefit  from  better  and  cheaper 
contracts.62
Despite  a  major  slump  in  sales  to  Iran after the  overthrow  of the  Shah  in 
1979,63 the number of employees in the defence industry was still rising and totalled 
62,000  in  1984,  most of them  organised in  strong  labour organisations  within  the 
state-owned  firms.64  These  organisations  secured  generous  wage  packages  for  the 
employees,  protected  by  rigid  collective  agreements  that  prevented  unilateral  or 
forced dismissal of workers and precluded new workers being hired, or existing ones
61 Barzilay, ‘The weapon of the economy’.
62 Zussman interview; Bonen, Rafael, p. 39.
63 Peri and Neuybach, ‘The Military Industrial Complex’, p. 226.
64 Tov, ‘Israel’s Defence Industries under Changing Circumstances 1984-1990’, p. 639.
132transferred,  without  explicit  approval  by  the  employees’  unions.  These  clauses 
granted them a significant influence over management decisions for years.65
By the late  1980s, Israel’s defence-industrial sector included over  150  firms 
and organisations.66 Most were privately owned, but the state-owned industries were 
the biggest, comprising about 70% of workforce.  In  1987 IAI had 22,000 workers, 
IMI employed 14,000 and Rafael had 6,000. The rest were in Tadiran (12,000), Elbit, 
El-Op,  Soltam and other companies. The defence industrial base (excluding military 
depots and subcontractors) amounted to over 4% of the total workforce and 20% of 
the industrial labour force.67
Industrial Adjustments in the 1990s
Significant events in the second half of the 1980s, namely the economic crisis in Israel 
and the end of the Cold War, had a long-lasting impact on the Israeli defence industry. 
Within a year, from 1989 to 1990, a 35% drop in foreign orders was recorded, and this
zo
trend continued until the mid-1990s (see Figure 3.1).  Contracts with major clients, 
such  as  Germany  and  South  Africa,  finished  while  others  did  not  arrive,  leaving
65 State Comptroller Annual Report no.  45, pp.  819, 878-879;  See Sharon Sadeh,  ‘The restructuring 
process  in the  Israeli  defence  industries’,  in  The Israeli Defence Industry,  Begin-Sadat Centre for 
Strategic Studies,  Studies in National Security no. 9 (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan,  1995), p.  18 
(hereafter: Sadeh, ‘The restructuring process in the Israeli defence industries’).
66 Israel’s Defence Sales Directory (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence Publishing,  1990) quoted at Tishler 
and Rotem, ‘The Reasons for the International Success of Israel’s Defence Enterprises’, p. 475.
67 Kleiman, Israel’ s Global Reach, p.73; Eliot Cohen et al., Knives,  Tanks and Missiles, p. 45; Bank of 
Israel Report for 1997, (Jerusalem: Bank of Israel, 1998), p. 294.
68 Tishler and Rotem, ‘The Reasons for the International Success of the Israeli Defence Enterprises’, p. 
471; the global defence spending declined from $1.2 trillion in 1985 to $868 billion in 1993 was the 
steepest since World War II,  costing the US  alone one million jobs.  See Defense News,  11  April 
1994; The Economist, quoted in the Telegraph (Israel), 16 January 1996.
133Israeli  defence  firms  struggling  with  significant  excess  capacity  and  a  tenured 
workforce.
Figure 3.1
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As  of  1985,  local  defence  expenditure  was  significantly  reduced  as  the 
government tried to rein in hyperinflation through a series of deep cuts in the defence 
budget to the tune of $700-800 million between 1987 and 1992.69 This translated into 
lower procurement from local defence industries, which fell some 50% between 1985 
and  1992.70  Also  cut  were  investments  in  defence  R&D,  reduced  by  two-thirds.7 1  
Instead of buying  from  local  firms,  the  IDF  opted  for American products paid  for 
through the annual US military aid.72
69 Tov, ‘Israel’s Defence Industries under Changing Circumstances 1984-1990’, p. 642.
70 Zeev Bonen, ‘The Israeli Defence Industry: Past and Future’, RUSI Journal (June 1994), p. 56.
7 1  Ibid.
72 IMI’s sales to MoD fell by 45% from an average of $200 million a year between 1982 and 1984, to 
$109  million  a  year  between  1985  and  1988.  See  State  Comptroller  special  report  on  IMI’ s 
incorporation,  p. 17.  During  the  same  period,  IAI  sales  to  the  MoD  dropped  by  22%  from  $641 
million a year to $500 million. See State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 868.
134Indeed, long-term US military assistance -  part of the 1979 peace accords with 
Egypt and standing at around $2 billion a year73 -  exposed deep anomalies  in the 
relationship between the IDF,  the  Ministry of Defence and the  defence industry.74 
During the  1980s the IDF started exercising the principle of ‘consumer sovereignty’ 
in  earnest,  following  the  aforementioned  1975  decision of the  then MoD  Director 
General. Consequently, the IDF’s preferences came to take precedence over the long­
term interests of the domestic industrial base. As the military favoured off-the-shelf 
equipment and objected to vast investments in costly and risky programmes funded 
through the defence budget,75 it gradually allocated less to R&D projects and more to 
the salaries and pension payments of IDF’s career officers (see Figure 3.2). In fact, the 
military R&D budget was cut by 43% between 1986 and 1994,76 while IDF pension 
payments grew by 57% between 1984 and 1994.77
73 Israel is required to use this grant for purchases in the US.  Some observers have suggested that the 
US Government indirectly subsidises its arms-makers in this way. See Yaakov Toren, ‘The Impact of 
the US Aid on the Industrial Policy’, in Tov (ed.), Defence and Israel’s National Economy, p. 103. In 
addition to the geostrategic factors that influenced this arrangement, some senior officers argue that 
another  American  consideration  was  to  ensure  that  Israel  would  be  totally  and  permanently 
dependent on the US for supply of spare parts.  Source: author’s interview with Yossi Snir, 23 June 
1998 (hereafter: Snir interview, 1998). Brig. General (res.) Snir served before joining IMI as Deputy 
Commander of the IDF’s Logistics Branch.
74 The  US restricted the scope  of modifications that  Israel was allowed to make to American-made 
weapons,  prompting  accusations  that  Israeli  dependence  on  American  aid  harms  its  defence 
industries.  See Toren,  ‘The impact of the US aid’, pp.  103-105;  Haim Katz,  ‘The industrial policy 
from the workers’ perspective’, in Defence and Israel’ s National Economy, pp. 125-126.
75 Moshe Arens, ‘Arrow, Ofek, Lavi’, Haaretz, 5 August 2004.
76 State Comptroller Annual Report No. 44 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1994), p. 1028.
77 Ministry of Finance -  Budget Department, State Budget 1998 -  Main Parts (Jerusalem: Government 
Printer, October 1997) and State Budget 2000 -  Main Parts (Jerusalem: Government Printer, October 
1999).
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The  1987 cancellation of the Lavi fighter project, under strong pressure from 
the Israeli Air Force -  which had previously supported it - and the US administration, 
was another turning point in the relationship between the armed forces and the local 
defence industry. The IDF/Air Force preferred the US F-16 aircraft and advocated a 
shift towards developing  ‘smart’  weaponry (e.g.  precision-guided  munitions,  cruise 
missiles and stand-off weapons) in preparation for the future battlefield,78 even though 
senior officials in the Ministry of Defence supported the more expensive Lavi in order 
to boost the country’s defence industrial base and overall technological capabilities.79 
Yitzhak Rabin, Defence Minister at the time, concluded that Israel could not meet the
78 Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, p. 292-298, 388-389.
79 Interview by the author with Lt Gen. (res.) Dan Shomron (IDF’s Chief of Staff, 1987-1991, and IMI 
Chairman, 1991-1995), 4 September 2002 (hereafter: Shomron interview, 2002).aircraft’s  development  costs  -   estimated  at  $2.5  billion  at  the  time80  -   without 
sacrificing  essential  military  requirements  (something  he  opposed)  or  asking  for 
substantial financial support from the United States (which was not forthcoming for 
commercial reasons).8 1   In the absence of available resources and in view of the Air 
Force’s changed position,  Rabin and his Labour party counterpart Shimon Peres (a 
prominent supporter of IAI and also the foreign minister in the Shamir-led National 
Unity Cabinet at the time)  reluctantly supported the project’s termination.  Another 
incentive for cancellation came from American agreement to support Israeli defence 
firms in several ways: the US allowed Israel to convert about 25% of annual military 
aid -  some $475 million -  to Israeli currency for local uses,82 designated ‘to maintain 
the Israeli technological base and preserve its qualitative advantage,’83 and allowed 
US manufacturers to sign industrial buyback agreements with Israeli firms, totalling 
about $500 million a year, as part of the arms deals with Israel.84
Despite  forceful  opposition  from  IAI  workers,  the  government  decided  to
Of
terminate the Lavi programme in 1987.  About fifth of the company’s workforce at
80  Author’s  interview  with  Amos  Rubin  (The  Economic  Adviser to  Prime  Minister  Shamir,  1986—  
1991), 24 August 1998.
8 1   Zekheim interview;  Meron interview;  Yedioth Ahronoth,  26  August  1997;  Maariv,  11  September 
1987.
82 Arens interview.
83 Ivry interview, 1998.
84 David Vaish,  ‘The importance of the US aid to the defence establishment’, in Defence and Israel’ s 
National Economy, pp. 108-112.
85 For further discussion on the background and implications of the Lavi cancellation, see:  ‘The Lavi 
project’s  decision-making  process’  in  State  Comptroller  Annual  Report  no.  37  (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer,  1987) pp.  1291-1325 (Hebrew); Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, pp.290- 
292, 420— 424, 453— 454;  Dov Zekheim, Flight of the Lavi: Inside a US-Israeli Crisis (Washington 
DC: Brassey’s, 1996); Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel, pp.  161-168; Reiser, The Israeli 
Arms Industry, pp. 171-186.
137the time, more than 4,000 workers, were made redundant; the first major workforce 
contraction in the history of the local the defence base.86 It was also the first time that 
the  MoF,  and  not  the  MoD,  administered  such  a  major move  within  the  defence 
industrial base,  which led to direct negotiations between representatives of the IAI 
workers and the Treasury.87 (Defence Minister Rabin became highly involved in this 
process  as  well.  He  lobbied  for  increased  compensation  packages  for  the  IAI 
employees who were made redundant, hoping to minimise in this way the political 
fallout from the projects’ demise.88 He knew that these costs would be covered by the 
state budget, and not through the defence budget.89)
The upshot of the Lavi  cancellation  was  that  the  defence  establishment  no 
longer saw the local defence industries as preferred suppliers to the IDF, as the US 
pledged to back Israel militarily and diplomatically during the peace negotiations in 
the Middle East.90 The local defence enterprises were merely required to guarantee the 
IDF’s qualitative edge through  ‘force multipliers’-  in other words,  to  supply small 
‘smart’ weapon systems that would guarantee superiority on the battlefield and were
86 State Comptroller Annual Report no.  40, pp. 914— 924; State Comptroller Annual Report no.  45, p. 
870.
87  Author’s  interviews  with  Yaakov  Sheffi,  Secretary  General  of IAI  national  workers  organisation 
(1978-1992), 24 June 1998 (hereafter: Sheffi interview).
88  Author’s interview with  Shimon  Sheves,  Director General  and Chief of Staff of the Israel  Prime 
Minister Office (1992-1995), 6 July 2000 (hereafter: Sheves interview).
89 Peretz interview, 1998b.
90 Speech by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the Knesset on 3 October 1994, reprinted in Near East 
Report, Vol. 38, No. 41, 10 October 1994, p.  184; Testimony of the Director of the Defence Security 
Assistance Agency before the House of Representatives’ Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations:  ‘Defence  Department  Testimony  on  US  Aid  to  the  Middle  East’,  United  States 
Information Service, 6 May 1994, p. 1.
138not available from other sources.9 1  However, this revised role depended on sufficient 
funding being available in the defence budget, as became clear soon after the Lavi’s 
cancellation.  Because immediate operational  needs  took precedence over long-term 
procurement,  the  high  level  of activity  after  the  outbreak  of the  first  Palestinian 
uprising {Intifada) in  1987 meant the IDF could not honour the Cabinet’s pledge to 
earmark  $100  million  per  annum92  for  alternative  programmes  at  IAI  and  other 
firms.93 Consequently, local defence firms recorded a 36.5% drop in orders from the 
MoD between 1985 and 1989, which affected their employment (see Figure 3.3).94
Figure 3.3
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At the same time, privately owned defence companies in the electronics and 
software sector gained prominence and spearheaded the local industry. Some of these
9 1  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 910; Lifshitz, Defence Economics -  The General Theory 
and the Israeli Case, p. 362.
92 Israel Cabinet Decision no. 658, ‘The Lavi Project’, 30 August 1987, paragraph III.
93 Interviews with Arens, Trop, 2001 and Ivry,  1997.
94 Speech by David Ivry in the annual  meeting of the Forum for Strategic Thinking with the Defence 
Establishment, March 1990 (transcript).
139companies, which had started as subcontractors to the main state-owned enterprises, 
stepped  into  the  latter’s  traditional  areas  of  expertise,  such  as  unmanned  aerial 
vehicles (uav), upgrade packages and electronics, and showed they could challenge 
the  dominance  of  the  state-owned  sector.95  (Over  the  years,  private  companies 
attracted a larger portion of Defence Ministry orders, from 12% in the late  1960s to 
37.5% in the second half of the 1990s,96 a change facilitated in part by the Mandatory 
Tenders Law.)
The  emergence  of  a  viable  private  defence  sector  prompted  the  Likud 
government  to  accelerate  the  privatisation  of state-owned  firms.  In  July  1991  an 
MoD-appointed  committee  recommended  that  four  companies  -   Elta  (an  IAI 
subsidiary), Ashot (an IMI subsidiary), the retail company Shekem and the jet engine 
maker Bet-Shemesh Engines -  should be fully privatised.97
However,  by the  beginning of 1992  the  state-owned  sector started to  show 
growing  signs  of financial  difficulties  (see  Table  3.3).  Significant  contracts  were 
approaching their end, others were cancelled and new ones were not forthcoming 98 
Attempts to branch out into the civilian market failed spectacularly, inflicting heavy 
losses on the firms involved.99
95  Sela interview; see also interview with Emanuel Gil,  President of Elbit,  in:  ‘The red flag of IAI’, 
Yedioth Ahronoth, 12 November 1993.
96  The  MoD’s  1972  assessment  on  the  defence  industry,  p.  1;  Sharon  Sadeh,  Israeli  Defence 
Procurement (London: SMi Publishing, 1999),  p. 73.
97  State  Comptroller Report on  Organisations  Connected to  the Defence Establishment (Jerusalem: 
Government  Printer,  December  1995),  p.  10  (hereafter:  State  Comptroller  Report  on  Elta’ s 
privatisation efforts).
98 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 871, 877, 910.
99 IMI, for instance, incurred a loss of $40 million in 1991 due to diversification into civilian products, 
while IAI posted a gross loss of $64.7 million between 1990 and 1992, of which $46.6 million was 
accumulated  in  1992.  Meanwhile,  only  1%  of  Rafael’s  sales  between  1989  and  1992  were  to
140Table 3.3: The state-owned defence enterprises in 1991
i  ....wm
Indicator IMI IAI Rafael
Profit (Loss) ($127m) $24 m ($89 m)
Sales $523 m $1,720 m $376 m
Employment 9,115 17,213 6,500
Sales per worker $51,621 $102,200 $57,850
Source: State Comptroller.
Note: figures in constant prices, $1  =fiy2.8 in  1993.
Meanwhile, foreign clients replaced the IDF as the main source of income for 
the domestic  industry.  Of IAI’s  sales,  for example,  80%  was abroad;  IMI exported 
50%  of its products,  and  about a  third  of Rafael’s  sales  went  to  foreign clients.10 0  
Growing dependence on foreign sales  increased the defence  industries’  exposure to 
the cyclical nature of the global arms market and to fluctuations in currency exchange 
rates.  The  latter  factor  eroded  the  firms’  profitability.  The  dollar exchange  rate  in 
Israel  remained  devalued  and  frozen  for  several  years  as  a  result  of  the  1985 
Emergency  Stabilisation  Programme;  however,  public-sector  cost-of-living  wage 
adjustments,  to  which the workers’  salaries were  linked,  increased  in real  terms by 
22%, year on year. This significantly eroded export profits.1 0 1
While  enterprises  in  the  private  sector  handled  their  problems  mostly 
internally  and  with  little  or no  assistance  from  the  Treasury,  the  state-owned  ones 
sought the help of the  government system.  The  Shamir government was  facing  the 
dilemma  of  whether  to  subsidize  hidden  unemployment  and  avoid  further
customers  in  the  civilian  market,  well  below  the  10%  target.  See State Comptroller Annual Report 
no. 45, pp. 821, 843, 875 and subsequent chapters in this dissertation.
100 Lifshitz, Defence Economics, p. 382; Maariv, 24 February 2004.
1 0 1  State Comptroller special report on I  M i’ s incorporation, p.  18.
»
141confrontations  with  the  workers,  or  to  tackle  these  firms’  problems  head  on  by 
streamlining  their operations  and workforce.  However,  the  Prime  Minister did not 
tackle the issue head on. According to then Defence Minister Arens, Shamir did not 
consider making reforms and structural changes in the defence  industrial  sector an 
essential policy goal.102  Facing general elections in mid-1992, he therefore left this 
matter unaddressed, effectively leaving it for the next government to handle.
Putting the Defence Industry on the Government Agenda
In June 1992 the Labour party narrowly beat Likud and returned to sole power for the 
first  time  in  fifteen  years  (from  1984  to  1990  it  had  been  part  of national  unity 
governments  with  Likud).  Its  victory  owed  as  much  to  rising  unemployment,  a 
collapsing health system, a severe housing shortage and disintegrating pension funds 
as  to  deteriorating  internal  security  and  growing  strains  in  relations  with  the  US 
(which  had viewed  the  previous  government  of Yitzhak  Shamir as  an obstacle  to 
regional  peace).  Incoming  Prime  Minister  Yitzhak  Rabin,  interpreting  Labour’s 
success as his own personal victory, moved swiftly to assert his control103 and made it 
clear from the outset that he intended to be a strong leader, not merely ‘first among
102 Arens interview.
103 Haaretz, 28 June 1994,3 July 1995; Marvin Feuerwerger, ‘Israeli-American Relations in the Second 
Rabin Era’, in Robert Freedman (ed.), Israel under Rabin (Boulder CO: Westview Press,  1995), pp. 
10- 11.
142equals’.104 This intention was clear from his victory speech, in which he declared that 
he would assume greater powers.105
Furthermore,  Rabin was  determined  to  redefine  Israel’s  strategic  goals  and 
decisively  tackle  its  lingering  economic  problems.  He  advocated  a  reordering  of 
national priorities: more spending on education, transport infrastructure and fighting 
unemployment,  and less  investment in the West Bank and Gaza  settlements.106 He 
assumed that by spearheading the peace process negotiations and improving Israel’s 
position in the world, both politically and economically, he would be able to reduce
•  •  •  107 its defence spending and free more resources for other priorities.
In  view  of the  Iraqi  defeat  in  1991  and,  above  all,  unwavering  American 
backing -  viewed by the IDF as the most significant deterrence against possible Arab 
aggression108  -  he believed Israel was enjoying a rare  window  of opportunity that
104 Arian, Nachmias and Amir, Executive Governance in Israel, pp.  137-138; Myron Aronoff, ‘Labour 
in  the  Second  Rabin  Era:  The  First Year of Leadership’,  in  Robert  Freedman  (ed.),  Israel  under 
Rabin, pp. 129-142.
105 David Horovitz (ed.),  Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of Peace (London: Peter Halban,  1996), p.  111. After 
the poll on 23 June 1992, which showed a Labour victory forthcoming, Mr Rabin told his supporters 
there  could  be  no  responsibility  without  authority  first  being  granted  to those  who  assume  such 
responsibility:  ‘Therefore / will handle the coalition negotiations as soon as the final election results 
are known.  And I will decide who will be ministers. There will be no horse trading’.  See  Yedioth 
Ahronoth, 24 June 1992.
106 See The Government’s Basic Policy Guidelines, Clause III,  ‘The changing of national priorities’, 
Records of the Knesset, vol. 1, 13th Knesset, p. 59. See also speech by Yitzhak Rabin, Records of the 
Knesset,  vol.  1, session no.  1,  ‘The Construction of Government and its Structure,’  13 July 1992, p. 
10.
107 Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, ‘Regional Trends in Security: Threats and Solutions’, in Tov (ed.), Defence 
and Israel’s National Economy, p.  145. Ben-Eliezer served as defence minister (2001-2002); Gilad, 
interview 1997 and author’s interview with Nir Gilad, 5 November 2001 (hereafter: Gilad interview, 
2001);  Tishler  and  Rotem,  ‘The  Reasons  for  the  International  Success  of  Israel’s  Defence 
Enterprises’, p. 475; ‘The most expensive battle of all’, Jerusalem Post, 20 August 1999.
108 Author’s interview with Maj.-Gen. (res.) Matan Vilnai, Deputy Chief of Staff (1994-1998), 25 June 
1998.
143allowed him to take some calculated risks.109 To Rabin, Israel’s security and economy 
were  interdependent,  and  he  decided  to  place  economic  reform  at  the  top  of his 
agenda.110
On 13 July 1992, when he was officially sworn in as Prime Minister, he said 
his Cabinet would increase economic growth by  ‘adapting our economy for “open” 
management, free of bureaucratic restrictions and excessive government intervention. 
There is too much paperwork and not enough productive work’.1 1 1   To  that end, he 
endorsed a string of economic reforms and also headed the Ministerial Privatisation 
Committee.  This  Committee  approved  the  most  significant  acts  of privatisation  in 
Israeli  history112  and  ultimately  achieved  a  substantial  reduction  in the  number of 
government-owned companies, selling approximately $1 billion worth of government 
assets, including banks and large companies in the first year of Rabin’s premiership 
alone.113
These  achievements  were  no  mean  feat,  considering  that  his  coalition 
consisted  of only  62  members  of Knesset  (out  of  120)114  and  that  his  popularity
109  Author’s  interview  with  Dr.  Gabi  Komisar  (IMI  Chief  Executive,  1991-1995),  11  June  1998 
(hereafter:  Komisar interview).  See also Horovitz (ed.),  Yitzhak Rabin:  Soldier of Peace, pp.  107- 
108;  Labour  Party  Manifesto  for the  13th  Knesset,  1992,  pp.  15,  17,  19;  interview  with  former 
foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, in Haaretz, 16 January 2006.
110 Flato interview.
1 1 1   Rabin Memoirs,  Appendix  B,  ‘Address to the  Knesset by  Prime  Minister  Rabin  introducing his 
Government, 13 July 1992’, p. 391.
112  Shlomo  Eckstein,  Shimon  Rozevich,  Benzion  Zilberfarb,  Privatisation  of Public  Enterprises  in 
Israel and Abroad (Jerusalem: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1998), pp. 169, 172-173 (Hebrew).
113 Myron J. Aronoff,  ‘Labour in the Second Rabin Era: The First Year of Leadership’, in Freedman 
(ed.), Israel Under Rabin, p. 135.
114 When it was first formed, Rabin’s government was supported by 62 coalition members (44 Labour, 
12 Meretz and 6 Shas) and another five Members of Knesset from outside the coalition.
144plummeted  from  60%  to  42%  in  his  first  100  days  in  office.115  However,  Rabin 
managed  to  maintain  sufficient  political  cohesion,  despite  his  small  coalition,  by 
constructing a Cabinet in which his Labour party played a dominant role: it held 13 of 
the  17 portfolios in  1992.  (This was similar to Rabin’s  1974 government,  in which 
Labour held 16 out of 19 portfolios in a coalition totalling 61 seats only.116)
Rabin’s drive to reduce government ownership stemmed from his belief that 
governments  were  not  capable  of  running  businesses117  and  that  state-owned 
industries were by definition inefficient and loss-making -  and this included the state- 
owned defence enterprises: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Israel Military Industries 
(IMI)  and  Rafael.  Indeed,  Rabin  publicly  asserted  that  the  realisation  of  how 
successive IMI managements had ‘relied on government handouts instead of tackling 
their  problems  by  themselves’  reaffirmed  his  contention  that  ‘all  state-owned 
companies  should to  be privatised’.118  But  Rabin  also  realised that,  to  make  these 
organisations economically viable,  the government needed to address some of their 
financial  and  labour  deficiencies.  ‘Rabin  had  this  lingering  feeling  that  we  were 
lacking  proper  administrative  tools  for  efficient  management  of  the  state-owned 
defence enterprises,’ noted David Ivry.119 Above all, these firms should become more 
business-oriented, accountable and responsible for their own actions, and should stop 
regarding  government  ownership  as  a  safety  net  to  soften  the  blow  of  failure.
115 Ibid., P. 137.
116 Figures taken from Arian, Nachmias and Amir, Executive Governance in Israel, p.  112.
117 See quote from Rabin, dated 18 September 1995, noted in special supplement on Rabin, Globes, 10 
November 1995, p. 14.
118 Rabin, speech at an Israeli Management Institute conference, quoted in Mabat, 17 November 1992.
119 David Ivry,  quoted in ‘Shalom,  Haver’, a booklet in memory of Yitzhak Rabin, published by the 
workers’ union of the MoD, 5 December 1995, p. 5.
145Government ownership should be a purely technical matter, and, just like any private
120 shareholder, the state should demand and expect a profit.
Rabin  also  believed  that  the  defence  firms’  continuing  losses  were 
increasingly  unsustainable  and  would  jeopardise  other  long-term  interests:  for 
instance, the funding of arms for the IDF.1 2 1  Former US Under-Secretary of Defence 
Dov Zekheim, who negotiated with Rabin the termination of the Lavi project, said in 
an interview with the author that ‘Rabin was very frustrated by the ability of the state- 
owned industry to dictate in effect what the state was going to  do.’  Rabin felt that 
military priorities had become secondary to those of the industries, which meant that 
the ‘[the firms’] trade unions were starting to distort decisions that actually were made 
on  the  basis  of defence  efficiency’.  Rabin,  he  noted,  ‘opposed  any  kind  of non- 
germane,  exogenous  matters  in the  decision-making  of resource  allocation’,  being 
acutely aware that resources were limited, while the military threat was ever-growing
122
and changing in nature.
The firms’  ability to influence policy decisions was attributed partly to then-
sheer size. Rabin’s Head of Prime Minister Bureau and one of his senior aides, Eitan
Haber,  noted  that  ‘Rabin  detested  the  bloated  structure  of  the  state-owned 
1 enterprises’  and wanted ‘to sort them out’ without fear or favour. Former Defence 
Minister Moshe Arens, asserted that Rabin felt ‘outright hostility’ towards the state- 
controlled enterprises,124 and this attitude was reflected in his estranged and highly
120 Flato interview; author’s interview with David Brodet (Director of Budget Department, Ministry of 
Finance,  1991-1994;  Director  General,  Ministry  of Finance  1994-1997),  2  July  1999  (hereafter: 
Brodet interview).
121 Komisar interview. See also Chapter 4.
122 Zekheim interview.
123 Haber interview.
124 Arens Interview.
146critical approach towards them. Ivry offered a different perspective: ‘Rabin valued the 
output  of  the  defence  firms,  their  R&D  output  and  the  quality  of  their  human 
resources ...  [but] he was also very frustrated at the innumerable administrative and 
legal difficulties that thwarted many of his attempts to resolve their problems and run 
them more efficiently’.125
Known  for his  straight  talking,  Rabin shared his  frustration with the wider 
public.  He  remarked  in  1992:  ‘There  is  no  escape  other  than  restructuring  and 
adjustment in the government defence firms. They must undergo a painful operation
1  9 A in order to cut them down in size.’  In 1994 he said:  ‘The defence firms should not 
exist at the expense of the IDF ... I am prepared to hand them over for free to anyone 
who would be willing to take and manage them’.127
As former chief of staff, ambassador to Washington and defence minister in 
the  National  Unity  Governments  between  1984  and  1990,  Rabin  had  first-hand 
knowledge of the problems facing the state-owned defence firms.128 More than other 
Israeli leaders, he questioned the need to build a large local infrastructure to produce 
military equipment -  in 1969, he objected to the development of the Kfir aircraft but 
was  overruled129  -   and  on  several  occasions  criticised  the  abilities  of  Israeli
11 ft
scientists.  His preference was to buy completely developed arms and systems off
125 David Ivry, quoted in ‘Shalom, Haver’, p. 5.
126 Rabin speech at Israeli Management Institute conference, quoted in Mabat, 17 November 1992.
127 Rabin speech to Jewish activists in New York, quoted in Haaretz, 18 December 1994.
128 Defence Minister Rabin commented in 1988 that ‘the state of Rafael results from its structure, which 
combines a research institute and a production factory. This state of affairs cannot be dragged on for 
long.’ See State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 857.
129 Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry, p. 103.
130 Such were his doubts that in 1965, during one of his first visits to Rafael after being appointed Chief 
of Staff, Rabin cancelled a project to develop an airborne warning system because he doubted that it
147the  shelf,  preferably  US-made.  In  the  rare  cases  where  he  approved  indigenous 
programmes  he  insisted  on  being  convinced  that  they  were  within  the  Israel’s 
financial  means.  (He  endorsed  the Lavi  project  at  the  beginning  of his  tenure  as 
Defence Minister in 1984 after receiving detailed assessments of its contribution and 
costs. He withdrew his support as soon as he realised that the end user, the Air Force,
131 rejected the project, and that its costs were more than Israel could afford.  )
Rabin also thought that maintaining a close military relationship with the US 
earned Israel security and diplomatic dividends far greater and more important than 
the contribution made by local defence firms.132 He therefore maintained that Israeli 
weapons manufacturers should specialise only in adapting imported weapons to the 
specific needs of the IDF,  whereas the MoD had traditionally favoured indigenous
133 weapons projects.
Despite  clear  indications  of the  defence  firms’  deteriorating  condition,  no 
previous  government  (including  governments  in  which  Rabin  had  been  Defence 
Minister)  had  formulated  and  executed  concrete  policies  for  improving  the 
management of the state-owned defence industries.134 Now, as holder of the defence
could be successfully completed. See Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’ s National Security (Baltimore 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 80.
1 3 1  Meron interview.
132 Komisar interview. Dr. Komisar argued that Rabin and other prime ministers insisted on keeping the 
US  military aid,  despite  its negative  consequences  for local  Israeli  industry,  because  it ensured  a 
steady supply of aircraft and battle tanks  which was crucial  for Israel’s operational readiness and 
strategic  deterrence.  For  discussion  on  Rabin’s  position  vis-a-vis  the  US,  see  Rabin,  The Rabin 
Memoirs, pp.  122-123; Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster,  1999), 
pp. 374-382,458— 459; and Inbar, Rabin and Israel’ s National Security, pp. 34— 57,168.
133 Inbar, Rabin and Israel’ s National Security, pp. 79-81.
134 State Comptroller Annual Report no.  45,  pp.  863,  918.  In  1989,  Rabin appointed a committee to 
resolve Rafael’s structural problems (the Yurtner committee) and endorsed its proposed solution, but 
did nothing to implement it. See Ibid., p. 855.portfolio, as well as Prime Minister -  he believed combining the two posts ensured 
greater authority, cohesion and civil control in military affairs and fewer openings for 
disagreement within the defence establishment135 -  Rabin decided to put the  state- 
owned enterprises in order and gave the issue a high priority.136 He opted for a hands- 
on approach -  discussing their problems personally every Thursday and Friday137 -  
and called for a major overhaul in the firms’ affairs, even at the cost of conflict with 
their management  and unions.  He  felt  that  this  attitude  would maintain his  public 
image  as a  ‘doer’,  a politician who  kept his promises to  the  voter.138  To  that end, 
Rabin  spent  many  hours  pondering  ways  to  ensure  that  the  defence  enterprises 
employed the best possible business practices.139
However, Rabin was reluctant to confront all three defence firms head-on and 
at the  same  time.  A few months  after the  Labour party came  to power Nir Gilad, 
Deputy Head of the Budget Department at the Finance Ministry,  suggested that the 
government should deal with all three in one go by merging them into a single entity. 
Rabin rejected the idea.140 ‘I have three problematic firms to handle,’ he said.  ‘Why 
should we turn them into a one big problem?’1 4 1   His first major decision, therefore, 
was  to  treat  the  defence  enterprises  individually  and  sequentially:  IMI,  IAI,  and 
finally Rafael. ‘The reason for that was simple: had he tried to alter their structure and 
operations simultaneously,  their strong unions would have joined forces to foil any
135 Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, pp.  172-173.
136 Eitan Haber, quoted in ‘Shalom, Haver’.
137 Deputy Defence Minister Mordechay Gur, answering opposition members’ questions in Knesset, 14 
July 1993, Records of the Knesset, vol. 36, p. 6689. On the last Friday before his murder, Rabin spent 
three hours debating Rafael. See interview with Haber in ‘Shalom, Haver’, p. 9.
138 Flato interview.
139 David Ivry, quoted in ‘Shalom, Haver’, p. 5.
140 Gilad interview, 2001.
1 41 Quoted in Haaretz, 17 January 1996.
149meaningful  step,’  explained Rabin’s  chief economic  adviser,  Ilan Flato.142  For this 
reason,  a proposal  to  combine  the  three  state-owned  firms  under a  single  holding 
company was dropped because it would have focused significant political influence in 
the hands of the employees’ organisations without producing meaningful and tangible 
business advantages.143
Nevertheless,  the  Finance  Ministry’s  Budget  Department  kept  raising 
suggestions for a complete overhaul in the defence sector, preparing internal papers 
for  discussion  with  Prime  Minister  Rabin.  The  Department  argued  that  the  state- 
owned  industry  had  become  bloated  and,  thanks  to  government  subsidies  and 
protectionist practices, was characterized by waste and duplication. It pointed out that 
Israel,  with  its  limited  resources,  had  two  companies  upgrading jet  fighters,  three 
producing uav, three producing missile and rocket engines, and four making avionics 
and  electronic  warfare  equipment.144  By  contrast,  Britain  had  only  one  missile 
manufacturer, which was part of a joint venture with a French company.145 And lower 
efficiency in the state-owned industry meant that average  sales per employee were 
around $40,000, well below the $100,000  level of comparable industries in the US 
and Europe.146
142 Flato interview.
143 Tov, The Price of  Defence Power, p. 202.
144  Ministry of Finance -  Budget Department, Reorganisation of the State-owned Defence Industry, 
June 1994 (internal document); Gilad interview, 1997.
145 Aviation  Week,  10  April  2000;  author’s  interview  with  Lord  Levene,  21  November  1997.  Lord 
Levene was Chief of Defence Procurement, UK Ministry of Defence (1985-1991) and consulted the 
Israeli government in 1993 on privatising the defence industry.
146  Speeches  by  Nir  Gilad  and  Yoseph  Ackerman  (CEO  and  President,  Elbit  Systems),  Herzliya 
Conference 4,  16 December 2003 (Hebrew), The Report of the Working Committee on the Future of 
the Defence Industries, http://www.herzlivaconference.Org/  Uploads/l 180defensindust.pdf (accessed 
11 January 2005); Ackerman, in Tov (ed.), Defense and Israel’ s National Economy, p. 129.
150Influenced by major restructuring and merger plans in Europe and the US, the 
MoF  explored various  options,  ranging  from a  ‘grand  merger’  of the  entire  state- 
owned defence  industrial base  (including  the  IDF’s  logistic  centre)  under a  single 
holding company, to a smaller-scale plan involving the creation of a new company 
based  on  a  merger  of  IMI  and  Rafael.147  A  third  proposal  suggested  that  the 
government appoint a trustee to manage and privatise IAI and IMI with the help of a 
$2-billion budget; the idea was discussed by the Defence Minister Rabin and Finance 
Minister Avraham Shochat but was eventually shelved.148
Bureaucratic Infighting
While the political echelon was pondering its options, a behind-the-scenes debate was 
raging. The growing losses of the three major state-owned firms posed a dilemma for 
both ministries  involved,  the MoD and the MoF:  which of the  two  should assume 
responsibility and should shoulder these losses? Would they be covered in the defence 
budget (which might destabilise the structure and operations of the army149) or the 
state budget (which might undermine the MoF’s macroeconomic objectives)?
The  Ministry  of Finance  placed  responsibility  squarely  on  the  defence 
establishment.150 It argued that the IDF had been the main beneficiary of the defence 
industries’  innovations,  and the  MoD was  in charge  of their growth and direction. 
However,  over the  years  the  defence  establishment had behaved  irresponsibly,  the 
MoF’s  Budget  Department  claimed,  by  encouraging  duplicate  infrastructure  and
147 Ministry of Finance -  Budget Department, Reorganisation of  the State-owned Defence Industry.
148 Tov, Price of  Defence Power, p. 202.
149 Note, for example, the warning by the financial adviser to the Chief of Staff: ‘The Rafael’s deficit, if 
imposed on the defence budget, will destroy the army’, Haaretz, 29 November 1995.
150 This section is based on Gilad interview, 1997.
151funding identical centres of research, maintenance and production, internally as well 
as externally, in excess of Israel’s actual needs. This was done because, with a rigid 
cap placed on the defence budget,  the defence establishment assumed it would get 
more for its money through competitive bidding.
Over the years, the MoF argued, as the defence budget’s share of government 
consumption expenditure remained stagnant,  and even became  smaller -  in  1986 it 
amounted to  fOJ25.98  billion,  and  in  1995  it was  down to  1DJ24.62  billion,  in  1995 
prices1 5 1  -  the military also had to cope with internal changes which were beyond its 
control:  on the one hand,  the costs  of locally made weapons,  paid  from the  local- 
currency  ingredient  of the  defence  budget  (also  used  to  pay  for  salaries,  defence 
imports and rehabilitation costs) increased; on the other hand, the labour cost of IDF 
personnel increased as well, due to general increases in the public sector to which it 
was linked.  Other built-in costs,  such as rehabilitation of disabled soldiers, grew as 
well. The military therefore had less money available for R&D and arms procurement 
from local sources, as it needed to allocate more funding for salaries and day-to-day 
tasks.152
151 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel No.  49,  1998, (Jerusalem: Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 1998), pp. 6-12, 6-13.
152 Gilad interview, 1997.Figure 3.4A
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According  to  MoF  officials,  the  defence  establishment  felt  trapped:  it  was 
basically given the same budget, but the size and proportional weight of its internal 
ingredients changed (see Figures 3.4A and 3.4B). The solution it adopted came at the 
expense  of the  state-owned  firms:  the  IDF  diverted  arms  orders  to  the  US  (paid 
through US annual military aid) and reduced the budgets for R&D and procurement 
from domestic  sources;  in this way it could increase its budgetary leeway and free 
more money  for internal needs,  such as  salaries and rehabilitation costs.  The MoF 
therefore  concluded  that,  because  the  defence  establishment controlled  the  internal
153distribution  of  its  budget  and  was  partially  responsible  for  the  decrease  in  the 
enterprises’ revenues, it was incumbent upon it to reprioritise its internal preferences: 
for example, reducing the number of in-house IDF logistic units -  which in essence 
provided services that could be outsourced, at lesser cost, from external suppliers such 
as the state-owned firms.153
The Ministry of  Defence rejected these claims, arguing that the MoF itself was 
chiefly  responsible  for the  defence  firms’  difficulties.  Labour costs  in these  firms 
increased well  beyond their financial means,  senior officials argued,  as a result of 
decisions  taken  by  the  MoF,  and  the  MoD  had  no  control  or  leverage  over  this. 
Determining labour costs in the public sector had rested solely in hands of the MoF’s 
Wage and Labour Accord Unit, which approved the sector’s salary raises as part of its 
annual wage negotiations with the Histadrut.  These rises had a direct effect on the 
state-owned  defence  enterprises,  whose  collective  labour  agreements  required 
management to  increase the workers’  salaries on a par with the rises in the public 
sector,  irrespective  of  their  actual  business  performance.  Consequently,  they 
experienced a sharp rise in running costs, a phenomenon that was acutely felt in the 
MoD-funded Rafael. Indeed, over the years, Rafael’s labour costs reached 70% of its 
total revenues, at IMI the figure was approximately 65% and at IAI about 50%.154
The then MoD Director General, David Ivry, argued the problem of the firms 
in question stemmed from their inability to control labour costs. In interview with the 
author he noted that ‘because we [the MoD] did not have full control and authority 
across the full sphere of management [in those firms], we could not have, and should 
not have, been responsible for these firms’. Ivry noted that ‘the MoF expected us to
153 Gilad interview, 1997, Fogel interview, and Brodet interview, 1999.
154 Sadeh, ‘The restructuring process in the Israeli defence industries’, p. 18.
154chip in and cover the costs of a problem which was not of our making and over which 
we had no control in the first place -  all these pay rises in the public sector -  so under 
no circumstances could we have accepted any responsibility’. He argued that the MoF 
was  less  concerned  about  the  state-owned  defence  industrial  base  than  about  the 
accomplishment  of  two  long-sought  objectives:  undermining  exclusive  military 
control over the defence budget, and forcing the MoD to make significant pay cuts in 
its  salary  base.155  As  to  the  MoF  suggestions  about  the  defence  establishment’s 
maintenance and logistic centres, the MoD maintained that it required these centres 
for operational reasons. Furthermore, the MoD mitigated the reduction in orders from 
local  industries  by  granting  them  more  export  licences  and  promoting  R&D 
agreements with foreign clients.156 Eventually, the MoD won the argument -  Prime 
Minister  Rabin  insisted  on  keeping  the  defence  budget  intact  during  the  peace
i en
negotiations  -  and the MoF was assigned to cover the enterprises’ expenses through 
the state budget.158
Conclusions
The main catalyst for the growth of the defence industrial base was the realisation 
that,  despite  the  traumatic  experience  of the  Holocaust,  Israel  was  still  subject  to 
existential  threats  from  the  Arab  world.  This  led  to  a  psychological  as  well  as  a 
material institutionalisation of the ‘Centrality of Security’ concept, an approach then 
strengthened by arms embargoes and foreign suppliers breaking agreements.
155 Ivry interview,  1998.
156 Ibid.
157 Flato interview; Rabin’s quote of 12 September 1995, in Globes, 10 November 1995.
158  Author’s  interview  with  Avraham  Shochat  (Finance  Minister  1992-1996,  1999-2001),  26  June 
1998 (hereafter: Shochat interview).
155Consequently,  Israel’s  policymakers  allowed  rapid  expansion  of the  state- 
owned arms industries and initiated production of indigenous state-of-the-art weapons 
systems  in  response  to  foreign  embargoes.  Significant  government  investments 
created a formidable state-controlled defence industrial base that grew well beyond 
the IDF’s operational needs. Even so, its production capabilities were supplemented 
by companies in the private sector, which were partially funded by the MoD -  and 
thereby the MoD sowed the seeds of future rivalry between these two segments.
Further  enlargement  of the  defence  industrial  base  took  place  in  the  early 
1970s. Rafael became the third arms-producer, after IAI and IMI, a change which also 
gave rise  to  increasing competition and duplication of expertise  and infrastructure. 
Gradually  the  defence  firms  came  to  comprise  the  biggest  manufacturing  and 
technological segment of Israel’s industrial sector, employing tens of thousands, most 
of them organised in strong unions.
Just as the close relationship between government, military and defence firms 
reflected a confluence of interests, decisions and events, so too did the eventual crisis 
that  splintered  it.  A  series  of  policy  events  and  geopolitical  developments, 
unconnected to each other, gradually brought the relationship to a head, as it became 
clear  that  the  Israeli  economy  was  unable  to  sustain  or  maintain  such  a  labour- 
intensive industrial base indefinitely.
The  MoD’s  1975  decision  to  grant  the  military  full  control  over the  arms 
spending budget, and easier access to US weapons arsenal following the 1979 peace 
treaty  with  Egypt,  gradually  shifted  the  IDF’s  procurement policy and  effectively 
ended the  industry’s  raison  d ’etre.  It  also  deprived  the  Israeli  firms  of their most 
important client and  sales promoter.  The  financial difficulties that hit Israel  in the 
mid-1980s,  which caused a massive reduction in MoD orders from local industries
156and revamped Israel’s macroeconomic objectives, showed that the country could no 
longer afford to develop major combat platforms. This was further underlined when 
the government cancelled the Lavi fighter project in 1987, which signalled a transition 
to the development of niche systems, in the form of ‘force multipliers’, for the IDF.
The MoD did indeed temporarily alleviate the  impact of the IDF’s  shift of 
platform procurement by granting the defence firms more export permits, which led to 
a rapid rise in their revenues in the 1980s. This source of income partially subsidized 
the  development  of new  weapons  and  compensated  for  further  sharp  cuts  in  the 
domestic  R&D budget.  No  less  important,  the  export  revenues  helped to  maintain 
inflated employment  levels  in the  government-owned  defence  firms,  albeit not for 
long. The simultaneous drop in domestic and foreign orders at the beginning of the 
1990s revealed the industry’s vulnerability. (See later chapters for further discussion, 
in the context of individual firms).
Financial  gains  obtained  during  the  successful  export  years  were  quickly 
consumed by the  firms’  bloated workforces  and loss-making projects.  Profitability 
plummeted, due to redundant production lines and exaggerated overheads. The sharp 
drop in sales and orders caused deep shortfalls in cash flow. At this point, it became 
clear that the MoD could no longer bear financial responsibility for this situation. Any 
attempt to shift funding from its shrinking defence budget to helping the ailing state 
firms  would come  at  the  expense  of vital  security tasks  and  could undermine  the 
military’s operational capabilities. That was inconceivable and unacceptable. Further, 
the IDF’s General Staff had other pressing concerns, such as retaining quality career 
officers by means of pay increases, and this stressed its inward-looking approach.
Therefore, and in a marked departure from its historic role, the MoD no longer 
viewed itself as the sole ‘custodian’ responsible for the viability of these enterprises.
157To do so might rob it of resources vitally needed for its ultimate and primary role: 
providing for the defence of Israel’s security by military means. The upshot was that, 
for the first time in their existence, the state-owned defence firms were left without 
Defence  Ministry  backing,  entangled  in  inherent  structural  and  managerial 
deficiencies that threatened their very existence.  Meanwhile bureaucratic  infighting 
between the Defence and Finance Ministries -  each refusing, for its own reasons, to 
assume ultimate financial responsibility for the defence firms -  created an ‘authority 
vacuum’  that compounded their problems.  No  one,  it seemed, was willing to tackle 
these problems head on.
Enter Yitzhak Rabin, who for many years had observed and been in charge of 
the defence industrial base, both as Defence Minister and Prime Minister. Rabin was a 
significant strategist, and he realised that Israel’s economic future was closely tied up 
with his own peace-making:  the more progress he made with the latter, the easier it 
would  be  to  secure  the  former.  Striving  to  change  national  investment  priorities, 
Rabin assumed that the way to alleviate the security burden -  which, in turn, would 
free  much-needed  resources  for honouring  his  campaign  promises -   was  to make 
significant progress on the Middle East peace process.
Tackling  what  Likud  governments  had  neglected  for  years  -   reducing 
unemployment,  reinvigorating  the  education  system  and  modernising  the  transport 
and communication infrastructures -  also  required a bold departure  from  Labour’s 
Socialist origins, and particularly from the idea of a state-controlled economy.  This 
last  point  was  fundamental  to  the  handling  and  recovery  of  the  ailing  defence 
industrial base, which was hampered by restrictive public-sector practices.
It  was  no  easy  task,  but,  by  holding  the  dual  role  of Prime  Minister  and 
Defence Minister and by maintaining cohesion and political discipline in his Labour-
158dominated Cabinet,  Rabin  stood the best chance  yet  of reforming  the  state-owned 
defence  firms,  despite  their  powerful  unions.  Rabin  was  no  stranger  to  crossing 
swords with disgruntled workers. In 1987 he had personally sealed the fate of the Lavi 
project, de facto ending the era of combat platforms production in Israel and presiding 
over the transformation of the domestic defence firms into providers of niche systems 
and services -  such as platform upgrading and developing specific sub-systems, like 
electronic warfare equipment and radars. Rabin realised that the investment required 
to develop niche systems was far lower and the risks less, and yet Israel could still 
maintain its  technological  qualitative  edge.  This  approach was perfectly consistent 
with his wider intention of equipping the military with the technological solutions it 
needed within a given and much reduced budget.  Rabin hoped  to  make  the  state- 
owned industries more efficient by reprioritising their objectives, by refocusing their 
product lines and by restructuring.  Failing that, the  firms would be unable to meet 
their primary goal: maintaining and facilitating national security.
In  this  sense,  Rabin  was  a  policy  entrepreneur  who  identified  a  ‘policy 
window’  and seized the opportunity to  initiate  action.  This particular window was 
opened  by  the  coincidence  of mounting  losses  by  the  three  defence  enterprises, 
including  Rafael,  with  the  advent  of  Rabin’s  new  administration,  committed  to 
deregulation  and  privatisation  policies,  and  changes  in  the  geopolitical  arena,  all 
against the backdrop of a post-Gulf-War Middle East, and the 1991 peace conference 
in  Madrid.  By  combining  a  pressing  problem,  new  policy  priorities  and  political 
realities into a single stream, Rabin placed the three defence industries firmly on the 
government agenda for the first time.
159CHAPTER 4 
Policy Implementation in the IMI Crisis
A major provider of weapons and explosives  to the IDF,  Israel Military Industries 
(IMI) operated as a department within the Ministry of Defence until  1990, when it 
became  a  government  company.  But,  as  the  newly  elected  Labour  government 
discovered in mid-1992, despite the firm’s achievements and international reputation, 
IMI was actually on the verge of collapse. A series of plans was implemented aiming 
to stabilise the company and address its managerial weaknesses. In the event, almost 
half the workforce was made redundant between 1993 and 1995.
This chapter examines the policy process in the IMI affair, which became a 
major political and financial challenge for Prime Minister Rabin and the government 
bureaucracy. Starting with the background to IMI’s difficulties, and then focusing on 
the interplay between the main actors  involved,  it examines the  considerations that 
guided ministers, state officials and labour representatives and pays close attention to 
the dynamics between the bargaining parties. The chapter ends with observations on 
the  effects  that  major  actors  and  past  policy  choices  had  on  government  policy 
capacities.
Passing the Buck to Rabin
In early July  1992, when the Rabin government was taking its first steps in power, 
IMI appealed to the Ministries of Defence and Finance for financial assistance.  An 
earlier  cash  injection,  made  by  the  MoD  at  the  beginning  of  1992,  helped  the 
company to pay for salaries and meet its contractual commitments. However, it was
160experiencing growing losses, and its resources were drying up fast. The two ministries 
agreed to provide IMI with additional funding of 80 million shekels.1
Rabin,  meanwhile,  received  detailed  briefings  about  the  firms  under  MoD 
control. News of IMI’s difficulties took him completely by surprise: just two years 
earlier,  when as  Defence Minister he had presided over its transformation from an 
MoD unit into a government-owned company, the management had presented a four- 
year business plan predicting continued growth in sales and profits (see Figure 4.1).2
Figure 4.1
IMI Business Results:  Projection vs. Actual
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Sources: Government Companies Authority, State Comptroller, IMI reports.
Note: IMI’s four-year business projection, suggesting a steady rise in sales and profits (block columns), 
was presented in 1989. External auditors, appointed a year later, examined IMI’s earlier accounts and 
discovered  shortcomings  in  the  calculations.  In  addition,  adverse  market  conditions  rendered  the 
projection totally unrealistic.  The details of IMI’s actual business results  (continuous lines) led to a 
major row between the MoD, which was responsible for IMI until  1990, and the Ministry of Finance 
(see text for further discussion).
1  Haaretz,  18 December  1992.
2  For  an  account  of  IMI’s  incorporation  process,  see:  State  Comptroller  special  report  on  IM I’ s 
incorporation, pp. 9-62.
161Further  enquiries  revealed  that  in  June  1991, just  seven  months  after  IMI 
became  a  company,  its  board  of  directors  had  realised  that  the  firm  was  at  a 
crossroads.  The  end  of the  Cold War resulted  in the  rapid contraction of defence 
budgets worldwide,  which was bad for IMI,  70%  of whose turnover derived from 
export sales. Major clients, such as the West German army, terminated their contracts 
with the firm,3 while others, including the Swiss and American forces, did not renew 
existing orders.4 Worst hit was one of IMI’s most profitable product lines, munitions 
and  explosives.5  At  the  same  time,  the  company  had  to  meet  stringent  financial 
obligations  imposed  as  part  of its  incorporation process,  including  costly  pension 
payments for thousands of former IMI workers (previously employed by the MoD); it 
was also charged a prohibitive interest rate -  no less than  10% per annum -  on its 
state-funded equity capital.6
A  strategic  plan  codenamed  Tafnit  (‘major  turn’  in  Hebrew),  implemented 
shortly afterwards,  did not stabilise  the  company’s cash flow;  IMI was  still losing 
money at an alarming rate, despite making almost 2,000 workers redundant, closing 
14  factories  and  revamping  the  firm’s  structure  and  commercial  focus.7  Business 
indicators  pointed  to  a  continuous  decline  in performance,  manifested by  a  $ 149- 
million drop in sales -  down to  $523  million in  1991  -  and an unexpected loss of
3 Letter from IMI’s internal auditor to the State Comptroller office, 4 October 1992.
4 Haaretz, 10 December 1992; Shor interview, Haaretz, 13 December 1992.
5 State Comptroller special report on IMI’ s incorporation, p. 33, footnote 40.
6 Draft decision on the Principles for turning IMI from a MoD unit to a government-owned company, 
as approved by the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs, pp. 4-5, 8. The draft was formally 
approved on 4 June 1989. (Hebrew).
7  As  part  of this  plan,  IMI  was  regrouped  into  six  divisions  and  18  factories,  down  from  eleven 
divisions and 32 factories; each of the remaining factories operated as a profit centre. The company 
also decided to branch out from its traditional military activities into the civil market. See: IMI Tafnit 
plan (internal document), June 1991; Haaretz, 18 December 1992.
162$240  million:  more  than  the  profit  posted  by  all  other  state-owned  companies 
combined.8   The  sales  forecast  for  1992  was  not  encouraging  either,  suggesting  a 
further drop of some $80 million.9 By now it was becoming clear that Tafnifs main 
assumptions -  that IMI would reach break-even by 1993 and increase sales to $650- 
700 million a year by penetrating the civil market -  were wide of the mark.1 0
The company’s chairman, former Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, was alarmed. 
‘I agreed to head the company at the request of Defence Minister Moshe Arens after 
he described it to me as “resilient and profitable”;  however,  it was not like that at 
all.’1 1   Shomron hired auditors and management consultants who advised him that the 
company was in fact lagging behind in almost every respect.1 2 Their reports suggested 
that IMI was heavily burdened by inflexible work rules, wage rates above the market 
average, under-funded pension plans and an outdated business strategy.  Specifically, 
they  highlighted  major  deficiencies  in  its  operations,  including  an  absence  of 
attractive products, a defective audit system, and slow adoption of effective business
8 Maariv, 16 September 1992.
9 Hadashot, 2 August 1992.
10 IMI planned to branch out from its traditional military activities into the civil market, expecting this 
to account  for up to 30%  of total turnover.  This  shift,  it assumed,  would offset the decline  in its 
military business, a view that was shared by the MoD. See IMI Tafnit plan (internal document), June
1991.  This approach was called into question by Defence Minister Moshe Arens, who said shortly 
before  his  departure  from  the  MoD  that  he  ‘never  heard  of an  arms  company  that  successfully 
diversified into the civil market’,  even though just two years earlier MoD Director General David 
Ivry had offered full support for this very notion. For Arens quote, see Hadashot, 2 August 1992, and 
for Ivry’s position see Yedioth Ahronoth, 2 March 1990.
1 1   Affidavit by Lt Gen.  (res.) Dan Shomron (IDF’s Chief of Staff,  1987-1991; IMI Chairman,  1991—  
1995) at the Israeli High Court of Justice, case no. 991/96: The Movement for Quality Government in 
Israel (MQG) vs. The State Attorney, p. 2 (hereafter: Shomron’s affidavit). See also Dan Shomron, ‘I 
received a sick company’,  Haaretz,  9  February  1995.  MQG  claimed that the MoD and IMI were 
negligent in their handling of firm’s incorporation process. The petition was dropped at the request of 
MQG in March 1996.
12 The main findings are discussed in State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 821-824.
163practices.  These  failings  reflected  IMI’s  previous  incarnation  as  a  unit  within  the 
MoD, whose main role was to serve as the  ‘national explosives warehouse’  for the 
IDF, regardless of economic considerations.1 3 After the  1973 Yom Kippur War, IMI 
had  been  instructed  to  expand  production  capacity  and  stock  up  with  significant 
amounts of raw materials for explosives manufacture.14 Over the years, however, IDF 
orders  had  declined,  leaving  IMI  with  significant  production  overcapacity.  Its 
accumulated  stocks  of raw  materials,  valued  at  over  $280  million,  had  become 
obsolete and had to be written off.1 5
The external advisers’ conclusions were harsh. A continued decline in orders 
(in January  1992  the IDF warned IMI  it would terminate orders of key products,16  
while  the  situation  in  the  export market  was  unlikely to  improve),  combined with 
technological advances in automation and machinery,  meant that almost half of the
17 workforce  was  actually  redundant.  Furthermore,  the  management  admitted  that 
entering the civil market was a costly mistake, and it should have invested more in 
what IMI did best: producing arms and weapon systems.1 8
1 3  Affidavit by Michael Shor (IMI Director General, 1972-1990, IMI Chairman 1990-1991) submitted 
to the High Court of Justice, case no. 991/96, p. 15 (hereafter: Shor’s affidavit).
14 These orders were given by the MoD and State Comptroller office as part of sweeping changes to the 
workings of the defence establishment after the Yom  Kippur War.  Source:  Shor interview;  Shor’s 
affidavit, p.15; State Comptroller special report on IMI’ s incorporation, p. 16.
1 5  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 823.
16  Letters from MoD  Procurement Directorate (which handles weapons  acquisition  on behalf of the 
IDF)  to  IMI  chief executive,  headed  ‘IMI  -   Acquisition  of  155mm  artillery  ammunition’,  and 
‘Acquisition of 5.56mm ammunition from IMI’, both dated 30 January 1992.
17 IMI Taas -  Israeli Industries Ltd, Operational Recovery Plan and Principles for a Comprehensive 
Business Strategy,  11 November 1992, pp.  17, 50 (hereafter: IMI,  Operational Recovery Plan)-, IMI 
Strategic  Planning  Division,  Taas:  Situation  Report,  January  1995,  p.  1  (internal  document); 
Shomron’s affidavit, p. 9; Shield and Spear, p. 241.
1 8 Snir interview,  1998. According to Yossi Snir, who prepared the Tafnit plan, the company was unfit 
to compete in the civil market and subsequently lost $40 million on civilian-related ventures; State
164These findings shocked the MoD and MoF representatives on the company’s 
board, who had not realised the extent of IMI’s troubles.19 An interdepartmental feud 
erupted in February  1992, with a senior official at the MoF charging that ‘the IMI 
management and the MoD knew about the firm’s difficulties for a while but preferred 
to conceal them from us.’20 (The MoF suspected that the MoD wanted to ensure that 
IMI’s transformation into  a government-owned company, underwritten by the state 
budget -  and not that of the Defence Ministry -  would go smoothly.21)
The MoD strenuously denied this.  ‘Neither IMI nor the MoD concealed any 
information on the  company;  simply put,  no  reliable  information was  available on 
IMI’, asserted the MoD Director General, David Ivry, noting that ‘even IMI did not 
have  a  clear picture  about  its  own  operations’.  He  added  that  the  MoF  was  fully 
involved in the transformation process  and could have examined any aspect of the 
firm’s accounts it wanted, but preferred not to. According to Ivry, the extent of IMI’s 
losses was revealed only in August  1990, when external auditors examined its first 
balance  sheet after  it  was  registered  as  a  company.22  (It  later  emerged  that  IMI’s 
previous management had failed to monitor its performance adequately and did not 
inform the board of its increasing difficulties; the Chairman, Michael Shor, accepted
Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 821; Avraham Ravitz, a Member of Knesset, publicly criticised 
IMI  for  overpricing  its  civil  products.  See  Records  of the  Knesset,  16  November  1994  (see: 
www.knesset.gov.il. accessed 3 August 2005).
1 9 Hadashot, 6 October 1992; Globes, 6 April 1995; Davar, 17 February 1995.
20  Letter  from  the  Director  of the  Budget  Department,  Ministry  of Finance  to  the  MoF  Director 
General, quoted in State Comptroller special report on IMI’ s incorporation, p. 33.
21 Author’s interviews with Shochat, Brodet and Shomron (2002).
22 Globes, 6 April 1995.
165full responsibility23  and left the board  shortly afterwards.24  Shomron replaced him, 
unaware of the full circumstances behind his predecessor’s departure.)
As the two ministries continued bickering, IMI -  now kept afloat by advance 
payments from the MoD25 -  started preparing a request for government assistance. In
April 1992 it asked Prime Minister Shamir for a $ 150-million aid package26 and was
01 informally notified that the government would be willing to endorse it.  At that point, 
however, the political system was already absorbed by preparations for the June 1992 
general elections,  and Shamir eventually did not approve IMI’s appeal,  leaving the 
matter for the next government.  Nevertheless,  three  weeks  before  the  elections  he 
appointed a government Steering Committee,  headed by the Director of the MoF’s 
Budget Department.  Shamir instructed the committee ‘to determine the scope of the 
financial aid the state will provide IMI,  to examine and approve the recovery plan, 
and to ensure that the company will  meet the plan’s objectives.’28  The  committee, 
which examined IMI’s requests, did not make up its mind on the matter, preferring 
instead to await further instructions from the incoming Labour government.
After they had digested these details, Yitzhak Rabin and his Finance Minister, 
Avraham Shochat realised that IMI would require substantial government help.  ‘We 
could  have  dismantled  IMI  then  and  there,  because  the  company  was  not 
economically viable; however, other considerations were at play,’ said Shochat.
23 Transcript of the IMI board meeting, 3 April 1991, p. 9.
24 State Comptroller special report on IMI’ s incorporation, p. 40.
25 Haaretz, 18 December 1992.
26 Ibid.
27 Haaretz, 16 April 1992.
28 Letter of Appointment to the members of IMI’s Steering Committee by Prime Minister Shamir, 2 
June 1992.
166We  had  to  bear  in  mind  the  wider  employment  implications,  especially  at  that 
particularly difficult period [with unemployment reaching a record 11.2%29]; we also had 
certain strategic considerations, as we wanted to maintain arms production capability in 
Israeli hands. Rabin decided to keep the company running,  and the government looked 
for practical ways to achieve this.30
MoF calculations suggested it was possible to secure long-term employment for only
about 3,000-3,500 workers;3 1  at the time, IMI employed more than 8,200.
By the beginning of August  1992 the company was on the verge of collapse. 
An accidental blast in its explosives bunker, a few miles outside Tel Aviv, killed two 
workers, injured several civilians (including a Cabinet minister), damaged thousands 
of nearby homes and brought IMI to a virtual standstill.32 This was the second such 
fatal explosion in less than two months, and the company came under intense public 
pressure.  While  a  committee  of  enquiry  investigated  its  safety  procedures,  IMI 
handled thousands of insurance claims  and considered relocating major production 
lines to the Negev desert.  (However,  such a major task was well beyond the firm’s 
financial means34 and aroused fierce  objections  from the workers.35  The relocation 
idea was subsequently dropped,36 despite Cabinet endorsement.37)
29 Bank of Israel, Annual Report for 1997, p. 293.
30 Shochat interview.
3 1  Ibid.
32 Hadashot, 31 July 1992.
33 Author’s interview with Yossi Snir, 21 June 2005 (hereafter: Snir interview, 2005a).
34Hadashot, 16 August 1992.
35 Davar, 1 August 1992.
36 Shochat interview.
37 A ministerial committee approved the plan to transfer IMI’s factories to the Negev in July 1992, see 
Hadashot, 2 July  1992.  Several members of Knesset protested that the Labour government did not 
honour its pledges on this matter. The then Deputy Defence Minister replied that not every Cabinet 
decision is eventually implemented, adding that any relocation of IMI factories had to be judged on 
the basis of cost-effectiveness. See transcript of Knesset session no.  199 of 2 June 1993, available on 
http://www.knesset.gov.il (accessed 1 August 2005).
167Shortly  after  the  accident  the  firm  submitted  an  appeal  for  an  urgent  aid 
package;  its resources were drained and it could not pay its workers and suppliers. 
However, the new request, for $250 million, was almost double the one submitted to 
the Shamir government just four months earlier.38 The Director of the MoF’s Budget 
Department, who headed the government’s IMI Steering Committee, was furious. He 
criticised the new request and concluded that the firm was ‘to all intents and purposes 
bankrupt’.39  Nonetheless,  Rabin  and  Shochat  instructed  IMI  to  prepare  a 
comprehensive plan for financial recovery; meanwhile they ordered the Treasury to 
transfer  250  million  shekels  (about  $100  million)  to  give  the  company  sufficient 
liquidity.40
This was enough to sustain the company for two more months, allowing IMI’s 
management to  fend off pressure  from workers  and suppliers.  In  September  1992, 
after  seven  months  of negotiations,  it  signed  a  new  labour  agreement  with  the 
workers’  national  organisation  and  the  Histadrut  (which  officially  represented  the 
company’s workers). The management promised to refrain from mass redundancies in 
exchange  for  a  16%  pay  cut  and  a  minor  reduction  in  the  existing  workforce, 
stabilising  it  at  around  7,500.  No  specific  provision  was  made  for  further 
redundancies, although -  unknown to the workers’ organisation -  such redundancies 
were planned,  as  more details  emerged of the  company’s  increasing  losses.  In the 
following weeks, the company’s external advisers completed their work and handed 
in recommendations for sweeping changes in structure and working practices.
38 Haaretz, 10 September 1992.
39 The Director of the Budget Department at the Ministry of Finance, in Haaretz, 24 September 1992.
40 Haaretz, 18 December 1992.
168Battling for Public Opinion
In November  1992, IMI (now trading under the name Taas41) unveiled  ‘A Plan for 
Operational  Recovery’.  It  stipulated that the company should match the size of its 
workforce to its sales and dramatically improve its output per employee. In the face of 
an unforeseen 30% drop in revenues over the previous two years, the company needed 
to lay off 3,000 more workers and close several factories, including a major plant in 
Jerusalem  and  two  smaller  ones  in  developing  areas.  Assuming  a  steady  level  of 
orders from the MoD, the company’s sales target was set at around $475 million for 
1994 and subsequent years (35% below the figure suggested in the defunct Tafnit plan 
of 1991), of which $217 million would go to the defence establishment42
The plan called on the Cabinet to assist the management financially, mainly by 
underwriting  its  labour  costs  and  its  pension  obligations  to  present  and  former 
employees.43 However, the full scale of the aid required had still to be ascertained, the 
management  insisted,  because  a comprehensive business  strategy  for the  company 
was still in the making. In the interim the company asked for a $ 153-million increase 
of its equity capital,  about $70 million towards the payment of other expenses, and 
another $139 million to fund the redundancy process, assuming that all 3,000 excess 
workers would depart within less than a year.44 (At that stage, the IMI management
41 The company changed its trading name in 1992 from IMI to its pre-state alias, Taas. The new name 
sounded more neutral and did not evoke military connotations. However, the company reverted to its 
original name in 1995. See Hadashot, 28 July 1992; Milo interview.
42 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 826.
43 IMI’ s Operational Recovery Plan, pp. 11-12, 16-18.
44 IMI’ s Operational Recovery Plan, pp. 3-7,  11, 40-42; IMI Management, Taas Recovery Plan -  An 
Executive Update, 20 December 1992, pp. 2-7 (internal document); State Comptroller Annual Report 
no. 45, p. 826.
169already assumed that the total multi-year assistance required would be  close to  $1 
billion.45)
The  main  elements  of the  plan  caused  shock waves  through the  company, 
sparking widespread protests among IMI workers. The chairman of the IMI workers’ 
national organisation, Shalom Havshoosh, was particularly dismayed, for, despite his 
close working relations with the management,  he  had been kept completely in the 
dark.46  He  rejected  the  recovery  plan,  arguing  that  it  made  a  mockery  of  the 
September 1992 labour agreement.47
In the following weeks the IMI workers’ organisation severed all contacts with 
management.  With  the  backing  of the  Histadrut  (the  national  labour  federation), 
which was a signatory to IMI collective agreements, it declared a labour dispute for 
the  first  time  in the  company’s  history.48  Havshoosh,  vowing  to  do  his  utmost to 
prevent the plan’s approval by Cabinet, hired a public affairs specialist to help prepare 
a campaign strategy.49 The Histadrut, in the meantime, gave the IMI workers blanket 
approval for industrial action.50
Hoping to win over public opinion and politicians by portraying themselves as 
victims of the management’s incompetence and lies,5 1  IMI workers initiated a twofold 
campaign.  The  overt  campaign  filled  the  national  and  local  media  with  ads  and
45 Author’s interview with Yossi Snir, 8 October 1997 (hereafter: Snir interview,  1997).
46 Haaretz, 13 December 1992.
47 Hadashot, 4 November 1992.
48 Hadashot, 9 November 1992.
49  Author’s  interview  with  Shalom  Havshoosh  (Chairman,  the  IMI  workers’  national  organisation, 
1980-1993), 22 June 1998 (hereafter: Havshoosh interview, 1998); Maariv, 5 January 1993.
50 Hadashot, 26 October 1992.
5 1  Maariv, 5 January 1993.
170revelations  of  alleged  management  and  MoD  wrongdoings,52  complemented  by 
explicit denunciations of the IMI board and management.  Similar messages were 
repeated  in  demonstrations  and  public  protests  near  the  compound  of the  Prime 
Minister’s Office in Jerusalem,54 the Labour Party convention in Tel Aviv,55 and the 
IMI  headquarters  in Ramat  Hasharon,  near  Tel  Aviv.56  These  received  significant 
media attention, not least because of the huge gridlocks they caused in Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem,  and  the  quantity  of  police  manpower  assigned  to  disperse  the
57 demonstrations. On several occasions, Rabin himself confronted the protestors.
At the same time, behind the scenes, the IMI workers’ organisation sought to 
form a lobbying alliance at parliamentary and local government levels. It approached 
Members  of Knesset  from  all  parties,  targeting  in particular those  residing  in key 
primary  constituencies,  such  as  the  Jerusalem  and  Haifa  districts,  and  those  on 
influential  Knesset  committees.  (During  this  lobbying  effort,  it  turned  out  that  a 
leading Likud MK was an ex-IMI employee.58) It also contacted mayors and heads of 
municipalities in developing areas that had been, or were about to be, affected by the 
large-scale redundancies at IMI. Finally, the Histadrut leaders -  past and present -  and
52 Havshoosh interview, 1998; Hadashot, 17 November 1992, and 27 November 1992.
53 Hadashot, 4 November 1992 and 18 November 1992; Yedioth Ahronoth, 12 November 1992.
54 Hadashot, 16 November 1992.
55 Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 November 1992.
56 Yedioth Ahronoth, 12 November 1992.
57 See, for example, Yedioth Ahronoth,  13 November 1992; Hadashot,  16 November and 20 December
1992.
58  See  speech  by  Ron  Nachman  MK  (Likud),  Motions  for  the  Knesset’s  Agenda,  Session  no.  38, 
Records of  the Knesset, 16 December 1992, p. 1229. Mr Nachman, Mayor of Ariel, the biggest Israeli 
town in the West Bank, was employed by IMI for  13 years, becoming Deputy Director General of 
Research and Development.  During that  Knesset  session he was  also  a  member of the Knesset’s 
Finance Committee.
171regional labour councils of the Histadrut were also called on for help.59 This direct 
appeal triggered  some  local  initiatives,  such as  a joint campaign by the  Jerusalem 
Labour  Council  and  the  Maale  Adumim  municipality  against  the  closure  of IMI 
factories in their respective areas.60
Havshoosh,  chairman of the  IMI workers’  national organisation since  1980, 
led the workers’  campaign.  As a life-long Labour Party member,  a member of the 
Histadrut’s  Central  Committee  (the body’s  supreme  decision-making  forum)  and a 
close confidant of senior party  figures,61  he could count on the  support of leading 
politicians.  One  was  Environment  Minister  Ora  Namir,  former  chairman  of  the 
powerful cross-party Knesset committee for Labour and Welfare Affairs, and one of
cry
Rabin’s closest allies.  Other ministers and politicians also pledged support for the 
IMI  workers,  including  Economic  Affairs  Minister  Shimon  Sheetrit,  who  lived  in 
Jerusalem.
While  the  employees  were  engaged  in  their PR  campaign,  IMI  prepared a 
counter-offensive.  It  hired  a  leading  public  affairs  agency,  whose  owner,  Moshe 
Teoim,  was  a  close  friend  of Shimon  Peres,  Rabin’s  Foreign  Minister,  and  well-
59 Author’s interview with Havshoosh, 16 June 2005 (hereafter: Havshoosh interview, 2005); Maariv, 3 
January 1993.
60 Hadashot, 4 November 1992.
61 Havshoosh interview, 2005. Havshoosh, who came to Israel from Yemen, was adopted as a child by 
the Jerusalem-based Baraam family,  which was prominent in Israeli politics and government.  The 
head  of family,  Moshe  Baraam,  served  as  Employment  and  Welfare  minister  in  the  first  Rabin 
cabinet; one of his sons, Uzi, became a minister in the second Rabin cabinet. See 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtBvNumber.asp?govt=17 and
http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtBvNumber.asp?govt=25  (accessed  27  August  2005).  Uzi 
Baraam’s brother, Haim, worked in Havshoosh’s office as sports affairs coordinator of IMI’s national 
workers’ organisation. See Snir interview, 25 September 2005 (hereafter: Snir interview, 2005c).
62  In  her  previous  capacity,  Ora  Namir  helped  Havshoosh  in  campaigns  against  Shamir’s  Likud 
government,  and especially its construction  minister Ariel  Sharon,  who  shelved orders  for prefab 
houses made by IMI. See Kol Hatzafon (regional newspaper in northern Israel), 17 January 1992.
172connected  among  the  political  and  business  elite.63  The  agency  handled  the 
management’s relations with the media and devised a communication and lobbying 
strategy; it also helped to formulate reassuring messages to the company’s clients.64 A 
second firm,  specialising  in decision-making and business  strategy, helped the IMI 
management  map  out  the  political  and  bureaucratic  actors  involved  in  the  policy
65 process.
In contrast  to  the  approach taken by the  workers,  the management  focused 
primarily on few ‘quality targets’, whose consent and cooperation was essential for 
approval of the recovery plan within the government system. These included Prime 
Minister  Rabin,  Finance  Minister  Shochat  and  the  officials  advising  them,  and 
members  of the  Knesset’s  Finance  Committee  (which  had  to  approve  the  budget 
earmarked for the plan). IMI chief executive Komisar, meanwhile, cultivated personal 
relations  with  the  Finance  Minister  and  the  chairman  of  the  Knesset’s  Finance 
Committee,  visiting them and their families in their home towns.  He did the same 
with  Prime  Minister  Rabin,  with  whom  he  had  worked  closely  when  Rabin  was 
Defence Minister.66
A second management objective was to ensure that the budget required, or at 
least a substantial part of it, would be secured without delay. ‘We were running out of 
time,’ said a senior IMI executive. ‘We knew that the financial problems at Rafael had 
yet to be addressed [by the Rabin government]; had we failed to secure the funding 
we needed at that point in time, in all probability it would have gone toward solving
63 Maariv, 3 January 1995; Snir interview, 1997.
64 Hadashot, 16 December 1992.
65 Snir interviews, 1997 and 2005a.
66  Komisar interview;  Snir  interviews,  1997,  2005a and  30  August 2005  (hereafter:  Snir interview, 
2005b).  Komisar  was  responsible  for  major  IMI  export  deals  in  Asia  during  Rabin’s  tenure  as 
Defence Minister in the 1980s.Rafael’s financial problems, not ours’.67 (In addition to the defence enterprises, other 
organisations  had  reached  crisis  point  at  the  end  of  1992  and  were  awaiting 
government  assistance,  among  them  the  biggest  health  maintenance  organisation, 
Kupat Holim Klalit,  and the Kibbutzim movement;68  their debts amounted to more 
than $4 billion.69)
With this in mind, the management initiated meetings with MKs identified as 
potential  opponents  of the  recovery plan,  inviting  them  for one-on-one  talks  with 
IMI’s  chairman.70  At  the  same  time,  the  IMI  board  and  management  met  key 
journalists from newspapers known to be read by Rabin and the senior government 
bureaucracy. Leading figures in the business community, with whom Rabin kept close
71 contact, were also briefed.
Over the next month, as the Cabinet decision drew near, both sides intensified 
their  campaigns.  IMI’s  workers  stepped  up  their  rhetoric  and  protests,  while 
management  countered  with  a  blitz  of  press  briefings  that  emphasised  IMI’s 
difficulties  but  also  indicated  to  the  company’s  customers  that  the  board  and
77 management  were  on  top  of  the  situation.  After  a  while,  violent  outbursts  by 
disgruntled  employees  marred  the  situation,  which  became  so  extreme  that
67 Snir interview, 1997.
68 Interview with Shochat, in Yedioth Ahronoth, 18 December 1992.
69 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 44, p. 142; State Comptroller Annual Report no. 43, pp. 88-89.
70 Snir interview, 1997.
71 Maariv, 5 January 1993.
72 Komisar interview. The company’s briefings received wide attention.  See, for example, a four-page 
cover feature on the IMI recovery plan in  Yedioth Ahronoth1  %  financial supplement,  17 November 
1992, and the Haaretz editorial,  13 November 1992. For a report on IMI’s difficulties, see Haaretz, 
10 December 1992; findings of a confidential report by the State Comptroller on the failings of the 
MoD and the former IMI management were published in Haaretz, 3 December 1992.
174management had to hire bodyguards and beef up security at the IMI headquarters after
7-1
managers were physically intimidated and the chief executive’s chair set on fire.
Nevertheless,  despite  the  apparent  havoc  at  IMI,  a  secret  channel  of 
communication  was  opened.  While  workers  were  protesting  and management was 
lobbying, IMI chief executive Komisar and the workers’ leader Havshoosh (who was 
occasionally accompanied by the Secretary General of the Histadrut, Haim Haberfeld) 
met routinely at a Tel Aviv hotel late at night. Komisar and Havshoosh had similar 
views  about  the  company,  and  they  also  feared  there  was  a  real  risk  that  it  was 
heading  for  self-destruction.74  ‘I  berated  Komisar  for  the  management’s  style  of 
negotiations;  broken  promises  and  deceit  were  never  the  hallmark  of the  labour
nc
relations at IMI’, said Havshoosh.  (IMI had been a model of stable labour relations 
for many decades, and even in the most turbulent times, such as when major layoffs 
were taking place, workers refrained from industrial action.76 Former Prime Minister 
Shimon  Peres  noted  that  during  his  many  years  at  the  helm  of the  MoD,  labour 
relations at IMI were exemplary, in part due to the shared understanding that certain 
arms deals with regional powers like China and Iran were of strategic importance to 
Israel.77) After admitting his initial mistake of reneging on the September agreement, 
Komisar discussed ways to reach an understanding with Havshoosh. The two decided 
to keep their nightly negotiations uuder wraps while carrying on their rival lobbying 
campaigns as planned.
73 Snir interview, 1998; Hadashot, 16 December 1992.
74 Havshoosh interviews, 1998 and 2005.
75 Ibid.
76 Author’s interviews with Shor, Havshoosh 1998; Shield and Spear, p. 241.
77 Peres interview.Setting the Political Stage
At  the  beginning  of  December  1992,  after  overcoming  last-minute  Treasury 
reservations,78 IMI’s management compiled a final draft of the Operational Recovery 
Plan. By then, the workers’ campaign had gained significant momentum. Half a dozen 
cabinet members, including the Finance, Health and Transport Ministers, as well as 
leading figures from Labour (including the party’s Secretary General) and prominent 
Members of Knesset from other parties, had either met the workers’ representatives or 
visited  factories  in  their  constituencies  slated  for  shutdown.79  Economic  Affairs 
Minister Shimon Sheetrit expressed reservations about the recovery plan and called 
for  it  to  be  reconsidered,80  and  the  Knesset’s  Labour  Affairs  Committee  also
01
expressed opposition,  while the influential Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee 
held sessions behind closed doors on the plan’s implications.82
In addition,  several Motions  for the  Agenda were presented at the  Knesset 
plenum and then discussed in the Finance and Labour Committees. Triggered mostly 
by direct appeals,  demonstrations and press reports about the  impending layoffs  at 
IMI, the Motions tabled by Labour and other parties’ MKs focused on the fate of the 
workers, urging the Cabinet to refrain from closing factories in developing areas,83
78 Yedioth Ahronoth, 15 November 1992.
79  Havshoosh  interview,  2005;  Hadashot,  18  November  1992  and  10  December  1992;  Maariv,  5 
January  1993.  The  ministers  were  Avraham  Shochat  (finance),  Ora  Namir  (environment),  Israel 
Keisar  (transport),  Shimon  Sheetrit  (economic  affairs),  Binyamin  Ben-Eliezer  (construction)  and 
Haim Ramon (health).
80 Shimon Sheetrit, quoted in Davar, 4 December 1992.
81 Haaretz, 19 November 1992.
82 Havshoosh interview, 1998.
83  Shlomo Buhbut MK (Labour), Motions for the Knesset’s Agenda, Records of the Knesset, session 
no.  17,  28  October  1992,  p.  90;  Gideon  Sagi  MK  (Labour),  Motion  for  the  Knesset’s  Agenda, 
Records of the Knesset,  vol. 4,  session no.  25,  17 November  1992, p. 490.  Both Buhbut and Sagi
176while  those  from  Likud  members  served  merely  as  pretexts  to  attack  the  Rabin 
government.84  Meanwhile,  the  Ministries  of Defence  and  Finance,  and  the  Prime 
Minister’s  Office,  were  deluged with  letters  and messages  of support for the  IMI 
workers. Havshoosh complemented these with grim assessments of the implications 
of the factory closures for developing towns.85
While the workers’  campaign was continuing, the management held intense 
meetings with the Defence and Finance Ministries. Rabin demanded to be apprised of 
every minute detail,86 insisting that his government ‘did not have a bottomless supply
on
of money for IMI’,  a view he  also conveyed to  IMI workers’  representatives.  In 
these discussions, the IMI Chairman and Chief Executive presented the main planks 
of the Operational Recovery Plan along with a comprehensive set of data, stressing 
that  ‘there  is  no  other  way  for  recovery  other  than  taking  a  hard  line’.88  The 
management took pains to explain why it needed to shed so many workers as quickly 
as possible, and why it would be worth the government paying the redundancy costs.
It  calculated  that  the  labour  cost  of the  excess  workforce  was  about  $150 
million a year, while the total cost of making them redundant was $300-350 million: 
in other words, the state would be able to write off the financial liabilities of these
were  members  of the  Knesset’s  Finance  Committee.  A  religious  opposition  party,  Mafdal,  also 
criticised the planned closure of IMI’s factories in the Jerusalem area and the loss of jobs. See: Hanan 
Porat MK (Mafdal), Motion for the Knesset’s Agenda, Records of the Knesset, vol. 4, session no. 26, 
18 November 1992, pp. 504-505.
84  Yaakov  Shamai  MK  (Likud),  Motion  for the  Knesset’s  Agenda,  Records  of the Knesset,  vol.  4, 
session no. 25, 17 November 1992, p. 491; Yehoshua Matza MK (Likud), Oral Questions, Records of 
the Knesset, vol. 4, session no. 26, 18 November 1992, p. 505
85 Havshoosh interview, 1998.
86 Snir interview, 2005a.
87 Hadas  hot, 16 November 1992.
88 Author’s interview with Dan Shomron, 16 February 1994 (hereafter: Shomron interview, 1994)
177redundancies within two years.89 This argument appealed to the Ministry of Finance, 
which had long sought a reduction of IMI’s workforce at minimum possible cost as 
part of its long-held intention to restructure and privatise defence companies.90 (The 
Treasury also assumed that, with fewer workers on the payroll, the power of the IMI 
unions  would  be  much  diminished,  as  would  their  ability  to  muster  the  political 
backing to thwart such a plan in the future). The IMI management also highlighted the 
dramatic increase in its labour costs over the years, compared with other employers, 
arguing that the cost of keeping such an excessive and costly workforce had become 
prohibitive. The most notable example was the 12% unconditional pay raise given to 
all IMI’s employees in February 1990, with the approval of the MoD and the MoF, in 
return  for  turning  IMI  into  a  company  when  it  was  actually  experiencing  sharp 
reduction in orders and persistent losses.9 1 (At that point neither IMI nor the MoD had 
envisaged  mass  redundancies  or  a  persistent  and  sharp  drop  in  the  company’s 
revenues.)
After extensive deliberations with senior officials, Rabin and Shochat agreed 
to endorse the Plan. However, the IMI management did not know whether this would 
be  enough to  win over the  Cabinet and the Knesset Members’  Social Lobby.  The 
Finance Minister,  meanwhile,  threatened that unless the  IMI  workers  accepted  the
09 recovery plan, he would consider putting the company into administration.  Such an 
action would entail automatic suspension of all labour agreements and the dissolution
89 Komisar and Snir (2005a) interviews. Pension instalments were to be spread over 20 years or more, 
so the  overall  financial  burden  on  the  state  budget  was  manageable.  These  payments  were  also 
taxable, so about half of this one-off expenditure was to be returned to the state coffers.
90 Ministry of Finance -  Budget Department, Reorganisation of the State-owned Defence Industry.
9 1  State  Comptroller special  report  on  IMI’ s  incorporation,  pp.  42— 43;  State  Comptroller Annual 
Report no. 45, p. 819.
92 Shochat repeated that threat publicly in an interview with Haaretz, 17 December 1992.
178of the  workers’  representative body,  while  a court-appointed receiver replaced the 
management and took charge of the company’s affairs. Rabin, who met members of 
the Knesset’s Social Lobby shortly afterwards, made a case for the IMI recovery and 
asked  them  to  pledge  their  support  for  it,  otherwise  the  company  would  face 
liquidation.93
With the backing of the MoF, the IMI management started preparing a plan to 
put the company into receivership.  However, it was reluctant to take such a drastic 
step;  rather,  it  intended  to  use  the  study  of  this  option  as  a  ploy,  part  of  its 
psychological warfare with the workers. ‘We played the bankruptcy card to convey a 
message  that  IMI  was  in  a  severe  crisis  and  that  we  would  go  all  the  way  if 
necessary,’ said Yossi Snir, a senior executive.
However, we left the door open for negotiation. We trod carefully, because the last thing 
we  wanted  was  to  undermine  the  workers’  organisation  to  the  point  of it  losing  all 
authority. The organisation was a worthy interlocutor, truly capable of pushing through a 
painful agreement among the workers and the local workers’  committees at each plant.
We had no intention of seeking the assistance of other bodies, such as the Histadrut, who 
might have complicated things. We had one point of contact, and we preferred to keep it
1  94 that way.
To  make  this  brinkmanship  strategy  credible,  the  management  announced  that  it 
would consider placing the company in administration and added a presentation by a 
leading lawyer, a specialist in bankruptcies and liquidations, to the agenda of the next 
board meeting.95
News of a possible receivership action spread quickly among worried workers, 
but Havshoosh and his colleagues remained sceptical.  They made discreet enquiries 
and  received  assurances  from  highly  placed  figures  that  such  an  eventuality  was
93 Shomron interview, 1994.
94 Snir interview, 1997.
95 Ibid
179purely hypothetical;  no  one  seriously considered placing  IMI  in receivership,  they 
were told.96 However, these messages did little to calm rank-and-file workers, whose 
low morale badly affected output. Consequently, IMI was unable to meet contractual 
commitments to the MoD and other customers, missing delivery deadlines to the tune 
of $100 million.97
In early December 1992, a couple of days before the Cabinet meeting, Rabin 
summoned Havshoosh for a face-to-face discussion. The worker’s leader reiterated his 
objections to the recovery plan, demanding that Rabin dismiss the IMI Chairman, Dan 
Shomron, and Chief Executive, Gabi Komisar.  ‘They deceived us; we simply do not
QO
trust them any more,’ he said.  However, Rabin refused to budge. Yielding to such a 
demand, his advisers warned him, might not only delay any recovery at IMI, because 
a new management would require some time to adjust, but would also set a dangerous 
precedent  that  other  powerful  workers’  organisations  in  state-owned  companies  - 
those  at  IAI  and  the  national  telecommunications  provider,  Bezeq,  for  instance  - 
would be  eager  to  take  advantage  of.99  (Other  considerations  were  also  involved. 
Rabin valued the judgement of the IMI’s Chief Executive,  Gabi Komisar, who also 
became  a close  personal  friend.100  As  to  the  Chairman,  Dan  Shomron,  Rabin was 
impressed by  his  military  achievements,  including  overseeing  the  Entebbe  Rescue 
Operation in 1976; like Rabin, Shomron was an ex-Chief of Staff and therefore had an 
open door to the Prime Minister at all times.101)  Rabin therefore explained that the
96 Havshoosh interview, 1998. He refused to identify his sources for this.
97 Haaretz, 18 December 1992.
98 Haaretz, 13 December 1992.
99 Haaretz, 18 December 1992.
100  Komisar  interview.  See  also  personal  letter  from  Yitzhak  Rabin  to  Komisar,  [Prime  Minister’s 
Office, Ref. 136-102], 27 August 1995.
101 Snir interviews, 2005a and 2005b.
180situation of IMI had become untenable and he was left with no other option but to 
reduce its size and workforce. Havshoosh retorted:
I  accept that the company is  in a difficult  situation,  but in other companies that have 
experienced  similar  problems  the  management tried  to  find new  markets  and worked 
much harder at getting orders. At IMI, on the other hand, all the management did was to 
cut our salaries and make people redundant.102
Rabin  remained  adamant,  saying  he  would  nevertheless  carry  the  recovery  plan 
through.103
The IMI management, meanwhile, met the Finance Minister, his advisers, and 
the top officials at the MoD,  including Director General Ivry,  for a final round of 
discussions  on the  main points  of the  plan.104  At  the  same  time,  the  IMI  workers 
contacted members of Cabinet, briefing them on the failure of the previous recovery 
plan (Tafnit)  and the apparent inconsistency in the management’s decisions,  which 
had culminated in the dismissal of more than 6,000 employees in six years.105 These 
briefings,  and pressure from other actors involved -  the Histadrut, municipalities in 
developing areas and other trade unions -  put Rabin and his political advisers under 
formidable pressure.
At the request of Havshoosh,  Rabin reluctantly agreed to  convene the  Our 
Ministers forum -  the group of Labour ministers in Cabinet -  for a special meeting. 
Havshoosh demanded to be given an opportunity to outline the reservations of the IMI 
workers about the recovery plan, ahead of the Cabinet session on the matter. This was 
unprecedented:  never  had  a  union  representative  succeeded  in  securing  an
102 Haaretz, 13 December 1992.
103 Ibid.
104 Snir interview, 2005a.
105 Havshoosh interviews, 1998 and 2005.
181unscheduled,  exclusive  gathering  of ruling  party  ministers  for the  sole  purpose  of 
lobbying against the Prime Minister.106
On 13 December 1992, a couple of hours before the decisive Cabinet meeting, 
Havshoosh met the Labour ministers. He presented documentary evidence illustrating 
the  IMI  management’s  apparent  inconsistency  over the  years  and  criticised major 
aspects of its strategy. From the workers’ perspective, the meeting ended successfully, 
as most ministers became convinced that the recovery plan was flawed and required 
more work.  They expressed support for the workers’  position and prepared to hurl 
tough questions at the board and management representatives.
Cabinet Showdown
The Cabinet session on IMI’s recovery plan, which took place shortly afterwards, was 
tense. In his opening remarks Prime Minister Rabin noted that he ‘had no idea’ of the 
severity  of IMI’s  difficulties  when  he  entered  office.107  He  pointed  out  that  the 
company’s seemingly insurmountable problems -  mounting losses and the breakdown 
in  trust  between  management  and  workers  -   posed  ‘a  serious  dilemma’  for  the 
government.108
IMI  representatives,  who  were  in  attendance,  had  prepared  a  detailed 
presentation which outlined a series of events that, they argued, had eventually led to 
the  company’s  downfall.  These  included  the  government’s  Economic  Stabilisation 
Programme  of  1985,  which  imposed  a  deep  cut  in  government  spending  and  a 
temporary  freeze  on  the  dollar  exchange  rate.  This,  the  company  representatives
106 Maariv, 5 January 1993.
107 Transcript of Cabinet meeting, 13 December 1992.
108 Ibid.
182maintained,  forced  the  MoD  to  cut  its  IMI  orders  by  46%.  Export  sales,  which 
increased in subsequent years, offset this drop for a while, but nevertheless were not 
enough to keep up with the spiralling labour costs. These grew by 80% between 1985 
and  1989, claiming almost half the company’s revenues, despite a  12% reduction in 
workforce.109 Rising labour cost, they said, compounded by production overcapacity 
and loss-making contracts, created a persistent cash-flow deficit. In order to mitigate 
these effects, the previous management had started eating into IMI’s savings, which 
had totalled some $350 million in 1985. (As a government unit at the time, IMI could 
not  borrow  from  financial  institutions  and  had  to  cover  losses  from  its  own 
resources.110) In 1991  these reserves had been completely consumed, by which time 
the global arms market had also fallen dramatically, after the end of the Cold War and 
of the US-led Gulf War. This resulted in a 30% drop in sales (see Figure 4.2).1 1 1
109  IMI Presentation  of the  Operational Recovery  Plan  to  the  Israeli  Cabinet,  13  December  1992 
(internal  document,  hereafter:  IMI  Presentation  to  Cabinet).  The  implementation  of  the  1985 
Economic Stabilisation plan may explain this anomaly:  while IMI’s shekel-paid wages rose in line 
with the cost-of-living increases and pay rises in the public sector,  its dollar-paid export revenues 
were devalued by the exchange-rate freeze. The rise in labour costs outpaced the increase of export 
revenues.  See State  Comptroller special report on IMI’ s  incorporation,  pp.  18-20;  see also Yair 
Aharoni, The Israeli Economy, pp. 83-91.
110 Shor interview.
1,1 Ibid.
183Figure 4.2
IMI:  Business Indicators
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Note:  This graph suggests that, despite a steady increase in sales and a slight reduction in workforce 
between 1987 and  1990, IMI posted losses and used up all its financial reserves in an effort to keep 
its workforce intact. In 1991, just as IMI became a company, it reached a crisis point, as sales dipped 
and losses mounted following the end of the Cold War.
IMI’s  chairman,  Dan  Shomron,  insisted  that  the  core  of  the  company’s
problem was rooted in factors beyond its control.  ‘Transformation of a government
unit  into  a  company  requires  mental  and  cultural  metamorphosis  (within  the
organisation); to do so while your business environment has just plunged into crisis is
particularly traumatic,’ he said, noting that:
In  1990  IMI  started  operating  [as  a company]  without  financial  resources  of its  own, 
overburdened by an inflexible, distorted wage structure that did not bear any relation to 
the company’s actual business results. [...] In fact, IMI performed not like a business but 
like a contractor, governed by non-commercial practices of a government department. It 
was an industrial enterprise with manufacturing units that had no concept whatsoever of 
profit  and  loss;  they  did not  even care  to  know.  At the  same time,  these units cross-
184subsidised each other to the point where no one knew which unit was actually making 
money and which one was losing it.112
Shomron confessed to complete ignorance about the true situation of IMI:
When  I  arrived  in  June  1991  I  had no  idea  of the  company’s problems  ...  the chief 
executive  had  only  a  sketchy  account  and  did  not  know  much  either.  The  way  IMI 
operated was such that it was very hard to have a complete picture; only partial details 
were available.113
Once these were compiled, the IMI representatives said, they realised that the 
company suffered from several problems that needed to be addressed urgently, such 
as  a  production  overcapacity  of  100%  and  underperforming  factories  with  a  low- 
output workforce (sales per worker were $50,000, compared to an average $100,000 
in  competing  companies).  Crucially,  they  stressed,  the  company  lacked control  of 
labour costs -  due to past agreements with the workers and government guidelines -  
and  was  burdened  further  by  pension  commitments  to  more  than  4,000  former 
employees, who had worked at IMI when it was a MoD unit but were paid by the 
company and not by the state Treasury.114 The company also needed to  internalise 
more sophisticated working practices.
The  IMI  representatives  went  on  to  describe  the  steps  the  company  had 
already  taken  to  address  its  deficiencies.  These  included  a  series  of cost-cutting 
measures and implementing the Tafnit plan, which sought to revamp the company’s 
organisational culture and reorient its business focus. Selling some of IMI’s real estate 
had raised additional capital. Yet,  they said, these efforts had not been enough, and 
the  only way to  halt  the  company’s  ‘cash haemorrhage’  was  immediately  to  shut 
down six loss-making plants, including two in developing areas, and consider closing
112 Transcript of Cabinet meeting, 13 December 1992.
113 Ibid.
114 IMI Presentation to Cabinet', IMI’ s Operational Recovery Plan, pp. 15-19.
185another four (see Figure 4.3). In the process, 3,000 employees would have to be made 
redundant,  stabilising  the  payroll  at  under  5,000.115  (IMI’s  Chief Executive,  Gabi 
Komisar, who presented this section, was interrupted by Environment Minister Ora 
Namir,  who  scolded him  for  saying  he  would  ‘release  redundant  employees’;  she 
responded, ‘these people are not slaves and you are no liberator.’116)
These drastic measures, the IMI representatives maintained, had to be paid for 
by the state in order to help the company achieve break-even by 1994. In addition, the 
Cabinet  was  asked  to  underwrite  loans  and  other  financial  expenses,  including 
pension plans of former and present workers, and to exempt the company from certain 
liabilities.  All in all, the projected cost of the  financial aid package throughout the 
recovery  phase  and  in  subsequent  years  stood  at  close  to  $1  billion.  The  IMI 
representatives asked the Cabinet to support this request, adding that a comprehensive 
strategic business plan would be presented later, probably within four months.117
While Rabin and Shochat guided the discussion and offered helpful comments, 
helping  IMI  representatives  to  build  a  stronger  case,  many  ministers  remained 
sceptical.  Transport  Minister,  Israel  Keisar,  previously  the  Histadrut’s  Secretary 
General from 1984 to  1992, and someone who was close to both Rabin and the IMI 
employees’ leader Havshoosh, disputed the management’s account:
When IMI was in the process of turning into a company, there was a great show of profit 
and strength. I myself took part in that, both in 1987 and 1988.118
115 Transcript of Cabinet meeting, 13 December 1992; IMI presentation to Cabinet.
116 Snir interview, 2005a.
117 Snir interviews 1997 and 2005c; IMI presentation to Cabinet; State Comptroller Annual Report no. 
45, p. 835.
118 Transcript of Cabinet meeting, 13 December 1992.
186Figure 4.3: Location of IMI’s factories
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187Some ministers asked the management to address discrepancies between the previous 
plan (Tafnit) and the new one: for example, the policy reversal over involvement in 
the civil market. Others focused on the breakdown in trust between management and 
employees and the apparently misleading behaviour of management over the defunct 
September  1992  labour agreement.  (This was an accusation Shomron flatly denied. 
He insisted that ‘while there was a clause in the agreement which stipulated an end to 
future mass redundancies, we also told the workers that we would keep the situation 
under  review.  We  approached  them  as  soon  as  we  finished  that  assessment.  We 
deceived no one. ’11 9)
As  the  meeting  progressed,  it  turned  out  that  most  ministers  remained 
unconvinced. Environment Minister Ora Namir unequivocally criticised the new plan 
and openly questioned the management’s ability to deliver it, based on its record to 
date: ‘This is the fourth recovery plan [at IMI]; all the previous ones resulted in mass 
redundancies  and  nothing  else  happened.’  She  therefore  demanded  the  immediate 
dismissal of the IMI management, arguing that, if it were to stay in post, this would 
spell ‘the beginning of the end’  for the company.120 Almost all ministers concurred, 
expressing  their  support  for  removing  the  management.1 2 1   Realising  he  would  be 
unable to secure sufficient support for the plan, Rabin closed the meeting.122 He later 
notified the  IMI  management that a  follow-up  Cabinet meeting  was  scheduled for 
later that week.
In the next few days,  Rabin considered whether he could accommodate the 
plan’s critics, discussing various options with the Ministries of Defence and Finance.
1,9 Ibid.
120 Haaretz, 13 December 1992.
121 Haaretz, 15 December 1992.
122 Snir interview, 2005a. (Snir was among those presenting the recovery plan in Cabinet)
188The IMI board of directors, meanwhile, held an emergency session at which it offered 
full backing to the management.  In a statement to the press, board members -  who 
included senior MoD and MoF officials -  expressed anger at the workers’ demands.
The spectre of a workers’ union dictating the replacement of a company management as 
a  condition  for  any  implementation  of  a  plan  by  its  owners,  the  government,  is  a 
dangerous precedent.  The continuous service of the present management is a vital and 
essential part of the IMI recovery.123
The same day, workers’ representatives led by Havshoosh arrived at the Knesset for a 
final  round  of lobbying,  meeting  MKs  and Finance Minister  Shochat.  (Havshoosh 
collapsed during the meeting with Shochat and was admitted to hospital with a heart 
problem;124 the first person to visit his bedside was Chief Executive Komisar.125)
On Wednesday 16 December 1992 Cabinet reconvened. Rabin was adamant, 
threatening  to  relinquish  any  responsibility  for  the  company  and  put  it  into 
administration at once  unless  Cabinet agreed  to  restructure  IMI  while keeping  the
1  * )f\ management  in  place.  However,  after  further  discussion  a  compromise  was 
reached. In return for accepting these initial demands, Rabin and Shochat agreed to 
water down the  original plan and to  address  some key concerns raised by Cabinet 
members: chief among them the scope and pace of workforce downsizing. Rabin was 
reminded by his colleagues and advisers -  and not least by IMI’s Havshoosh -  that 
such a large wave of redundancies would run contrary to the party’s ethos and might 
well play into the hands of Labour’s detractors. New clauses were therefore inserted, 
which deviated significantly from the original plan.
123 Haaretz, 15 December 1992.
124 Noted by Finance Minister Shochat, in a speech to the Knesset, see Records of the Knesset, Vol. 8, 
Session 38, ‘Motions for the Agenda’, 16 December 1992, p. 1233.
125 Havshoosh interview, 1998; Maariv, 3 January 1993.
126 Haaretz, 18 December 1992.
189First, the Cabinet ordered the IMI management not to shut down three of the 
six factories slated for closure (those in Jerusalem,  the adjacent developing area of 
Mishor Adumim,  and the  northern town of Maalot -  all  strongholds  of prominent 
Labour ministers and MKs127) and to find alternative solutions instead.  Second, the 
Cabinet  called  for  a  gradual,  sequential  reduction  in  the  workforce,  laying  down 
several  conditions  that  had  to  be  met  before  moving  on  to  the  next  wave  of 
redundancies;  it also  asked  for a comprehensive business plan to  be  submitted by 
March  1993.128  In  response  to  ministers’  criticism  of  the  IMI  management’s 
behaviour, Rabin and Shochat added another clause instructing it to cooperate fully 
with the workers’ organisation on all aspects of the recovery plan and to refrain from
129 unilateral actions.
The modified proposal was accepted by a majority of eight ministers to three 
(two of whom, Namir and Sheetrit, had already sided publicly with the IMI workers), 
with three  abstentions.  Two  counter-proposals -  one  to  delay redundancies by six 
months  and  spread  the  plan’s  implementation  over  a  longer  period,  the  other  to 
postpone the whole plan for two months and ask the IMI management to prepare a 
more complete one -  were narrowly rejected.130
Shortly  after  the  vote  Finance  Minister  Shochat  declared  that,  while  the 
Cabinet decision was a ‘life preserver’ for the company, the prospect of receivership 
was  still  on  the  table.  ‘Should  the  workers  and  management  fail  to  agree  on
127  Three  Labour  ministers  -   Uzi  Baraam,  Shimon  Sheetrit  and  Avraham  Shochat  -   resided  in 
Jerusalem; the Mayor of Maalot, a small town on the Israel-Lebanon border, was the Labour MK 
Shlomo Buhbut, who was also member of the powerful Knesset’s Finance Affairs committee.
128 See clauses III, V and IX, in Cabinet’ s Decision no.  455: Operational Recovery Plan for Taas,  16 
December 1992.
129 See Ibid., clause XIII.
130 Haaretz, 17 December 1992.
190implementation of the recovery plan ... the company might be liquidated or placed in 
administration’.1 3 1  To the Members of Knesset, he said that the Cabinet decision ‘was 
not taken light-heartedly,’ describing the chain of events that had led to the crisis at 
IMI and the efforts to preserve as many factories as possible.  He then attacked the 
Shamir government for failing to address IMI’s problems earlier, claiming that it had 
known of the company’s problems as early as  1991  ‘but preferred -  I presume for 
political reasons -  to wait long enough so they could pass on this hot potato straight to 
us’.132 (Prime Minister Shamir rejected this charge: ‘We looked for solutions [for IMI] 
which did not involve mass redundancies; we saw nothing positive in that.’ He added 
that  ‘no  one  predicted  the  sudden  collapse  in  IMI’s  exports.  ...  I  remember  its 
management bragging about its success, presenting long lists of orders; these orders 
disappeared virtually overnight’.133)
Away from the political bickering, the reactions of the IMI management were 
mixed. On the one hand, the Cabinet approved a two-year aid package to the company 
worth $292 million as well as the immediate  laying off of 1,500 workers,  with an 
option of a further 1,000 to follow. On the other, the compromises and concessions 
outlined in that decision were at odds with the premises of the original recovery plan, 
rendering it more expensive,  if not outright impossible.134 Yet,  the Cabinet did not 
allocate any additional funding or set provisions for potential untoward eventualities, 
such as a lengthy negotiation with the workers’ organisation and the Histadrut, even 
though the company management clearly outlined the financial implications of any
131 Ibid.
132 Speech by Finance Minister Shochat, Records of  the Knesset, 16 December 1992, Vol. 8, p. 1233.
133 Author’s interview with Yitzhak Shamir (Prime Minister 1983-1984, 1986-1992), 30 June 1998.
134 Taos: Situation Report, p. 2.
191such  delay  in  its  recovery  plan.135  The  workers,  meanwhile,  announced  that  they
1 would do their utmost to foil the ‘implementation of the IMI destruction plan’.
Unravelling the Recovery Plan
Once the Cabinet decision had been taken, implementation of the IMI recovery plan 
was handed over to the company’s management and the Ministries of Finance and 
Defence. However, key assumptions in the plan began crumbling almost immediately, 
either because changing preferences by IMI’s main customer,  the MoD,  influenced 
the company’s sales projection, or because political constraints delayed, or in some 
cases  prevented,  timely  reductions  in  its  workforce.  The  following  sections  -   on 
labour,  restructuring  and  sales -   examine  key  developments  in these  areas,  which 
affected IMI throughout the implementation of the plan in 1993 and 1994.
Labour Reduction: Delays and Cost Overruns
The Cabinet decision, with its conditions and restrictions, posed a major challenge to 
the  IMI  management.  Immediately  afterwards,  and  while  the  Ministry  of Finance 
continued  pouring  large  sums  of  money  into  the  company,  the  management 
unsuccessfully  tried  to  resume  communication  with  the  workers.137  The  standoff 
lasted  for  several  weeks,  during  which hundreds  of workers  demonstrated  against 
Rabin in front of his MoD office in Tel Aviv.138
The Prime Minister,  who  witnessed some of the protests  and even haggled 
with demonstrators, was furious. He publicly denounced the IMI workers’ refusal to
135 See IMI Presentation to Cabinet; IMI Operational Recovery Plan, pp. 42— 44.
136 Haaretz, 17 December 1992.
137 Maariv, 31 December 1992.
138 Hadashot, 20 December 1992.
192cooperate, asserting that it ‘would be cheaper to accommodate them in Hilton hotels 
than  on  the  factory  floor’.139  And,  while  criticising  the  ‘inaction’  of the previous 
government, he argued that the money to be spent on IMI  ‘could have created new 
workplaces  for more than  10,000 unemployed people’140  or  ‘done wonders  for the 
education system ’.1 4 1
Rabin’s attacks fuelled much anger and resentment among the IMI workers, 
but also left them despondent. Havshoosh noted,
for  me  and  for my  fellow  workers,  to hear  these  disparaging remarks  uttered by  the 
highest  authority  of all  -   Prime  Minister  Rabin  himself -   was  like  witnessing  the 
destruction of the Tables of the Covenant. We believed that by risking our lives working 
on capricious production lines we actually performed a major national security function; 
now we felt as if a knife was piercing our body. The result was hatred: of the workplace, 
of the defence establishment. Under such circumstances, all that was left for me was to 
get the best redundancy  packages  possible,  and that  was  exactly  my  intention.  I  told 
Rabin as much.142
Realising  they  had  lost  the  battle  in  the  public  arena,  and  with  the  Prime 
Minister  turning  against  them  as  well,  the  workers  agreed  to  negotiate  with 
management.  Havshoosh  says  his  main  interest  was  not  to  reduce  the  number  of 
redundant workers -  he did not challenge the figures given in the Cabinet decision -  
but  to  improve  their  severance  terms;  he  was  less  concerned with the  fate  of the 
remaining workers.143 The discussions lasted more than three months, during which 
the workers realised that ‘everyone wanted to see the back of this process’, so they
139 Rabin, speech to union leaders from the Haifa district, quoted in Haaretz, 24 December 1992.
140 Ibid.
1 41  Rabin, speech at the national conference of mayors and heads of municipal authorities, quoted in 
Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 January 1993.
142 Havshoosh interview, 1998.
143 Ibid.
193deliberately stalled it.144 Another factor in their favour was the Cabinet’s instruction to 
the management that it must win the workers’ approval for the operational recovery 
plan.  Most  of  their  initial  demands  were  therefore  accepted,  including  career 
retraining packages at government expense.  However, the workers’ most significant 
achievement related to compensation and retirement arrangements.  Laid-off workers 
were  awarded  one-off compensation  of over  $100,000  each  (equal  to  three  years’ 
work on full pay), more than twice the statutory rate;  others were allowed to retire 
early on full pension -  which, in net terms, was almost double the cost of the one-off
145 compensation payment.
The 5,000 employees not laid off had to forgo pay rises and agree to certain 
conditions, including the outsourcing of services and the hiring of contract workers on 
lower pay.146 They also accepted, with the consent of the Histadrut, that IMI’s future 
survival was contingent on the profitability and performance of each of the factories, 
and that each would be assessed and dealt with individually (to avoid the phenomenon 
of cross-subsidy between factories).
The  terms  of  the  new  agreement  were  approved  in  March  1993  by  the 
government’s  IMI  Steering  Committee,  even  though  the  cost  of the  redundancy 
package  was  almost  50%  higher than  estimated:  up  from  the  $139  million  in  the 
recovery plan to  $192  million.147 A few weeks later the Cabinet also  endorsed the 
agreement, noting that it ‘met the government guidelines’.148 However, it allocated no 
additional  funding,  even  though  the  company  had  already  missed  key  recovery
144 Ibid.
145 Transcript of IMI board meeting, 10 March 1994, p. 2; Haaretz, 23 June 1998.
146 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 831-832.
147 Ibid., p. 833.
148 Clause I, Cabinet Decision No.  1118 on lM I’ s Operational Recovery Plan, 4 April 1993 (hereafter: 
Cabinet Decision No. 1118).
194objectives  due  to  the  preconditions  stipulated  in  the  Cabinet’s  December  1992 
decision.
Over and above the increase  in the  direct compensation cost,  the Cabinet’s 
preconditions also slowed workforce reduction. According to IMI’s figures, instead of 
the  1,500 employees the company planned to lay off by the end of March 1993, only 
831  actually departed  (a delay management blamed on the  protracted negotiations 
with the workers). In other words, only 55.4% of target layoffs was achieved, which 
meant higher than expected running costs. In June 1993 the IMI Steering Committee 
examined the company’s business results and authorised a management request to lay 
off 1,500 extra workers, bringing the total number of redundancies close to 3,000.149
Political Opposition to the IMI Restructuring
The decision of the Steering Committee -  which also noted that it would expect to see 
the  company  back  in  profit  within  eighteen  months  -   signalled  to  the  remaining 
workers that the management was adamant about carrying through the recovery plan 
in its entirety, including factory closures. Indeed, in the course of 1993 IMI shut down 
three of the  six  factories  it planned  to  close -   a prefab  production plant  in  IMI’s 
northern  factories  complex  in  Haifa,  a  munitions  plant  in  its  Ramat  Hasharon 
complex, and a metal-working plant for the civil market in Maalot. While the plant in 
Haifa was closed on time, that in Ramat Hasharon was shut after a six-month delay, 
and the factory in Maalot was sold to an Israeli firm after it gave financial guarantees 
to  the workers.  (The workers  at the Maalot plant agreed to the deal only after the 
Finance Minister visited them in person and persuaded them to accept it.150)
149 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 831.
150 Shochat interview.
195A few months into the first wave of redundancies and plant shutdowns, the 
management found itself exposed to  a new wave of criticism.  A series of scathing 
investigative  reports  in  a  national  daily,1 5 1   which  were  based  on  information  and 
documentary evidence from ex-IMI workers, prompted some Members of Knesset to
152 call for a public enquiry into the company’s alleged ‘incompetence and corruption’. 
Two MKs filed a joint complaint with the police, asking for a criminal investigation 
into  the  newspaper’s  claims.153  However,  the  Defence  and  Finance  Ministries 
dismissed the calls and gave the company full backing. (Four months later, the police 
told IMI management it had decided not to press charges and closed the case.154)
While  the  management  was  fending  off  its  critics,  the  workers’  national 
organisation -  now headed by Havshoosh’s  successor,  Haim Zweig,  also  a Labour 
Party  member -   sought  to  prevent  closure  of the  two  remaining  factories  in  the 
Jerusalem  area.  In  contrast  to  Havshoosh,  who  had  favoured  dialogue  and 
compromise,  the  new  workers’  leadership  took  a  stance  as  unyielding  as  it  was 
forceful. The first hints of possible closure of IMI’s factories in Jerusalem and Mishor 
Adumim  started  circulating  in  January  1994,  a  few  weeks  after  the  management 
finished a comprehensive  feasibility  study that suggested these  factories  should be 
closed because they had accumulated an operational loss of $11  million in  1993.155 
The local workers’  committee at the Jerusalem factory decided to handle their fight 
for  survival  on  their  own  terms.  With  the  backing  of the  IMI  workers’  national
1 5 1   See articles in  Yedioth Ahronoth,  1  October  1993, 8  October  1993,  15  October  1993, 22 October 
1993, 29 October 1993.
152 See speech of MK Raanan Cohen in Transcript of Knesset session no.  143, 3 November 1993, see 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/ (visited 14 March 2005).
153 Yedioth Ahronoth, 2 November 1993.
154 Haaretz, 7 March 1994.
155 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 837.
196organisation,  they  broke  off  all  relations  with  management  and  warned  senior 
executives not to attempt to enter the factory. (Indeed, none of these executives dared 
to  set  foot  there  for  two  years,  and  the  factory  was  practically  run  by  its  line 
managers,  who  received  occasional  instructions  telephoned  and  faxed  from  IMI 
headquarters.156  Remarkably,  the  MoD  and  the  company  kept  this  situation under 
wraps and did not initiate legal proceedings against the workers).
Meanwhile,  in  April  1994  the  IMI  board  passed  a  resolution  to  close  the 
Jerusalem factory and relocate its infrastructure to another IMI factory in Haifa. IMI’s 
Finance Director estimated the costs of closure, including redundancy of the factory’s 
357 workers, at $50 million but noted that IMI would be spared significant expenses 
associated with the loss-making plant and could streamline its aviation activities on 
one site instead of two. All in all, he predicted the company would cover this one-off 
cost ‘within two to three years’.157 Even though the company lacked the resources for 
such an undertaking, a point made clear by the MoF representative on the board, the 
company’s  Chairman  was  confident  that  state  funding  would  be  forthcoming  and 
declared that he ‘would personally take care of this’.158
However,  the IMI workers’  organisation opposed the board’s decision from 
the outset. It sought to reverse it by direct appeals at political level -  to the Knesset 
and the Defence and Finance Ministers. This proved highly effective, given the strong 
support the workers  received from Jerusalem-based politicians,  including ministers 
(the  Finance  and  Tourism  Ministers  among  them)  and  influential  Members  of 
Knesset, from both Labour and Likud,159 such as Dalia Itzik, chairman of the Knesset
156 Snir interviews, 1997, 1998, 2005a, 2005b.
157 Transcript of IMI Board of Directors meeting, 10 March 1994, p. 4.
158 Ibid.
159 Snir interview, 1998.
197Education  Committee,160  and  opposition  leader  and  head  of  Likud  Binyamin 
Netanyahu. The latter even visited the Mishor Adumim factory and promised to keep
it open;1 6 1  the message relayed to the Jerusalem employees was unequivocal -  under
162 no circumstances would the politicians allow a major factory in the capital to close.
To make their case yet more persuasive, the workers’ organisation hired management 
consultants to examine the Jerusalem factory’s performance and long-term viability. 
Soon afterwards, when a workers delegation met Finance Minister Shochat to advise 
him of this initiative, he backed the idea and asked to see the report’s findings.163
IMI  management  refused  to  assist  the  workers’  advisers  or  give  them 
unfettered access to information,  so the advisers relied on line managers and rank- 
and-file  workers,  who  supplied  them  with  internal  assessments  and  documents.164 
These sources helped to produce a telling account that alleged IMI management had 
rushed to close the factory without examining alternative solutions for its revival. An 
interim report by the consultants, released in May 1994, warned of dire consequences 
and a potential loss of revenues to the tune of $197 million (including $47 million in 
firm orders). The report pointed out that over the years IMI Jerusalem had acquired 
unique  expertise  in  aerospace  systems  and  had  been  awarded  non-transferable 
qualifications from leading foreign manufacturers; it also suggested some cost-cutting
160 Member of Knesset Dalia Itzik was instrumental in the workers’ lobbying efforts within the Labour 
party, see, for example, her Motion for the Knesset’s Agenda protesting against the imminent closure 
of IMI Jerusalem, in Records of the Knesset, session 224, 1 June 1994, vol. 32, pp. 7762-7763.
161 Zweig interview, 1998a.
162 Snir interview, 2005a.
163 Maagar Mohot Ltd, IMI Jerusalem —  Economic Analysis: Interim Report, May 1994, p. 2. The study 
was commissioned by the IMI workers’ national organisation.
164 Ibid.
198measures  and  relocating  the  factory  rather  than  closing  it  down.165  Copies  of the 
report  were  sent  to  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office,  the  Ministries  of  Defence  and 
Finance,  selected  Knesset  committees,  and  news  organisations.  The  workers  also 
presented them to Rabin and Shochat in person.
On receiving these findings, the Knesset’s Finance Committee convened for a 
special session in June  1994, at which it instructed IMI management to refrain from 
any deliberate attempt to close the factory or lay off its workers.166 However, after 
discussions with Prime Minister Rabin and Finance Minister Shochat, the Committee 
chairman,  Labour  MK  Gdalia  Gal,  asked  an  independent  expert  from  Tel  Aviv 
University to look into the workers’ claims. IMI management commissioned a leading 
economist  (who  had  once  been a  Labour candidate  for the  finance portfolio167)  to 
produce a report of its own, which was based on the management’s assessments.168 
The two reports did indeed call into question many of the workers’ assertions but did 
little to change the politicians’  mind.  The pressures that Prime Minister Rabin was 
under -  at the time he was intensely involved in the Middle East peace process, while 
also negotiating a recovery plan for IAI (see Chapter 5) -  made him disinclined to 
take a bold stand on the matter. He therefore dodged the issue for months, ignoring 
recurrent calls by IMI’s board and management to  close the  factory,  which,  in the 
meantime, continued to incur significant losses.169 In the summer of 1994, however, 
the IMI started implementing the closure. A senior executive was assigned to prepare
165 IMI Jerusalem -  Economic Analysis:  Interim Report, pp.  3-4.  See also Maagar Mohot Ltd., IMI 
Jerusalem -  Economic Analysis: Final Report, July 1994, pp. 5-7.
166 Haaretz, 9 June 1994; IMI Jerusalem -  Economic Analysis: Final Report, p. 4.
167 News First Class,  13 May 2001  (www.nfc.co.il. visited 30 August 2005). Prof. Haim Ben-Shakhar 
also served as special advisor to Prime Minister Barak.
168 Snir interviews, 1998a, 2005b; Haaretz, 4 August 1994.
169 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 837.
199the complex shutdown of the Jerusalem factory, discreetly transferring its know-how 
and infrastructure to the Haifa factory.170
While this was going on, an internal dispute erupted between Chief Executive 
Komisar and Chairman  Shomron over an opportunity that arose  for the Jerusalem 
factory. An IMI consultant, who was also working on a restructuring project for the 
other state-owned company, Israel Aircraft Industries, suggested that company might 
be  a prospective  buyer  for  the  Jerusalem  factory.  Komisar  endorsed  the  idea  and 
negotiated a deal with his counterpart at IAI; the two  sides even drafted a tentative 
agreement.1 7 1   However,  Shomron opposed the initiative, insisting that the relocation 
of Jerusalem factory to Haifa should go ahead as planned; he also persuaded the board 
to veto the Chief Executive’s deal with IAI.172
The rift caused a split among senior management and board members, who 
were  presented with conflicting  expert assessments  commissioned by  each  side.173 
The employees, too, were divided. On the one hand, the workers’ local committee of 
the Haifa plant and the Histadrut’s regional labour council in Haifa sided with the 
Chairman and called for the dismissal of the Chief Executive174 (the Chairman of the 
Histadrut’s branch in Haifa asked the Knesset to intervene175). The workers’ national 
organisation, by contrast, initially agreed to support Komisar’s idea on condition that 
IAI offered immediate and permanent employment to all the workers at the Jerusalem 
factory.176  Once  that  demand  was  rejected,  it  decided  to  oppose  both proposals -
170 Snir interview, 1998. Snir was in charge of the Jerusalem factory relocation project.
171 Komisar interview.
172 Ibid.
173 Snir interviews, 1998 and 2005b.
174 Haaretz, 14 December 1994.
175 Haaretz, 20 December 1994.
176 Author’s interview with Haim Zweig, 2 July 1998 (hereafter: Zweig interview, 1998b)
200relocation to Haifa and IAI’s purchase offer -  and demanded the replacement of the 
Chairman, claiming he was unable to lead the company to recovery.177 However, the 
chairman of the IMI workers’ organisation was presented with internal management 
assessments suggesting that the Haifa factory faced possible shutdown as well, if the 
transfer of IMI Jerusalem were not completed. Apparently, the IMI munitions factory 
in Haifa could not cover its  operating costs  on its  own and needed the  additional 
production lines of the Jerusalem factory to remain in business.178
The fate of the Jerusalem and Mishor Adumim factories was not the only thing 
in doubt.  A third factory,  in Tel  Aviv,  was  slated for shutdown by June  1993  but 
remained open more than a year later, due to differences with the workers over their 
terms of departure; some unforeseen technical problems also contributed to the delay. 
The factory posted an operational loss of more than $20 million in  1993  and  1994, 
which had to be absorbed by IMI.179 Also in 1994, the IMI board decided to relocate 
two other factories, a step contingent upon government funding.180 On the other hand, 
a plan to close the loss-making factory in Kiryat Shmona, a struggling town on the 
Israel-Lebanon  border,  was  scrapped  after  the  IMI  board  concluded  the  Cabinet 
would not endorse it for political reasons.  The State Comptroller censured the IMI 
board for this,  stating that it failed to uphold its responsibility for following profit- 
driven considerations, as laid down in the Government Companies Law.1 8 1
177 Interview with Haim Zweig in Haaretz, 10 November 1994.
178 Zweig interview, 1998b.
179 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 838.
180 Ibid., pp. 838-839.
181 Ibid. p. 838.
201Sales: Diminishing MoD Orders
The  closure  of loss-making  factories  was  not  all  that  failed  to  materialise.  IMI’s 
domestic sales forecast, whose accuracy was critical for the success of its recovery 
plan, also proved over-optimistic.
During  discussions  with  the  MoD  the  company  was  informed  that  its 
predictions were  ‘unrealistic and not based on the  actual  [acquisition]  plans of the 
MoD,’  contrary to the Cabinet decision of April  1993, which stipulated that ‘IMI’s 
recovery plan ... should be compatible with the IDF’s long term work plan’.182 On the 
basis of the IDF work plan the MoD placed orders from IMI, and, according to the 
MoD  Director General,  he  was  ‘unable  to  dictate  to  the  military  what  to  buy.’183 
Against this background,  the  MoD maintained,  IMI’s  expectation  that  the  military 
would place orders to the tune of $200 million a year was ‘well beyond the MoD’s 
budgetary means’  and also  ‘outside  the  scope  of its  immediate  priorities’.  In fact, 
actual IDF orders from IMI fell well below company estimates (see Figure 4.4).184
The MoD also insisted it could not commit itself to long-term acquisition from 
any single source, IMI included.  Such an undertaking,  it argued, ran contrary to the 
Mandatory Tenders Law of 1992, which stipulated that a government ministry could 
only enter into a contractual arrangement with a supplier after a competitive bidding 
process.185 Moreover, the MoD had other sources for weapons and explosives in the 
form of American manufacturers; their products could be contracted and paid for as 
part of the US annual military aid to Israel (which meant that the IDF would receive 
these  products  free,  whereas  purchases  from  IMI  were  paid  for  from  the  local-
182 Clause IV, in Cabinet Decision No.  1118.
183 Interview with David Ivry, in Davar, 17 February 1995, p. 16.
184 Shomron interview, 1994.
185 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 829.
202currency portion of the defence budget,  which had  to  accommodate other pressing 
needs).
Figure 4.4
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Note: IMI’s actual sales to the MoD in 1993 and 1994 -  the years covered in the Recovery Plan -  fell 
below  the  Company’s  predictions  by  $41  million  and  $37  million,  respectively.  Elsewhere,  the 
company performed well and even better than expected.
The IDF’s position was unexpected, perhaps - it had not objected to any of the 
sales projections IMI had presented to the Steering Committee and to the Cabinet186 - 
but hardly surprising,  since  it had full autonomy to determine  its operational needs 
and  purchases  (under  the  ‘consumer  sovereignty’  directive,  discussed  earlier).  In 
addition,  the  IDF  tended to  reduce  its orders  from  local  contractors  in response  to 
budget cuts; this was also useful means of protest by proxy -  some affected suppliers
186 Ibid., p. 830.
f
203would usually lobby the Cabinet and Knesset against defence cuts proposed by the
187 Ministry of Finance.
IMI’s management was aware of this, as well as of the fluctuations in overseas 
markets, and therefore decided to hedge against future shortfalls in military orders. To 
this end, the company’s board -  which included four ex-Generals, in addition to an 
ex-Chief  of  Staff  as  chairman  -   put  considerable  pressure  on  the  defence 
establishment and Prime Minister Rabin, asking for a complete rethink of the IDF’s 
position vis-a-vis IMI. ‘Governments all over the world subsidise their domestic arms 
producers,’ noted the Chairman, Dan Shomron. ‘The Israeli government should do the
same by keeping a steady stream of purchases from IMI at the level that was set in the
188 Operational Recovery Plan’  -  i.e. $200 million a year.
Matters of particular concern were the artillery munitions and rocket engines 
production  lines,  which  involved  particularly  high  fixed  costs  but  operated  in  an 
unsteady business environment.  IMI concluded that keeping these lines open would 
require a minimum level of orders; below that level, it argued, they would cease to be 
viable.  To ensure that this would not happen,  the company asked for an indefinite 
subsidy from the government, about $10-15 million a year, if the company failed to 
reach predefined annual sales targets.189 (IMI studied subsidy arrangements in other 
countries and followed the one that existed between a British arms manufacturer and 
the UK’s MoD.190)
Shomron himself spearheaded the efforts to secure that commitment. Over the 
following weeks and months he threw his weight into promoting the subsidy proposal,
187 Snir interview, 2005b.
188 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 829.
189 Snir interview, 2005b.
190 Ibid
204enlisting at times the help of Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, who succeeded him in that 
role.  Together  they  approached  Prime  Minister  Rabin  and  persuaded  him  that 
maintaining the artillery munitions and rocket propulsion lines at IMI was of strategic 
importance to the military -  especially in war -  and that such an undertaking should 
be funded outside the defence budget. The MoF, which opposed this initiative from 
the outset, was furious; from its point of view, the defence establishment had simply 
found  another way to  increase  its  budget beyond  the  agreed  ceiling.  However,  in 
December 1994 Rabin instructed Finance Minister Shochat to accept the arrangement, 
notwithstanding the MoF officials’ reservations.1 9 1
Credibility Crisis at IMI
Around the final weeks of 1994 it became clear that the Operational Recovery Plan 
had failed in some key objectives. Relations with the workers had not been stabilised; 
indeed, mistrust and resentment reached new heights, as witness the struggle over the 
Jerusalem factory.  Occasional  industrial action initiated by the  employees’  national 
organisation  disrupted  deliveries  and  threatened  to  damage  the  company’s
1Q 9
reputation.  (This was narrowly averted thanks to management marketing initiatives, 
which  generated  larger-than-expected  export  revenues;  the  MoD  also  helped  by 
forwarding advanced payments and supporting IMI’s export efforts abroad.193)
The  company’s  financial  situation  was  hampered  by  continued  excess 
production capacity at some factories -  such as those in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv - 
which the management tried unsuccessfully to close.  It was also exacerbated by the
1 9 1  Snir interviews 2005a and 2005b.
192 Author’s interview with Avihay Ben-Yaakov, IMI spokesman and senior executive (1990-1996), 10 
May 1994; Haaretz, 13 October 1994, and 11 November 1994.
193 Ivry interview in Davar, 17 February 1995, pp. 15-16.
205delay  in  the  departure  of redundant  employees,  which  meant  more  people  on  the 
payroll than originally budgeted for. Consequently, IMI did not reach break-even by 
the end of 1994, but posted a $47-million loss instead (see Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5
IMI Recovery Plan: Workforce Reduction and Business Results
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Sources: State Comptroller, IMI Reports, Government Companies Authority.
Notes:  The chart compares projected (p) with actual  (a) sales,  operating profit and workforce.  Sales 
projections for  1993 and  1994 were not met;  at the same time factory closures were delayed.  The 
combination led to higher than expected operating losses:  $85 million and $47 million in 1993 and 
1994, respectively (an operating profit of $1 million had been forecast for 1994).
The  MoF,  meanwhile,  became  increasingly  worried.  The  Comprehensive 
Strategic  Plan,  expected  to  be  submitted  by  March  1993,  was  not  presented  until 
August 1994, amid increasing signs of disagreement between the management and the 
board  over  the  future  structure  of  the  company’s  military  operations.194  The 
government’s IMI Steering Committee, which examined the  184-page plan, asserted 
that it was not consistent with the multi-year work plan of the IDF, as it contained
194 Haaretz, 6 February 1995.
206unrealistic estimates of procurement by the MoD.195 This was disputed by IMI, which 
argued that the projections were based on assessments and working assumptions that 
formed the basis of the Operational Recovery Plan, endorsed by Cabinet in December 
1992 196 Nevertheless,  the  Strategic  Plan was  rejected by  the  Steering  Committee, 
which asked the company to present a modified version consistent with the military’s 
future needs.197 In the meantime, IMI requested and was granted an additional $87- 
million  cash  injection,  on  top  of  the  $292  million  already  given,  towards  the 
additional expenses it incurred as a result of the preconditions  set in the Cabinet’s 
December 1992 decision.198
The request for additional support, along with the company’s financial results, 
suggested that it would still be several months,  if not more, before IMI reached its 
recovery targets. Realising it was heading towards another round of redundancies, in 
September 1994 Finance Minister Shochat instructed IMI management to renegotiate 
the terms of the collective agreement it had with the remaining workers. Specifically, 
he asked it to  reduce the  costs  of future redundancies  (which meant that the MoF 
wanted  cutbacks  in  the  generous  pension  and  compensation  packages  previously 
offered to departing workers).199 The MoF also insisted that it should take part in the 
discussions with the workers about their terms of departure, because it was the state 
treasury, not IMI, that was actually paying for the workforce reduction.
IMI management was baffled.  Further enquiries revealed that the MoF’s top 
bureaucracy had persuaded both Rabin and Shochat that IMI had negotiated excessive
195 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 839.
196 Taas -  Israel Industries, Strategic Business Plan, August 1994, pp. 6-8, 11-12.
197 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 839.
198 Ibid.
199 Haaretz, 29 September 1994.
207severance  packages,  setting  a bad precedent  for  future  redundancy  negotiations  in 
other workplaces, including the private sector.200 The management rejected this claim, 
arguing that the terms of the severance packages were based on those the MoF itself 
had awarded to former state employees. According to Shmuel Kaufman, the executive 
who represented IMI vis-a-vis the MoF:
Finance Minister Shochat claimed repeatedly that IMI had set an unacceptable ceiling, 
and that the workers were practically given a lottery win.  The truth was that the terms 
IMI offered to its departing workers were exactly those proposed by the MoF in  1985, 
when the  government  reduced  3%  of the  workforce  in  ministerial  offices  [one  of the 
measures  taken  under  the  Economic  Stabilisation  Programme].  IMI  was  part  of the 
government  machinery  and  could not  go  below  these  terms.  I  told  Shochat he  could 
check this for himself and would most certainly discover that these were exactly the same 
terms as those offered in 1985; the MoF made them public in a memo it circulated back 
then.201
IMI  management  also  rejected  the  MoF’s  request  to  participate  in  the 
negotiations with the workers.  Chief executive Komisar insisted that he alone was 
‘best suited to lead these discussions’ and threatened to resign if the MoF intervened.
909 Rabin and Shochat yielded, and the MoF backed down.  Rabin also gave Komisar 
permission to start preparing a bankruptcy filing for IMI, should the employees refuse 
to compromise.
Bolstered by the Prime Minister’s backing, Komisar started negotiating with 
the workers on a new collective agreement according to the terms laid down by the 
Finance Ministry.  Initially,  the workers refused to  deviate from the terms they had 
received in the past, but Komisar told them the company was facing possible break-up 
if the negotiations failed.  ‘I told them simply: either we reach a deal or the company
200 Author’s interview with  Shmuel  Kaufman (IMI  Executive Vice-President for Human Resources, 
1993-1996), 6 July 1998 (hereafter: Kaufman interview).
201 Ibid.
202 Komisar interview.
208will instantly be placed in administration. Now, you can try me,’ said Komisar. The 
workers refused to believe the receivership option was on the cards and asked to meet 
Rabin,  but  the  Prime  Minister  backed  Komisar’s  position.203  (Some  weeks  later, 
Rabin said in a speech that he would ‘give away IAI and IMI if only someone could 
manage them properly.’204 Asked by Komisar exactly what he meant, Rabin replied 
that he ‘did not want to pay for the industries any more, because he had better uses for
90S the money spent on them. ’  )
Then, in December 1994, the IMI board presented a revised strategic plan to 
the government’s Steering Committee. This called for comprehensive restructuring of 
the company -  something the IMI management opposed -  underwritten by multi-year 
government  assistance  totalling  some  $800  million  to  meet  one-off and  recurring 
expenses  such as redundancy and pension payments,  maintaining production lines, 
relocating  factories  and  R&D  investments.206  Separately,  IMI  presented  a  draft 
memorandum of a new collective agreement in which the employees’ representatives 
agreed to additional layoffs of some 1,500 workers on less generous terms than those 
offered in previous redundancy waves, while the management promised the remaining 
workers that they would receive favourable severance packages.
The  Steering Committee was not impressed.  It rejected the draft agreement, 
suggesting  instead  that  1,000  workers  should  leave  immediately  but  on  even  less 
generous terms, which were closer to the statutory rate.207 Crucially, it questioned the 
feasibility  of  the  strategic  plan,  given  the  tension  between  the  board  and  the
203 Ibid.
204 Rabin’s speech to Israel Bonds in New York, quoted in Haaretz, 21 November 1994.
205 Komisar interview.
206 Taas: Situation Report, p. 6; Haaretz, 30 December 1994.
207 Haaretz, 2 January 1995.
209management and the company’s continuing losses. It concluded that IMI ‘was beyond 
repair’ and therefore recommended calling in the receivers.208
Prime Minister Rabin, presented with this a stark option for the second time in 
two years, did not rule it out. At a meeting on 1 January 1995 in his Tel Aviv office he 
received up-to-date briefings on the company and was also notified that IMI and the 
government  ministries  had  completed  preparations  for  putting  the  company  into 
receivership.  In the presence  of Finance  Minister  Shochat and  senior Defence  and 
Finance Ministry officials, Rabin sided with the Steering Committee and rejected the 
deal  reached  between  workers  and  management.  He  told  Komisar  the  proposed 
collective agreement ‘was not good enough’ and advised him that he had ‘one week to 
come up with a new agreement on much reduced terms’; otherwise, IMI would be put 
into receivership.209
Rabin’s ultimatum prompted a fresh round of negotiations with the workers,
which also involved the Histadrut and the Finance Minister.210 In fact, this was a two-
way negotiation, with the IMI management -  acting both as a broker and sounding
board -  shuttling between the workers and the MoF’s Budget Department and Wage
211 and Labour Accord Unit.  Even though they threatened to declare a general strike 
with the backing of the Histadrut,212 the employees’ representatives realised that the 
stakes  were  too  high.  Unlike  the  previous  crisis  in  1992,  this  time  the  threat  of 
receivership was real. That could have dire consequences for the company and spell 
the end of the employees’ organisation itself, so the workers agreed to a series of far-
208 Haaretz, 6 February 1995.
209 Komisar and Kaufman interviews.
210 Komisar interview; Haaretz, 6 February 1995.
211 Kaufman interview.
212 Haaretz, 4 January 1995.
210reaching  concessions.  Those  laid-off,  for  example,  received  reduced  severance 
packages  (16% less  costly,  on average,  than awarded previously),  while remaining 
employees had to forgo long-held practices such as automatic salary increases in line 
with public-sector pay rises. They also agreed to a differential pay scale, including the 
introduction of performance-related bonuses for individual workers. Significantly, the 
employees’  organisation  consented  to  the  hiring  of senior  employees  on  personal 
contracts, the terms of which were set beyond its control or influence.213 Four days 
later, Komisar presented the draft of a new collective agreement, which was approved 
within a week by the Steering Committee, the Ministries of Finance and Defence and 
the Histadrut.214
Meanwhile, the row between Komisar and Shomron over the future structure 
of the company’s military operations reached boiling point. The board decided to go 
ahead  with  its  unauthorised  Strategic  Plan  to  turn IMI  as  soon  as  possible  into  a 
holding company whose main divisions would operate as independent subsidiaries. It 
instructed  the  management  to  come  up  with  a  plan  to  that  effect  within  a  few 
months.215 Komisar, however, objected. He thought that the plan was patently wrong, 
especially at that time,  and  suggested a different structure  for the company.  Either 
way, he urged the board to halt any restructuring effort for at least a couple of years, 
and until then to keep IMI running as a single entity whose units operated as separate 
profit centres.216
The  board  refused,  and  so  Komisar decided  to  leave  the  company.  On  13 
January 1995 he approached Rabin and Shochat directly with a request to discharge
213 Taas: Situation Report, pp. 33-34.
214 Haaretz, 6 February 1995.
215 Ibid.
216 Komisar interview; Haaretz, 15 January 1995.
211him from his post, claiming that the Defence and Finance Ministers had decided his
217 appointment, not the board, and therefore they should terminate his appointment. 
(By that stage, the relationship between Shomron and Komisar had deteriorated to the 
point where they stopped communicating with each other; Komisar reported directly 
to the Ministers instead.) However, the legal advisers at the Ministries of Defence and 
Finance pointed out that under the Government Companies Law, only the company’s 
board was authorised to deal with this matter; there were also some doubts as to the 
legal validity of the resignation letter itself.218 At that point, Finance Minister Shochat 
called  on  IMI’s  Chairman  and  asked  him  to  halt  any  discussion  on  Komisar’s 
departure.  A board meeting was therefore scheduled for 29 January, until when the
219 situation remained undecided.
Behind  the  scenes,  however,  pressure  to  dismiss  Shomron  himself began 
mounting. Top officials at the MoF and the Histadrut expressed their discontent with 
the  performance  of  IMI’s  board.  The  Histadrut  sent  a  letter  to  Rabin  openly 
questioning Shomron’s capacity to lead the company and calling for his dismissal;220 
and  senior  officials  of  the  MoF’s  Budget  Department  (frustrated,  some  said,  at 
Shomron’s ability to influence Rabin against their interests) convinced Shochat that 
Shomron was unfit to continue as IMI Chairman.221 This view was also reinforced by 
Komisar,  who  was  quietly  lobbying  against  Shomron  and  suggesting  potential
217 Haaretz, 16 January 1995.
218 Komisar interview.
219 Haaretz, 16 January 1995.
220 Haaretz, 26 January 1995.
221 Snir interviews 2005a and 2005b.
212successors, and by senior MoD officials,  including the Ministry’s Director General, 
David Ivry, who had clashed with Shomron in the past.222
Prime Minister Rabin, meanwhile, busy fending off criticism over a separate 
policy issue (a controversial proposal to tax capital gains on stock market profits), was 
unaware of the move to replace  Shomron.  Over the weekend, he was persuaded to 
shelve the decision on the new tax -  he was inundated with phone calls about it from
99^ investors and leading business figures  -  much to the dismay of the MoF, which had 
hoped for a new source of income, having initially secured the support of the Cabinet 
and Knesset, including Rabin’s, for the move.224 Shochat met Shomron and asked him 
not to let Komisar leave the company, ‘because the Prime Minister and I did not want 
this to happen,’ adding that if the board met to discuss this, ‘all options were open.’225 
Shomron, however, told the Finance Minister that he was under pressure to convene 
the board and to discuss the implications of Komisar’s letter.226
Fearing that the board would vote for Komisar’s departure, Shochat and one of 
his top officials decided to act pre-emptively. The next day, just hours before the IMI 
board was to convene, they approached Rabin and convinced him to sack Shomron -  
asking  him  to  hand  back  his  mandate,  even  though  just  six  months  earlier  his
997 appointment had been extended by three years.  Shortly before the board meeting
222 Ivry had openly clashed with Shomron over the Lavi aircraft project. Ivry supported the programme; 
Shomron fiercely opposed it and persuaded Rabin and other ministers to shelve it. In an interview for 
this study, Ivry maintained that Shomron landed the chairmanship of IMI not on merit but because of 
a prior commitment to offer him a ‘suitable job placement’  on his retirement as Chief of Staff (Ivry 
interview, 1997).
223 See quotes by Rabin, in Globes, 10 November 1995.
224 Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of  Peace, p. 143.
225 Interview with Shochat in Globes, 22 September 1995; Komisar interview.
226 Komisar interview.
227 Snir interviews, 2005a and 2005b; Haaretz, 15 August 1994.
213started,  Shochat phoned  Shomron  and  told  him  that  the  Ministers  wished  to  keep 
Komisar in his job and so objected to any discussion on this in the meeting. Therefore, 
Shomron was told, the Ministers had no choice but to ask him to leave his job and to 
dissolve the entire board. He asked to have this request in writing, and a formal letter, 
signed by Shochat and Rabin, was faxed to his office.228 ‘In order to have free hand in 
implementing the recovery plan,’ they wrote, ‘the ministers responsible cordially ask 
the  board  members  and  management  to  discharge  themselves  from  their  duties’.
99Q Rabin and Shochat did not elaborate further.
The inexplicable haste with which Shomron and the entire board of IMI were 
asked  to  leave -   by  fax  - caused  a  public  furore.  Never before  had a board  of a 
government  company -   let  alone  one  with  five  ex-IDF  generals  on  it  -   been  so 
unceremoniously dismissed.  Shomron  himself was  hurt  and baffled  (he  had  had  a 
meeting  with  Rabin just  weeks  earlier,  and  the  Prime  Minister  had  not  hinted  at
9 ^ a
dissatisfaction  with  Shomron  )  but  nevertheless  refused  to  appeal  against  the 
decision.  ‘The commander in chief asked me  to  leave,  and  I will  obey,’  he  told a 
senior executive who  suggested  fighting back.231  The  other board members agreed 
and tendered their resignations there and then, noting that they were willing to act as 
caretakers for a few days until a new board was appointed.232
228 Interview with Shochat in Globes.
229 Letter by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Finance Minister Avraham Shochat addressed to IMI 
Chairman Dan Shomron, IMI Board members and IMI Chief Executive Komisar, 29 January 1995.
230 Haaretz, 31 January 1995.
231 Snir interviews, 2005a and 2005b.
232 Letter from IMI Chairman Dan Shomron to Prime Minister Rabin and Finance Minister Shochat, 29 
January 1995.
214New Constraints on IMI
Shomron’s successor, Yaakov Lifshitz, asked for and was granted three months ‘time 
out’  to  study  the  company’s  situation.233  A  former  senior official  and  a  respected 
figure in the Israeli business community -  Lifshitz had served as economic adviser to 
the MoD and the Director General of the MoF and also headed major companies in 
the banking,  energy and electronics  sectors -  he quickly realised that IMI was not 
ready for a major restructuring as proposed by the previous board. His first decision, 
therefore,  was  to  shelve  his  predecessor’s  proposal  to  convert  IMI  into  a  holding 
company and to resubmit a new plan. He also contacted the outgoing chief executive 
and  asked  him  to  retract  his  resignation;234  Komisar  agreed  to  stay  for  six  more 
months until he had completed five years in the job.  Thereafter, their first decision 
was to go ahead with the agreement reached with the workers in January 1995.
Next,  Lifshitz  approached  the  Finance  Ministry  for  clarification  of  its 
commitments  to  the  IMI  recovery process.  In particular,  he  asked the  Ministry  to 
increase the company’s equity capital significantly, to give it financial latitude, and to 
outline the financial aid it proposed to allocate.236 In the process he emphasised IMI 
would  strive  to  reduce  reliance  on  state  handouts  to  a  minimum,  opting  for more 
commercially viable ways to raise money (like bank loans and strategic partnerships).
Whereas  his  predecessor  had  had  a  fractious  relationship  with  the  MoF, 
Lifshitz’s appointment was warmly endorsed by Ministry officials, who were more 
forthcoming in response to his requests. In a highly detailed letter, Finance Minister
233 Interview with Lifshitz, in Business supplement, Maariv, 9 July 1996, pp. 20-21  (hereafter Lifshitz 
interview in Maariv).
234 Haaretz, 14 February 1995.
235 Komisar interview.
236 Lifshitz interview in Maariv.
215Shochat specified the amounts and assurances the state was willing to grant IMI and 
its ailing subsidiary, Ashot Ashkelon. Shochat promised to pay $120 million for the 
severance packages of 1,350 employees slated to leave from February 1995 onwards, 
to give another $63 million for the severance packages of workers who had left the 
company before that date, and to add $6.5 million towards Ashot’s recovery costs. He 
also  noted that ultimate responsibility  for the  redundancy costs would lie with the 
state  Treasury,  not with IMI.237  (In  a  subsequent letter,  the  MoF  Director General 
qualified some of Shochat’s commitments.  )
IMI management, meanwhile, started a new attempt to win the support of the 
political echelon for the closure of the Jerusalem factory.  All the actors previously 
involved -  the IMI board, management and workers’  representatives,  the Histadrut, 
the Jerusalem politicians and the Ministries of Defence and Finance -  were once more 
embroiled in a heated debate. Senior officials at the MoD and IMI favoured the option 
of merging the factory with IAI;239 the Histadrut regional branch in Jerusalem and the 
workers’  committee  at  IMI  Jerusalem,  on  the  other hand,  opposed  any  relocation 
attempt.240 Inside the Labour party, two camps formed -  each comprising politicians 
prominent at national and municipal level. One, led by the Haifa Mayor and several 
ministers and MKs who resided in the city, put the case for relocating the Jerusalem 
factory to Haifa; the other, led by Jerusalem-based politicians, favoured a reversal of 
the decision to move the Jerusalem factory to  Haifa.241  This time Finance Minister 
Shochat -  who had previously opposed the Jerusalem factory’s closure -  tipped the
237  Letter  from  Finance  Minister Avraham  Shochat to  IMI  Chairman  Yaakov  Lifshitz,  20  February 
1995.
238 Letter by MoF Director General, David Brodet, to IMI Chief Executive Komisar, 8 March 1995.
239 Snir interview, 1998; Globes, 1 February 1995.
240 Globes, 1 February 1995; Globes, 16 March 1995.
241 Zweig interview, 1998a.
216scale, when he informed IMI in February 1995 that he would rather see the Jerusalem 
factory  merge  with  IMI’s  factory  in  Haifa.242  A  month  later,  he  also  enlisted  the
94^ support of Prime Minister Rabin, and the two formally approved the move,  almost a 
year  after the  IMI  board’s  decision  on  the  issue.  (By  then,  IMI  management  had 
finished the discreet transfer of know-how and infrastructure from Jerusalem to the 
Haifa plant, begun six months earlier, and the Jerusalem plant had completed a major 
order for the US firm McDonnell Douglas, which had threatened legal proceedings if 
IMI failed to deliver on time.244)
A week later,  on  14 March  1995,  Shochat and two senior officials from the 
MoF  Budget  Department  met  the  IMI  Chairman  and  senior  management 
representatives  for an  update  briefing.  Shochat  was  told  that  a  last-minute  hurdle 
delayed  the  signing  of  the  new  collective  agreement.  IMI’s  management  had 
discovered a gap of 91 million shekels between the figures promised by the Treasury 
and  the  actual  cost of redundancies,  and  it had been haggling  over this  and other 
issues with Treasury officials for months. This debate, he was told, adversely affected 
IMI’s  condition,  as  well  as  making  the  final  settlement  with  the  workers  more 
expensive.245 The Finance Minister was having none of it: he instructed management 
to  ‘sign  the  agreement  immediately’  and,  notwithstanding  Treasury  officials’
242 Globes, 1  February 1995.
243 Haaretz, 15 March 1995.
244 Snir interviews,  1998a, 2005a and 2005b. IMI was an accredited supplier of McDonnell Douglas for 
the F-15 aircraft and sole supplier of its fuel tanks. The management came under heavy pressure to 
comply with the terms of a major order being handled by the Jerusalem plant during its transfer to 
Haifa. Facing possible major disruption to its F-15 production line, McDonnell Douglas warned that, 
if IMI failed to deliver on time, it would initiate immediate punitive action, including daily interest 
charges  for  each  $50-million  aircraft  not  delivered  on  time  to  its  intended  customer.  IMI  then 
allocated significant resources to ensure successful completion of the order.
245 Kaufman interview.
217reservations, gave his consent to ‘covering the financial gap as part of the financial aid 
given to IMI’.246 After this, IMI management signed the agreement with the workers, 
and the Cabinet approved the necessary funding, totalling some $155 million, all in 
the same week.247
With relocation of the Jerusalem  factory  and  the  new  collective  agreement 
both concluded, the IMI board and the management focused on preparing a modified 
strategic plan. After wide-ranging consultations, the IMI Chairman concluded that to 
secure  the company’s  long-term viability it must implement additional cost-cutting 
measures  and  bring  in  external  partners.  Lifshitz  identified  the  light  and  heavy 
munitions product lines as ideal candidates for restructuring and partial privatisation, 
a finding warmly welcomed by Prime Minister Rabin and top officials in the Defence 
and Finance Ministries. However, his proposal to transform secret IMI production and 
manufacturing lines into MoD-owned ones that IMI would be contracted to manage 
(an  arrangement  also  known  as  GOCO  -   government-owned,  contractor-operated) 
was turned down.248
Two  months  later,  on  15  May  1995,  the  IMI  board  presented  the  Steering 
Committee  with  a  revised  strategic  plan,  which  called  for  a  major  change  in  the 
company’s structure and organisational culture. It proposed that IMI should consist of 
three  organisational  divisions  and  should  focus  on  eight  areas  of  technological
246 Ministry of Finance -  Budget Division, ‘Summary of the Finance Minister’s meeting with the IMI 
management’, 15 March 1995 (internal document).
247  Cabinet  approved  additional  financial  assistance  to  IMI  on  26  March  1995.  See:  Government 
Companies  Authority,  MoD  and  Ministry  of  Finance,  Report  on  IMI  (November  2001),  p.  9; 
Haaretz, 24 and 28 March 1995.
248  Author’s  interview  with  Yaakov  Lifshitz  (IMI  Chairman,  1995-2001),  15  July  1996  (hereafter: 
Lifshitz interview).
218expertise in the military sphere249 -  a move underlined by the suggestion to ditch the 
trading name  ‘Taas’  and rename the company ‘IMI’.  The plan placed significant 
emphasis on forming strategic partnerships with global and local companies in each 
core business area; this way, Lifshitz asserted, the company would keep the flexibility 
to cope with any future restructuring of the state-owned industries while maximising 
its business potential and hedging against untoward fluctuations in the arms market. 
However,  certain  production  lines  that  served  strategic  purposes  would  remain 
classified  and  non-commercial;  the  MoF  and  MoD  would  maintain  these  through
9  S1 subsidies and annual orders.  In addition, the Treasury was asked to finance in full 
IMI’s  redundancy packages  and  factory  relocation,  provide  export  guarantees,  and 
increase its equity capital.  The total cost of the plan was estimated at $800 million, 
similar to the amount specified by the previous board.252
IMI’s board and the Steering Committee tentatively accepted the plan, and the 
sides began detailed negotiations on its terms and conditions.  In the meantime, IMI 
closed several of its factories (in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Mishor Adumim, Herzliya and 
Mitzpe Ramon), sold off sites and shut down internal units that were not part of the 
company’s core business,  outsourcing services from external  suppliers instead.  The 
gradual  reduction  in  workforce  and  fixed  costs  helped  to  stabilise  the  company’s
253 finances.  However, once again, the company was experiencing delays in deliveries 
to the IDF, which threatened to respond by reducing its future orders. IMI’s new chief 
executive,  Shlomo Milo,  who had succeeded Komisar in August  1995,  realised the
249 Taas -  Israel Industries, Multi-year Strategic Business Plan for 1995-2000, May 1995, pp. 12-13.
250 Ibid., p. 8.
251 Ibid., pp. 1 and 9; see also Lifshitz interview, and Lifshitz interview in Maariv.
252 Report on IMI, pp. 9-11 and appendix III.
253 Lifshitz interview; Komisar interview.
219needed to implement a series of urgent steps to restore the trust of its most important 
customer.254 He also noted the degree of intimacy between some senior politicians and 
workers’ leaders (Finance Minister Shochat, and at least two other Cabinet ministers, 
for example, had taken part in a private function organised by the workers’ leader of 
the IMI Haifa plant).255
During the  intense negotiations with IMI’s board and management over the 
terms of strategic plan the MoF imposed various requirements, as also did the MoD. 
Lifshitz,  frustrated  by  these  new  preconditions,  lambasted  Rabin  in  one  of their 
meetings.
The  way  we  were  treated  means  one  thing.  You  want  to  close  us  down  but  without 
making  an  explicit  decision  to  do  so;  you  do  not  have  the  courage  to  make  such  a 
decision; I certainly have no intention to initiate that myself.  If you think that somehow 
the company’s figures would work out fine by themselves, think again. After a year or 
two, the whole business called IMI would just fall apart.256
Despite  this,  the  MoF’s  Budget  Department  demanded  that  the  company 
accept several preconditions and restrictions: for example, a cap on the subsidies IMI 
would receive  for maintaining its artillery and rocket lines -  in effect reversing an 
understanding  between  Rabin  and  previous  IMI  Chairman  Shomron.  Against  the 
advice of his senior executives, Lifshitz yielded to the MoF’s demand and agreed to a 
time  limit  of five  years 257  However,  on  other issues,  the  Treasury  was  willing  to 
accept  Lifshitz’s  requests,  for  example  by  substantially  increasing  the  company’s 
equity capital (achieved inter alia by letting the company retain the proceeds from the 
sale of land it had previously leased from the state). Lifshitz also received qualified
254 Milo interview.
255 Ibid.
256 Lifshitz interview.
257 Snir interview, 2005b.
220approval from both MoD and MoF to pursue part-privatisation initiatives that would 
enable the company to raise additional capital from other sources.258
Six months later, on 2 October 1995, the Cabinet accepted IMI’s strategic plan 
and approved a comprehensive package of assistance totalling $545 million, resulting 
from the discussions between the company and the Treasury.  It also disbanded the 
MoF-led Steering Committee.  The decision, which was pre-vetted by the Treasury, 
outlined  a  comprehensive  financial  package  that  covered  many  of the  company’s 
running and one-off expenses, including those of relocating and closing factories, and 
an increase in IMI’s equity capital.
Approval of IMI’s  Strategic  Plan was warmly welcomed at the Ministry of 
Finance,  whose  series  of  upbeat  press  releases  highlighted  the  continuous 
improvement  in the  company’s  situation and predicted  it  would  reach  ‘break-even 
point within a year’.  The ministry also hailed the collective agreement signed seven 
months earlier as a ‘breakthrough in the labour relations of the state-owned defence 
firms’.260
Cabinet approval paved the way for the company to proceed with the board’s 
reorganisation  plan  for  the  company.  Top  of  Lifshitz’s  agenda  was  partial 
privatisation of the artillery munitions line (he realised ‘we simply could not maintain
0f\ 1 the line without external partners’  ), which was to be turned into a subsidiary that 
would  then  be  partially  sold.  To  underline  the  seriousness  of  its  intention,  IMI 
prepared a prospectus for potential buyers with the assistance of external accountants. 
Two  of the biggest companies  in the  field,  Olin and Lockheed Martin’s armament
258 Lifshitz interview; Lifshitz interview in Maariv.
259 See Israeli Cabinet Decision No. 6172, ‘The multi year business plan of IMI’, 2 October 1995.
260 Ministry of Finance, Press Releases on IMI’s strategic plan, 1 October 1995 and 2 October 1995.
261 Lifshitz interview.
221subsidiary,  were  contacted  and  agreed  to  study  IMI’s  proposals;262  they  hired 
solicitors and consultants to assess IMI’s suggestions.  Representatives of Olin,  who 
had previously met Rabin, asked Lifshitz whether Rabin’s proposal to give away IMI 
for free still stood.  Lifshitz replied that Rabin’s November  1994 remarks had been 
misunderstood; IMI was certainly not to be given away free of charge, and the offer 
applied  only  to  the  artillery  munitions  line.  The  American  firm,  which  had  taken 
Rabin’s assertions at face value, nevertheless decided to continue with its enquiries, as 
did Lockheed Martin.263  The  latter was particularly interested in IMI’s proposition, 
seeing possible synergy between IMI’s research capabilities in artillery munitions and 
its armament subsidiary.264
The Undoing of IMI’s Partnership Strategy
The  murder  of  Prime  Minister  Rabin  on  4  November  1995  delayed  the  IMI 
management’s privatisation efforts for a while. They were resumed once the go-ahead 
was received from Rabin’s successor, Shimon Peres. (IMI’s Chairman had served as 
Ministry of Finance Director General under Peres  in the  1980s,  and the two  knew 
each  other  well).265  Peres  even  met  Dan  Tellep,  the  chief executive  of Lockheed 
Martin,  the  world’s  biggest  defence  contractor at the  time  and  one  of the  biggest 
weapon  suppliers  to  the  IDF,  in  March  1996.  Tellep  reiterated  his  firm’s  serious 
intentions  regarding  IMI,  and  Peres  encouraged  him  to  continue  with  his 
negotiations.266 ‘I supported the deal with the American firm wholeheartedly,’ he said,
262 Haaretz, 11 February 1996.
263 Lifshitz interview.
264 Ivry interview,  1998; Yedioth Ahronoth, 18 July 1996.
265 Ibid.
266 Haaretz, 8 March 1996.
222Of\7 ‘because it could have given IMI a far wider leverage, marketing-wise’.  Lockheed 
Martin  would  greatly  benefit  from  the  deal  because  its  armament  and  munitions
'Jf.Q
subsidiary, IMI’s potential partner, lacked the Israeli firm’s research capabilities.  In 
April 1996 both companies began formal talks on the purchase of 40% of IMI’s heavy 
munitions division. However, if the Israeli company had hoped the Prime Minister’s 
backing would clinch a quick deal, the hope was short-lived.
Soon after IMI and Lockheed Martin began their discussions, both the MoD 
and  the  MoF  started  to  question  the  proposed deal.  At the  MoD,  Maj.-Gen.  (res.) 
Israel Tal,  a senior assistant to  the Defence Minister and the head of the Merkava 
battle tank programme, raised serious doubts over the merits of the proposed deal. In a 
harshly worded letter to Prime Minister Peres and the MoD’s Director General David 
Ivry, he branded it  ‘highly dangerous’,  claiming that by applying strict commercial 
considerations to manufacturing of artillery munitions, Israel risked ‘a real debilitating 
impact on existing capabilities’, which in turn might hamper IMI’s ability to meet the 
IDF’s future needs. Furthermore,  ‘Israel might lose its independence in these areas if 
the American firm decided to increase its controlling stake. Israel was also risking an 
untoward exposure of unique IDF capabilities in the highly sensitive areas of armour 
and shell penetration’.269 Tal was particularly dismayed by the manner in which the 
negotiation was handled, demanding that ‘a strategic issue of the first order such as 
this  should not be left at the hands of the  IMI management’.  He implied that  ‘the 
whole decision process was not controlled and monitored properly’ and proposed that 
only the MoD  should be  the prime negotiator.  Other MoD officials,  like Assistant
267 Peres interview.
268 Yedioth Ahronoth, 18 June 1996.
269 From partial letter by Assistant Defence Minister Israel Tal to MoD Director General, David Ivry 
[undated copy]; see also Tal interview.
223Defence Minister Moshe  Peled,  also  objected to the proposed deal.  He argued that 
IMI might be required to follow the US law in addition to Israeli law if an American 
firm  was  to  acquire  a  stake  in  it.  Such  situation,  he  said,  might  lead  to  serious 
diplomatic  complications  in  the  event  of sales  to  countries  under  an  international 
embargo that Israel was not a party to. He noted that IMI had major export deals with 
countries that were subject to UN or US sanctions.270
The  MoF  was  unhappy  with  the  deal  too,  fearing  that  Lockheed  Martin 
wanted, in fact, to take advantage of IMI’s contracts with the MoD.  ‘IMI wanted to 
sell the Americans the MoD’s commitment of long-term orders, which was not theirs 
to negotiate to begin with,’  argued MoD Director General,  David Ivry.271  The MoF 
asked him to issue a letter ordering a freeze on further negotiations. IMI’s Chairman 
had meanwhile suggested excluding IMI’s central research laboratory from the deal, 
thus meeting most of the security concerns raised by Assistant Defence Minister Tal; 
nevertheless,  the  MoD  forbade  IMI  to  negotiate  or  disclose  information  on  its 
divisions to foreign companies.
IMI Chairman Yaakov Lifshitz was perplexed.
We received mixed signals. On the one hand, the MoD told us that it did not mind if we 
closed our [artillery and heavy munitions] lines because it did not view them as essential 
any more, and that it was reluctant to subsidise them;273 on the other hand, when we told 
them that we would bring in an outside partner to help us maintain these production lines,
270  Author’s  interview  with  Maj.  General  (Res.)  Moshe  Peled  (Assistant  Defence  Minister  for 
Industries,  1992-1999, Rafael Director General  1988-1992); author’s interview with Tov, 8 October 
1997 (hereafter: Tov interview,  1997).
271 Ivry interview, 1998.
272 Globes, 11 July 1996.
273 The MoD advised IMI in January 1992 that the IDF would cease buying artillery munitions from the 
company and it therefore had ‘no objection to close the line’. See: Letter from the MoD Procurement 
Directorate  (which  handles  weapons  acquisition  on  behalf of the  IDF)  to  IMI’s  chief executive, 
headed ‘IMI -  acquisition of 155mm artillery munition’, 30 January 1992.
224all  of a sudden we were told that this  option would compromise national  security.  So 
which of these positions was true? Did the MoD need these lines or not? It simply did not 
make up its mind.274
Peres,  too,  regretted this chain of events,  saying  that it  ‘was possible  to  arrange  a 
clearance agreement with the American firm’.275 At this point, though, he was deeply 
involved in campaigning for the election due in June 1996 (which he lost).
Lockheed Martin, meanwhile, reconsidered its position and, in the light of the 
MoD objections, concluded that the likelihood of a concrete deal with IMI was slim. 
It therefore withdrew its offer and decided that artillery production was no longer part 
of  its  core  business  activities.  In  November  1996  it  sold  off  its  munitions  and 
armament  subsidiary  to  another  American  firm,  General  Dynamics.  Shortly 
afterwards  IMI  abandoned  the  idea  of  strategic  partnerships  and  opted  for 
straightforward strategic alliances instead.276
Conclusions
IMI  started  operating  as  a  government  company  in  1990,  heavily  burdened  by 
restrictive collective agreements,  too  large  a workforce and unsustainable  financial 
commitments.  Its  structure  and  operations  were  outdated  and  oversized,  and  its 
financial performance was well below par.  The global arms  slowdown of the early 
1990s hit the firm’s earnings and showed that IMI was spread too thinly across too 
many businesses, sites and product lines.
From 1991 to 1995 IMI sold or shut down dozens of underperforming or non- 
strategic  factories,  businesses  and  product  lines.  It  also  turned  its  organisational
274 Lifshitz interview.
275 Peres interview.
276 Milo interview.
225culture  on  its  head:  moving  from  a  government  contractor  to  a  profit-oriented 
business. Rather than addressing the needs of the state, IMI focused more and more 
on  its  own  interests.  This  change  was  manifested  in  many  ways,  not  least by  the 
management’s approach to new contracts. Rather than pursuing them at all costs, and 
often signing them at a loss, post-incorporation IMI realised the damage they could do 
to  its profit-and-loss account,  and so became more selective,  signing only contracts 
that could yield significant profit (see Figure 4.6 for the steady improvement in IMI’s 
sales, output and net profit between 1992 and 1996). Yet this turn-round was largely 
obscured  by  the  lingering  global  recessionary  environment  and  the  company’s 
continuing losses (it reached break-even after 1996).
Figure 4.6
IMI:  Business Results under Rabin-Peres Government
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The  policy  process  at  work  in  the  IMI  crisis  highlights  the  contrasting 
considerations applied by various actors in the decision-making chain. It also suggests 
that the government policy-making process, characterised by a series of interactions
226between several participants taking place at several locations simultaneously, brought 
to light built-in policy preferences and biases that, in turn, influenced the pace, costs 
and effectiveness of the policy implementation phase.
But before we focus on the respective actors’  policy preferences,  we should 
note  the  glaring  failures  of the  regulatory  bodies  (the  Ministries  of Finance  and 
Defence) during IMI’s transformation and incorporation process, which preceded the 
IMI crisis. The inadequacies of that process -  unrealistic commercial expectations for 
IMI and under-funded corporate and financial structure -  became apparent only when 
the market conditions in which IMI operated became adverse. Until then, none of the 
main actors responsible for the company -  neither the Defence Minister (first, Moshe 
Arens, then Yitzhak Rabin), nor the Ministries of Defence and Finance, let alone IMI 
itself -  had reliable knowledge of the company’s actual plight;  that was discovered 
only when external auditors and management consultants analysed the firm’s business 
performance.  This  speaks  volumes  about  the  incapacity  of the  state’s  regulatory 
bodies effectively to control and supervise state-funded bodies.
One  factor  affecting  this  capacity,  though,  was  defective  reporting  by  IMI 
itself,  which  conveyed  to  its  political  masters  a  soothing  message  of ‘business  as 
usual’ (note, for example, the comments by Prime Ministers Shamir and Rabin). Apart 
from  its  internal  inefficiencies,  the  company  started  off with  significant  financial 
commitments,  including  prohibitive  pension  payments  for  thousands  of  former 
workers, and flawed financial foundations blighted by insufficient equity capital and 
lack  of  control  over  labour  costs.  Only  when  losses  rose  rapidly  did  the  IMI 
management realise, in June 1991, that it was ill prepared -  operationally, financially 
and organisationally -  to  face the commercial and business challenges of the post-
227Cold-War era.  And only at that point,  when IMI was  close  to bankruptcy,  did the 
government bureaucracy leap into action.
However, even when all the relevant actors -  the Cabinet, IMI management 
and  employees,  the  Ministries  of  Defence  and  Finance  and  the  Histadrut  -  
acknowledged  and  understood  the  situation  the  company  was  in,  new  setbacks 
hampered the efforts to turn its fortune.  Some were obvious, others more subtle and 
hidden.  At  the  company  level,  both  management  and  board  were  deeply  divided 
during  the  implementation  of the  Operational  Recovery  Plan  in  1993  and  1994. 
Neither  the  Chairman  nor  the  Chief Executive  could  agree  on  issues  of strategic 
importance,  differing over the  future  of the Jerusalem plant and over the preferred 
corporate  and  financial  structure  for  IMI’s  military  operations.  A  breakdown  in 
communication while the company was struggling to meet its recovery targets was 
inevitable, and later led to the departure of the IMI board in early 1995.
The dilemmas that divided the two responsible ministries,  the MoD and the 
MoF, were of a different order. The MoD sought to extricate itself from any financial 
responsibility  for  IMI,  and  indeed  fulfilled  a  secondary  role  in  the  company’s 
recovery process from the outset. The MoF, for its part, at first tried to pass the buck 
to the MoD, and when this failed it sought to limit the state’s financial commitments 
to the company as much as possible (to the point where the Finance Minister himself 
felt compelled to  override his officials,  as happened in March  1995).  Indeed,  these 
positions, which were conveyed in both word and deed, delayed IMI’s recovery, made 
it more expensive and hampered management’s efforts to reach its objectives.
Underlying  the  inter-departmental  turf  wars  and  personal  rivalries  well- 
entrenched  interests  were  evident.  These,  the  long-lasting  and  deep-seated  after­
effects of separate policy events that had taken place many years before the crisis at
228IMI was detected, influenced the responses and preferences of three key actors -  the 
MoD, the IDF and the MoF.
The  defence  establishment  approach  to  arms  production  and  purchasing, 
largely formed in the traumatic shadow of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, focused almost 
exclusively on  addressing the  IDF’s pressing  military needs,  but  from  a  shrinking 
defence budget. So the MoD sought to slough off completely any financial burdens or 
long-term obligations associated with IMI. The IDF, for example, paid no heed at all 
to  the  company’s  financial  difficulties  during  its  most  fragile  phase,  the 
implementation of its recovery plan in 1993 and 1994. IDF orders from IMI were cut 
just when the company needed them most -  a move that only served to manifest the 
armed forces’ insular, inward-looking modus operandi following the 1975 ‘consumer 
sovereign’ directive and the division of responsibilities between the IDF and the MoD 
(see  Chapter 2).  In  the  same  vein,  the  MoD  rejected IMI’s  demand  for long-term 
acquisition  commitments,  not  only  because  this  might  have  limited  the  military’s 
budgetary freedom,  but also because  the MoD had to meet statutory requirements, 
such  as  the  1992  Mandatory  Tenders  Law  that  normally  forbade  sole-supplier 
arrangements of this kind.  Indeed,  save  for sporadic cash injections and occasional 
lobbying of potential clients abroad on behalf of IMI, the MoD did little financially to 
alleviate  the  company’s  situation  from  its  own  resources.  Even  when  the  IDF 
intervened on behalf of the company, as in the case of the joint lobbying by the IMI 
chairman and the IDF Chief of Staff, the bulk of the subsidy for maintaining strategic 
production lines was to come from the state’s central budget, not the MoD’s.
The MoF,  for its part,  employed a different set of considerations in dealing 
with IMI. These reflected its macro-economic objectives in the aftermath of the 1985 
battle against hyperinflation. The Ministry’s Budget Department became familiar with
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within the defence establishment and outside it were about to mount, or already were 
mounting, urgent appeals for state funding. To the Budget Department this was just 
another ailing enterprise waiting for state assistance, and it sought to limit as much as 
possible any costs associated with IMI’s  contraction and streamlining plans.  It got 
mixed results. On the one hand, specific instructions from the Cabinet and the Finance 
Minister  meant  the  MoF  had  to  commit  to  meeting  from  the  state  budget  costly 
pension payments it had previously hoped would be borne by IMI. On the other hand, 
it achieved two important breakthroughs in the  1995 negotiation round:  for the first 
time in the annals of the defence industrial base it reduced the costs of future pension 
and severance packages for IMI workers, and it set a five-year time limit on the state 
subsidies granted to the company.
The significance of these achievements was twofold.  The MoF succeeded in 
curtailing possible indefinite financial reliance on the state by IMI, forcing it to take 
concrete steps to find alternative sources of capital and to implement a series of cost- 
cutting measures. Crucially, the MoF managed to end the costly tradition of voluntary 
redundancies in the  state-owned defence enterprises,  with excess workers receiving 
ever-improving severance packages in return for consenting to early retirement.
The MoF thus sent a strong message to other companies that state ownership 
does not necessarily mean a blank cheque and an automatic bail-out; public money 
was no longer readily available for failing companies. Indeed, the MoF’s insistence on 
considering putting IMI into receivership if the workers had refused to accept smaller 
wages and reduced severance packages -  a demand backed by Prime Minister Rabin 
himself,  not once  but  twice -   conveyed that message  quite  effectively.  Yet,  even 
though the MoF took a critical attitude towards IMI throughout the crisis, it opted fora negotiated settlement rather than taking unilateral action that might have sparked 
widespread protest by other unions -  its interest was in keeping the situation under 
control and to keeping channels open as much as possible.
For all the MoF’s cost cutting achievements, though, the total earmarked for 
IMI’s  recovery plans  was  significant:  more  than  $800  million  spread  over  several 
years. This highlights the generous pay terms offered to workers in the defence sector 
and also the influence that IMI, and especially its workers, exerted within the political 
system.  In  fact,  politicisation  of the  decision phase -   for example,  before  Cabinet 
decisions -  grew so blatant that straightforward business or economic considerations 
became  of only  secondary  importance  or  none  at  all.  Furthermore,  it  seems  that 
pressure from the IMI’s workers organisation (whose involvement in the bargaining 
phase was enshrined in the company’s collective labour agreements) and its pervasive 
reach within the political system influenced, and at times dictated, the pace and course 
of action preferred by Prime Minister Rabin (resulting, for example, in the watered- 
down  Cabinet  decision  of December  1992)  and  the  state  bureaucracy,  mainly  the 
Ministry of Finance.
In the case of IMI, opportunities to disrupt policy implementation existed at 
several points on the  institutional map -  in the inner Cabinet,  at the parliamentary 
level (through the Knesset’s committees) and within the Labour Party itself (via its 
representation on local authorities and regional labour councils) -  and the workers’ 
organisation exploited them to  the  full.  Although in theory apolitical,  the workers’ 
organisation  was  in  fact  a  major  bastion  of Labour  hegemony:  the  two  workers’ 
leaders  at  the  time  were  Party  members  and  high-ranking  functionaries  in  the 
Histadrut,  and hence  well  connected  to  senior figures  in  the political  system.  The 
effectiveness  of  the  workers’  resistance  to  the  management’s  restructuring  plan
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workers’ leader to Labour ministers, and the year-long delay in closing the Jerusalem 
plant) was due to the success of their tactics of astutely exploiting developments in the 
Israeli political arena -  including, for example, the advent of primaries. At all levels -  
Cabinet, parliamentary and local-govemment -  the workers devoted significant time 
and effort to targeted lobbying. It was no accident, for example, that IMI workers put 
so much effort into influencing MKs from the Jerusalem and Haifa districts, two key 
strongholds of the Labour party at the time, where IMI operated several factories.
The  political  backing  given  to  the  workers  -   after  all  it  was  a  Labour 
government -  and the timing of the crisis, with both Rabin and his ministers facing 
mounting  diplomatic  and  economic  crises,  led  to  a protracted  negotiation process, 
which became costlier as it became longer. In fact, the workers’ unions managed to 
twist the arms of both the government bureaucracy and the IMI management, which 
succumbed to many of their demands, thereby arguably gaining far more advantage 
than their actual political clout warranted (by 1992 IMI was less than half the size it 
had  been  in  its  heyday).  This  indicates  that  it  was  not  the  sheer  size  of  IMI’s 
workforce that brought it benefits, so much as the willingness of politicians to meet its 
demands. And these demands were also backed, to a large degree by the management 
-  in fact, some evidence suggests the two sides acted to advance each other’s interests 
(see the secret meetings between the Chief Executive and the workers’ leader), to the 
point  where  the  Prime  Minister  himself  intervened  to  put  an  end  to  this  cosy 
relationship with his landmark ultimatum in early 1995.
Interestingly, the IMI workers’ organisation managed to achieve its objectives 
without calling on other trade unions or sister organisations from other companies to 
help in putting pressure on the management or Cabinet; nor did it appeal to the Labour
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ask the Histadrut to join in the crucial phases of the negotiations, not only to make use 
of its vast experience of dealing with the MoF, but also for tactical/internal reasons: it 
helped persuade the employees to accept uneasy compromises with management.
In net terms,  only a  state  could afford  to  provide  such significant aid to  a 
single  company  as  IMI  received,  and  yet  during  the  tenure  of  the  Rabin-Peres 
government it was  still far from achieving full recovery.  In fact,  for all its marked 
improvements in output and overall  financial performance,  IMI  struggled to devise 
and  implement  a  practical  business  strategy  that  would  guarantee  its  long-term 
viability.  The  company  had  to  contend  with  significant  obstacles  during  the 
implementation of the operational recovery plan.  The first round of discussions,  in 
December  1992,  resulted in the Cabinet ordering  IMI  management to conduct any 
planned redundancies only after reaching consensus with the workers on their terms 
of departure  (which delayed  this phase by at  least  four months  and made  it more 
costly) and to refrain from closing down several factories, arguably for political rather 
than  economic  reasons.  At  a  later  stage,  in  June  1994,  the  Knesset’s  Finance 
Committee  intervened  as  well,  on  the  basis  of  flimsy  evidence,  instructing  the 
management to refrain from closing the loss-making Jerusalem factory:  this delayed 
its inevitable closure by seven costly months.
So intrusive did political intervention become that the IMI board started to act 
against  the  company’s  interests  -   in  complete  disregard  of  the  Government 
Companies  Law  itself -   for fear of additional  political  vetoes.  This  approach  was 
evident in its reluctance to consider closing another troubled factory, in the northern 
town of Kiryat  Shmona,  in  the  belief that  it would not  get political  and  financial 
backing for this. In addition, the company was unable to secure long-term orders from
233its  most important  customer,  the  MoD,  and  even those  that were  offered  fell  well 
below its projections, for reasons discussed earlier. The end result was a much more 
expensive recovery plan, and the gap between the initial estimates and the actual costs 
(for example, the redundancy costs almost doubled as a result of the Cabinet decision) 
was grudgingly covered by the state Treasury.  Much later, in early  1996, when the 
IMI board was striving to execute its Cabinet-approved strategic plan, it encountered 
unforeseen objections from within the defence establishment that caused the collapse 
of the plan’s most important objective: the creation of strategic partnerships with local 
and foreign companies. Bizarrely, the MoD overruled proposed strategic cooperation 
with the US firm Lockheed Martin, one of the IDF’s biggest suppliers, even though 
the  initiative was backed by Prime Minister Peres and was  seen by the company’s 
board as essential to IMI’s long term survival.
The  contrasting  and  inconsistent  positions  of  the  relevant  government 
ministries (evident in the saga of the defunct Lockheed Martin deal),  coupled with 
agenda congestion in the Cabinet, especially at a time of intense Middle East peace 
negotiations,  all contributed in one way or another to make IMI’s recovery process 
costly and extremely lengthy. Add to that the institutional opportunities for disruption 
that  were  available  to  astute  and  determined  union representatives,  and  one  could 
conclude that any meaningful attempt to achieve a desired policy goal in such a highly 
politicised environment required steely determination and Herculean strength.
In  at  least  two  separate  cases,  and  notwithstanding  the  significant  power 
vested in Israeli Prime Ministers, both Rabin and Peres faced considerable opposition 
to  their preferred policy  choice.  In December  1992  Rabin needed  all  his  personal 
political clout to prevail over the workers’  challenge and force IMI’s recovery plan 
through Cabinet, where it was narrowly approved after a second round of discussions
234and acceptance of many costly concessions. The case of the botched IMI-Lockheed 
negotiations in May 1996 was instructive as well, because it showed that even though 
both Rabin and Peres supported the deal, that was not enough to seal it. The result of 
their failure to reach consensus among all the actors involved in a policy event -  to 
deal with the objections of the Labour party ministers in the first example, and the 
MoD’s  and  the  MoF’s  reservations  in  the  second  -   may  be  that  political  cost 
calculations dictated their final positions, once they realised that other policy issues 
were more pressing, and that IMI was not worth risking their political careers for. Add 
the built-in delays in government decision-making -  approval for financial assistance 
can take months to pass through Cabinet and the political and regulatory bodies in the 
Knesset and the government bureaucracy -  plus the effects of past policy choices - 
such as the public-sector pay increases to  which IMI workers were linked,  and the 
1985 Economic Stabilisation Programme, which deeply affected the company and the 
preferences of the MoD and the MoF -  and it is no surprise that the costs of helping 
an ailing government company like IMI usually balloon. And, inevitably, the taxpayer 
shoulders these extra costs.
Could the sort of mistakes and costly errors apparent in the IMI affair have 
been  avoided?  Apparently  not.  The  evidence  presented  here  suggests  that  IMI 
underwent  a  unique  transition  that  was  beyond  the  experience  of the  government 
bureaucracy, the defence establishment and IMI itself -  hence their many mistakes. In 
other words, both the government bureaucracy and the firm were on a costly learning 
curve. However, it was the firm that adjusted quicker to the changing circumstances -  
for example,  by ditching its ill-fated attempt to reverse its fortunes by entering the 
civilian  market  -   while  the  government  bureaucracy  was  at  times  indecisive  and 
inconsistent, as vividly shown in the IMI-Lockheed Martin episode.In  conclusion,  the  policy  process  at  IMI  suggests  that  any  attempt  by 
government to impose financial losses on an organised interest group depends upon 
achieving  consensus  in  favour  of  the  proposed  policy  within  the  government 
bureaucracy, and wall-to-wall backing within the political institutions (Knesset, party 
forums), before it is implemented. Otherwise, the attempt is likely to run into serious 
and  costly  delays  because  of institutional  openings  for  disruption  (in  Cabinet  and 
party), the knock-on effects of past policy choices, and legal barriers of various kinds 
(such as legislation or court decisions).
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Policy Implementation in the IAI Crisis
Israel Aircraft Industries, Israel’s largest industrial enterprise, encountered a financial 
crisis  in  1992  and  1993  that brought it near bankruptcy.  A  sharp  decline in orders 
prompted it to initiate two readjustment plans. However, the employees’ organisation 
rejected the second plan, which called for the dismissal of 3,000 workers and vast pay 
cuts. Its demands and its power, which at one point led to the temporary closure of 
Israel’s  main  international  airport,  posed  a  political  and  financial  challenge  to  the 
Rabin government. In November 1993, a few hours before the Prime Minister decided 
to put the company into administration, a last-minute compromise was reached.
This  chapter  sets  out  the  chain  of events  that  led  Prime  Minister Rabin  to 
intervene personally in the mediation of the IAI crisis. After outlining the background 
to the company’s financial difficulties, it charts the formulation and implementation 
of the recovery plans, focusing on the considerations and opportunities that influenced 
the choices made by key actors.  Finally,  it assesses the constraints that shaped the 
outcome and affected the policy-making capabilities of the government system.
First Signs of Difficulties
In  May  1992,  shortly  before  the  general  elections,  the  IAI  Finance  Directorate 
discovered that the company was facing a severe cash-flow problem. Until then, this 
wholly owned government company,  with  17,200  workers  in  17  factories and two 
subsidiaries,1   had been enjoying  steady growth  in contracts  and revenues,  and had
1  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 865, 867.
237successfully  recovered  from  the  termination  of  the  Lavi  fighter,  its  flagship 
programme,  in August  1987.2  However,  contrary to  the management’s  forecast  for 
1992, which predicted a further 2% rise in revenues and a net profit of $39 million, 
initial indications pointed to an unforeseen drop in income and an overall cash-flow 
deficit totalling some $133 million.4
A further investigation suggested that IAI had been hit by a sudden change in 
the  business  environment  in  two  key  target  markets:  the  defence  sector  (foreign 
armies  and  governments)  and  civil  aviation.  Highly profitable  export  deals,  which 
made the company the biggest Israeli exporter,5  were fast approaching their end, and 
it was struggling to refill its order book. Existing clients cancelled or cut their original 
orders (in some cases by up to  75%),  others insisted on renegotiating their contract 
terms and demanded discounts.6
As markets conditions moved against IAI,  so did the terms attached to new 
contracts;  in some cases these  involved  sales  on credit or included a  late payment 
option, while in others payments were spread over a long period,  which meant that 
IAI needed to raise loans to bridge a period of low income or none. At the same time, 
the  company was  haemorrhaging  money  on  costly projects  like  developing  a new 
corporate jet  (which between  1990  and  1992  generated  a  $41.6-million  loss  on  a
2  Message  from  the  IAI  Chief  Executive  and  IAI’s  press  release,  13  April  1992.  On  the  IAI 
restructuring following the Lavi project cancellation see: State Comptroller Report no. 45, pp. 866- 
871,  897;  State  Comptroller,  State  Comptroller Annual  Report  no.  40  (Jerusalem:  Government 
Printer, 1989), pp. 902-909; Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 August 1993.
3  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 882.
4 State Comptroller Report on Elta ’ s privatisation efforts, p.  12.
5 IAI’s share in Israel’s industrial exports (excluding diamonds) stood on  17% in  1991  -  $1.3 billion 
out of $7.8 billion. See: IAI Chairman briefing, April 1992, p. 1.
6 Internal IAI briefing document to the Board of Directors (undated), pp. 4-6; State comptroller Annual
Report no. 45, p. 872; Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 August 1993; Haaretz, 23 September 1992.
238$359-million  investment7)  and  a  programme  for  converting  cargo  airliners  ($16.7 
million  lost  from  1990  to  19928),  while  investing  heavily  in developing  advanced 
projects such as combat UAV and satellites.
On top of all this, IAI had fixed labour costs of about $750 million a year,9 
including $10 million a year for ‘inter-factory employment balance’:1 0  a euphemism 
for pockets  of surplus  workers  who  were paid but,  due  to  lack of orders,  did not 
actually work.  (After the closure of the Lavi project,  which led to the departure of 
more  than 5,000  workers,  IAI was  left with about 400  tenured workers  who  were 
slated  for dismissal but refused to  leave  the  company.1 1   Under the terms  of IAI’s 
Collective Agreement and the Lavi termination arrangements,  leaving  the company 
was  voluntary,  and  the  management  could  not  lay  off any  workers  without  their 
explicit  consent  and  the  approval  of their  legally  recognised  representatives,  the
Histadrut and the National Organisation of the IAI Employees, a Histadrut-affiliated
10 labour union.  )
Hitherto  IAI  had been  able  to  meet  its  contractual  commitments,  thanks  to 
highly  profitable  export  deals  signed  during  the  second  half of the  1980s.  These 
contracts -  some requiring special Cabinet approval, granted on the recommendation
7 State Comptroller Annual Report no.  45, pp. 876, 901. The IAI management was severely criticised
by  the  State  Comptroller  for  its  handling  of this  project;  see  ‘IAI’s  Astra  Project  -   follow-up 
findings,’ State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 900-908.
8 Ibid., p. 876
9  The  average  monthly  gross  pay  per  employee  at  IAI  grew  from  $2,500  in  1987  to  $3,700  in 
1992/1993. See Yedioth Ahronoth, 22 October 1993.
10 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 879;
1 1  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 878; author’s interview with Arieh Penso, IAI Corporate 
Vice President for Human Resources (1992-present), 7 October 1997 (hereafter: Penso interview).
12 IAI Ltd and the Trade Union Division of the Histadrut -  the General Federation of Labour in Israel, 
IAI Special Collective Agreement (April 1979), p. 56 (hereafter: IAI Collective Agreement.
23913 of then Defence Minister Rabin, who also ensured that the US would not veto them 
-  brought a gross profit of $800 million between 1988 and 1992.14 This profit enabled 
IAI  to  absorb  heavy  losses  on  projects  for  the  civilian  market,  accommodate  its 
hidden unemployment and overcome a gradual decline in orders from the MoD (see 
Figure  5.1).  However,  these  gains  were  dwindling  quickly,  not  least  because  of 
adverse movements of the  dollar exchange  rate (which affected the  value of IAI’s 
export  contracts)  in  relation  to  Israel’s  consumer  price  index  (which  affected  its 
labour costs). Between 1988 and 1992 the CPI increased by 52%, but the dollar/shekel 
exchange rate by only 29%, which significantly eroded company export revenues.1 5
Another burden on the cash flow was IAI’s wage structure, which entitled its 
workers  to  receive  the  public-sector  pay  rises  irrespective  of the  firm’s  financial 
performance. In mid-1992 IAI was notified by the MoF that it would have to pay its 
workers a 4% increase in accordance with a recent agreement between the Histadrut 
and  the  Ministry  of Finance.  Hence,  the  company would have  to  make  additional 
provisions that went well beyond its earlier expense estimates.
IAI Corporate Vice President for Finance,  Shmuel Peretz, met President and 
Chief Executive Moshe Keret and briefed him. IAI, he said, would run out of cash by
1 3  Sheves interview; The Shamir Cabinet approved several state-guaranteed export contracts in order to 
ease the impact of the Lavi cancellation on IAI and other firms. Chief among them was a $1.5 billion 
1988 deal, which earned IAI a net profit of $450 million; the contract, which lasted seven years, led 
to the direct employment of about  1,000 workers at IAI and  1,000 more in other firms,  including 
Rafael,  Tadiran and Elbit.  See:  State  Comptroller Report no.  45,  p.  873;  author’s interviews with 
Moshe Keret (IAI  President  and  Chief Executive,  1985-2006),  7  and  9 October  1997  (hereafter: 
Keret interview) and Shmuel  Peretz, IAI’s Corporate Vice President for Finance (1991-1996) and 
President, IAI Europe (1996-2002), 21 July 1998 (hereafter: Peretz interview, 1998d).
14 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 877.
1 5 Ibid., p. 879; see also interview with Shmuel Peretz in Haaretz, 4 April 1995.
240October  1992,  and,  failing  urgent  action,  ‘we  would  not  be  able  to  pay  our 
employees’. Keret, unconvinced, brushed off his concerns.1 6
Figure 5.1
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Note:  Until  1985,  the  MoD  was  IAI’s  primary  client  but  this  changed  following  the  Economic 
Stabilisation  Programme  of the  same  year.  Between  1988  and  1991,  IAI  posted  a  32%  rise  in 
revenues,  owing to a 52%  increase  in exports.  IAI’s  sales  to the  MoD,  however,  dropped by more 
than 20% in this period (all figures shown are in constant 1993 prices).
However,  IAI’s  financial  situation  became  worse  by  the  day,  and  a
contingency plan was prepared. Keret and the senior management at IAI viewed the
11
situation as a temporary lapse,  though, and were busy debating proposals to privatise 
the  company  and  its  profitable  subsidiary,  Elta,  after  earlier  discussions  with  the 
Government Companies Authority (GCA).  In July  1992 -  while IAI’s management
16 Author’s interview with Shmuel Peretz,  19 February 1998 (hereafter:  Peretz interview,  1998a).
17 State Com ptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 8891  8 was preparing a redundancy plan for hundreds of workers  -  its Board of Directors, 
which included senior representatives  from the Ministries  of Defence and Finance, 
decided that IAI should be privatised as a whole and without delay.19 (At the same 
time, the management was engaged in protracted negotiation with the IAI Employees’ 
Organisation over the decision to  sell one of the company’s  subsidiaries,  Ramta in 
Beer  Sheba,  which made  military patrol  boats.  The  Histadrut  and  the  Employees’ 
Organisation  challenged  this  through  the  courts;20  successive  injunctions  and  long 
deliberations effectively shelved this privatisation initiative.)
The  Board’s  decision,  however,  never  materialised.  IAI’s  situation  rapidly 
deteriorated, and in the summer of 1992 internal consultations confirmed a persistent 
and growing gap between the company’s sales projections and actual financial results. 
There were several reasons for this, including the cancellation of multi-million-dollar 
military  and  civil  contracts;  underbudgeting  and  overrun  costs  on  classified 
programmes for the MoD; and a sharp reduction in orders from existing civil aviation 
customers.  In addition,  the MoD remained non-committal about the level  of future 
orders from the company, because of a proposed 300 million shekel cut in the defence 
budget which was being discussed at the time 2 1
1 8  Yedioth Ahronoth,  15 July 1992
1 9 State Comptroller Report on Elta’ s privatisation efforts, pp. 10-11.
20  The  legal  battle  on  Ramta’s  privatisation  lasted  12  years  and  ended  in  a  partial  victory  for  the 
workers’  representatives at the High Court of Justice, after they had initially lost their case in the 
labour courts.  See Ruling by the Labour Court -  Tel Aviv District,  The Histadrut vs.  IAI Ltd.  and 
Ramta Ltd., 25 August  1993; Ruling by the National Labour Court,  The Histadrut vs. IAI Ltd.  and 
Ramta Ltd.,  22  April  1996;  Ruling by the  High  Court of Justice,  The Histadrut vs.  IAI Ltd.  and 
Ramta Ltd., cases no. 8111/96 and 922/97, 2 June 2004 (available at www.court.gov.il. accessed 12 
December 2005).
21 Maariv, 30 October 1992.
242The conclusion reached by the company’s Finance Directorate was grave: IAI
22 had failed to meet its business targets and was fast heading towards insolvency.  Its 
new contracts figure was $100 million lower than expected, the backlog of orders had 
dipped by  $157  million,  and  sales  were  $67  million below  target.  Payments  from 
existing customers were $145 million less than the company had budgeted for, and it 
could not borrow enough to ensure sufficient liquidity, a failure that resulted in a $112
9 " ^ million cash-flow deficit.
The  management’s  main  concern  was  the  reaction  of the  banking  sector, 
which  at  that point,  in  view  of the  company’s  rapidly  deteriorating  situation,  was 
reluctant  to  lend  it  still  more  money.24  IAI  management  therefore  appointed  six 
external  teams  to  examine  organisational  and  managerial  aspects  of its  activities,
9 ^ including the labour force structure and the profitability of projects.  The report on 
the order backlog revealed that IAI would generate a negligible operational profit of 
about  1% or less  from  its  contracts,  and also  concluded that most of the contracts 
signed by IAI would end in losses, due to hidden unemployment and flawed resource
9  (\
allocation practices.  These findings prompted the company to prepare an emergency 
plan, which was discussed during the summer of 1992.
Negotiations with the Workforce
In September 1992 IAI management presented to the board a draft of its emergency 
plan, codenamed Rotem (the word is a Hebrew acronym for ‘profit and cash flow’).
22 State Comptroller Report on Elta’ s privatisation efforts, p.  12
23 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 865-866, 885-886.
24 State Comptroller Report on Elta’ s privatisation efforts, p. 12.
25 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 882.
26 Ibid., p. 874.
243Its goals included reaching $50 million net profit by  1994,  ensuring sufficient cash 
flow for day-to-day expenses and investments, and further efforts to diversify into the
77 civil market. It also suggested preparing the company for privatisation.
In a briefing to  the board,  management representatives  explained that these 
targets were to be achieved by swiftly cutting overhead and running costs, laying off 
1,500  workers  (1,100  of  them  tenured),  a  10%  reduction  in  labour  cost,  and  a 
concerted effort to increase revenues towards $1.6 billion.28 Further investments were 
required for new products in the civilian market. The management also predicted that 
the market downturn was temporary, and that the company would recover.29
From the outset, IAI management sought to secure the close cooperation from 
the  workers  in  executing  the  Rotem  plan.  The  IAI  Employees’  Organisation  was 
known  as  a  disciplined,  highly  motivated  organisation  that  exercised  significant 
influence over rank-and-file workers.30 The company’s management therefore saw it 
as  an  essential  partner  in  facilitating  structural  changes,  not  only  because  of  a 
contractual  obligation  (IAI’s  collective  agreement  required  participation  by 
employees’ representatives in such matters) but also because of its track record.3 1  The 
Employees’ Organisation, in effect, became extension of the management.
Another  reason  to  seek  close  cooperation  with  the  employees  was  their 
influence over, and access to, politicians.  The Employees’  Organisation maintained 
direct  and  independent  channels  of communication  with  officials  at  the  Finance 
Ministry and the Prime Minister Office that had been cultivated since the negotiations
27 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 888
28 Haaretz, 23 September 1992
29 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 888-889.
30 Keret interview.
31 Ibid.
244on  the redundancy packages  for workers  laid  off during  the  run-down of the Lavi 
programme.32  Haim  Katz,  then  Undersecretary  General  of  the  IAI  Employees’ 
Organisation, for example, maintained direct and close contacts with key politicians 
and officials,  including Ora Namir,  Rabin’s Labour Affairs Minister, Haim Ramon, 
the  Health  Minister,  and  Shimon  Sheves,  the  Prime  Minister  Office  Director 
General.33
In addition, the IAI Employees’  Organisation was one of the first organised 
interests to recognise the opportunities presented by the introduction of constituency 
primaries  in  the  main  parties.  Shortly  before  the  June  1992  general  elections,  its 
Secretary General, Yaakov Sheffi,  campaigned among IAI workers,  urging them to 
join  the  Labour  Party  regardless  of their  political  leanings  and  vote  in  the  party 
primaries.  The objective was to  insert an IAI representative into the Labour party’s 
Knesset delegation.  Sheffi,  who openly stated that looking after the interests of the 
IAI employees would top his Knesset agenda,34 won the 35th place on Labour’s list, 
and his success underlined the fact that the Employees’ Organisation was capable of 
mobilising large  groups  of voters in concentrated geographic  areas.  It enhanced its 
political clout by actively assisting the primaries campaigns of such leading Labour 
party figures as Shimon Peres, Israel Keisar and Ora Namir.35
32 Sheffi interview.
33 Sheves interview; Shochat interview; Katz interview.
34  Sheffi  interview;  See  also  Sheffi’s comments  in Records of the  Knesset,  Motion for the Agenda, 
Session  117,  Vol.  36,  14  July  1993,  pp.  6686-6687;  Sheffi  interview  in  Yedioth  Ahronoth,  13 
November 1992.
35 Haber interview; Shochat interview; Gilad interview, 2001; Yaakov Sheffi, the Secretary General of 
the IAI Employees’ Organisation, was a campaign manager for Israel Keisar, the former Histadrut’s 
Secretary General, in the 1992 Labour party primaries. See Yedioth Ahronoth, 7 February 1992.
245It  was  against  this  background  that  the  IAI  Chief  Executive  and  senior 
managers  approached  the  Employees’  Organisation  and  briefed  them  about  the 
company’s impending crisis.  Its leaders were told that the company would have to 
reduce its workforce and forgo pay raises in the foreseeable future (including those 
agreed in the public sector), as the company did not have sufficient income.  Similar 
messages were reiterated in a wider forum, when Chief Executive Keret later met the 
75-strong  Council  of  IAI  Workers  (the  body  that  elected  the  Employees’ 
Organisation), which included workers’ representatives from each of the company’s 
factories. Keret did not mince words:
We  have  1,500  redundant  employees  in  the  company,  among  them  several  hundred 
workers that have made zero contribution; their salaries came at our expense.
In addition to forced redundancies, he asked that the remaining workers accept a 10%
cut in wages by the end of 1993. He warned that the company was in a fragile state,
and that protests by the workers,  in the form of deliberate delays in the delivery of
finished systems or any disruption to the normal course of work, might damage its
36 reputation irreversibly.  Keret also promised that the management would contribute 
to the recovery effort by cutting 30% of managers’  salaries, halting promotions and 
shelving all non-essential renovations and trips.37 The employees, however, rejected 
his call.
Shortly  afterwards,  delegations  from  both  the  IAI  management  and  the 
Employees’  Organisation met,  separately,  with  Prime  Minister  Rabin and  Finance 
Mmister Shochat.  The employees insisted that the management should honour the
36 Minutes of a meeting between IAI Chief Executive and the National Organisation of IAI Employees, 
22 September 1992.
37 Maariv, 30 October 1992.
38 Shochat interview; Haaretz, 23 September 1992
246company’s  collective  agreement  and  pay  the  workers  the  public  sector’s  4%  pay 
increase. (According to the union representatives, Prime Minister Rabin also backed 
this position, although urging them to accept some concessions.39)
The management rejected this demand, maintaining it could not accommodate 
any further salary increases. Another of the Organisation’s requests was that the 1,500 
redundancy quota be made up of temporary workers instead of tenured ones, as IAI 
employed  about  2,000  of  them;40  the  management,  though,  insisted  that  some 
temporary  workers  possessed  specialist  skills,  and  so  the  list  would  include  both 
tenured and temporary workers.  It also appealed for the workers’  cooperation:  ‘The 
crisis is here and our reserves are eaten up; we need to perform the essential surgical 
operations very soon’.4 1
The  IAI  management,  meanwhile,  held  meetings  with  the  Ministries  of 
Finance and Defence. Briefing Rabin and Shochat on IAI’s deepening crisis and the 
objectives  of the Rotem  emergency plan,  Chief Executive  Keret  requested  one-off 
assistance of about $455  million in total  over three years.  He  said IAI needed the 
money for investing in future civilian projects, paying redundancy packages (which 
would  cost about  $50  million)  and  increasing  the  company’s  equity capital42  The 
issue  of pensions  was  a particular worry,  IAI  management maintained,  because  it 
could  not pay  the  severance  packages  of workers  who  would  be made redundant. 
(Like  those  of other  companies,  IAI’s  pension  scheme  was  not  connected  to,  or 
underwritten by, the state Treasury.  It was based on contributions by employer and 
employee and the assumption that the latter would retire at the statutory age of 65; but
39 Haaretz, 23 September 1992.
40 Interview with Sheffi in Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 November 1992
41 Maariv, 30 October 1992.
42 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 888.
247the proposed readjustment plan stipulated that hundreds of workers would leave on 
early retirement or on increased compensation packages, for which the company had 
not made sufficient provision; it therefore had to rely on supplementary state aid.43) 
Keret  insisted  that  IAI’s  future  resilience  depended  on the  government’s  financial 
support,  and that further redundancies were  likely,  due to  the proposed cuts in the 
defence budget (which would most certainly lead to a further drop in orders for IAI) 44 
In the interim,  he added,  the management had implemented a series of cost-cutting 
measures, such as not allowing workers to leave the company on early retirement45
Both Ministries asked for time to  assess Keret’s  requests.  However,  it soon 
emerged that the defence establishment was unwilling to contribute towards the IAI 
recovery plan, due to its own pressing budgetary needs. MoD Director General David 
Ivry also blamed the MoF for exacerbating the company’s difficulties unnecessarily. 
In an interview with the author he argued that IAI was a victim of MoF inaction: the 
MoF agreed with the Histadrut on a public sector pay rise, which also applied to IAI 
because  of  its  collective  agreement;  the  upshot  was  that  the  company  needed 
additional income to cover this unexpected expense, but adverse market conditions 
abroad rendered this impossible. IAI was thus left without enough revenue to meet its 
increased labour costs, yet could not reduce its workforce without the consent of the
43 IAI’s expectation of a state bailout was based on a precedent set after the closure of the Lavi project 
in  1987.  IAI  was  awarded  $250  million  by  the  MoD  and the  MoF  to cover  its post-termination 
expenses,  $100 million of which was special assistance to help it meet the costs of redundancies. 
However, both Ministries insisted that this aid was a one-off arrangement and did not bind them in 
respect of future redundancies at IAI or other government-owned companies. The MoF, in particular, 
was wary of possible  ‘lateral effects’  of the Lavi precedent;  indeed,  other companies such as IMI 
later requested state aid.  See:  Peretz interview,  1998d;  State Comptroller Report no.  40, pp.  915—  
916, 922-924.
44 Haaretz, 23 October 1992.
45 Haaretz, 15 October 1992.
248unions.  According to  Ivry,  ‘instead of exempting  IAI  from this pay rise,  the MoF 
simply did nothing; IAI was therefore forced to initiate the Rotem plan’.46
The  MoF  also  voiced reluctance  to  help  IAI  on the  ground that it was not 
required to do. MoF officials explained to the author that, because IAI was a business 
entity and not part of the  civil  service,  the Treasury was not compelled by law to 
underwrite or otherwise cover its losses or share its pension payments burden. It was 
the responsibility of the company, as laid out in the Government Companies Law and 
the company’s own regulations, to shoulder its financial obligations through its own 
resources 47 The MoF  also  feared that yielding to  IAI’s  demands might undermine 
fiscal discipline. And, in any event, it insisted that any government support be given 
on condition that IAI should undergo significant structural changes.48
Back at IAI, workers’ and management representatives were exchanging draft 
proposals  for a new,  interim  Collective  Agreement based  on the  objectives  of the 
Rotem emergency plan. The Histadrut was consulted also, as the formal signatory to 
all IAI’s collective agreements. At the same time, the other unions at Rafael and IMI 
were preparing protests against redundancy plans in their respective workplaces that 
the  IAI  Employees’  Organisation  refused  to  join.49  Instead  it  completed  the 
negotiations on a Special Collective Agreement to temporarily replace the collective 
agreement in force at the time. Whereas the existing agreement rigidly regulated all 
aspects of labour relations, including promotions, work schedules and layoffs50 -  and
46 Ivry interview, 1997. See also: Peretz interview, 3 March 1998 (hereafter: Peretz interview, 1998b)
47 Brodet interview;  author’s interview with Uzi Levy (Deputy Director of the Budget Department at 
the Ministry of Finance, 1996-2000), 15 January 1998 (hereafter: Levy interview, 1998a).
48 Fogel interview.
49 Haaretz, 12 November 1992.
50 IAI Collective Agreement, pp.  I-IV and as an illustration see clauses 7 (settlement of disputes),  18 
(order of promotion) and 61 (dismissals).
249therefore prevented management from making adjustments to salaries and personnel 
in  response  to  market  conditions  -   the  new  agreement  contained  several  opt-out 
clauses and minor concessions. These included a gross reduction of 7% in the salary 
base and the number of paid holidays. In return, the IAI management agreed to back 
down on several key demands. It agreed that the agreement should be applied for a 
fixed period of 13  months, rather than  16,  until the end of December  1993.  It also 
agreed to reduce the working week by 1  x h hours, from 42 to 40/4 hours.
The main concession related to the number of departing workers:  instead of 
1,100 tenured workers,  the management agreed to the early retirement of less than 
700.  These  were  granted  preferential  terms,  guaranteed  and  paid  for  by  the  state 
Treasury.  The  new  agreement  also  forbade  the  management  from  making  further 
redundancies without the consent of the Employees’ Organisation and provided that, 
in disputed cases, individual redundancies would be settled by special tribunals.5 1
The  final  draft  of the  Rotem  plan,  approved  by  the  management  and  the 
Employees’ Organisation in November 1992, was predicated on the condition that the 
MoF would underwrite IAI’s financial needs; the MoF, however, rejected the plan’s 
premises outright. Said Finance Minister Shochat:
The recovery plan, as presented to me and the IAI board, is unacceptable. Its proposers 
behave as if nothing had happened, as if IAI was not in trouble at all. I will recommend 
the  Cabinet  to  reject  this  proposal,  even  if this  leads  to  mass  demonstrations.  Any 
concession on this issue will haunt us in a year or two years time, as we would face far 
graver problems then.52
Shochat and the MoF officials told Prime Minister Rabin that the plan did not 
address some of IAI’s core problems, given its current and future losses, and that any
5 1  State Comptroller Report no. 45, p. 888
52 Finance Minister Shochat quoted in Yedioth Ahronoth, 25 November 1992.
250concession to the IAI management would have severe implications for the company 
and the wider economy, as it would send the wrong signal to other ailing companies.53 
According to the then MoF Director General, Aharon Fogel, the Ministry insisted on 
pressing IAI on this matter because it realised that its management had glossed over 
the  company’s  deep  structural  deficiencies  for  too  long,  implementing  minimal 
cosmetic changes instead.54 In an interview with the author he maintained that
IAI management co-opted the employees and has grown accustomed to easy, quick fixes 
... this happened not because it did not know what to do ... [but because] it had a certain 
management style which focused on ensuring a steady cash flow and assuming the rest 
would take care of itself.
Fogel  branded  this  approach  ‘life  by  the  cash  flow’:  as  long  as  IAI  had
sufficient cash, it believed it was in the clear, but, once it experienced difficulties, the
management turned to the Treasury for financial help instead of solving its problems
internally by initiating organisational changes and forced redundancies. ‘This frame of
mind, we insisted, had to be changed,’ as Fogel noted.55
Rabin accepted the MoF’s position and rejected the Rotem plan, but not for
long. Four days after he had initially dismissed it, a delegation of IAI workers headed
by Haim Katz persuaded him to change his mind. Katz presented the salary structure
of IAI  and  argued  in  favour  of the  plan,  supporting  his  arguments  with  internal
documents provided by the management.56 Rabin agreed to reverse his position and
back the plan after extracting more concessions from the workers, including further
postponement of the public-sector pay rise (the 4% increase the workers expected in
April  1992  was  to  be  paid  only  in  October  1993),  a  concession  which  eased  the
53 Yedioth Ahronoth, 25 November 1992.
54 Fogel interview
55 Ibid.
56 Katz interview.
251pressure on IAI’s cash flow. The workers’ representatives also promised to ensure that 
a further 300 to 500 employees, whose contribution to IAI was low, would ‘quietly’ 
leave the company.57
Following this, both Rabin and Shochat instructed the management to prepare 
a  final  draft  that  would  reflect  these  additional  provisions  and  submit  it  for  the 
approval  of the  IAI  board.  According  to  press  reports,  Rabin  wanted  to  stabilise 
labour  relations  across  the  state-owned  defence  firms,  which  had  become  highly 
charged since the presentation of a major redundancy plan at IMI few weeks earlier. A 
compromise  at  IAI,  he  hoped,  would  head  off a  possible  confrontation  with  its 
employees, at least for a while.58 (Senior officials also believed that IAI stood better 
chance  of  recovery  than  IMI,  because  of  its  superior  technology  and  capable 
workforce.59)
However,  the  draft  agreement  was  strongly  criticised  by  members  of the 
board, who at a special meeting on 6 December 1992 demanded several changes. In 
particular, they insisted on clearly defining the number of redundancies, maintaining 
that ‘it was unacceptable to leave such matter unspecified, as if we were dealing here 
in a sort of a gentleman’s agreement’. Some criticised Rabin’s unforeseen volte face, 
arguing  that  the  agreement  needed  to  include  additional  clauses  about  the 
commitments given by the Employees’ Organisation to the Prime Minister. One board 
member even resigned in protest over the proposed agreement.60
Nonetheless,  the  IAI  management  insisted  on pushing  the  draft  agreement 
through,  noting  that  the  new,  revised  version -   the  board  had  rejected  an  earlier
57 Haaretz, 7 December 1992.
58 Ibid.
59 Tov interview, 1997; Granit interview, 1998.
60 Haaretz, 7 December 1992.
252version  based  on  the  workers’  proposal,  after  branding  it  ‘inadequate ’6 1   -   was 
approved by the ministers themselves and by the Ministries of Finance and Defence, 
as  well  as  the  Histadrut  and  IAI’s  workers.62  Reluctantly  the  IAI  board  gave  its 
consent,  and  the  agreement  was  finally  signed  on  29  December  1992,  without 
detailing the extent of workforce reduction or its composition.63 Four weeks later the 
Knesset’s Finance Committee issued a SI 00-million state guarantee to the company, 
and on 31 January 1993 a Cabinet resolution granted IAI a comprehensive assistance 
package,  including  $50  million  towards  redundancy  packages  for  400  tenured 
workers, a $ 15-million increase in its equity capital and other forms of assistance. In 
addition, the MoD agreed to temporarily forgo export royalties owed by IAI.64
Further Signs of Decline
Within a few months, however, the IAI management noticed the premises underlying 
the Rotem plan beginning to unravel.  Struggling to stabilise its orders portfolio, the 
company was dismayed when in April 1993 the MoD awarded its main rival, Elbit, a 
$ 140-million contract to develop a classified weapon system.65 The Ministry rejected 
IAI’s  protests,  arguing  that,  notwithstanding  the  state  ownership  of  IAI,  it  was 
required by law to consider the proposal from the privately-owned Elbit and to hold
6 1 Ibid.
62 State Comptroller Report no. 45, p. 888.
63  See  IAI,  the  Histadrut  and  the  IAI  Employees’  Committee,  Special  Collective  Agreement,  29 
December 1992.
64 State Comptroller Report no. 45, p. 888.
65 Yedioth Ahronoth, 15 April 1993. Several MoD officials who served on the board of IAI, such as the 
Ministry’s Economic Adviser, were physically and verbally intimidated by members of IAI’s unions 
during  the  competition  process  and  afterwards.  Source:  Author’s  interview  with  Imri  Tov,  18 
November 2001 (hereafter: Tov interview, 2001).
253competitive bidding for this contract in accordance with the Mandatory Tenders Law. 
Any attempt to  circumvent this procedure -  for example,  by exercising  an opt-out 
clause in the law66 -  would have been legally contested and, most probably, reversed 
by the courts.67 The Ministry noted that Elbit had won after careful consideration of 
its  proposal,  which  was  also  cheaper  than  IAI’s.68  IAI  appealed  to  the  Tel  Aviv 
District  Court  but  lost.69  In  a  separate  move,  the  IAI  Employees’  Organisation 
demanded  the  replacement  of five  board  members  (four  of them  representing  the 
MoD and the MoF) on the grounds of conflict of interest;70 the Defence and Finance 
Ministers ignored the call.
IAI’s  situation  continued  to  deteriorate,  as  initial  results  for  the  first  two 
quarters of 1993 suggested that the company would face another difficult year. Most, 
if not  all,  of its  initial  assumptions -  IAI  would return to profitability by keeping 
annual revenue steady at $1.6 billion and reducing labour costs7 1 -  proved inaccurate. 
In fact, the company posted a $ 17-million loss in the first six months, and, as the year 
progressed,  management realised that the  sales  figure would be under $1.5  billion. 
The new contracts figure was $1.3 billion instead of a projected $1.5 billion, and the
66  Mandatory Tenders  Law  -   1992,  The  Official  Gazette:  Israel Statute Book no.  1387 (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer, 12 March 1992), clause 5.
67 Ivry interviews, 1997 and 1998.
68 Ibid.  See also Eilam interview,  1999.  The MoD has consistently opted for suppliers which met its 
requirements  at  a  lower  cost.  For  example,  in  February  1995  it  awarded  Elisra,  an  emerging 
competitor  of IAI  subsidiary  Elta,  a  major  contract  to  supply  electronic  warfare  systems  after 
concluding  that  its  proposal  was  cheaper  and  technologically  superior.  See  State  Comptroller, 
‘Report on Elta’  in Reports on Organisations Connected to the Defence Establishment (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer, March 1998), pp. 27-28 (hereafter State Comptroller Report on Elta).
69 Haaretz, 2 July 1993. Shortly after the ruling Elbit hired IAI as a secondary principal contractor for 
this project, awarding it about 85% of the total work. Tov interview, 1998.
70 Circular by the IAI Employees’ Organisation, 12 July 1993.
71 State Comptroller Report no. 45, p. 889.
254orders backlog stood at $2.6 billion (equivalent to a year-and-a-half s work) against 
IAI’s normal backlog of two years and more (see Figure 5.2).72
Figure 5.2
IAI:  Contracts and Backlog
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Sources:  IAI, State Comptroller, Haaretz.
Notes:  The graph shows that  IAI  encountered a  15%  drop  in new contracts  between  1991  and  1993, 
and  its  backlog  shrank  by  10%  during  that  period  (all  figures  are  in  current  prices;  end  of year 
results).
These disappointing results were compounded by the management’s failure to 
reduce  the  number  of excess  workers,  because  the  Employees’  Organisation  had 
backtracked  on  its  earlier  commitment  to  Rabin.73  As  a  result,  the  company’s 
workforce was reduced by only some 1,100 employees, and 400 tenured but unneeded 
workers  were  left  on  the  payroll.74  In  addition,  the  Chief Scientist  Office  at  the 
Ministry  of Trade  and  Industry  withdrew  a  $35-million  grant  awarded  to  IAI  for
72 Davar, 7 July 1993.
73 State Comptroller Annual Report no.  45, p.  889.
74 Hadashot,  1 April  1993 and 27 April 1993.
255activities in the civil market, because the company failed to submit detailed project 
proposals.75
Only at this late  stage,  in mid-1993,  did the management finally realise the 
enormity of the company’s situation, as attested by Chief Executive Keret:
When the Israel Cabinet cancelled the Lavi project [in 1987] it was a clear-cut situation: 
there  was  no  doubt  that  the  company  could  not  afford  to  retain  the  5,000  workers 
assigned for it  ...  this time,  sensing the coming crisis was much  harder:  our financial 
results for 1991 were some of the best in the company’s history, and the early signs of a 
possible slowdown in our key markets were inconclusive. It took a while, almost a year, 
until we felt a rapid decline in business. Until then everything went as planned, so it was 
hard for everyone -  the management, the employees, even the ministers in charge -  to 
accept that we were actually facing an imminent problem. When we finally did, it was 
just too late; we should have begun preparing ourselves for this situation a year before.76
This late recognition stemmed, to a large degree, from ad hoc cash injections 
(either from foreign clients or the MoD) which helped to alleviate IAI’s deteriorating 
finances but also obscured the severity of its problems (as noted earlier by the MoF 
Director General).
Early signs of trouble had begun to show as early as February 1993, just few 
months after the Rotem agreement was signed. IAI experienced a persistent cash-flow 
problem, struggling to raise sufficient funds to pay for salaries and services. However, 
its cash shortages were quickly mitigated through sporadic cash injections, including 
advance down payments from the MoD, received after vigorous lobbying by senior
75 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 891.
76 Keret interview. Not only was IAI  oblivious to the rapidly changing circumstances in the world’s 
arms markets; the press was unaware of the situation as well. A leading Israeli paper published an 
editorial praising IAI  for its  1991  financial results and its overall  strategy.  See  ‘IAI is in the right 
direction’, Globes, 15 April 1992.
256representatives  of  the  IAI  Employees’  Organisation.  They  appealed  directly  to
77 Cabinet ministers and the Histadrut chiefs in a ritual that was repeated every month.
In July  1993, however, the IAI management realised that it could no  longer 
afford to keep the entire workforce,  and it informed the employees’  representatives 
that  1,500 jobs needed to go with immediate effect.78 This figure was in fact much 
lower than was really needed -  at the end of 1992 it had already been realised that the 
workforce should be reduced by at least 2,500 employees79 -  but this was not the most 
pressing issue the management faced. The main challenge was to adapt the Collective 
Agreement  to  its  changing  circumstances.  The  sticking  point  of  the  Rotem 
negotiations -  that IAI’s Collective  Agreement did not permit forced redundancies 
without explicit consent of the Employees’ Committee -  resurfaced again, but, given 
IAI’s lack of orders and capital, this time far more acutely.
Amid  growing  signs  of  difficulties,  the  IAI  management  approached  the 
Employees’  Committee  and  asked  to  renegotiate  terms  of the  original  Collective 
Agreement,  which was about to be reinstated once the Rotem  agreement lapsed.  In 
particular, the management was concerned about the rigid dismissal procedure and the 
linkage  to  the  public-sector  pay  rises,  which  severely  curtailed  its  financial  and 
commercial flexibility. It informed the employees’ representatives that it was adamant 
about  taking  decisive  action  (including  unilateral  suspension  of  the  Collective 
Agreement), until the company’s situation stabilised.  IAI did not want to break the
77  Katz  interview.  In  the  course  of their  lobbying  efforts,  the  workers’  representatives  met  the 
Histadrut’s Secretary-General Haberfeld and approached both Shochat and Rabin.  Health Minister 
Haim Ramon was also instrumental in facilitating the workers’ efforts.
78 Haaretz, 9 July 1993.
79 Penso interview.
257Collective Agreement, a senior executive said, but was left with no choice,  ‘because 
keeping it had become prohibitive’.80
The MoF, meanwhile, publicly criticised the situation at IAI for the first time. 
‘The  company  was  no  longer  commercially  viable,’  said  Nir  Gilad,  the  Deputy 
Director of the Budget Department, to the Knesset’s Finance Committee,8 1   and in a 
later appearance before the Knesset’s Labour Committee he alluded to the possibility 
of shutting down IAI if its losses continued.82 The Budget Department examined IAI 
assets and argued that it needed a fundamental reorganisation,  including the sale of 
profitable units and a complete overhaul of its Collective Agreement and corporate 
strategy.  It  demanded  that  IAI  employees  should  agree  to  major  changes  in  the 
agreement, similar to those implemented six months earlier at IMI:  sharp workforce 
and wage reductions; workforce mobility and severance of all wage linkages to the 
public-sector  pay  raises.  In  addition,  the  MoF  insisted  that  the  IAI  management 
should  cease  the  practice  of cross-subsidy  between  factories,  which  ‘perpetuated
01
inefficiency and waste’.  Behind the  scenes, the MoF’s Budget Department started 
exploring drastic steps, including putting IAI into receivership or outright liquidation 
-  the  strongest of the measures prescribed by the Government Companies Law84 - 
should the employees refuse to yield.
For IAI’s workers, the management’s threat and the pressure from the MoF 
were nothing short of a casus belli. They launched a PR offensive with a statement 
from the IAI Employees’ Organisation that any attempt to undermine the company’s
80 Shmuel Peretz interview, 9 June 1998 (hereafter: Peretz interview, 1998c)
8 1  Globes, 24 June 1993.
82 Globes, 30 July 1993
83 Haaretz, 23 July 1993.
84 See Government Companies Law, clause 14.
258Collective  Agreement  would  be  met  with  fierce  resistance.85  A  press  briefing 
maintained that any breach of the employees’  statutory rights ‘would lead to a third 
world war’, and also rejected any attempt to compare the situation at IAI to that of 
IMI.  Accusing  the  MoF  of  ‘deliberately  spreading  lies,’  it  argued  that  ‘the  IMI 
workers were previously civil servants whose pension schemes were already budgeted 
by the state;  this was not the case with IAI,  whose employees were relying on the 
company’s resources for their retirement’.86 (This last claim was not accurate: before 
IMI became a company in  1990  it had operated as a unit within the MoD, and its 
workers were therefore part of the civil service; however, once it became a company, 
IMI took upon itself the future pension and salary obligations of its employees.87)
Having exhausted all other options, and following a breakdown in negotiations 
with  the  employees’  representatives,  the  management  approached  Prime  Minister 
Rabin  and  Finance  Minister  Shochat  in  July  1993  and  presented  an  updated 
assessment of its situation. It asked for an urgent aid package totalling $400 million 
and ministerial backing for taking a drastic line with the employees. As to the latter, 
the management suggested either unilateral suspension of the Collective Agreement 
by the management, with the backing of the ministers in charge, until the company’s 
situation has  stabilised;  or else placing  IAI  in the  hands  of a receiver through the
85 Haaretz, 15 July 1993.
86 The IAI Employees’ Organisation Press release, 14 July 1993, p. 3; open letter to the IAI workers by 
the Histadrut, the IAI Employees’ Organisation and the IAI Workers’ Council, 12 July 1993.
87 See Dan Shomron,  ‘IMI: Present and Future’, in The Israeli Economy at the Threshold of the Year 
2000 -  Conference Proceedings (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs and Old City Press, 
1993),  pp.  199-200  (Hebrew);  comments by  IMI  Acting Chief Executive  in a  session titled  ‘the 
crisis at IMI’ held by the Labour, Welfare and Health Affairs Committee of the Knesset, 7 June 2005 
(protocol held by author, also available on www.knesset.gov.il. accessed 20 December 2005).
259courts.88 (The employees already rejected the possibility of a consensual suspension 
of the Collective Agreement.)
Of the two, the IAI chief executive preferred the first option, arguing that a 
labour dispute as a result of temporarily suspending the Collective Agreement would 
cause  less  harm  to  the  company’s  reputation.  ‘IAI’s  customer  base  was  mainly 
abroad, with over fifty clients’, explained a senior IAI executive who took part in the
on
meeting with Rabin.  ‘If we were placed in receivership, our clients would dump us 
and go to the next competitor. No one would risk doing business with us.’ If, on the 
other hand,  ‘IAI were engaged in a labour dispute, the clients would most probably 
accept that this was only temporary phase that would last no more than a month or 
two’.90
Prime Minister Rabin, however, rejected the management’s position:
Under  no  circumstances  would  I  sanction  a  unilateral  suspension  of  a  collective 
agreement. If I do that, the Electric Company would shut down the electric supply, Bezeq 
[then  the  state-owned  telecommunication  company]  would  bring  down  the  telephone 
network,  and  Maaz  [the  government-owned  road  works  department]  would  close  the 
highways. I would be left with a paralysed country.91
He also argued that IAI’s proposal was not decisive enough and could not guarantee
the massive reduction in workforce and salaries the company so urgently needed.  (In
an  interview  with  the  author,  Mr  Shochat  explained  that  ‘breaking  collective
agreements  with  the  [IAI]  unions  might have  led  to  a  colossal  confrontation.  The
Cabinet did  not  want  to  face  a  crisis  of such  magnitude  at  that  point  in time’.93)
88 Globs, 8 July 1993.
89 Peretz interview, 1998c.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Granit interview, 1998.
93 Shochat interview.
260Instead, and to the great dismay of IAI management, the two ministers instructed it to 
negotiate an agreement with the employees along the lines of the IMI agreement, and 
to bring it over for approval within a month.  If the management failed to do this in 
time, ministers would recommend placing the company in receivership -  so it should 
prepare for that possibility as well.94
The ministers’ decision was influenced by secret discussions held with senior 
MoF  officials  and  IAI’s  board  Chairman  few  weeks  earlier.  Anticipating  the 
employees’ defiance, the MoF’s Budget Department (whose Director had previously 
been a senior executive at IAI) maintained that only a decisive, unequivocal measure 
would convince  the  IAI  employees  to  accept  significant  concessions.  It  suggested 
presenting  them  with  an ultimatum:  unless  they  complied,  the  ministers  in charge 
would ask Cabinet to authorise putting IAI  in receivership and file a request to the 
courts to that effect. Such step would undermine the very existence of the IAI unions 
themselves -  a receiver was entitled to suspend IAI’s Collective Agreement, including 
fringe benefits and pay raises, and to make employees redundant at the statutory rate - 
and this threat alone might persuade them to accept the management’s demands.95 The 
Budget Department therefore recommended a brinkmanship strategy, which was risky 
and  potentially  damaging  (there  was  no  guarantee  that  the  court  would  agree  to 
appoint  a  receiver  for  IAI,  and  in  any  event  the  company’s  reputation  would  be 
harmed) but nevertheless the only way to achieve the required structural changes in 
the company. According to the then Director of the Budget Department:
The MoF viewed the crisis at IAI  as a major test case,  similar in its magnitude to the 
watershed  crisis  of  AT  A,  a  private  textile  company  which  appealed  in  1985  for 
government aid.  ATA was located in a developing area with high unemployment rate,
94 Haaretz, 25 July 1993; Maariv, 25 July 1993.
95 Gilad interview, 2001.
261and its business was export-oriented; nevertheless, in a marked departure from previous 
conventions,  the  Cabinet  refused  to  help  the  company;  AT  A  subsequently  collapsed.
Since then, no other private company had appealed for government assistance, realising 
that it needed to sort out its problems on its own.  We tried to institutionalise the same 
approach vis-a-vis the state-owned enterprises by forcing a receiver on IAI. Through this 
action we wanted to convey a clear message:  “Do not think that, just because you are 
owned by the government, it means that we will automatically leap to your assistance.
You must  be  more business-minded  and take  responsibility for  your  actions.”  We no 
longer accepted a situation where the management and the employees colluded to extract 
state funding.96
Indeed, the MoF believed that its decisiveness in the IAI crisis would serve it 
well in other labour disputes. The MoF Director General noted that a decisive move 
vis-a-vis IAI’s employees sent a stem, deterrent message to other ailing organisations 
in the public sector -  such as the General Sickness Fund (Kupat Holim Klalit), which 
also required substantial state aid -  to the effect that the Cabinet would do not hesitate 
to enforce painful structural changes through the courts.97 (Shochat indeed noted that 
the crisis at Kupat Holim was more significant than IAI’s, because ‘it affected 70% of 
the Israeli population’.98)
In  separate  discussions,  exactly  the  same  recommendation  was  relayed  to 
Prime Minister Rabin by the IAI Chairman, former Chief of Staff Zvi Zur, one of his 
most  valued  and  respected  friends,99  and  by  the  Economic  Adviser  to  the  Prime 
Minister, Ilan Flato, a former MoF official.100 Unknown to the IAI management, Zur 
met Rabin in private and told him that a firm course of action against the employees 
was inevitable:
96 Brodet interview.
97 Fogel interview.
98 Shochat interview.
99 Haber interview.
100 Flato interview.
262A softly-softly approach would lead us to nowhere. We must place IAI in the hands of a 
court-appointed receiver, and by this means dismantle the stifling,  formal  structures of 
decision-making inside the company  [IAI’s Collective  Agreement  and the  Employees’ 
Organisation]; only thus would we manage to turn the company round.1 0 1
Rabin accepted this recommendation.
Ministerial endorsement of a receivership option for IAI took management by 
surprise.  The  ministers’  outright  rejection  of  its  suggestion  prompted  several 
executives  to  suggest  that  the  IAI  management  should  collectively  hand  in  its 
resignation;  Keret  dismissed  this  idea  outright.102  The  Employees’  Organisation, 
meanwhile, held an emergency session in which it declared Finance Minister Shochat 
‘the No.  1  enemy of IAI’ and promised to ‘destroy him politically’.103 At the behest of 
several IAI employees,104 the Histadrut also became involved in the crisis, promising 
to  back  IAI’s  workers  through  industrial  action  across  the  public  sector  if  the 
company were put into administration.105
IAI’s  financial  situation,  meanwhile,  reached  a  crisis  point.  The  costs  of 
maintaining 2,500 excess workers  ‘became unsustainable’,106 as clients continued to 
cancel  or defer contracts.  Banks  refused  IAI  further loans -   it already owed them 
more than $600 million107 -  and within days the company’s reserves came close to 
depletion.  It was  unable  to  pay  the  employees’  full  salaries  (a  clear breach of the 
Collective Agreement)  and could afford only partial down payments.  On 9 August
1 0 1  Zur interview.
102 Peretz interview, 1 January 2006 (Hereafter: Peretz interview, 2006)
103 Jerusalem Post, 27 July 1993; Globes, 25 July 1993.
104  Letter  from  Eli  Holtzman,  a  union  representative  at  IAI’s  MBT  factory  and  member  of the 
Histadrut’s Central Committee to the Histadrut’s Secretary General, Haim Haberfeld,  14 July 1993.
105 Yedioth Ahronoth, 28 July 1993.
106 Penso interview.
107 Maariv, 9 August 1993.
2631993, when the management informed the employees of its situation and told them 
that  the  previous  month’s  salary  was  temporarily  withheld,  the  work  across  IAI 
factories was brought to an abrupt halt.  Several thousand employees at IAI’s main 
complex near Ben-Gurion Airport stormed the management building, causing damage
1  HR and havoc on their way; order was restored after police intervention.
The  IAI  crisis  caught  the  attention  of the  political  system.  Representatives 
from the main parties, including a large group from the ruling Labour party, visited 
the company and met the employees and management. The opposition Likud party, in 
particular,  saw an opportunity to embarrass the Labour government.  A ten-member 
delegation, headed by party leader Binyamin Netanyahu, arrived at the invitation of 
the Employees’ Organisation for a tour at IAI just a day before the salary crisis broke 
out, on 8 August 1993; however, the management did not allow it in. Before leaving, 
Mr Netanyahu and his  colleagues  promised  the  workers  they  would  ‘intervene  on 
their  behalf.109  Other  Members  of  Knesset  presented  in  the  media  makeshift 
proposals ‘to alleviate IAI’s situation and restore its finances’, but none was followed
up.110
Negotiations
The clashes at IAI captured headlines and featured prominently in news bulletins. A 
few  days  later a  fresh round  of negotiations  started  in  earnest.  Up  against  a  tight 
deadline,  IAI management and workers’  representatives met daily,  trying to  find a 
compromise  that  satisfied  the  conditions  presented  by  the  Defence  and  Finance
108 Hadashot, 10 August 1993.
109 Maariv, 9 August 1993,
110 Ibid.
264Ministers.  The  Israeli  President,  who  visited  IAI  in  September  1993,  expressed 
concern and urged the parties to reach a compromise.11 1
Both  sides  came  well  prepared  for  the  negotiations  on  a  new  Special 
Collective  Agreement,  called  Rotem  2.  The  IAI  management  presented  similar 
demands, which were based on the previous Rotem agreement, but insisted that the 
situation required far harder concessions by the employees. The management’s team 
was accompanied by professional consultants,  including  lawyers  and labour affairs 
specialists.  With  the  help  a  former  union  leader  (once  head  of  the  Workers’ 
Committee  at  IAI’s  subsidiary  Elta)  it  conducted  ‘war  games’  to  simulate  likely 
moves  by  the  employees’  representatives.112  The  Employees’  Organisation,  for  its 
part, appointed a team of negotiators led by the Under Secretary of the Employees 
Organisation,  Haim  Katz,  and  assisted  by  lawyers,  accountants  and  pension  plan 
specialists.113
The  workers  divided  their  efforts:  while  Katz  negotiated  with  the  IAI 
management,  Secretary  General  Sheffi  lobbied  on behalf of the  employees  in  the 
Knesset, winning support for the IAI workers from other MKs, both on the left and 
the  right.114.  According  to  Sheffi,  he  intended  to  exercise  his  parliamentarian 
privileges to the fullest, and if necessary to apply direct pressure on his own party. A 
veteran  Histadrut  apparatchik,  Sheffi  did  not  get  along  at  all  with Prime  Minister 
Rabin -  they were on such bad terms that they did not speak for more than eighteen
111 IAI press release, ‘Visit of the President’, 9 September 1993.
112 Penso.
113 Sheffi interview.
114 See speeches by Anat Maor MK (Meretz), Tamar Godjansky (Hadash) and Gidon Sagi (Labour), 
Yosef Ba-Gad (Moledet),  Meir  Shitrit  and  Silvan  Shalom  (Likud)  at the  Knesset,  Records  of the 
Knesset,  25  October  1993,  1  December  1993,  and  22  December  1993.  Available  at: 
www.knesset.gov.il (accessed:  15 August 2005).
265months, until the beginning of 1994, even though Sheffi was the party whip115 -  and 
gradually established himself as a distinctive,  critical voice,  differing from the line 
taken  by  Prime  Minister  Rabin  on  defence  spending,  organised  labour  and  the 
handling of the IAI crisis. He soon realised that the fragile make-up of the governing 
coalition -  just 62 seats out of 120, (and later only 58116) -  enhanced his influence, 
and put him in a powerful position to overthrow the Rabin government almost at will. 
‘A majority of one was enough to topple the prime minister, and therefore every vote 
mattered. The party leadership was under great pressure because of this,’ he said.117 
As the crisis at IAI deepened, so did his efforts on the employees’ behalf.
The Premier’s Involvement
Despite long, round-the-clock discussions usually finishing in the early hours of each 
morning -  the workers prolonged the discussions to grind the management down by
1  I O
attrition  -   a  compromise  turned  out  to  be  beyond  reach.  The  employees  also 
discovered that whatever offer the management representatives made, it needed to be 
approved by the  IAI  Chief Executive,  the  IAI  Board,  the  Government Companies 
Authority and two separate departments at the MoF;119 many of the proposals were 
rejected or changed along this decision chain. The employees consequently hardened 
their position, and this prompted a senior management official to conclude that they
115 Sheffi interview.
116 After Shas left the Labour-led coalition in September 1993 and another party -  Yi'ud -  joined it, the 
number of MKs supporting the government fell to 58 coalition members and five more from outside 
the coalition. See Knesset website (www.knesset.gov.il. accessed 20 December 2005).
117 Ibid.
118 Penso interview.
119 Penso and Katz interviews.
266‘either  did  not understand  or  simply  refused  to  accept how  severe  IAI’s  situation 
really was’.120
At the same time, preparations for the IAI receivership application continued 
apace. The MoF formed a task force of representatives from three departments and the 
Ministry’s legal adviser to deal exclusively with this issue. Its work was coordinated 
by  the  Deputy  Head  of  the  Budget  Department,  who  liaised  with  teams  at  the 
Government Companies Authority,  the Ministry of Defence and IAI.1 2 1   At IAI,  the 
Chairman of the  Board presided  over an  internal  team  that assessed  the  legal  and 
operational  implications  of  a  receivership  application,  including  the  financial 
requirements  for  the  completion  of projects.122  In  addition,  the  company’s  legal 
adviser and the heads of key departments prepared detailed affidavits in support of the
123 receivership application.  The MoF, meanwhile, issued performance guarantees for 
the company’s customers;124 IAI’s Chief Executive then went on a worldwide tour, 
meeting the company’s key clients in a bid to keep their business.125
The situation at IAI was closely monitored by the political advisers of Prime 
Minister Rabin, including the Director General of the Prime Minister Office, Shimon 
Sheves,  who  was  regularly  briefed  by  IAI’s  Employees  Organisation.  In  the 
meantime,  the  management  hired  management  consultants  to  examine  and
120  Author’s  interview  with  Doron  Suslik,  (IAI  Head  of Communications  Directorate,  1986-1999, 
Deputy Vice President for Communications 2000-present), 7 October 1997.
121 Gilad interview, 2001.
122 Zur interview; Peretz interview, 1998c.
123 Peretz interview, 2006
124 Fogel interview
125 Gilad interview, 2001.
267recommend  a  new  structure  for  the  company.126  However,  there  was  little  or  no 
progress in the negotiations with the employees, and they reached a dead end.
Seeking  a  solution  to  this  impasse,  the  employees’  chief negotiator  Katz 
contacted Rabin’s Chief of Staff Sheves  in  September  1993  and asked to meet the
197 Prime Minister.  This was a seemingly unusual request, given Rabin’s disparaging 
comments on the IAI crisis (‘spending $400 million dollars on the company would be 
a  waste  of money  and  would  compromise  vital  security  needs’128)  and his  known 
dislike for its unions and the Histadrut.129 It also circumvented the official channel of 
communication and authority,  since the formal interlocutor for the IAI workers was 
the management, not Cabinet. Nevertheless, appreciating the delicate situation at IAI 
and its potential political  ramifications,  Sheves  arranged  for the  Prime  Minister to 
meet Katz.
Rabin knew Katz from previous informal meetings the two had held in private, 
although  these  had  been  kept  secret  from  the  IAI  management.130  Rabin,  an 
introverted,  cerebral  person,1 3 1   gradually  grew  fond  of  the  IAI  workers’ 
representative, whom he viewed as an authentic,  trustworthy union leader who also 
shared his deep contempt for the Histadrut’s policies.132 However, at this meeting the
126 Hadashot, 10 September 1993.
127 Sheves interview.
128 Hadashot, 5 August 1993
129 Granit (1998 interview), Haber and Fogel interviews; Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 211. Rabin 
disliked the IAI unions in particular because he viewed them as an electoral pool base of his political 
rival, Shimon Peres.
130 Katz interview.
1 31 For reflections on Rabin’s personality, see: the CIA’s biographical account of Prime Minister Rabin, 
in Yossi Melman,  The  CIA  Report on  the Israeli Intelligence Community (Tel Aviv:  Erez/Zmora- 
Bitan-Modan, 1982), p. 104; Kissinger, Years of  Renewal, pp. 374-376
132 Granit interview, 1998 and Penso interview.
268two  hardly  saw  eye  to  eye,  and  engaged  in  a  ‘long,  tense  discussion,’  as  Katz 
recalled.133
Rabin blamed the  IAI  employees  for presenting unacceptable  demands  and 
warned Katz that they would have themselves to blame for IAI’s downfall, a message 
he had also given some weeks earlier to the labour affairs minister, Ora Namir, one of 
Katz’s confidants and a staunch supporter of the IAI unions.134 Katz told Rabin that 
IAI’s employees wanted to reach a compromise, but the management was incapable 
of making a credible offer. ‘We simply stopped taking them seriously,’ he said, asking
135 the Prune Minister to intervene.
Rabin spoke with Finance Minister Shochat and they summoned a senior MoF 
official,  Shalom Granit,  then Director of the Wage  and Labour Accord Unit,  for a 
meeting at the end of September 1993. By this time the two ministers had increasing 
doubts about whether the receivership plan was indeed the right course of action for 
IAI, given the political and commercial risks involved and the relative inexperience of 
the courts and the government bureaucracy in dealing with such matters.136 (At the 
time, the only other big company run by a receiver was El Al, but it served a different 
type of client and operated in a market markedly different from IAI’s). Granit shared 
their  concerns,  arguing  that  receivership  should  be  kept  as  a  last  resort.  Granit 
disagreed with the brinkmanship advocated by his colleagues at the MoF’s  Budget 
Department  and  believed  that  only  direct  dialogue  with  the  IAI  employees  would 
defuse  the  stalemate  and  eventually  solve  the  crisis.  He  felt  that  the  MoF  should
133 Katz interview.
134 Yedioth Ahronoth, 5 August 1993.
135 Katz interview.
136 Author’s interview with Israel Oz (Chief of Staff, Office  of the Finance Minister,  1993-1995) 2 
January 2006; Gilad interview, 2001.
269actively pursue compromise with IAI’s employees on all relevant matters, including 
issues  from  IAI  management’s  agenda,  such  as  the  future  privatisation  of  the 
company. This view was objectionable to other MoF  officials, who opposed giving 
the employees any say in management decisions.137
The  two  ministers,  accepting  that  the  risks  of  a  possible  receivership 
outweighed  its  benefits,  then  asked  Granit  to  take  charge  of  direct,  personal 
negotiations  with  Katz.  Instructing  him  ‘to  conceal  his  meetings  from  all  other 
officials’,  including those  of IAI  and the  Ministries  of Defence  and Finance,  they 
outlined the main concessions he needed to extract from the IAI employees, such as 
the unlinking of their salaries from public-sector wages and agreement to a reduction
138 of about 3,000 employees.  He was also given a set budget for the negotiations by 
Finance Minister Shochat, totalling around $500 million (five times the amount the 
MoF’s  Budget  Department  publicly  pledged  for  accommodating  the  employees’ 
demands139). This amount allowed Granit to offer the IAI employees high severance 
packages -  averaging some $166,000 per head -  in exchange for their concessions.140 
With this mandate, Granit met Katz during the small hours of every night, after the 
formal round of negotiations between IAI management and employees had ended. At 
times, the two met in the Finance Minister’s house or at secret locations in or near 
Jerusalem.1 4 1
Explaining why Granit was appointed, Avraham Shochat told the author that 
‘the costs associated with the IAI recovery plan were such that we had to take the lead
137 Granit interview, 1998.
138 Ibid.
139 Hadashot, 28 September 1993 and 4 October 1993.
140 Granit interview, 2 January 2006 (hereafter: Granit interview, 2006).
1 41 Shochat, Katz and Granit (1998) interviews.
270on this matter’.  He added  that  ‘we  felt that the IAI  management was  incapable of 
reaching a satisfactory solution, and in any event it was simply wrong to let them deal 
with this issue on their own while the recovery costs were to be borne by the state 
Treasury.’142  (This  last  point  alluded  to  the  unease  of senior  MoF  officials,  who 
claimed  it  was  patently  wrong  to  let  the  IAI  management  negotiate  the  terms  of 
redundancy packages that were to be paid by the state, not the company.)
Rabin’s Brinkmanship
While the preparations for a putting IAI into receivership and the secret negotiations 
over  a  compromise  continued  in  two  separate,  parallel  tracks,  the  Prime  Minister 
Rabin’s closest political advisers were feeling growing concern. As elections for local 
authorities  -   slated  for  2  November  1993  -   drew  nearer,  internal  assessments 
suggested that the Labour party might be defeated in several key municipalities. The 
Prime Minister was worried,  because he viewed the result of these elections as an 
important  indication of the  public  support  for the  Israeli-Palestinian Oslo  accords, 
signed just weeks earlier.143 He warned that ‘a victory of a Likud candidate in one of 
the three big cities would have far-reaching consequences, well beyond the municipal 
level; it might derail the peace process altogether’.144 Rabin’s concerns played straight 
into  the  hands  of  the  IAI  employees,  who  started  campaigning  against  Labour 
candidates.
Indeed,  Rabin’s  political  advisers,  mainly  Sheves,  saw  the  IAI’s  workers 
machinations as a political threat that was not to be taken lightly,  especially before
142 Shochat interview.
143 Haaretz, 12 November 1998.
144 Rabin quoted in Yedioth Ahronoth, 24 October 1993.
271elections.145 With its network of activists and track record in public campaigns, the 
IAI Employees’ Organisation appeared to be having an influence on the make-up of 
several  municipalities  and  local  authorities  in  central  Israel,  especially  near  the 
company’s  main  industrial  complex  (see  Figure  5.3),  and  it  was  presumed  to  be 
capable of mustering up to 50,000 votes (equalled to 3-4 seats in the Knesset).146 In 
addition,  it  maintained  close  cross-sector  cooperation  with  other powerful  unions, 
such as the National Organisation of Airlines and Airport Employees and the National 
Organisation  of  Electric  Company  Employees  (which,  at  the  time,  had  its  own 
grudges  against  the  Rabin  government147)  and  according  to  Shochat  was  indeed 
capable of disrupting key operations in the country. However, he did not believe that 
the Employees’ Organisation possessed the electoral influence it claimed to have.148
However, senior officials at the MoF and the Prime Minister Office argued to 
the contrary, and indeed the IAI employees had gone to great lengths to show Rabin 
and  Shochat  their  political  strength.  In  several  meetings,  the  employees’  chief 
negotiator Katz warned the Prime Minister that the IAI employees were capable of 
inflicting a major blow to  him and his party.  ‘We will bury you if the company is 
dismantled,’  he  told  Rabin  time  and  again.149  To  prove  this  point,  the  employees 
gradually escalated their protests.
145 Granit interview, 1998; Sheves and Zur interviews.
146 Zur and Flato interviews; Makor Rishon, 28 November 2003. The IAI Employees’ Organisation was 
politically active in as much as twenty municipalities.
147  At  that  time,  the  Electricity  Company  employees  Organisation  resisted  a  proposal  to  break  the 
company into smaller producing units and to appoint independent regulator for energy prices. See: 
Shochat interview; Haaretz, 5 September 1994, and 9 July 2004.
148 Shochat interview.
149 Granit interview, 1998.
272Figure 5.3: Location of IAI’s factories
Legend:
©   Profitable factory in a developing area
©   Loss making factory in a developing area
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273After the September holidays, in response to Shochat’s announcement that he 
would withhold all funding for IAI until it set an immediate deadline for its recovery 
plan,  IAI personnel took to  the  streets  and blocked major highways.  When shortly 
afterwards IAI’s management started compiling redundancy lists,150 the Employees’ 
Organisation coordinated a demonstration that closed down Ben-Gurion International 
Airport.  On  21  October  1993,  in  scenes  reminiscent  of the  protests  against  the 
cancellation  of the  Lavi  project,  thousands  of IAI  employees  stormed  the  airport 
runways  and prevented  flights  landing  or taking  off for several  hours.  During  the 
demonstration,  Katz  mounted  a  podium  and  threatened  political  retribution  in  the 
imminent  local  elections  ‘unless  the  Labour  party  meets  our  demands’.1 5 1   The 
employees’  leader, Member of Knesset Yaakov Sheffi, also promised to act:  ‘If the 
[Rabin] government will not yield, I will oppose the state budget bill, even though I 
am a Labour party member’.152
And Sheffi carried out his threat. A week before the local elections, he voted 
against the state budget bill during its first reading, which was embarrassing to the 
Labour leadership because  it  signalled that he would not hesitate  to bring Rabin’s 
government down. The vote took place just weeks after Shas, a major party, had left 
Rabin’s coalition in protest at the Oslo Accords, bringing the coalition’s seats in the 
Knesset below the 60-seat threshold. Opposition members quickly seized the moment 
and congratulated Sheffi for ‘his courageous vote’, which was akin to a vote of no­
150 Hadashot, 19 October 1993
1 5 1  Hadashot, 22 October 1993.
152 Ibid.
274confidence.153 However, his vote was actually a tactical move aimed at warning the 
Labour leadership to tread carefully in its negotiations with the IAI employees.154
However,  the  Prime  Minister  refused  to  budge.  Maintaining  a  fa9ade  of 
‘business as usual’, and as preparations for the receivership action neared completion, 
he was presented with reports and assessments by the IAI chairman and management, 
the  MoF’s  Budget  Department  and  the  MoD  legal  adviser  (who  was  assigned  to 
prepare  a  detailed  application to  the  courts).155  The  Ministry  of Finance’s  Budget 
Department suggested approaching the courts a day after the Cabinet meeting, or as 
soon as Prime Minister agreed to do so, as it assumed that by that point the employees 
would back down.156
Shortly afterwards, Rabin met the IAI chairman Zvi Zur in private.  The two 
agreed  to  bring  the  IAI  receivership  plan  before  the  Cabinet  for  approval  at  the 
beginning of November, shortly after the local elections, and to approach the courts 
immediately afterwards.  However,  Rabin -  who  did  not divulge  to  Zur the  secret 
negotiations between Katz and Granit -  wanted to review the legal aspects of the plan 
for  the  last  time  with  the  most  senior  MoD,  MoF  and  IAI  officials.  He  and  Zur 
therefore  scheduled a major meeting  on  3  November,  at which Rabin asked to  be 
presented the complete paperwork.  Rabin then made another, and quite unexpected, 
request: ahead of the Cabinet discussion on the IAI receivership, he -  Rabin -  wanted 
to ensure the backing of Peres for this move. According to Zur,
153 See comments by the Likud MK, Meir Shitrit, on 22 December 1993 during a Knesset discussion on 
the Economic Arrangements bill for  1994 (available at www.knesset.gov.il accessed 20 December 
2005).
154 Sheffi interview.
155 Peretz interview, 2006.
156 Gilad interview, 2001 and Brodet interview.
275Rabin told  me:  ‘Shimon  Peres  is  a  friend  of yours,  so before  we  convene  Cabinet to 
discuss the receivership plan for IAI, sort this out with him first’. Now, Peres felt close 
affinity to IAI  because,  more  than  anyone  else,  he  was the  one  who  built  it  up  from 
scratch. Many of his friends and voters came from there, and they comprised a very large 
base of support for him.  I sat down with Peres and told him about the situation of the 
company.  He said to me:  ‘You are probably  100% right but I will never hand IAI to a 
receiver. I simply cannot do it.’ Once Rabin heard that Peres objected to the receivership 
plan, he became much less enthusiastic about it.157
Shimon Peres was not the only cabinet minister who refused to confront the 
IAI employees. Labour affairs minister Namir also approached Rabin and pressed for 
a negotiated compromise with them (a position she also voiced in Cabinet meetings 
and through opinion articles written by her senior adviser.158)
While  Zur was  struggling  to  come  to  terms  with  Peres’  refusal,  the  secret 
negotiations  between  Granit  and  Katz  reached  a  critical  impasse.  Katz  then  met 
Finance Minister Shochat, who stated his support for recommending placing IAI in 
receivership to Rabin.159 This last development set in motion a rapid chain of events. 
Katz  called  Sheves  and  updated  him  on  the  collapsed  negotiations  with  Shochat. 
Sheves approached Rabin ahead of the weekly ‘Our Ministers’ meeting and cautioned 
him that matters were about to get out of hand. Putting IAI into receivership, he said, 
would bring the party in a collision course ‘not just with the IAI employees, but with 
all the others as well. It would have some catastrophic consequences. ’ He urged Rabin
157 Zur interview. According to Shimon Sheves, Rabin tricked Zur into believing that Peres’ position 
mattered  to  him;  in  truth,  ‘he  did  not  really  care  whether  Peres  would  support  or  oppose  a 
receivership plan for IAI  ...  he simply wanted Zur to challenge Peres with the idea, and to see his 
reaction, just to know whether he would entertain it or not’ (Sheves interview).
158  Haaretz,  8  August  1993;  Esther  Alexander,  ‘we  buried  the  Lavi  and  we  shall  also  bury  IAI’, 
Ha’olam Haze,  18 August 1993; Esther Alexander, ‘Sickening recovery at IAI, Globes, 2 November 
1993. Dr Alexander was economic adviser to Labour Affairs minister Namir.
159 Sheves interview.
276to  ‘take  charge of the  situation,  personally’  and find a  solution to  this problem.160 
According to Sheves, Rabin
had  very  good political  instincts  ...  he  dreaded  the  thought  of a  failure  with the  IAI 
employees. He was afraid of the political repercussions of such an outcome.  ... What he 
wanted was to ease the pressure, at least temporarily, so that he could focus on the peace 
process. For him, at that point in time, the peace talks were the most important issue.
Rabin  therefore  strove  to  ensure  that  IAI  was  stabilised  and  not  forced  to  pay 
excessively, and to do so ‘without clashing with its employees’.1 6 1
At  that point,  and  as  the  elections  were just  days  away,  Rabin decided  to 
confront the Finance Minister. In a closed session of the ‘Our Ministers’  forum, the 
senior  gathering  of the  Labour  party  ministers,  he  asked  Shochat  to  present  the 
situation at IAI and its implications. The Finance Minister described the background 
to the company’s crisis and the failure of the negotiations with the employees, noting 
that the MoF  recommended putting  IAI  into  receivership.  ‘All  avenues  have  been 
exhausted, and we reached a dead end; I was left with no other choice,’ he said. This 
conclusion angered Rabin, who slammed his hand down on the table and said:
I simply cannot accept this. You [Shochat] do not have a clue how to handle these things 
...  from now on, I am in charge  ...  I suggest that you learn how we laid off 6,000 IAI 
workers after the Lavi  [was cancelled]  and stayed alive.  If you do that,  you will  learn 
how not to break IAI into pieces.162
Rabin’s outburst surprised those present,  Shochat included, but in statements to  the 
media the Finance Minister continued to appear firm, and in Cabinet few days later he 
declared that ‘the government would appoint a receiver to IAI unless the negotiations 
with the employees achieve some progress.’
160 Ibid.
1 61 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Hadashot, 1 November 1993
277Few days later, Katz met Rabin once again, at the Prime Minister’s home. By 
this time Sheves had told him that the Prime Minister was his last hope of sparing IAI 
from receivership,  so Katz came to the meeting less defiant and ‘with lots of good 
will’ to strike a deal with Rabin.164 The two discussed the matter and agreed on broad 
guidelines for a compromise. Nevertheless, Rabin told Katz that unless he reached an 
agreement by Wednesday, 3 November, IAI would be put in receivership as planned. 
After  the  meeting,  Rabin  phoned  Shochat  and  informed  him  of the  results  of his 
discussion with Katz, instructing him to secure these understandings in writing.
As Katz resumed his negotiations with Granit -  who by now had received new 
guidelines from Shochat -  the IAI Board and management, as well as the legal teams 
at  the  MoD  and  the  MoF,  completed  a  final  presentation  for  Rabin  on  IAI’s 
receivership. While the attention of the media and political system was focused on the 
local elections, Katz held a series of round-the-clock discussions with Granit and the 
Finance Minister’s chief of staff, Israel Oz. In the early hours of 3 November 1993 the 
three reached a compromise. They went to Shochat’s home and received his approval. 
The Finance Minister then called Rabin, the two discussed the draft’s main points, and 
the  Prime  Minister  then  accepted  it  as  well.  Shochat  now  phoned  the  IAI  Chief 
Executive, Keret, at 3 a.m. and informed him, to his great surprise, that a settlement 
had been reached with the employees. He instructed him to go to the IAI headquarters 
and meet the two MoF officials, Granit and Oz, as well as Katz.165
By the early hours of the morning, a draft memorandum was prepared: Katz 
agreed to the dismissal of up to 2,900 tenured employees and the unlinking of the 
remaining workers from the public-sector pay rises for two years -  equivalent to a pay
164 Sheves interview.
165 This section is based on the author’s interviews with Shochat, Katz, Granit (1998) and Sheves.
278cut  of  at  least  20%  -   with  an  option  of  extension.166  In  return,  the  Treasury 
representatives waived the threat of receivership action against IAI and promised that 
the state would pay for the severance packages of the departing workers.
Katz,  who  was  about  to  replace  Sheffi  at  the  helm  of  the  Employees’ 
Organisation, had some conditions of his own. He asserted that his organisation would 
not be involved in the redundancy selection process -  he  feared that handling this 
sensitive issue might prove to be too risky for his position and image -  and therefore 
insisted that the management should deal with it exclusively.167 He also demanded 
that the memorandum should recognise in a separate paragraph the ‘special standing’ 
of the  Employees’  Organisation  with  respect to  future  privatisation plans  for IAI, 
giving it a de facto veto power over any such process.168 Later known as Clause 80, 
this stated that ‘the parties acknowledge the company’s need for strategic alliances, 
joint ventures and raising equity capital through privatisation; however, these actions 
will  take place  only  after ensuring  that  the  employees’  rights  are  secured  (by  the 
state)’.169  Finally,  Katz  insisted  that  the  memorandum  should be  applicable  to  the 
entire workforce of the company, including IAI’s most profitable subsidiary, Elta (a 
decision which was unsuccessfully challenged by Elta’s management and employees, 
and later led to a mass departure of key employees and managers170). These requests 
were also granted.
166 Gilad interview, 2001, and Fogel and Zur interviews;  IAI Ltd and Elta Ltd., the Histadrut and the 
National  Organisation  of the  IAI  Employees,  Special  Collective  Agreement,  8  December  1993, 
clauses 1, 78 and 81.
167 Granit interview, 2006.
168 Granit interview, 1998.
169 IAI Ltd and Elta Ltd., the Histadrut and the National Organisation of the IAI Employees, Special 
Collective Agreement, 8 December 1993, Clause 80.
170 State Comptroller Report on Elta’s privatisation efforts, pp. 16-17
279No one within the senior bureaucracy was aware of the night’s developments. 
Dozens  of senior officials,  including  the  Directors  General of the  MoF  and MoD, 
made their way to the Prime Minister Office in Jerusalem, presumably to discuss the 
final details of the receivership plan, when they were told that the meeting was called 
off and the plan shelved. Just minutes before his arrival the IAI Chairman received a 
phone call from Shochat, who told him about the breakthrough with the employees. 
When Zur entered the  Prime  Minister Office he  learnt  for the  first time about the 
secret negotiations channel. The Finance Minister then presented him and Rabin the 
main points of the memorandum with the  IAI  employees,  during which the Prime 
Minister kept asking whether they agreed to be de facto  separated from the public 
sector.1 7 1   Shochat  replied  in  the  affirmative,  and  Rabin  then  turned  to  the  IAI 
chairman  and  asked  him  for  his  opinion.  (In  accordance  with  the  Government 
Companies Law, the IAI chairman held an independent position with respect to the 
company’s affairs, which the ministers could not override).
Zur  accepted  that  the  draft  memorandum  ‘was  indeed  an  impressive 
achievement’. However, he noted, that ‘the company’s structure remained unchanged, 
and  it  will  therefore  be  left  with  the  same  basic  problems  as  before.’172  Rabin 
responded:
If there  is  a  compromise,  then  it  is  a  compromise!  What  do  you  want me to  do?  To 
decide here and now to appoint a receiver for IAI? A move never before taken and which 
was likely to be rejected by Cabinet? Let’s wait a while and see what will happen.173
Faced with this position, Zur decided to endorse the draft memorandum as well, to the 
great relief of Rabin’s advisers. (In an interview with the author, Zur said that he later
1 7 1  Flato interview.
172 Zur interview.
173 Ibid.
280enquired and found that the  Cabinet had  indeed been unlikely  to  approve  the  IAI
receivership plan.174)
The  memorandum  was  signed  on  the  same  day  by  the  management  and
employees representatives and later approved by the IAI board,  even though senior
MoF officials severely criticised its terms -  in particular, the clause on the company’s
future privatisation, which, they argued, had given the employees undue influence.175
The MoF Director General  argued that the agreement did nothing to  ensure better
managerial performance by IAI and noted that it contained ‘some absurd clauses’. The
decision to enforce it on the Elta employees, for example, ‘compelled them to accept a
20% pay cut, even though this particular subsidiary of IAI was very successful.  We
approached  Elta’s  management  and  employees  directly  and  suggested  exempting
them from the agreement; not only that, we also offered them stock options if Elta
were to be privatised. They rejected both offers’.176
On 8  December  1993  the  IAI management  signed the  revised version of the
memorandum, which by now became to be known as the Rotem 2 Agreement.  Even
though  the  IAI  Employees’  Organisation  forfeited  some  of  its  most  cherished
privileges, it nevertheless stood by the agreement. In an interview, Katz said,
We  reluctantly  accepted  the  Rotem  2  agreement  because  we  were  forced  to  choose 
between the  bad and the  worse  ...  some people  here  did  not realise  that,  had  we  not 
signed  it,  the  Employees’  Organisation  would have  ceased to exist.  And  our  strength
177 stemmed from our existence.
IAI and the MoF then entered into a detailed negotiation in which the MoF’s
Budget Department agreed to pay the redundancy costs of two-thirds of the departing
174 Ibid.
175 Flato interview; Brodet interview; Gilad interview, 2001.
176 Fogel interview.
177 Katz interview.
281employees, while the management undertook the costs of the remaining third, if its 
financial condition permitted it to do so.178 At the same time the Histadrut was asked 
to formally endorse the memorandum, but, it raised last-minute objections, forcing a 
further round of negotiations  on the  final terms  that lasted two more months.  The 
trade union federation, which had deliberately been kept out of the negotiations phase 
by Rabin and Katz,  refused to ratify the Rotem  2  agreement until certain financial 
conditions were met by the MoF. According to the Chairman of the Histadrut, Amir 
Peretz, Rabin was entitled to conduct the negotiations with the IAI employees as he 
saw fit, but it was then the duty of the Histadrut ‘to examine the agreement and ensure 
that it did not undermine  existing agreements  with other unions’.179 Only after the 
MoF  agreed  to  provide  additional  guarantees  concerning  IAI  employees’  pension 
payments,  did  the  Histadrut  chiefs  formally  endorse  the  Rotem  2  agreement.180 
(During this period Finance Minister Shochat threatened once again to recommend 
putting IAI in receivership, but this was an empty gesture in view of the significant 
opposition to it in Cabinet.181)
After the  Histadrut’s  endorsement,  on 23  January  1994  Cabinet approved a 
comprehensive financial package for IAI.  It included $338 million in direct funding 
and a supplementary budget of $70 million for the development of civil products. IAI, 
in turn, agreed to contribute $28 million from its own resources towards the funding
1  89 of the Rotem 2 agreement.  At the behest of the MoF’s Budget Department, Rabin 
and Shochat appointed a Steering Committee for IAI, headed by the MoF’s Director
178 Interview with David Brodet in Hadashot, 9 November 1993; Peretz interview, 2006.
179 Author’s interview with Amir Peretz MK (Chairman of the Trade Union Division at the Histadrut, 
1994-1995, and Chairman of the Histadrut, 1995-2005), 29 November 1999.
180 Davar, 20 January 1994.
181 Telegraph (Israel), 1 December 1993
182 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 892.
282General. A letter signed by the two ministers assigned the Committee’s members -  
who included the MoD Director General, the Director of the GCA and the Economic 
Adviser to the Prime Minister -  to
monitor the  progress  of the  implementation of the recovery programme;  examine  and 
approve  a  comprehensive  recovery  plan  for  IAI  which  will  include  organisational 
changes and privatisation of business units.183
According to MoF officials, the Steering Committee in effect outgunned the 
IAI Board, and became -  for the duration of the Rotem 2 agreement -  the de facto IAI 
Board.  In  other words,  without  an  accompanying  legislative  framework,  ministers 
suspended some of the powers vested in the IAI Board by the Government Companies 
Law.184 The need for close supervision stemmed from IAI’s significant debt -  $766
1  R S million in January 1994  -  and the significant public investment in its recovery.
The MoF’s Budget Department, meanwhile, discovered that Finance Minister 
Shochat did not qualify the controversial Clause 80 before he approved the Rotem 2 
agreement.  The  clause,  which  empowered  the  IAI  unions  with  respect  to  future 
privatisation plans of the company,  was viewed as a major obstacle on the way of 
future structural changes at IAI. This oversight by the MoF was apparently due to a 
communication failure between the Labour Accord Unit (responsible for drafting the 
Rotem 2 agreement) and the Budget Department (which oversaw its implementation) 
-   the  two  kept  a  sort  of  ‘Chinese  wall’  between  them,  and  were  careful  not  to 
intervene  in  each  other’s  internal  affairs186  -   and  to  Shochat’s  own  inattention.187
183 Letter from Prime Minister Rabin and Finance Minister Shochat to the MoF and the MoD Director 
Generals  and  other  officials,  titled:  ‘Steering  Committee  for  the  IAI  recovery  -   letter  of 
appointment’, 31 January 1994.
184 Author’s interview with Uzi Levy, 25 June 1998 (hereafter: Levy interview, 1998b).
185 Letter from the IAI Directorate of Finance to eight Israeli banks, titled:  ‘The Obligation Report of 
IAI for February 1994’, 15 March 1994.
186 Flato interview.
283Clause 80 underpinned the position of the IAI Employees Organisation for years to 
come, and neither IAI nor any of its subsidiaries,  including Elta, was  subsequently 
privatised.  (In  1994,  the  IAI  management  approached  the  Government Companies 
Authority with a proposal to privatise the company. The offer was rejected by the then 
GCA Director on economic grounds; no further attempts were pursued after that.  ) 
IAI,  meanwhile,  began  implementing  the Rotem  2  agreement.  After  initial 
internal unrest, as the redundancy phase was carried out,189 the company’s finances 
gradually improved (see Figure 5.4), and there was no further Cabinet intervention in 
its financial affairs throughout the remaining years of the Rabin/Peres government.
Figure 5.4
IAI:  Business indicators
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Note: The Rotem 2 agreement, which led to a gradual decrease in IAI’s costly workforce, improved the 
company’s output and reduced its losses.
187 Shochat interview.
188 Peretz interviews,  1998b and 2006.
189 Penso interview; Haaretz, 27 December 1993
284Conclusions
Policy implementation in the IAI crisis illustrated how a labour dispute involving a 
large special interest with a geographically concentrated membership could threaten 
the political survival of a prime minister. Indeed, the handling of this crisis -  against 
the backdrop of fragile coalition on the verge of collapse, and a highly charged public 
atmosphere after the signing of controversial peace accords -  played into the hands of 
an astute special interest, the IAI Employees’ Organisation, which took advantage of 
the  potential  that  the  constituency  primaries  presented,  and  thereby  managed  to 
manipulate both the government bureaucracy and the elected governing party.
As in the case of IMI, there was no pre-emptive intervention by Cabinet or the 
Ministry of Finance  in LAI’s  affairs  until  the  end of  1992,  when the  company was 
already deep  in financial trouble.  Its  cash-flow  crisis was  inevitable,  given its  fixed 
labour  costs  and  inflexible  collective  agreement,  which  had  remained  unchanged 
despite a marked decline in its key export markets after the end of the Cold War. The 
impact of this drop on IAI finances was not felt immediately, as the company still had 
sufficient orders from existing customers, but when it did happen IAI was unable to 
respond. Indeed, the high turnover and lucrative export deals had a numbing effect on 
the company: they enabled it to meet its contractual commitments, and, as long as the 
revenues  kept  coming,  the  company did  not  feel  compelled to  address  its  internal 
deficiencies.
Initially,  the  financial  crisis  at  IAI  did  not  require  the  active  and  personal 
intervention of the Prime Minister. Labour disputes were governed by the company’s 
collective agreement,  which, although restrictive and stifling from the management’s 
point of view (especially with respect to layoffs and labour costs), was still negotiable. 
This  was  evident  when  both  the  management  and  employees  discussed  the  first
285recovery plan for IAI, signed in late 1992. At that point, the parties concerned assumed 
that IAI was experiencing a temporary setback from which it would recover with the 
help of limited government funding.
The  ministers  in  charge  -   then  embroiled  in  an  uphill  struggle  with  IMI 
employees over their company’s reorganisation plan -  and the Ministries of Defence 
and Finance presumed the same, but were soon proved wrong.  IAI’s export markets 
remained  depressed,  and  the  company  accumulated  a  significant  cash-flow  deficit. 
Unable  to meet its  financial  commitments  to  employees  and  suppliers,  it was  soon 
heading for insolvency.
Only at that point, at the beginning of 1993, did IAI’s management realise the 
severity of its problems and the shortcomings of the first recovery plan.  Confronted 
with  mounting  debt  and  dwindling  resources,  the  management  sought  ministerial 
backing  for  drastic,  unilateral  measures  against  the  powerful  IAI  Employees’ 
Organisation, and generous state aid to address its financial shortfall.
The  role  played  by  the  two  principal  ministries,  the  MoD  and  MoF,  in 
mitigating IAI’s difficulties repeated a pattern already observed at IMI.  Faced with 
growing  pressures  on  its  budget,  and  with  the  IDF  applying  the  ‘consumer 
sovereignty’  directive,  the MoD  ceased to be  IAI’s principal customer in the mid- 
1980s; a further shift away from the company happened after the introduction of the 
Mandatory Tenders  Law  in  1992.  Recognising  its  diminishing  contribution  to  the 
company’s order backlog and the IAI management’s restricted leeway in respect of 
labour  costs,  the  MoD  -   and  Defence  Minister  Rabin  in  particular  -   played  an 
important role in facilitating IAI’s  export endeavours.  But when the export market 
crashed and the  company appealed  for government help,  the  MoD  quickly shifted
286responsibility  onto  the  MoF,  citing  its  own  budgetary  constraints  and holding  the 
Treasury partially responsible for IAI’s plight.
The MoF, for its part, was pursuing a different set of objectives and interests. 
Unwilling to accommodate IAI’s appeal, the MoF’s Budget Department presented the 
company with a series of stringent preconditions. The Department saw this situation as 
a  golden  opportunity  to  advance  a  strategic  objective  of its  own:  ending  the  cosy 
reliance of public enterprises on state bail-out. Facing similar appeals from other debt- 
ridden organisations, such as the General Sickness Fund (Kupat Holim Klalit) and the 
Kibbutzim movement,  the  MoF  championed  a  tough  stance  against  IAI,  up  to  and 
including the appointment of a receiver for the company; this, it assumed, would serve 
as a deterrent to the other organisations.
The political echelon -  both the Defence Minister and Finance Minister -  was 
willing to back the position of the MoF until the  IAI  crisis  cut across  separate and 
unrelated  developments  in  the  political  arena,  namely  the  public  battle  over  the 
legitimacy of the Oslo Accords. At that point, the firm stance advocated by the MoF 
bureaucrats was judged too risky by the ministers in charge. For them, the issue of IAI 
moved past the point of being a mere economic issue and became a political problem 
that needed solving. Fearing a political backlash and serious social consequences could 
result  from  liquidating  Israel’s  biggest  industrial  enterprise,  Prime  Minister  Rabin 
changed tack, forcing Finance Minister Shochat to follow suit; they both sought a way 
to avoid putting IAI into receivership, accepting that the risks of doing so outweighed 
the benefits. For Rabin, above and beyond the maxims he had advocated all along (that 
the  state  should not run businesses,  and government-owned companies  should yield 
profits and dividends like those in the private sector), there lay at this moment a more 
important strategic objective:  facilitating the reconciliation process between Israel andits neighbours -  which, in turn would reduce the nation’s defence spending and ensure 
the availability of greater investments for other policy sectors in need. In this context, 
the prolonged struggle with the IAI employees became an obstacle in the way of his 
grand  plan,  because  it  risked  consuming  the  Cabinet’s  attention  and  energy  and 
undermining its political standing.
The case suggests that the executive branch had significant powers with respect 
to  state-owned  entities,  but  using  those  powers  involved  political  cost  calculations. 
Indeed, placing IAI in the hands of the courts, through a receivership action, did not 
look appealing  from a narrow political perspective.  The independent judiciary had a 
separate  agenda  and  considerations  on  which  the  executive  had no  influence.  Such 
move would have amounted to an admission of failure by the Labour government -  
something the opposition would no doubt have capitalised on -  and would also have 
removed  it  from  a  position  of  control  over  the  company’s  affairs  (with  all  the 
concomitant side benefits,  such as political appointments to the board of IAI and its 
subsidiaries).  Faced  with  the  visible  inability  of  IAI’s  management  to  rein  in  its 
employees -  culminating in the embarrassing closure of Ben-Gurion Airport -  Prime 
Minister Rabin concluded that, unless he intervened personally to diffuse the situation, 
matters would get out of hand just when he needed to devote most of his time and 
attention to what he saw as a more important policy objective.
He therefore decided to bring this matter to a close via a brinkmanship strategy, 
which  enabled  him  to  extract  significant  concessions  from  the  IAI  employees  and 
spared him involvement  in the  micromanagement  of a politically damaging  labour 
dispute. The government bureaucracy and the IAI board received ministerial backing 
for the plan to put the company into receivership so long as this did not interfere with 
other Labour government policy objectives. But once several policy issues started to
288cut across one another, Prime Minister Rabin prioritised: by deferring the completion 
of IAI’s reorganisation to a later stage, he and his Cabinet could focus on what they 
perceived as the more important task of peace negotiations.
Rabin therefore  agreed  to  a  compromise  that  came  at  a  very  high price  - 
almost $500 million in total -  but did at least remove this issue from his congested 
agenda. It also put IAI on the path to financial recovery by imposing financial losses 
on  its  employees  and  streamlining  its  operations.  To  ensure  this,  he  appointed  a 
Steering Committee for the company.  But,  far from being a tactical move aimed at 
ensuring  the  implementation  of  the  recovery  plan,  this  in  fact  made  the  state’s 
involvement in the company’s affairs more entrenched,  in complete contradiction to 
the objectives of the Government Companies Law and indeed of Rabin’s himself.
The case outcome also suggests that once special interests have the chance to 
access institutional actors (like the courts) or claim a stake within one (the legislature), 
they stand a better chance of thwarting a policy that runs contrary to their interests. 
The  employees  appealed  in  the  courts  against  the  attempt  to  sell  one  of  IAI’s 
subsidiaries, and the move effectively shelved that process.  The strategic choice by 
IAI  employees  to  insert  their  own  representative  into  the  Knesset  worked  well  in 
capturing the attention of legislature and influencing the executive,  especially when 
the Rabin government no longer had a majority coalition in the Knesset. IAI’s Knesset 
representative therefore held a position of strength and to all intents and purposes acted 
as a faction of one on matters pertaining IAI.
This,  combined  with  their  organisational  competence  and  influence  over 
Cabinet ministers, meant that IAI employees were viewed as a formidable force that 
could  not  be  ignored  -   something  that  was  also  evidenced  by  the  time  the  Prime 
Minister  spent  with  their  representative  in private.  The  crisis  ended  when  the  two
289reached common ground on which they based a compromise; at that point neither the 
government bureaucracy nor the IAI management, nor the Histadrut were in any way 
involved.  Even  though  the  IAI  employees  were  forced  to  sacrifice  some  of their 
privileges,  this  was  for  a  few  years  only.  Their  organisational  structure  and 
involvement  in  the  management  of  IAI’s  affairs  remained  intact  and  was  even 
strengthened  (with  respect  to  future  restructuring  and privatisation  of IAI,  through 
Clause 80). Not only did the IAI Employees’ Organisation survive the crisis virtually 
unscathed, it also retained as much political clout as before.
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Policy Implementation in the Rafael Crisis
Rafael was established in 1958 as an organisation operating within the Israeli Ministry 
of Defence  (MoD),  responsible  for  developing  advanced  weapon  systems.  At  the 
beginning of the  1990s its growing losses and hidden unemployment precipitated a 
financial crisis that turned into one of the most contentious issues Yitzhak Rabin’s 
government had to  deal with.  In  1994  the government decided to  address Rafael’s 
problems by ordering a substantial reduction of the workforce and changing Rafael’s 
structure and legal status. The main plank of this transformation, deemed crucial to its 
recovery, was to turn Rafael into a state-owned company. However, the government 
plan was  fiercely resisted  by  Rafael’s  workers  and by  segments  within the  senior 
bureaucracy, and therefore was not implemented during Rabin’s period in office or 
that of his successor, Shimon Peres.
This  chapter  discusses  policy  formation  and  implementation  in  the  Rafael 
case. Starting with the background to Rafael’s financial and labour problems, it then 
presents the debates within the bureaucracy and the attempts by the management and 
Prime  Minister  Rabin  to  weather  the  political  and  legal  challenges  the  workers’ 
unions  posed.  It  ends  with  observations  on  the  considerations  influencing  policy­
makers and the impact of institutional features on government policy capabilities.
Government Conflict Management
Deteriorating labour relations within Rafael, coupled with its growing losses and lack 
of coherent managerial guidance, forced Rabin’s government to pay close attention to 
the organisation’s problems. Rafael’s Director General, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Moshe Peled,
291had resigned in June  1992 due to ill health.1   His successor, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yitzhak 
Gat,  was not appointed until December  1992  and then requested,  and was granted, 
‘time  out’  to  study Rafael4s problems.  (‘I  wanted  to  start afresh,  without any bias 
towards a particular solution,’ he explained.  ‘Rabin gave me a free hand to come up 
with whatever I thought was appropriate’.2)
In  the  meantime,  the  MoD  appointed  an  inter-ministerial  committee  to 
examine Rafael’s situation, headed by the Ministry’s economic adviser. In July 1992 
it recommended that Rafael should be incorporated as a business entity, whose joint 
owners  would  be  the  state,  the  employees  and  an  Israeli  group  from  the  private 
sector.3 However, when the committee’s chairman, Imri Tov, told Rabin that he did 
not have  ‘any idea how to  take this  recommendation forward’,  the  Prime  Minister 
decided to put this issue on hold.4 He and Finance Minister Avraham Shochat agreed 
that Rafael’s status would remain unchanged over the next two years -  during which 
its restructuring plan would be prepared -  and meanwhile the status quo would be 
maintained.5  Another consideration was the looming crisis at IMI and IAI, which the 
Prime  Minister  decided  to  handle  first.6  Rabin’s  apparent  rejection  of the  MoD 
recommendation was greeted with scepticism by Rafael’s unions, which demanded to 
be  part  of  any  future  discussion  on  the  firm’s  structure.  They  argued  that  any 
unilateral move by the MoD was bound to fail.7
1  Interview with Moshe Peled in Maariv, 17 July 1992; Jerusalem Post, 18 April 2000.
2 Gat interview.
3  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 856-857; Haaretz, 6 August 1992.
4 Tov interview, 2001.
5  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, pp. 856-857.
6 Rabin’s quote of 18 January 1993, in Globes, 10 November 1995.
7 Haaretz, 14 September 1992 and 24 September 1992.
292Inter-ministerial Tension
Around  the  time  of  Gat’s  appointment  -   and  while  he  was  assessing  Rafael’s 
condition -  the MoD and the Finance Ministry were involved in a heated debate about 
Rafael and public-sector collective agreements. Rafael workers were grouped in two 
categories  -   collective  agreement  workers  (about  30%),  whose  labour terms  were 
agreed between the Histadrut and the MoD,  and state employees (including a large 
group of research staff), who were part of the civil service. The salaries of both were 
linked to public-sector pay rises, but research staff benefited from additional perks, 
such  as  fully  paid  sabbaticals  and  study  funds.  The  differences  in  academic 
background  and  professional  affiliation within Rafael  meant  that  its  workers  were 
represented by five separate committees, each corresponding to a different rank and 
remuneration scale8  and led to prolonged in-fighting and inter-group rivalry.9
Amid  signs  of  further  deterioration  in  Rafael’s  finances,  MoD  Director 
General David Ivry recommended that the  Cabinet endorse  a bill unlinking Rafael 
workers’ salaries from frequent public-sector pay rises. His reasoning was that these 
rises were agreed by the Finance Ministry for reasons that had no relevance to the 
MoD,  but they nonetheless affected the MoD’s ability to manage appropriately the 
budget  allocated  to  it.  They  had  a  devastating  effect  on  Rafael’s  financial 
performance,  and  hence  on  the  defence  budget,  which  had  to  underwrite  the
8   Bonen,  Rafael,  p.  43.  The  committees  represented:  Research  Workers,  Technicians  and  Practical 
Engineers,  Engineers and Social  Sciences Workers,  Uniformed Pay Scale Workers,  and Technical 
Workers/Agreement (the first four representing state employees, the fifth affiliated to the Histadrut).
9  Flato  interview;  Galnoor,  No,  Mr  Commissioner,  p.  168.  Prof.  Galnoor  was  the  Civil  Service 
Commissioner (1994-1996).
293organisation’s  losses.  Dissociating  Rafael  from  the  public  sector  would  give  its 
management better control over spending.10
The  Finance  Ministry’s  legal  advisers  objected.  The  proposed  legislation 
would contravene two of Israel’s Basic Laws -  one on human dignity and freedom, 
and the other on freedom of employment -  and, if challenged by Rafael’s workers in 
the High Court of Justice, could not be defended. They pointed out that the state could 
not break a  signed agreement or change  its  terms  unilaterally,  because this would 
undermine the fabric of labour relations in Israel. (According to a senior MoF official, 
‘implementing  this  proposal  would  have  been  like  using  a  nuclear bomb  to  settle 
labour disputes. It was unheard of.’11) A signed labour agreement could be changed 
only with the approval of the workers concerned, not through legislation;  otherwise 
the  Cabinet  could  lose  its  ethical  and  moral  standing  and  forfeit  trust.  Finance 
Ministry  officials  -   the  Director-General,  the  Director  of  the  Wage  and  Labour 
Accord Unit and the legal adviser -  concluded that such a bill would never be passed 
in the Knesset.12 Finance Minister Shochat accepted his officials’  view and rejected 
Ivry’s proposal.
The  MoD  was  disappointed,  because  it  felt  that  this  would  unnecessarily 
increase the cost of any restructuring plan for Rafael that its new Director General 
might  formulate  in  the  meantime.  Consequently,  the  MoD  decided  to  shift  sole 
responsibility for Rafael’s restructuring costs to the Finance Ministry and refused to 
allocate the majority of funding for this purpose from its own budget,  even though 
Rafael was part of the MoD.13 Gat, therefore, had to work out his plan with the MoF.
10 Ivry interview, 1997.
1 1  Brodet interview.
12 Brodet, Flato and Granit (1998) interviews.
1 3  Ivry interview, 1998; Brodet interview.
294Rafael’s Restructuring Plan
In  July  1993,  Director  General  Gat  presented  Rabin  with  a  plan  that  called  for 
Rafael’s  immediate  incorporation.  Prompt  action  was  needed,  he  argued,  because 
Rafael’s  financial  crisis  was  deepening  (see  Figure  6.1),  and  1994  losses  were 
projected to increase by 20% to 256 million shekels.14 Gat had concluded that only a 
radical  shake-up,  including a new business  and remuneration structure,  would save 
Rafael from complete disintegration.1 5
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This dire warning was based on the findings of a comprehensive background 
analysis presented to Rabin along with the recommendation for a restructuring plan. 
The analysis pointed to a combination of internal and external factors, some of them 
completely beyond Rafael’s control, that had led to its financial difficulties. First, the
14 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 845.
1 5  Ibid., p. 860; Tov interview, 1997; Gat interview; author’s interview with Yigal Sarbero (Rafael Vice 
President for Strategic Planning,  1997-present), 18 January 1998 (hereafter: Sarbero interview).
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295domestic  arms  market  had  undergone  fundamental  changes  that  put Rafael  under 
increasing strain. The Ministry of Defence reduced its orders from Rafael by almost a 
third between 1991 and 1993 (see Figure 6.2), returning to the same spending level as 
in the mid-1980s (which in itself reflected a 26% drop in MoD orders compared to 
earlier years,  following  the  1985  Economic  Stabilisation emergency programme16). 
The Ministry then reprioritised its appropriations, shifting more funding to two other 
weapon  programmes  not handled  by  Rafael.  In  addition,  other companies  entered 
Rafael’s fields of expertise, and its products were relatively more expensive.1 7
At the same time, the global arms market had also taken an unfavourable turn. 
In  1993  Rafael  noted  a  19.3%  decline  in  its  foreign  sales  compared  to  1992,  a 
downturn  that  the  management  predicted  would  continue  until  1997.1 8   Rafael 
management observed ‘a noticeable drop’ in global defence budgets, including those 
in the third world,  as clients became more selective and demanding, putting greater 
emphasis  on  broader  economic  considerations.  The  result  was  that  foreign  clients 
started preconditioning deals with a technology transfer element in order to facilitate 
indigenous  production,  a  development  which  ultimately  reduced  even  further  the 
demand for arms imports. Finally, the competition in the arms market became fiercer, 
as mergers and acquisitions  created a  small number of big firms  and multinational 
alliances;  in  addition,  competing  foreign  industries  benefited  from  protectionist 
policies and subsidies offered by their respective governments.19
16 Bonen, Rafael, p. 189.
17  Rafael  management,  Rafael’s  Crisis  Analysis  (internal  presentation),  July  1993,  p.  13;  State 
Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 849.
1 8  State Comptroller Report Annual Report no. 45, p. 851.
19 Rafael’ s Crisis Analysis, p. 12.
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Note:  In  the  early  1990s  Rafael’s  sales  to  the  MoD  dropped  to  their  mid-1980s  level,  a  decline 
cushioned by export deals. However, starting in  1993,  Rafael noted a fall in its foreign sales as well.
Effects of Unplanned Growth
Rafael  also  found  itself  in  an  increasingly  untenable  position  because  its  original 
mission and structure did not match its actual development.  It had been formed as a 
small  research and  design unit,  working  for the  MoD  on a  handful  of projects and 
employing  few  hundred  workers,  most  of  them  scientists.  Within  two  decades, 
however,  it  had  turned  into  a  full-scale  manufacturer,  engaged  in  state-of-the-art 
weapons programmes and export activities and employing several thousands -  and yet
it  was  still operating  as a  government  department  within  the  public  sector.  The
adverse managerial implications of this status had been known since the early 1970s. 
Even  so,  in  1978,  when  the  then  Director  General,  Zeev  Bonen,  proposed  turning 
Rafael  into  a  state-owned  company,  which  would  have  given  it  greater  financial 
flexibility, the MoD endorsed the idea but then retracted its support; later attempts, in
2 9 71984 and  1987, were rejected as well.20 The managerial  limits in Rafael were well 
known also to Defence Minister Rabin, who had commented in 1988 (while serving in 
Yitzhak Shamir’s government) that ‘the state of Rafael ... which combines a research 
institute and a production factory under one roof... cannot be dragged on for long’2 1 
Indeed  Gat,  in  a  July  1993  assessment,  asserted  that  ‘Rafael  was  in  an 
impossible situation’. While the MoD expected Rafael to stick to its budgetary limits 
and  employ business  considerations  (which  was  also  necessary  on  account  of the 
competitive environment in which it was operating), it was still governed by inflexible 
labour agreements. Benefits and bonuses granted to the public sector were also given 
to Rafael’s workers,  irrespective of the organisation’s actual revenues and financial 
condition.  This ran counter to customary business practices and hampered Rafael’s 
commercial  efforts  in  the  domestic  and  international  markets.  Gat  concluded  that 
Rafael  ‘could  no  longer  continue  operating  under  these  contradictory  operational 
perceptions’.22  In  a  later interview  with  the  author he  added  that  ‘Rafael  was  still 
treated as a research unit within the MoD, while 90% of its activities actually evolved 
around  arms  sales;  this  was  an  anomaly  and  was  patently  wrong.  It  should  have 
become either a scientific centre or a company’.23
20  Bonen  interview;  Gat  interview.  See  also  Bonen,  Rafael,  pp.  43,  46.  In  February  1978  the  then 
Defence  Minister,  Ezer  Weitzman,  approved  outgoing  MoD  Director  General  Prof.  Pinhas 
Zussman’s recommendation to transform Rafael into a company; however, the new MoD Director 
General, Yosef Maayan, appointed in August  1978, shelved the idea. Maayan favoured a centralised 
style of management and preferred to retain full MoD control over Rafael.
2 1  State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 857
22 Rafael’s Crisis Analysis, p.  15.
23 Gat interview.
298In the management’s view,  the labour agreements at Rafael perpetuated the 
organisation’s public-sector characteristics and considerably restricted its powers.24 It 
could not adjust its payroll and workforce to  its financial condition.  Moreover,  the 
management  could  not  dismiss  workers  without  the  permission  of  the  relevant 
employee  unions  or  the  approval  of the  Service  Committee  of the  Civil  Service 
Commission (which was authorised to override the unions’ objection). The workers, 
on the other hand, were allowed to challenge any decision regarding their status or 
terms  of employment -   including  decisions  by  the  Commission -   through  Labour 
Courts;  also,  they  could  legally  protest  by  means  of  temporary  work  sanctions, 
picketing and strikes, provided the Histadrut backed these actions.
This  state  of  affairs  affected  both  Rafael’s  competitiveness  and  its 
profitability. The cost of Rafael’s average salary and social benefits package exceeded 
that of similar companies in the private sector, and between 1987 and 1992 Rafael’s 
average hourly cost had been 14% higher than that in similar firms.25 Its overall costs 
were estimated to be 30% higher than its competitors’, in part owing to the 40% pay 
rise granted in 1992-1993 to academic staff in the higher education system, to which 
Rafael research staff pay was linked.26
Such  organisational  rigidity  led  to  hidden  unemployment  and  low 
productivity, even when judged by the MoD’s lenient standards. Between  1989 and 
1991  there were between 300 and 400 excess workers,  in  1992 at least 230, and in 
1993  Rafael  estimated  that there  were  around  380  surplus  workers  on  its  payroll. 
Maintaining  these  workers  cost  on  average  113  million  shekels  in  each  of these
24 Sarbero and Gat interviews.
25 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 850.
26 Ibid.; Sarbero interview.
299years.27  The  combined  effect  of  the  pay  rise  to  research  staff  and  the  hidden 
unemployment, the management claimed, was that the total cost of salaries stayed at 
the  same  level between  1989  and  1993,  although  the  number of employees  fell  by 
20%.28 In other words, the salaries of the remaining workforce grew by 23%, in real 
terms, over a period of four years (see Figure 6.3).29
Figure 6.3
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Note:  Rafael’s workforce was reduced  by  1,000 employees (about  20%)  between  1989  and  1993,  yet 
its salary cost stayed the same throughout this period.  Figures are in constant  1993 prices.
Gat’s explanation of why this organisational structure prevailed for so  long -  
despite  the  changes  in  Rafael’s  activities  -   was  inertia:  ‘The  workers  have  always 
perceived  Rafael  as  the “national  laboratory or national weapons  systems house”,  a 
perception underpinned by Rafael’s historic assignment and background.’ This deeply 
embedded  philosophy  ‘prevented  the  development  of the  business  orientation  and
27 State Com ptroller Annual Report no.  45, p.  850.
28 Ibid., p.  853.
29 Ministry of Finance -  Budget Department, Reorganisation o f the State-owned Defence Industry.
3 00internalisation of business practices which were more appropriate and compatible to 
the competitive business environment in which Rafael had been operating in recent 
years.’  In addition,  Rafael’s  labour structure and agreements,  ‘befitted  government 
offices and universities, not business organisations’.30
According to Gat, the only feasible way to recover was to transform Rafael 
into  a business entity whose  shares would be  owned by the  state.  The  secret non­
commercial  production  lines  (also  known  as  ‘the  national  laboratory’)  would  be 
managed  by  the  new  company  but  funded  by  the  state  through  the  MoD.  This 
configuration, Gat said, was based in part on the recommendations of an internal MoD 
committee, which examined Rafael’s structure in 1989.31
The proposed plan was designed to  provide Rafael with a flexible  structure 
and a salary mechanism that promised reduced labour costs.  The workers would be 
transferred to  the new entity;  their salaries  would be  performance-related and  free 
from any link to collective agreements in the public sector. (This proposal was based 
on lessons learned from the crises in IMI and IAI, which had been exacerbated by 
expensive  and  rigid  collective  labour  agreements  inherited  from  their  pre- 
incorporation days.  ) The state was to allocate funding sufficient to cover the costs of 
the transition and those of early retirement and compensation for redundant workers, 
estimated at 1  billion shekels (the plan concluded that a further 1,000-1,500 workers 
needed  to  be  made  redundant  in  the  immediate  future).33  The  main  challenge 
remained convincing the employees to accept Gat’s proposal, but the chances of that
30 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 857.
31 Gat interview.
32 Sarbero interview.
33 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 859.
301were  slim:  for  the  employees,  staying  within  the  MoD  meant  job  security  and 
permanent salaries, which could not have been guaranteed outside the public sector.34
Government Reaction
Rabin  agreed  to  the  plan  in  principle,  but  decided  in  July  1993  to  postpone  its 
implementation: ‘I accept the general approach as presented. But, as there are already 
impending decisions concerning the [other] state-owned defence firms, and in order to 
avoid  immediate  confrontations,  we  need  to  ponder  carefully  the  right  timing  of 
implementing this plan in its entirety,’ he said.35 Rabin then instructed the MoD and 
Rafael to present him with the financial implications of starting the plan either by the 
beginning of 1994 or later that year.
This  deferment  -   which  increased  Rafael’s  losses  by  at  least  108  million 
shekels, according to its management36 -  was consistent with Rabin’s initial decision 
to deal with Rafael after concluding the crises in IMI and IAI (in  1992  and  1993, 
respectively).  According  to  Gat,  Rabin  told  him  that  he  preferred  to  address  the 
problems of these two companies first and ‘to leave the issue of Rafael to last’.37
Other  factors  were  also  at  work,  such  as  the  regional  effects  of  mass 
redundancies in Rafael’s plants, which were located in northern Israel and employed 
hundreds of sub-contract employees in adjacent companies (see Figure 6.5).38 In an 
earlier Knesset discussion,  Deputy Defence Minister Mordechay Gur had remarked 
that ‘the Prime Minister delved into the minute details of every project in each of the
34 Sarbero interview.
35 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 860.
36 Ibid.
37 Gat interview.
38 Bonen, Rafael, p. 153.
302[state-owned]  defence  industries  to  ascertain  exactly  which  of these  projects  was 
essential  to  the  national  security  and  what  would  be  the  economic  and  social 
implications [in case of their termination], as a significant part of these enterprises is 
located in developing areas where unemployment rate is much higher than average’.39 
Indeed, according to official statistics, the unemployment rate in the Haifa district was 
consistently higher, by as much as 38%, than the average national unemployment rate 
(see  Figure  6.4).  It  peaked  in  1992  at  15.5%,  compared  to  the  national  average  of 
11.2%; in 1993 the figures were 12% and 10%, respectively.40
Figure 6.4
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39  Records  o f the  Knesset,  Motions  for the  Knesset’s  Agenda,  session  17,  vol.  1,  28  October  1992,  p. 
93.
40 Bank of Israel, Annual Report fo r 1994 (Jerusalem:  Bank of Israel,  1995), p.  189.
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303Figure 6.5: Location of Rafael’s plants
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3 0 4Rabin  was  reluctant  to  initiate  mass  redundancies  for  another  reason. 
According to his head of bureau, Eitan Haber, ‘whenever possible, Rabin preferred to 
postpone tough decisions as much as he could, especially those which might have led 
to mass redundancies. He considered the families of those affected.’4 1
The Defence and Finance Ministries’ bureaucracies welcomed Rabin’s support 
for Rafael’s restructuring, but closer examination revealed internal frictions over the 
proposed plan, especially within the MoD. The MoD R&D Directorate was concerned 
that, in its new form as a profit-driven business entity,  Rafael might be tempted to 
abolish or cut sensitive research activities for the sake of a better balance sheet.42 On 
the other hand, the MoD’s economic adviser Imri Tov -  who had headed the inter- 
ministerial committee on Rafael, whose 1992 recommendation of incorporation Rabin 
had  shelved  -   said  that  Gat’s  proposal  was  ultimately  the  preferred  solution, 
notwithstanding  the  organisational  shock  such move  might  have  entailed,  because 
‘Rafael’s burden on the MoD’s budget became simply intolerable’. For him, leaving 
Rafael within the MoD meant that it would siphon off essential resources from the 
defence budget whenever a financial crisis loomed.43
Finance  Ministry  officials  who  belonged  to  the  Budget  Department  had 
different  concerns.  Feeling  that  over-zealous  government  commitment  to  Rafael’s 
transition  programme  would  set  an  expensive  precedent  for  incorporation  or 
privatisation  of other  state-funded  organisations,  they  secretly  agreed  to  delay  the 
plan’s implementation as long as possible, in the hope that a future breakthrough with
41 Haber interview.
42 Author’s interview with Maj.-General Itzik Ben-Israel (Head of R&D Directorate, MoD 1997-2002), 
15 March 1998 (hereafter: Ben-Israel interview).
43 Tov interview, 1997.
305Rafael’s workers would reduce the transition’s final costs.44 They also believed that, 
in the interim, Rafael’s increasing losses would force the MoD (which, until the plan’s 
completion, was legally required to fund Rafael in full) to cut unnecessary operations 
and expenses and manage its budget more efficiently 45 Their chosen delaying tactic 
was  to  raise reservations  and objections  to  different clauses  during the  anticipated 
negotiations with the MoD and Rafael’s employees 46 For as long as the process was 
delayed,  the  Ministry  would  not  have  to  make  provisions  or  appropriations  for 
Rafael’s transition, thus keeping the state budget and public expenditure within the 
target range 47
The Unions’ Challenge: Lobbying and Legal Action
Rafael’s  unions  objected  to  any  attempt  to  make  organisational  changes,  and  in 
October 1993 they were alarmed to learn that the Ministries of Defence and Finance 
had appointed a  steering  committee  to  oversee  teams  examining  and  outlining  the 
requirements  for  Rafael’s  incorporation.48  In  response,  they  orchestrated  a 
concentrated campaign that targeted members of the Knesset (especially members of 
the inner political cabinet of the Labour party, the  ‘Our Ministers’  forum), past and 
present  Defence  Ministers,  MoD  and  state  comptroller  officials  and journalists.49
44 Tov interview, 1997; Flato interview; Horev interview.
45 Sarbero interview; Ivry interviews, 1997 and 1998; Granit interview, 1998.
46 Haaretz, 3 October 1999; Sarbero interview.
47 Haaretz,  2 June  1997 and 3 October 1999; Granit (1998), Ivry (1997 and  1998), Sarbero and Flato 
interviews.
48 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 860.
49 See Rafael unions’ letter and enclosures to the State Comptroller Miriam Ben-Porat, Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin and three Members of Knesset, dated 11 November 1993, asking for the appointment
306Members of Knesset -  especially those  from northern districts,  where most Rafael 
workers were based (one of these, Yossi Katz, was the legal adviser to the Histadrut in 
the  Haifa  district  and  known  for  his  pro-union  stance50)  -   were  urged  to  table 
questions  to  the  Cabinet,  while journalists,  particularly  military  and  labour  affairs 
correspondents, were invited for briefings.5 1
At the same time, the unions’  legal advisers devised their legal strategy and 
subpoenaed the  MoD,  Rafael’s  management and  the  Civil  Service  Commission  to 
court  hearings.  (The  workers  were  entitled  to  dispute  restructuring  and  dismissal 
decisions in Labour Courts.) Over the next seven months,  they appealed five times 
against  different  administrative  and  managerial  decisions  taken  by  Rafael 
management, winning several injunctions in the process.  The aim of these actions 
was  to  further a counter-narrative  of the background  to  the  Rafael  crisis  aimed  at 
refuting  the  management’s  claims  that  Rafael  needed  to  be  transformed  into  an 
independent, business-oriented entity. The United Struggle Headquarters, an umbrella 
forum consisting of representatives from all five of Rafael’s worker unions, claimed 
that the blame for the organisation’s poor condition lay solely with the government, 
the MoD and Rafael’s management.  In letters to politicians and state officials, they 
detailed  a  catalogue  of mistakes  and  obscure  decisions,  errors  of judgement  and
of a special investigative commission of enquiry on Rafael’s difficulties. See also the Rafael unions’ 
circular, ‘Rafael -  Status and Purpose’, 24 March 1994.
50 See, for example, Records of the Knesset, 1 June 1994, p. 7753; Arei Hamifratz, 23 February 1996.
51 These,briefings led in some cases to favourable feature articles;  see  Yedioth Ahronoth, 8 February 
1994.
52 During 1994 the employees sought to block the restructuring of Rafael’s logistic and support division 
and won a temporary injunction against the management. See ruling by Haifa District Labour Court, 
Histadrut and the National Organisation of Research Employees in the Defence Establishment vs. 
the MoD and Rafael, Case No. 4/15, 21 February 1994.
307careless assumptions that had contributed in their mind to the organisation’s financial 
downfall over the years.
Their main arguments were summarised in a pamphlet, Rafael’ s Incorporation 
Endangers  the National Security,  circulated  in March  1994.53  The  writers  warned 
against measuring and treating Rafael as a business,  and flatly rejected the  idea of 
turning it into a state-owned company ‘in preparation for its future privatisation’. The 
planned  reorganisation  of  the  firm,  they  claimed,  was  decided  on  the  basis  of 
recommendations  by  a  private  consultancy,  ‘which  examined  Rafael’s  business 
potential while ignoring its contribution to national security’.54
The writers went on to stress the contribution of the military scientific research 
to  Israel’s deterrence,  which was now being threatened because  ‘the  MoD  and the 
Finance Ministry are  laying  the  foundations  for privatising  the  government-owned 
defence  firms  by  turning  public  opinion  against  them’.  They  claimed  that  both 
Ministries ‘were making scathing remarks against Rafael, which is a state-funded unit, 
and  its  workers,  who  are  government  employees.  They  present  them  as  bunch  of 
parasites that work at the taxpayer’s expense in an unworthy organisation that fails to 
meet business expectations.  ... We, Rafael workers, view the recent years’ events as a 
damaging  blow  to  the  organisation’s  future  and  as  a  serious  mistake,  which  puts 
Israel’s security at risk in the years to come’.55
In briefings with journalists, the unions stepped up their rhetoric by pointing 
specifically  to  three  issues  that,  according  to  official  documents  and  management
53  Unions  of Rafael’s  workers  pamphlet  Rafael’ s  Incorporation  Endangers  the  National  Security, 
March 1994, p. 1.
54 Ibid., p. 2.
55 Ibid., p. 3.
308reports,  had  exacerbated  Rafael’s  problems  no  end.56  First,  the  building  of a  new 
production and testing complex in northern Galilee -  a project initiated to give Rafael 
further industrial space and to help in mobilising Jewish population into that region, 
but  one  that  had cost Rafael  dearly,  due  to  management  miscalculations  and  also 
because it was approved in 1983, before the organisation’s worsening condition was 
fully known.58  Secondly,  the IDF’s  frequent objections  to  Rafael’s  export licenses 
meant that only 20% of its requests were approved.59 Third, the growing dependence 
on American-made weaponry -  the IDF received most of its weapons from the US, a 
preference  openly endorsed by  Rabin and previous  defence  ministers60  -   deprived 
Rafael of its most important client and sales promoter. It was forced to rely on foreign 
customers to ensure sufficient revenue, but this also exposed it to the cyclical nature 
of the arms export market and to fluctuations in the official rate of exchange which 
affected its profitability.
56 Haaretz, 10 May 1994.
57  Yedioth Ahronoth, 24 September  1995; Zeev Bonen, Rafael, pp.  152-153. The project in Northern 
Galilee was at a centre of a scathing State Comptroller report that pointed to flawed decision-making 
and cost-assessment processes; see State Comptroller Annual Report no. 40, pp. 891-900.
58 When Rafael’s previous Director General,  Moshe Peled,  took office in  1987, he was surprised to 
discover  that  the  organisation  had  not  hitherto  produced  a  balance  sheet.  A  few  days  later  he 
discovered that Rafael had a $50-million deficit, contrary to previous reports submitted to the MoD 
and  Peled  himself;  see  Hadashot,  1  May  1992.  Furthermore,  Rafael  started  repaying  the  state- 
guaranteed loan that funded the construction of the complex in the northern Galilee in  1989 -  the 
year in which it also posted a loss of 129 million shekels. See State Comptroller Annual Report no. 
45, p. 858.
59 Interview with Moshe Peled, Rafael’s Director General in Hadashot, 1 May 1992.
60 Arens interview.
309Government Decisions
In January 1994, having now concluded the major adjustment plans for IMI and IAI, 
Rabin seconded Gat’s recommendation for an interim work plan for Rafael (for six 
months only) and the immediate dismissal of 250 workers.  He also instructed Gat to 
complete a comprehensive transition plan; if approved by the Cabinet, Rabin said, this 
would be implemented in the second half of 1994. Rabin also emphasised:  ‘Rafael is 
in a difficult and unsustainable condition,  and we  should do everything possible in 
order to execute a recovery plan as soon as possible.’6 1  Shortly afterwards, in April 
1994, Gat met the Civil Service Commissioner, Prof. Yitzhak Galnoor, and presented 
his  plan and potential  difficulties.  The  Commissioner was  persuaded  that  Rafael’s
deteriorating  situation  called  for  a  thorough  reorganisation,  including  a  limited
62 number of redundancies.  This view was also endorsed by the Regional Labour Court 
in Haifa, which ruled on 25 April  1994 that the incorporation plan was lawful (and 
also  rejected  the  Rafael  unions’  other  four  petitions  to  overrule  administrative 
decisions by the management).  Rafael’s unions,  in response,  announced that they 
would  initiate  immediate  steps  to  prevent  the  management  from  implementing  its 
plans, calling all the workers to refrain from cooperating with it.64
Rafael’s  management,  meanwhile,  sought  ways  to  reduce  its  labour  costs, 
which by that point reached more than 60% of its revenues.65 In discreet discussions 
with the MoF, Gat asked that Rafael should be exempt from further pay rises in the 
forthcoming Public Sector Wage Agreement for the years 1993 to 1996, which at the
6 1 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 845.
62 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 168.
63 Haifa District Labour Court, Case No. 4/15, 25 April 1994, pp. 45-46.
64 Circular by the Rafael Workers’ Unions, 25 April 1994.
65 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 853.
310time was being negotiated by the MoF’s Director of the Wage and Labour Accord 
Unit,  Shalom Granit,  and the  Secretary General of the  Histadrut,  Haim Haberfeld. 
Granit  promised  Gat  that,  although  Rafael  was  a  government  department  and 
therefore bound by all public-sector agreements, the MoF would ensure that the new 
agreement would not apply to it. Granit was confident that the Histadrut would agree 
to  such a request,  given Rafael’s financial  state and a precedent that had excluded 
Rafael from a similar agreement in 1988.66
The Histadrut’s Secretary General, however, refused.  Haberfeld told Finance 
Minister Shochat and Granit that he lacked the powers and influence he had had some 
years earlier, and that any attempt to keep Rafael out of this agreement would bring 
the entire economy to an immediate halt. ‘Rafael workers are state employees, and the 
entire public sector would strike at once if they are to be excluded,’ he said.  ‘Would 
the Cabinet be able to withstand such a protest?’67 Haberfeld, who was fighting for his 
political life at the time -  elections to the Histadrut Convention were to be held just 
few  weeks  later,  on  10  May  1994  -   was  adamant.  Finance  Minister  Shochat 
reluctantly backed down and agreed to include Rafael in the Wage Agreement, which 
granted a  19.2% pay rise to various sectors,68 despite its growing losses. The stakes 
were just too  high:  not only was  he  risking  a head-on confrontation with  700,000 
public-sector workers at a crucial time, he might also have caused irreparable damage 
to  the  campaign  of  Haberfeld,  who  represented  Labour  (Shochat’s  party)  in  the 
Histadrut. (Haberfeld subsequently lost the elections to a faction led by former Labour 
Party politicians, Haim Ramon and Amir Peretz.)
66 Granit interview, 1998.
67 Ibid.
68 The Civil Service Commission, The Public Sector’ s  Wage Agreement for 1993-1996, May 1994, p.
41 (Hebrew).
311The Prime Minister Office deferred further Cabinet discussion on the future of 
Rafael until after the elections to the Histadrut, scheduling it for 25 May 1994. Before 
then, the Defence and Finance ministries reviewed the proposed structure for Rafael 
and other some alternative scenarios. The Rafael unions, meanwhile, prepared to hold 
a demonstration outside the Prime Minister Office on the same day.
At its 25 May meeting the Cabinet heard briefings on Rafael’s difficulties, in 
line with the management  and  MoD  arguments.  It  learned that Rafael’s  cash-flow 
deficit would reach 1  billion shekels by 1998, and this would have to be covered by 
the  defence  budget.  ‘In  light  of this  situation,  Rafael  should  cease  operating  as  a 
budgeted unit within the MoD -  the need for its  incorporation is  self-evident,’  the 
MoD, MoF and Rafael representatives concluded.69 The proposed solution was to turn 
Rafael  into  a  government-owned  company  handling  both  secret  and  commercial 
activities, as per Gat’s proposal; this would lead to the reduction of the workforce by 
1,200 employees and cost an estimated 2.6 billion shekels.70 
The Cabinet decided unanimously to:
start initial steps towards transforming Rafael into a government-owned company, which
would combine business operations and state-funded activities.  [Rafael’s incorporation]
is to be decided by the Cabinet at a later stage ... based on a proposal of the Defence and 
71 Finance Ministers.
It  instructed  the  Ministries  to  finish  their  preparatory  work  and  forward  a  draft 
proposal  on Rafael’s  incorporation.  It also  authorised  Rafael  management to  enter 
negotiations with its  workers  and the  Histadrut  in order to  reach a flexible  labour 
agreement,  which  would  include  performance-related  incentives  and  a  new
69 Quoted in State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 861.
70 Haaretz, 1 August 1995.
71 Cabinet secretariat, Cabinet decision no. 3178: a preparation for the incorporation of Rafael, 25 May 
1994, article 1.
312remuneration scale.72 These negotiations were unsuccessful,  as the workers made it 
clear  from  the  outset  that  they  would  actively  oppose  any  attempt  to  incorporate 
Rafael.73 This attitude was soon manifested in a highly confrontational strategy:  the 
unions hindered day-to-day work in various parts of the organisation,74 held picket 
lines near the management building and harshly criticised Gat in leaflets and posters 
that were delivered near his home; they also initiated threatening calls to his office.75
At the same time, the workers’ unions appealed at the National Labour Court 
against  the  earlier decision of the  Haifa  District Labour Court,  which allowed the
•  7 f\ management to continue its restructuring process,  and sought a judicial review of the 
Cabinet decision at the High Court of Justice;77 both attempts were unsuccessful. The 
management,  in  the  meantime,  continued  its  internal  restructuring  programme  and 
started the formal redundancy process for 250 tenured workers.78
Despite deteriorating labour relations at Rafael -  which was to be expected, 
judging by the militant,  violent  attitude  of the  unions  in previous  disputes79 -   the 
Prime Minister offered Gat his full backing. Indeed, the few contacts between Rabin 
and workers’ representatives that did take place in 1994 were acrimonious. Rabin had 
long  argued  that  Rafael  had  become  a  financial  burden  that  robbed  the  IDF  of
72 Press release by the Government Press Office headed ‘The Cabinet’s discussion on Rafael’s future’, 
25 May 1994.
73 Press release by the joint forum of Rafael’s workers unions, 25 May 1994.
74 Circular by Rafael workers’ unions, 14 July 1994.
75 Internal memo of the Rafael workers’ protest forum, 21 July 1994.
76 Circular by Rafael workers’ unions, 10 July 1994.
77 Globes, 29 September 1994.
78  Letter from Rafael  Director General to the Histadrut and the  MoD, headed  ‘Redundancies due to 
downsizing’, 6 July 1994.
79 Bonen interview;  Trop interview 2001.  In  1986 union representatives’  destroyed the office of the 
Director General in protest over a delay in payment of salaries. See Bonen, Rafael, p. 45.
313essential resources,80 and he wholeheartedly supported the plan to incorporate it and 
cut  its  size.8 1   Whenever  Gat  approached  him  to  support  a  step  related  to  the 
restructuring process -  the  two  met regularly,  at  least  once  a month,  for in-depth 
discussions82  -   Rabin  vented  his  anger  at  the  workers’  unions’  obstructiveness.83 
Nevertheless,  he  insisted on meeting  the workers  personally,  especially during the 
most hostile clashes, because he wanted ‘to look them in the eye’ and ‘challenge their 
grievances directly’, according to a senior aide.84 That said,  Gat was careful not to 
permit direct,  non-brokered meetings between the workers’  representatives  and the 
Prime Minister and insisted on being present at all times.85
In Search of Winning Strategies
While  it had long been clear that the Prime Minister had aligned himself with the 
Rafael management,  the workers’  representatives  received  strong  support  from the 
Histadrut. The new chairman of the Trade Unions division, Amir Peretz, promised a 
more determined approach to guarding workers’ rights than his predecessor’s.86 At a 
meeting  with  Gat  and  other  Rafael  and  MoD  representatives  in  August  1994  he 
strongly criticised the management ‘for rushing to dismiss 250 employees through the
80  Rabin  was  highly  critical  of Rafael  unions  and  the  organisation  itself,  which  he  described  as  a 
‘paradise of waste’ in which ‘money flows like there is no tomorrow’. During a meeting in 1991 he 
charged that, because of earlier financial commitments to Rafael, the IDF was forced to cut down its 
military units. See Davar,  15 July  1991. A year later, after he became Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister, Rabin repeated the last claim in a radio broadcast. See Haaretz, 24 September 1992.
81  Haaretz,  28  June  1995;  Haaretz,  9  August  1995;  The  National  Laboratory  -   Rafael  Workers’ 
Newsletter, No. 1 (June 1995), pp.  1-2.
82 Sarbero interview.
83 Gat interview.
84 Haber interview.
oe  .
Gat interview.
86 Haaretz, 19 July 1994.
314Civil Service Commission’ rather than negotiating their departure with the unions.87 
His  discussion with Gat,  during which the  Director General  complained  about the 
behaviour of Rafael’s unions and the damage they caused,  revealed deep divisions 
between the two.  Whereas Gat insisted that  ‘the ultimate responsibility for Rafael’ 
rested on him, Peretz countered that he and the Histadrut also had a say in the fate of 
enterprise. Peretz asked for more time to study the situation —  it was the first major 
labour dispute he had to handle since his appointment -  and requested Gat to refrain 
from unilateral actions in the meantime. The Director General refused, insisting on a 
set deadline and asserting that he would go ahead and force the redundancies on the 
unions through the Commission, with or without the Histadrut’s consent.88
Also in August 1994, senior MoF officials convened to discuss the Cabinet’s 
decision  and  the  ways  to  take  it  forward.  The  Deputy  Director  of  the  Budget 
Department presented a proposal,  never devised or implemented  in Israel before,89 
that was secretly discussed at the time with the Rafael management. The core of the 
plan,  which  Gat  labelled  ‘the  Closure-Opening  model’,  involved  legally  closing 
Rafael  as  a  fully budgeted  unit  in  the  Ministry  of Defence  and  reopening  it  as  a 
government-owned company with a special pension and salary scheme, which would 
replace the existing pay scales. This plan, in essence, aimed at easing the concerns of 
the workers while freeing Rafael, in its company format, from all debt that stemmed 
from its historic past as a MoD unit, a direct lesson from the IMI incorporation plan.90
87  Handwritten  protocol  of a  meeting  between  the  chairman  of the  Trade  Union  Division  at  the 
Histadrut, Rafael Director General and the workers’ unions, 4 August 1994.
88 Ibid.
89 Haaretz, 5 November 1996.
90  Sarbero interview;  Author’s  interview  with  (Deputy  Director  of Wage  and  Labour  Accord Unit, 
Ministry of Finance 1993-1994; Chief of Staff, Finance Minister Office, 1995; Director of Wage and
315The  participants,  who  included  the  MoF  Director  General  and  the  Civil 
Service Commissioner, expressed interest. They agreed to explore the model further 
with the MoD and Rafael’s management and to present it to the Histadrut and the 
employees only after reaching a common position.9 1 A consensus on this matter was 
necessary as senior officials, including the Director of the Wage and Labour Accord 
Unit,  Shalom Granit, strongly objected to the model,  claiming that it would lead to 
unacceptable  financial  demands  across  the  public  sector  in  the  event  of  future
92 restructuring in other government umts.
In the interim, the MoD and MoF discussed the guidelines and the practical 
issues concerning the creation of a new government company. Rafael’s management 
insisted that the structure of the proposed company should avoid, as far as possible, 
the managerial and financial pitfalls that had blighted sister companies IAI and IMI, 
as revealed during their recent crises. In particular, Rafael management was wary of a 
prohibitive collective agreement,  like IAI’s,  which prevented the management from 
executing redundancies without the consent of the unions, and of undue ‘sweeteners’ 
in  the  form  of pay  rises  to  employees  in  exchange  for  their consenting  to join a 
government company, as had happened with IMI’s botched incorporation of 1990.93 
To that end, joint teams from Rafael and the two ministries prepared a thorough audit 
of Rafael’s structure, assets and business performance, and a detailed examination of 
the new company’s present and future  financial liabilities.  Rafael management also 
insisted -  another lesson from IMI’s flawed incorporation -  on being provided with
Labour  Accord  Unit,  Ministry  of  Finance  1995-2005),  16  March  2002  (hereafter:  Rachlevsky 
interview).
91 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 172
92 Granit interview, 1998.
93 Sarbero interview.
316sufficient equity capital without any financial burden stemming from the firm’s pre­
incorporation past.94  At the  same  time,  it  negotiated  a  detailed  agreement  for the 
voluntary  retirement  of 120  tenured  workers,  which  the  Histadrut  was  inclined  to 
support;  however,  representatives  of  the  research  staff  union  raised  last-minute 
objections to the deal.95
The  unions,  meanwhile,  discussed  a  new  strategy  for  challenging  Rabin’s 
leadership  through  the  Labour  party’s  primaries.  In  a  bid  to  put  a  stop  to  the 
incorporation plan, and taking account of recommendations from political consultants 
and media experts, in October 1994 the unions drafted a series of leaflets and circulars 
that  called  for  a  mass  enrolment  of Rafael’s  employees  and  their  families  to  the 
Labour party, ahead of its primaries.  Such step, they noted, was indeed extreme and 
extraordinary, as ‘Rafael has striven, since its inception, to keep itself outside the filth 
of the Israeli political system. ... [However] we must now act inside it for the sake of 
saving our Rafael’. Likening Rafael to ‘a precious diamond-studded gold watch which 
fell into the gutter’, the unions claimed that they ‘were left with no other choice but to 
enter inside, in order to save and clean it’.96 In another circular, the unions admitted 
that  all  their  indirect  efforts  -   briefings  with  the  media,  lobbying  politicians  and 
demonstrations -  had hitherto been in vain. ‘Because the Cabinet decision [of 25 May 
1994]  was political, fighting it requires political means.  We therefore would like to 
exert influence through direct political pressure’.97
94 Ibid.; see also, in this context, comments by the Acting President of IMI in a session of the Knesset’s 
Labour and  Welfare  Affairs  Committee,  7  June  2005  (www.knesset.gov.il.  accessed  6  December 
2005)
95 Letter from the Chairman of the Histadrut in the Haifa district to the Histadrut’s Chairman of the 
Trade Union Division, headed ‘Voluntary retirement agreement in Rafael’, 10 August 1994.
96 Circular by Rafael unions, 1 October 1994.
97 Circular by Rafael unions [undated].
317The unions hoped that, by installing a power base of 15,000 members or more 
within the ruling party,  they would be able to mobilise  sufficient votes against the 
nomination of Rabin as the Labour candidate for prime minister at the next elections. 
They also promised to actively promote the nomination of any candidate who would 
agree to include in the party’s manifesto a proposal for a new Basic Law which, like 
the  ‘Basic Law: IDF’ would ensure that Rafael was recognised as unique institution 
and kept as the national weapons laboratory of Israel.98
The unions launched their recruitment campaign through a proxy organisation 
called ‘Citizens for Rafael,’ circulating membership application forms for the Labour 
party  to  all  Rafael  workers,  pensioners  and  family  members.99  The  timing  of the 
campaign’s launch -  1  November 1994 -  was chosen to ensure maximum exposure in 
the media and local press ahead of a Cabinet discussion on Rafael, which was to take 
place few days later.
While their political campaign was taking shape, the unions continued to apply 
pressure on both the MoD and Rafael management. They disrupted the normal course 
of work across Rafael with the full backing of the Histadrut,100 and filed a complaint 
with  the  police,  asking  for  Gat  to  be  investigated  on  suspicion  of bribery  and 
corruption;.1 0 1   The  complaint  was  prominently  covered  in  the  local  press,102
98 Circular by Rafael unions, 1 October 1994.
99 Circular by ‘Citizens for Rafael’, 1  November 1994.
100 Letter by the Chairman of the Histadrut in the Haifa district to Rafael’s Director General, headed 
‘Work disruptions in Rafael’, 2 October 1994.
1 01 Letter from Rafael unions’ lawyer to the Israel Police Commissioner and the Head of Investigations 
and  Crime  Fighting  Department,  headed  ‘Complaint  against  Rafael’s  Director  General’,  26 
September 1994.
102  See  ‘Rafael’s unions filed a complaint with the Police Commissioner:  the management allegedly 
conspired to accept bribes’, Arei Hamifratz (a Haifa regional paper, part of Yedioth Ahronoth), 30 
September 1994, p. 1.
318prompting a Member of Knesset to table a parliamentary question to  Rabin on the 
matter103  (the police  dismissed it  for lack of evidence104).  At the  same  time,  they 
approached  the  MoD  Director  General,  David  Ivry,  and  asked  him  to  stop  the 
incorporation plan,  or at least to  convey their concerns  to  the  Prime Minister and 
Cabinet ministers. He agreed to pass on their message to Rabin but refused to back 
down on the plan. A few days before the Cabinet meeting, Ivry informed them that the 
MoD ‘will continue the [incorporation] process while giving the utmost respect to [the 
rulings  of]  the  High  Court  of  Justice  and  to  the  workers,  and  with  the  full 
understanding that, while the latter would like to stall the process, we have no choice 
but to press ahead due to Rafael’s situation’.105
As  soon  as  the  MoD  and  the  MoF  concluded  their  internal  discussions, 
Cabinet convened on 6 November 1994 to chart the terms under which Rafael was to 
be incorporated.  Based on a joint proposal drafted by the two Ministries, it decided 
that:
Rafael  will  become a  company,  wholly owned  by  the  government.  ...  In the  light  of 
financial indicators presented to us, it cannot continue operating as a unit in the Defence 
Ministry.  The  company,  Rafael  Ltd.,  will  combine  commercial  activity  with  funded 
activity  of  national  defence  infrastructure.  While  transferring  to  the  company,  the 
workers are to retain their previous entitlements accumulated during their service as state 
employees in Rafael.106
The parties to the negotiations -  management and workers -  were urged to bridge 
their differences, with the proviso that:
103 Haaretz, 10 November 1994.
104 Letter from the Investigations and Prosecutions Branch of the Israel Police to the lawyer of Rafael’s 
unions, 15 November 1994.
105  Letter  from  the  MoD  Director  General  to  Rafael’s  Director  General,  headed  ‘The  letter  from 
Rafael’s workers unions of 27 October 1994’, 1 November 1994.
106 MoD Press release of Cabinet decision, 6 November 1994.
319If the agreements pertinent to this decision are not signed within six months,  or within 
any other timeframe set by the Defence and Finance Ministers, all Rafael’s activities will
be  shut  down  for  economic  reasons,  apart  from  those  activities  that  belong  to  the
107 ‘national infrastructure and technological research centres’.
The Cabinet’s decision was carefully worded. By stressing the importance of a 
negotiated  settlement  and  emphasising  that  workers’  rights  were  to  be  preserved 
throughout the transition process, it acknowledged their contribution to the nation’s 
security and showed that the government was acting as a responsible employer. (This 
also  addressed a scenario much feared by security chiefs:  if a decision was  forced 
upon them, frustrated workers holding high security clearance might, in desperation, 
decide to sabotage operations -  note the case of Mordechay Vanunu, who revealed 
Israel’s nuclear secrets,  shortly after he was  made  redundant.108)  The  Cabinet also 
agreed to  allocate  an additional  $55  million a year to  fund  specific  R&D projects 
handled by Rafael;  this was  to  ease  concerns  in the MoD’s  R&D  directorate,  that 
some  programmes  might  be  adversely  affected  by  a  profit-driven  approach  (even 
though the directorate remained unconvinced that this would solve the problem).109
At the same time, the Cabinet made it clear that Rafael’s current structure was 
obsolete, costly and unacceptably burdensome to the entire MoD budget. And it put 
psychological pressure on the workers by laying down a firm timetable for change, 
coupled  with  an  explicit  threat  of closure  (though  giving  itself  some  leeway  by 
stipulating that the deadline was not confirmed and could be extended at the Defence 
and Finance Ministers’ discretion).
107 Cabinet decision of 6 November 1994, quoted in State Comptroller Annual Report no.  45, p. 862; 
see also a final draft proposal for the Cabinet decision on Rafael, circulated by the MoD’s general 
counsel, 18 October.
108 Granit interview, 1998; Tov interview, 2001.
109 Ben-Israel interview.
320Implementation: Protests and Litigation
Immediately after the Cabinet’s decision, the Rafael management, with the backing of 
the Defence and Finance Ministries, invited the Rafael union representatives and the 
Histadrut  for detailed negotiations  on the  labour and wage  agreements  of the new 
company.110  Rafael’s unions,  however,  refused to  cooperate.  Some union activists, 
who belonged to Rafael’s research staff,  formed a policy team that sought ways to 
block the proposed incorporation.  Other unions held emergency meetings  at which 
they expressed their utter objection to  the plan.  Their anger reached a peak on 24 
November  1994,  after  a  general  gathering  of  union  activists,  when  dozens  of 
disgruntled workers stormed the management building, smashing and breaking walls, 
intercom and telephone systems and flooding the building’s  floors with water.  The 
police  were  called  in  and  several  complaints  were  lodged  by  the  MoD.  Rafael 
management expressed its shock and disgust in an open letter to the workers in which 
it detailed the day’s events -  the third violent outburst of this kind in as many months 
-  and promised to bring all the perpetrators to justice.1 1 1   The Histadrut, meanwhile, 
endorsed the workers’ position and declared a collective labour dispute in Rafael:  a 
call which allowed the workers to intensify their protest in accordance with existing 
laws.112 The regional labour council of Haifa also expressed solidarity with their stand 
and offered assistance.113
As the situation in Rafael continued escalating, Prime Minister Rabin ordered 
a review of the MoD’s relationship with Rafael with a view to  separating the two.
110 Letter from Rafael’s Director General to the Chairman of the Histadrut in the Haifa district, headed 
‘The Cabinet’s decision on turning Rafael’s into a government-owned company’, 7 November 1994.
111 Open letter by Rafael’s Director General, 4 December 1994.
112 Circulars by Rafael’s Workers’ Unions, 8 December 1994 and 29 January 1995.
113 Ibid.
321Following the earlier unsuccessful attempt to unlink Rafael  from the public  sector, 
Rabin decided to explore another possibility: a government-sponsored bill separating 
Rafael from the MoD,  and turning it into a company.  Justice Minister David Libai 
rejected the idea, explaining that the Cabinet was not permitted to propose or endorse 
a law which ran contrary to a signed agreement between the State and its employees. 
Rabin discreetly turned to  the  Chairman  of the  Knesset’s  Finance  Committee,  the 
Labour MK Gdalia Gal, who agreed to initiate a private bill on this matter -  and by so 
doing to circumvent the Justice Ministry’s objection.114
Rabin’s request came at a time  when the  Finance Committee discussed the 
proposed incorporation of Rafael.  (In accordance with the Government Companies 
Law, the Committee was required to approve the inclusion and maintenance of non­
commercial activities  in Rafael,  once  it became  a  company.115)  The  understanding 
between Gal and Rabin remained unknown to the other committee members, who in 
the meantime became embroiled in a heated debate on the pros and cons of the new 
company’s  structure,  fuelled  by  the  contradictory  arguments  the  management  and 
unions’  representatives  presented  to  them.  So  when  Gal  suggested  deferring  the 
decision on this matter for few months, and in the meantime continuing to assess the 
situation, they willingly obliged.116
Against this backdrop, and while the labour relations at Rafael remained tense, 
Gat  summoned  the  unions  and  the  Histadrut  representatives  in  March  1995  for  a 
discussion  on  his  proposed  Closure-Opening  plan.  He  explained  that  all  workers 
would be made redundant and leave on early retirement, paid or underwritten by the
114 Interview with Ilan Flato in Yedioth Ahronoth, 10 November 1995.
115 Government Companies Law -  1975, The Official Gazette: Israel Statute Book no.  770 (Jerusalem: 
Government Printer, 4 July 1975), p. 132, clause 4(a) (Hebrew)
116 Globes, 14 February 1995.
322State, and would then be rehired by Rafael the company, which would then pay them 
a progressive salary without special benefits or a linkage to the public sector, similar 
to the pay in other hi-tech companies;117 not all the workers would be invited back - 
only those required by the management -  and in any event they would be represented 
by a single Committee, and not five as before.118 While accepting that ‘the proposed 
model  is  unconventional’  and  might  therefore  cause  concern,  Gat  stressed  that  ‘it 
would be based on negotiated agreement and acceptance by all parties concerned,’ 
and therefore the management would not attempt to impose it on the unions.119 He 
also  promised  to  refrain  from  unilateral  actions.  The  unions,  however,  were  not 
convinced:  ‘We would not enter into any negotiations ...  until the issues concerning 
retirement and pension matters are solved ... judging by our past experiences with the 
management, we could no longer count on its promises and therefore have taken all 
the  necessary  precautions,  both  legally  and  organisationally,  to  deal  with  any 
eventuality’.120  In  a  later circular  they  threatened  to  ‘bring  Rafael  down’,  and  to 
‘conduct a repeat of the Masada episode’  should the management continue with its 
plan.1 2 1   The Histadrut, too, dismissed what it branded as a ‘one-sided’ proposal and
117  Details  of the  proposed  model  were  included  in Letter to  Rafael Employees from  the Director 
General’ s Office, 15 January 1996.
118 See table comparing the current and proposed new structure of Rafael, prepared by the management 
(undated); Haaretz, 5 November 1996 and 1 December 2000.
119  Letter  from  Rafael’s  Deputy  Director  General  for  Human  Resources  to  the  Chairman  of the 
Histadrut in the Haifa district, headed ‘The retirement-recruitment model’  [the initial name of the 
model, later changed to Closure-Opening model], 20 March 1995.
120 Rafael’s Unions’ circular to the Rafael workers, 21 March 1995.
121 Rafael’s Unions’ circular to Rafael workers, 3 April 1995.
323demanded that ‘any future plan regarding Rafael should not be accepted without the
1  99
consent of the unions and the Histadrut’.
The workers’ unequivocal rejection of the plan prompted the management and 
government bureaucracy to consider their next moves. However, it was soon apparent 
that they were struggling to forge a common position. Senior officials were divided on 
how best to  handle  Rafael’s  transition,  and  they  could not  even agree on a  single 
estimate of the costs involved: the gap between the Finance Ministry’s figure and that 
of Rafael’s management was more than one billion dollars.123
In March  1995, therefore, when Prime Minister Rabin met Finance Minister 
Shochat  and  senior  officials  from  the  MoD  and  the  MoF  to  discuss  the  crisis  in 
Rafael, he was confronted with a wide array of views. Whereas the MoF and Rafael 
management  advocated  the  Closure-Opening  model,  MoD  Director  General  Ivry 
expressed  his  utter  objection  to  the  idea,  labelling  it  ‘a  fiction’  that  would  not 
withstand  any  legal  challenge;  worse  still,  he  claimed,  the  government  might  be 
accused  of acting  in  bad  faith  (as  such  model  might  be  viewed  as  a  unilateral 
departure from previous conventions and understandings with state employees).  He 
also held the MoF responsible for exacerbating Rafael’s losses, due to the May 1994 
Public  Sector Wage Agreement,  which forced the MoD to  increase  its  employees’ 
salaries  -   an  increase  he  found  totally  unwarranted.124  Rafael’s  Director  General 
disputed Ivry’s reservations on the proposed model and suggested that for the time 
being,  the MoD  should take a drastic  step -  shutting Rafael down for few months 
(another proposal to which Ivry strongly objected) -  so as to convey an unequivocal
122  Letter  from the  Rafael  Affairs  Administrator at the  Haifa  district  of the  Histadrut to  the  Prime 
Minister and the Finance Minister, headed ‘Rafael -  negotiation’, 2 April 1995.
123 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 174.
124 Ibid., p. 174; see also Haaretz, 7 January 1996.
324message to the workers. He said that some union leaders expressed support for such 
step, and noted that the workers would cooperate only when they realised that the 
State was determined to bring the situation to a head. His suggestion therefore was to 
convene the Civil Service Commission and ask it to issue redundancy letters to 650 
state  employees.  The  representatives  of the  MoF,  on  the  other hand,  proposed to 
implement the Closure-Opening model without delay.
Rabin informed the participants that a proposal to present a bill on Rafael had 
been dropped, as it was unlikely to pass in the Knesset, and there was no other choice 
but to find an administrative solution that could stand judicial scrutiny, because ‘none 
of the Cabinet’s decisions were immune from [being overruled by] the courts’.125 He 
therefore  rejected a proposal  to  that  the  Cabinet  should unilaterally announce  that 
Rafael  was to become a government company with immediate effect;  on the other 
hand, the Closure-Opening model was an administrative option he wanted to explore 
further.  It soon turned out,  though,  that  it posed  some  legal  and  labour dilemmas. 
Would the new business entity be exempted from past labour agreements signed by 
Rafael,  and therefore free to  recruit new employees on lesser terms? What kind of 
severance  packages  would  apply?  Was  it  lawful  and  technically  feasible  to  close 
down a legal entity and superimpose on it a new one that would employ the same 
labour force?126
A  legal  opinion  presented  to  Rabin  at  the  meeting  by  the  Deputy  Legal 
Adviser to the MoD was inconclusive, pointing to potential weaknesses in the model 
but not ruling it out completely. Finance Minister Shochat said in response that he did 
not want to reach a solution ‘with burnt tyres near the gates of Rafael’,  and Rabin
125 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 175.
126 Ibid., p. 173; Tov interview, 2001.
325noted that the unions were ‘politically savvy’ and were striving to slow the process for 
another year, inching it closer towards the elections (expected to be held in 1996). The 
Prime Minister closed the meeting, concluding that Rafael’s situation was worsening 
and could no longer be tolerated -  its losses increased from 215 million shekels in 
1993 to 287 million shekels in 1994 -  and he would therefore not rule out the most 
drastic measures. He asked the officials for practical suggestions which he would re­
examine a month later.127
At the Knesset, meanwhile,  a concerted lobbying effort by Rafael’s workers 
led on  19 June  1995  to  the lodging of a Knesset Motion of No  Confidence  in the 
Labour government for its handling of the Rafael crisis,128 followed by parliamentary 
questions  from  right-wing  opposition  parties  which  opposed  the  incorporation 
process.129 The Motion was eventually defeated -  by 40 votes to 53130 -  but from the 
unions’  point  of view  it  was  a  successful  effort,  as  they  managed  to  bring  their 
struggle  on  to  the  national  agenda,  enlisting  the  support  of  dozens  of  Knesset 
Members.
Despite the parliamentarians’ protests, in July 1995 the registration of Rafael 
as a company came into force, but this was merely a symbolic, nominal act, for Rafael 
was  still being managed and budgeted  as  a government department.  However,  the 
Ministries  of  Finance  and  Defence,  and  especially  Rafael’s  management,  were 
determined  to  push  this  process  forward.  The  negotiations  were  led  by  a  senior
127 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 176.
128 See  ‘Proposal of the Zomet party for a Motion of No Confidence in the Government’s policy on 
Rafael and the future of the defence industries’, 19 June 1995, (transcript). The former Chief of Staff, 
Rafael Eitan (Zomet), presented the Motion, which was also seconded by Meir Shitrit MK of Likud.
129 See, for example, a parliamentary question by Likud MK Moshe Katzav on ‘Military R&D cuts and 
redundancies in Rafael’, tabled on 24 July 1995.
130 Haaretz, 20 June 1995.
326Finance  Ministry  official  and  Rafael’s  Director  General,  who  acted  under  strict 
instructions from the Finance Minister regarding the cost of the transition plan and the 
redundancy payments. The actual figure -  about $1 billion1 3 1  -  was actually closer to 
a revised cost estimate of $1.1  billion presented by Rafael management which, was 
$300 million higher than the MoF Budget Department’s calculation.132 (However, the 
MoF made provision for even a costlier transition process at Rafael, putting its total 
cost at closer to  $1.5 billion.133) Yet, while these negotiations were taking place, it 
was  unclear  whether,  in  view  of its  novelty,  the  Closure-Opening  model  would 
withstand a future legal challenge. The Ministries of Defence and Finance therefore 
referred  the matter to  the Attorney General,  Michael Ben-Yair,  for evaluation and 
approval.  This  move  was  not  without  risk,  however.  Gat  and  the  MoF’s  Budget 
department  viewed  this  model  as  an  indispensable  prerequisite  for  a  successful 
incorporation; if the Attorney General vetoed it because he found the model unlawful 
or otherwise indefensible in the courts, then the entire transformation of Rafael could 
have been thwarted.134
While  the  government  administration  weighed  its  options,  Rafael’s  unions 
stepped  up  their public  pressure.  They  arranged  press  conferences  which  received
1  35 wide coverage;  the management countered by giving revealing interviews  to  the
131 Rachlevsky interview; see also Gat interview.
132 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 180.
133 Ministry of Finance -  Budget Department, State Budget 1996 -  Main Parts (Jerusalem: Government 
Printer, October 1995), p. 77
134 Tov interview, 2001; Rachlevsky interview.
135 Their press briefing of 25 April 1995 was covered by the main local and national newspapers. See, 
for example, the reports in Maariv, 26 April  1995,  Yedioth Ahronoth, 26 April  1995, Telegraph, 25 
April 1995 and Hed Hakrayot, 28 April 1995.
327local  media.136  The  workers  also  extended  their  lobbying  operations  by  appealing 
directly to local residents137 and enlisting the support of two mayors who agreed to 
suspend  their municipalities’  work  for one  day  in  a  show  of sympathy with their 
struggle.138 They were also aided by the Histadrut, which offered legal assistance and 
orchestrated solidarity strikes in various factories across northern Israel;139 Histadrut 
spokespersons also briefed the media during the legal proceedings.
Back  at  Rafael,  the  unions  prepared  themselves  for  a  phase  of protracted 
negotiation with the management. They joined forces and organised themselves into a 
single negotiating team including members  of all  five unions -  putting aside their 
fractious relations and disagreements -  on the assumption that a combined position 
would strengthen their hand.  However,  it became clear that this show of unity was 
cosmetic,  and  each  union  was  seeking  to  advance  its  own  interests  behind  the 
scenes.140  This  was  quickly  exploited  by  Gat,  who  employed  a  divide-and-rule 
negotiating style. While negotiating with the main union team, he also secretly met 
representatives  of each sector separately,  hoping  thus  to  undermine  the bargaining 
strategy  of  each  sector  and  to  weaken  the  workers’  united  front.  Without  the
136 Since his appointment in December  1992, Gat had refused to give press interviews.  He agreed to 
conduct his  first  interview  in  May  1995  with Haaretz's  local  papers  in the  Haifa  area,  See Hed 
Hakrayot/Esek Mekomi, 16 May 1995.
137 See, for example, the Unions’ circular to the residents of municipalities near Rafael’s main complex 
in Haifa, 24 May 1995.
138 Arei Hamifratz, 19 May 1995.
139 Letter from the Chairman of the Histadrut in the Haifa district to the Chairman of the Histadrut’s 
Trade Union Division  in the  Haifa district, headed  ‘Work sanctions  in Rafael’,  3  August  1995;  a 
press release by the Histadrut -  Haifa district, 6 August 1995; Haaretz, 15 March 1995, 13 July 1995, 
and 26 December 1995.
140 Rachlevsky interview; for an illustration of the tension between the different workers committees in 
Rafael, see: letter from the Technical Workers Committee of Rafael to the Director General, headed 
‘Letter of Deputy Director General 9 January 1995.
328knowledge  or consent of the  Ministry of Finance,  he  even offered certain benefits 
which apparently breached payout guidelines issued by its Wage and Labour Accord 
Unit and the Budget Department; the MoF therefore refused to endorse an agreement 
Gat  reached  with  the  Histadrut  and  one  of  Rafael’s  unions,  the  Technical 
Workers/Agreement  Committee,  and  suggested  an  immediate  halt  to  the  transition 
process.1 4 1   The disclosure of Gat’s tactics in the national press created a credibility 
crisis among the main participants;  some members of Rafael’s management and the 
other workers’ committees felt betrayed and misled.142
Gat’s firm and uncompromising approach provoked the unions to occasional 
outbursts of fury towards him -  including the demolition of his office, walkouts and 
sudden suspensions of work.143 During  1995 the workers went on strike for a total of 
30 days, leading to losses of millions of dollars,144 as well as halting the supply of raw 
material,  staging  frequent  walkouts  and  preventing  temporary  employees  and 
subcontractors  entering  plants  -   all  of which  badly  affected  deliveries  to  foreign 
customers and the IDF. They also hired a public-relations firm to give them strategic 
advice  regarding  the  media  (most  workers  were  officially  barred  from  talking  to 
journalists).  They  distributed  leaflets  and  communiques  and  sought  to  exercise 
political  influence  within  the  Labour party through  the  1,500  Rafael  workers  who 
joined  the  party’s  northern  constituency  and  promoted  their  views  via  Labour 
members of Knesset, a vociferous lobby that sought to delay the restructuring plan in 
every legal way possible.145
1 4 1  Globes, 20 February 1996.
142 Haaretz, 20 December 1995.
143 Haaretz, 9 January 1994.
144 Haaretz, 22 May 1994, 6 June 1995.
145 Haaretz, 11 February 1996, 20 February 1996
329The workers’ preferred weapon, though, was legal action. Frequent objections 
about the management’s  actions were made  to  the  Civil  Service Commission,  and 
requests for injunctions and judicial reviews from regional and national Labour Courts 
severely delayed Rafael’s  incorporation process.  The Chief Justice of the Regional 
Labour Court in Haifa, Doron Meiblum, who presided over many of these hearings, 
expressed his disapproval of such practices. One of his rulings against Rafael’s unions 
noted:  ‘We [the court] suspect that the workers are deliberately prolonging the legal 
process.  They believe  that dragging  out  the  process  indefinitely would  serve  their 
purposes, but... we think they should have acted more responsibly.’146
To add insult to injury, the poor performance of the State Attorney lawyers 
representing Rafael management exacerbated the sluggishness of court proceedings. 
In 1995, after protests and appeals from Gat, Rabin authorised the hiring of a leading 
solicitor specialising in labour laws from the private sector,147 and thereafter Rafael 
hardly lost a case. This reinforcement, however, did not discourage the workers’, who 
insisted on frustrating the management’s restructuring plans through the courts. This 
strategy proved  highly  effective,  as  it kept  delaying  further  attempts  at  workforce 
reduction.
The attempt to make 650 of Rafael’s workers redundant was a case in point. 
Union representatives challenged as unlawful the May 1995 approval by the Service 
Committee of the Civil Service Commission of Rafael’s decision to dismiss 322 state 
employees,  in  addition  to  300  workers  from  the  collective-agreement  sector.  The 
Commission’s decision came after long deliberations, during which it heard the views 
of the workers,  the Histadrut, Rafael’s management and the Ministry of Finance.  It
146 Haifa District Labour Court, Case No. 41/20, 26 November 1995, pp. 75-76.
147 Gat interview.also  found  itself under  pressure  from  the  MoF  (which  lobbied  in  favour  of the 
decision), the Haifa mayor (who opposed it) and several Members of Knesset, (who
148 objected to it as well) just prior to the Commission final discussion on the matter.
The  decision  itself  was  greeted  with  dismay  by  Rafael’s  unions.  They 
threatened  to  initiate  industrial  action  encompassing  the  two  other  state-owned 
defence firms, while denouncing Rabin in demonstrations and through press briefings, 
and  warning  him  of dire  consequences  to  his  political  career.149  In  addition,  they 
attacked the  Civil  Service Commissioner in the press and staged a protest rally in 
front of his office.150 The Histadrut’s Trade Union chief was highly critical as well, 
promising the Commissioner he would do his utmost to reverse the decision.1 5 1  After 
few days, however, both the MoF and the Histadrut decided to consider a compromise 
in which the Commission’s decision would be suspended for a period, during which 
the sides would negotiate the terms of departure for the workers and agree on turning 
Rafael into a government-owned company.152
At that point,  while  the  MoF  and  Rafael  management  were  discussing  the 
severance packages, Rafael’s unions appealed against the Commission’s decision. In 
August 1995 the Haifa Labour Court issued a temporary injunction against this move, 
ordering Rafael management and the Commission to revisit the decision.  A further 
discussion took place two  months  later,  in October  1995,  and the  Commission re­
148 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 177.
149 Ibid., p. 179.
150 Maariv, 1 June 1995.
151 Galnoor, No, Mr Commissioner, p. 178.
152 Memorandum headed ‘Negotiating a solution for the crisis in Rafael’, issued by the Office of the 
Finance Minister and co-signed by the Finance Minister’s Chief of Staff, the Histadrut’s Head of the 
Trade Unions Division and the MoF’s Director of Wage and Labour Accord Unit, 13 June 1995.
331approved its earlier decision;153 the workers and the Histadrut rejected the decision 
and promptly filed an appeal in the Haifa Labour Court.
At that point, the Ministry of Finance persuaded Rabin that in the face of yet 
another impasse in the negotiations, the time had come for a tougher stance towards 
the workers. On 25 October 1995 Rabin met a small number of senior MoF and MoD 
officials in the Knesset.154 He was presented with updated figures which suggested 
that  Rafael’s  losses  were  mounting.  The  officials  recommended  declaring  an 
emergency lockout for several months, during which all work would be suspended, 
bar essential projects of national importance; this was also consistent with the Cabinet 
decision  of  November  1994.  Rabin  agreed  and  asked  to  examine  the  legal 
implications  of such  measure,  despite  a  strong  objection  by  the  MoD’s  Director 
General, David Ivry, who (consistent with his earlier objection of March 1995) argued 
that a lockout was the wrong approach because it might jeopardise national interests. 
‘It was the first time [since the Rafael crisis had begun] that Rabin was willing to go 
all the way,’ said a senior MoF official, Yuval Rachlevsky, who attended the meeting. 
‘Such a step was not without risks: it had never been enforced before [in Rafael], and 
there was a possibility that the courts would overturn it.’155
By  that  point  the  Closure-Opening  model,  which  was  at  the  heart  of the 
restructuring plan, was also approved by the Attorney General, Michael Ben-Yair.156 
However, he attached several conditions as a hedge against potential legal challenges, 
and stipulated that its use was restricted to  the case of Rafael only.  (The Treasury 
wanted  to  prevent  a  situation  in which  other  segments  of the  public  sector -   for
153 See: Decision by the Service Committee of the Civil Service Commission, 18 October 1995.
154 Rachlevsky interview.
155 Ibid.
156 Sarbero interview.
332example, hospital employees -  would condition restructuring and privatisation of their 
workplace by demanding  a  safety net  similar to  Rafael’s  Closure-Opening  model, 
which was more expensive than normal state-backed pension plans.157) Now having 
the backing of the Attorney General, the Treasury and Rafael management were ready 
to confront the workers in a final showdown.
At  that  point,  however,  a  new  row  erupted  between  the  MoF’s  Budget 
Department and the MoD over the transition costs.  Each side insisted that the other 
should shoulder the lion’s share of these costs -  a debate that lasted for years (and was 
in  fact  decided  only  in  1999).  According  to  the  MoD’s  economic  adviser,  who 
represented the defence establishment in these negotiations, ‘we simply did not know 
how to reach an agreed position on this point’.158
The Impact of Rabin’s Assassination
In November  1995  Rabin was assassinated,  and this set back the transition process 
significantly.  Shimon  Peres,  previously  Rabin’s  Minister  of Foreign  Affairs,  now 
became  Prime  Minister  and  Defence  Minister.  The  losses  of  Rafael  featured 
prominently  on  his  agenda,  and  he  addressed  them  in  a  series  of meetings  with 
Finance Minister Shochat as part of a wider discussion on the defence budget.159 At 
this time the Haifa Labour Court upheld the latest Civil Service Commission decision 
on the dismissal of 650 Rafael workers,160 to which the unions responded by filing 
another appeal,  this time  to  the National Labour Court,  which halted the dismissal 
process.
157 Rachlevsky interview.
158 Tov interview, 2001.
159 Haaretz, 26 November 1995.
160 Haifa District Labour Court, Case No. 41/20, 26 November 1995; Haaretz, 27 November 1995.
333That decision alarmed the defence establishment,  which sought to minimise 
any untoward liabilities on the defence budget. The IDF, one of the parties affected by 
this  delay,  refrained  from  publicly  interfering  in  this  conflict until  it  realised that 
Rafael’s mounting losses (1  million shekels a day, equal to the price of a brand new 
guided mfssile161) might have serious effects on its operations.162 During 1995 senior 
officers  expressed  their  concerns  in  closed  forums  (Cabinet,  Knesset  committees) 
besides frequently complaining to Rafael. In November 1995, however, while Prime 
Minister Peres was discussing the defence budget with Shochat, the military stepped 
up  the pressure  with a direct,  public  attack  on Rafael:  the  financial  adviser to  the 
IDF’s Chief-of-Staff gave a rare interview in which he charged that ‘covering Rafael 
deficits through the defence budget might destroy the Army’.163 This harsh statement, 
unprecedented in the history of IDF-Rafael relations, echoed the late Prime Minister 
Rabin,  who  had  asserted  two  months  earlier  that  ‘Rafael’s  persistent  deficits 
undermine the IDF and the state’s security’.164
Against  this  background,  Prime  Minister  Peres  was  presented  with  several 
options.  The  Ministry  of Finance  proposed  deferring  the  transition  until  after  the 
general  election  (expected  in a  few months)  and restarting  the  process  in  1997,165 
while Labour members of Knesset recommended postponing the transition for three 
years.166 A senior aide to the Minister of Defence suggested closing Rafael as a unit in 
the  MoD,  discharging  its  employees  and  then  rehiring  some  of them  through  the
161 Gat interview; see also Haaretz, 26 December 1995.
162 Haaretz, 28 November 1995.
163 Haaretz, 29 November 1995.
164 ‘Shalom, Haver’  special Globes supplement,  10 November 1995, quoting a Rabin speech dated  10 
September 1995.
165 ‘Letter to Rafael employees from the Director General’s office’, 8 January 1996.
166 Haaretz, 19 December 1995.
334private  sector.167  Another  option  was  to  continue  the  process  as  planned,  in 
accordance with the decision of November 1994.
During  his  previous  career  in  the  MoD,  Peres  had  favoured  a  more  co­
operative,  conciliatory  approach  to  labour  disputes.  ‘In  labour  negotiations,  one 
should not assume  that only the owner is  right;  maybe  the  employees also  have a 
point. We have always found a way to reach a common ground with the workers,’ he 
told  the  author.  He  also  believed  that  stable  labour  relations  in  the  state-owned 
defence enterprises were crucial for successfully implementing export deals.168 Peres 
therefore  chose  a  less confrontational  approach to  the  Rafael  problem than Rabin. 
Noting that it is hard to make painful decisions on industrial relations in an election 
year,169 he initially decided to continue  the transition process,  but insisted  ‘that all 
redundancies  should  be  handled  by  the  Service  Committee  (of the  Civil  Service 
Commission)’  and  that  the  Histadrut  be  consulted  on  ways  to  reduce  Rafael’s 
losses;170 these reached 330 million shekels in 1995 and were expected to grow to 512 
million in  1996.1 7 1   He also  sought to avoid confrontation with the unions as far as 
possible, so he rejected Gat’s request to dismiss several workers’ leaders (the Defence 
Minister had to authorise this) because of the Histadrut’s fierce objections.172 This so 
angered Rafael’s Director General that he threatened immediate resignation.173 In the
167 Haaretz, 1 January 1996.
168 Peres interview.  Peres noted that during his career in the defence ministry (he served as defence 
minister between  1973  and  1977)  the relationship  between the  government system and the  entire 
defence industrial base was ‘exemplary’ and ‘there were no labour disputes’.
169 Haaretz, 2 January 1996.
170 Prime Minister Office -  Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, ‘Minutes of a discussion held by 
Prime Minister Peres on Rafael, 1 January 1996’, dated 3 January 1996.
171 Haaretz, 29 November 1995.
172 Haaretz, 7 December 1995.
173 Gat interview.
335event, Gat was persuaded to stay, and the union representatives quietly resigned a few 
months later.
However, while the management was preparing for another round of layoffs 
and clashes -  the National Labour Court dismissed the unions’ appeal and in January 
1996  upheld  the  Commission’s  decision  to  lay  off  650  workers174  -   the  MoF 
reassessed the situation at Rafael. Its senior officials felt Gat’s insistence on pushing 
ahead with the Closure-Opening model was completely futile and counterproductive, 
given  the  prevailing  political  climate  and  the  recent  decision  on  early  elections 
(scheduled for May  1996).  The workers,  meanwhile,  escalated their actions,  which 
culminated in violent demonstrations and hunger strikes in response to a management 
decision to  make  90  surplus  workers  redundant.175  In  addition,  they invited  senior 
politicians, including the opposition leader, Binyamin Netanyahu, for election rallies
i
inside Rafael’s compound,  and at the same time nominated two union leaders to 
stand for the Labour party primaries.177
Realising that the political echelon wanted to keep Rafael off the agenda until 
after the elections, the MoF decided to act.  ‘Both Peres and Shochat indicated that 
they had  no  desire to  confront  the  workers,’  said Yuval  Rachlevsky,  then  Deputy 
Director of the Wage and Labour Accord Unit, ‘so we were facing a dilemma: should 
we try minimising Rafael’s increasing losses or should we simply wait’.178 The MoF’s 
Budget Department chose the second course -  from its point view, as long as Rafael
174 Haaretz, 22 January 1996
175 Maariv, 13 February 1996, Yedioth Ahronoth, 14 February 1996.
176 Haaretz, 26 January 1996; Maariv, 26 January 1996.
177  Letter  from  Rafael’s  Deputy  Director  General  for  Human  Resources  to  two  Rafael  workers 
(Nachum Blatman and David Zookman) headed ‘Your participation in the primaries for the Labour 
party’, 13 February 1996.
178 Rachlevsky interview.
336was kept inside the  MoD,  it was  the  MoD’s problem -  but the Wage and Labour 
Accord Unit rejected this because it wanted to keep Rafael labour costs to a minimum, 
as did the MoD and Rafael’s management.179 In February 1996 it therefore negotiated 
a  secret  interim  agreement  with  the  Histadrut:  the  transition  process  would  be 
postponed  for  two  years,  though  negotiations  between  management  and  workers 
would continue, and the workers agreed to minor pay cuts and 750 redundancies.180
Gat, who joined the negotiations at their last stage, accepted the deal on the 
condition that it should clearly state  that deferral  of the  incorporation process  was
only temporary.  ‘Otherwise,’  he told the MoF,  ‘the agreement would put the entire
181 process  on  hold,  indefinitely.’  Rachlevsky,  who  led  the  negotiations  with  the 
Histadrut, met Gat on 19 February 1996 and told him that he was unwilling to accept 
any  changes.  He  argued  that  the  agreement  was  clear  enough,  and  he  therefore 
recommended signing it; this prompted a second resignation threat from Gat.
Finance Minister Shochat, informed about the crisis with Gat on same night, 
asked for an emergency meeting with Prime Minister and Defence Minister Peres the 
following  morning,  before  the  Cabinet  meeting.  Rachlevsky,  meanwhile,  met  the 
Finance  Minister and the  senior MoF  bureaucracy,  briefed them on the  agreement 
with the Histadrut and received their backing. Shortly afterwards he and Shochat went 
to see Mr Peres. They explained the situation and asked him whether he preferred to 
go ahead with the incorporation plan or to postpone it. Peres opted for postponement 
and endorsed the proposed agreement,  noting that he  ‘simply did not have enough 
time to complete the task (of incorporation) before the elections’.182 Gat, who went to
179 Ibid.
180 Globes, 20 February 1996.
1 8 1  Rachlevsky interview.
182 Ibid.
337see the Prime Minister just after they left, tendered his resignation. A few days later, 
following an ad hoc compromise with the Histadrut, the Prime Minister issued a letter 
promising  to  complete  Rafael’s  transformation  into  a  company  as  soon  as  the 
management concluded labour arrangements with the unions. He also reiterated that 
his policy had not changed and expressed full support for Gat and his plans.183 Gat 
again reconsidered and remained in his job.
Peres subsequently explained in an interview with the author that he had not 
found  the  time  to  address  Rafael’s  problems  because  of his  tight  agenda  and  the 
severe complications of the peace process  (during his  last months  in power,  Israel 
experienced a series of terror attacks in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem). He also noted that in 
the Rafael situation he had ‘inherited an ongoing and bitter crisis’ in which he had not 
previously been  involved.  His  main concern was  to  ease  the  tensions  as  much  as 
possible and to enable Rafael to operate smoothly, ‘without souring the relations with 
the  employees’.  He  maintained  that  the  right  way  forward  was  only  through  a 
mutually accepted agreement with the workers, and that a forced solution would have
184 been ‘undemocratic’.
In  the  event,  Peres  lost  the  May  1996  general  election,  and  a  Likud 
government was elected. During the course of deliberations in the Rafael episode - 
from  the  May  1994  decision  to  start  turning  Rafael  into  a  government-owned 
company until  1996  -  the  total  cost of the  incorporation had  doubled:  from  the  2 
billion  shekels  estimated  in  1994185  to  4.8  billion  shekels  (about  $1.1  billion)  in
183 MoD press release, 26 February 1996; Sarbero interview.
184 Peres interview.
185 State Comptroller Annual Report no. 45, p. 862.
3381996.186 This  increase reflected pension cost capitalisation, pay rises under public- 
sector labour agreements (to which most Rafael workers’  salaries were linked) and 
higher mandatory redundancy payments terms agreed by the state.187 It was not until 
2002 that Rafael began operating as a government-owned company.
Conclusions
In the case of Rafael, the policy-making process was a complicated one involving two 
parallel  tracks:  a  continuous  effort  to  reduce  Rafael’s  spiralling  losses  and, 
simultaneously,  a  search  for  ways  to  turn  it  into  a  government-owned  company. 
Fourteen different actors -  drawn from the political echelon (ministers/Cabinet), the 
bureaucracy (two departments, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defence, 
and  Rafael  management),  and  the judiciary  (Labour Court  and  the  High  Court of 
Justice) as well as Rafael’s five workers’ unions, the Histadrut, and the Civil Service 
Commission  -   actively  participated  at  different  stages.  Knesset  Members,  the 
Attorney General Office, the Justice Ministry, and the IDF were also involved, albeit 
briefly. Consequently, the sheer number of parties concerned, each with its own set of 
considerations,  goals  and  agenda  congestion,  contributed  to  the  length  of  the 
deliberations. All the same, this in itself was not what determined the outcome, as will 
be explained later.
The evidence presented here suggests that the agendas of the main actors -  the 
executive  (both elected representatives  and bureaucrats)  and  the  organised  interest
186  Letter from  Defence Minister Yitzhak Mordechay to Member of Knesset Yona Yahav (Labour), 
headed 'Your Parliamentary Question on Rafael',  18 November 1996; see also Haaretz, 5 November 
1996 and 6 November 1996.
187 The total cost of Rafael’s incorporation, which was concluded in January 2002, was higher, but no 
official figures were released at the time of writing this thesis.
339group  (Rafael’s  workers)  -   were  each  driven  by  a  strategic  calculus.  Rafael 
management  wanted  to  make  the  unit  more  efficient  and  economically  viable  by 
turning it into a company, and to make use of all possible administrative and legal 
avenues to this end. The MoD, under pressure from the IDF (exercising the ‘consumer 
sovereignty principle’ the military viewed Rafael as a financial burden that was pre­
emptively restricting its room for manoeuvre in using the defence budget) sought to 
pass  financial  responsibility  for  Rafael  on  to  the  Treasury,  and  therefore 
wholeheartedly  supported  the  incorporation  effort.  The  unions  and,  at  times,  the 
Ministry  of  Finance’s  Budget  Department  sought  to  block  this.  And  each  actor 
selected the course of action best calculated to achieve its goal.
The  political  echelon  was  motivated  by  political  cost  calculations.  Prime 
Minister Rabin and Finance Minister Shochat,  for example, postponed the recovery 
process in Rafael for two years while handling the crises at IMI and IAI (in addition 
to the other pressing issues, like the Middle East peace process and the financial crises 
of the Kibbutzim, Kupat Holim and other organisations);  Shochat, on the eve of the 
Histadrut elections, waived his attempt to temporarily unlink Rafael from the Public 
Sector Wage Agreement. The upshot of these decisions was mainly financial: Rafael’s 
losses mounted, and its transition became ever costlier.
And yet,  evident throughout this  episode  was the way in which the actors’ 
choices  were  played  out  underlined  the  interdependence  between  policy-makers 
(whether politicians  or  officials)  and various  constraining  factors:  non-institutional 
effects like past policy choices, as well as institutional ones like judicial intervention, 
decision autonomy by the bureaucracy and attributes of decision-making.
Past policy choices -  in the form of the labour structure of Rafael, which had 
been formed and agreed upon in the 1950s -  meant it was all but impossible to lay off
340employees without statutory (Civil Service Commission) or judicial (Labour Courts) 
intervention. In practical terms, it took the MoD and Rafael management as long as a 
year to make workers redundant. Take, for example, the decision to lay off 650 Rafael 
workers: the decision, first taken in March  1995, was challenged by the unions, and 
was finally given the go-ahead by the court only in January 1996.
Attempts to change this  situation,  either by legislation or via administrative 
measures  such  as  a  defensive  lockout,  were  resisted by  different  segments  of the 
bureaucracy, each time for different reasons, and each time revealing the existence of 
deep-seated interests. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice opposed the 
legislative option (the former fearing it could destabilise national labour relations, the 
latter that it might destabilise the constitutional framework and possibly breach Basic 
Laws), while the MoD resisted the administrative one (on safety and national security 
grounds).  Prime  Minister Rabin’s  attempt  to  change  this  situation -   including  his 
landmark decision to close Rafael for few months, while secretly discussing a private 
bill to detach it from the MoD -  was curtailed by his assassination and therefore never 
materialised.  In  his  absence,  disunity  and  interdepartmental  in-fighting  within  the 
government  bureaucracy  continued,  prolonging  the  policy-implementation  process 
and at times even derailing it.
By  providing  different  opportunities  for  vetoing  policies,  the  institutional 
structure affected the relative weights of the actors involved, as well as the strategies 
they deemed best suited to promoting their interests.  Some actors,  like the unions, 
formulated their goals and strategies independently of the institutional structure within 
which their actions were to take place, but then sought to use institutional mechanisms 
to accomplish those goals. In this context, the veto points offered important ‘strategic
341openings’ that actors could exploit to achieve their aims within and during the policy 
process.
The actors’  strategic  calculations  and choices  were also  influenced by their 
expectations of how others would be likely to act in response to,  or simultaneously 
with,  their own actions.  The  ability of Rafael’s workers  to  force  issues out of the 
executive arena and into that of the independent judiciary gave them a great deal of 
leverage over government policy-making, because politicians were forced to consider 
carefully the workers’ views, and likely actions or responses, before making the next 
move.  For  example,  in  1993  the  Finance  Ministry  rejected  the  MoD  proposal  for 
unlinking Rafael from the public sector by means of legislation, because it assumed 
that the workers could challenge that legislation in the High Court of Justice and win. 
A  similar  concern  resurfaced  in  1995,  when  Prime  Minister  Rabin  rejected  a 
suggestion that the Cabinet unilaterally declare Rafael a government company for fear 
of such a decision being overturned by the courts; he opted for a consensual solution 
instead -  the Rafael Closure-Opening model -  which was subsequently vetted by the 
Attorney General. And the Cabinet waited to see if a Labour Court would uphold the 
unions’ claim that a plan to incorporate Rafael was unlawful; not until a month after 
the court had rejected the claim in April 1994 did the Cabinet decide that Rafael was 
to be incorporated.
Indeed,  veto  points played  a major part in  determining the outcome  of the 
Rafael episode. The effective veto power of Finance Ministry officials was manifested 
in the way they could delay negotiations -  on the grounds that this would serve other 
vital  national  interests,  like  keeping  the  state  budget  on  target  -   without  the 
knowledge  or  consent  of  the  political  echelon.  (That  this  practice  was  possible 
reflected a lack of ministerial control and authority over the bureaucracy.) The unions
342used  the  courts  as  a  means  to  prevent  (or  at  least  stall  as  long  as  possible)  the 
implementation of redundancies and Rafael’s restructuring plan. Nor was legal action 
the only veto opportunity open to them. They also sought to influence policy-making 
by accumulating political power -  following the example set by the IAI employees - 
via mass membership of the Labour party,  as  well as by targeting members of the 
inner  political  Cabinet  of the  Labour  party  (who  were  more  sympathetic  to  the 
defence  industry than Rabin),  and by applying pressure  through the municipal  and 
local government level.
Together,  veto  opportunities  severely  delayed  the  implementation  of  the 
restructuring plan. Indeed, after Rabin’s murder, they prevented it de facto. Rabin’s 
successor Shimon Peres  (a defence  industry  sympathiser and  a man struggling  for 
political  survival)  was  preoccupied  with  other more  pressing  issues  -   such as  the 
Middle  East  peace  process  and  preparations  for  early  elections  -   which  took 
precedence.  At  the  same  time,  and  despite  the  long-term  financial  implications, 
Finance and Defence Ministry officials (each for their own reasons) did not push for 
the  process  of incorporating  Rafael  to  be  completed.  Thus  the  Peres  government, 
foreseeing no penalty for postponing the decisive action (a political showdown with 
the workers), eventually felt free to ‘leave the field’.
In  sum,  the  case  of  Rafael  shows  how  specific  institutional  mechanisms 
structure the decision process,  and how,  in so  doing,  they give  interest groups and 
bureaucrats opportunities to  influence political decisions and policy outcomes.  The 
Labour  government’s  ability  to  implement  its  decision  to  restructure  Rafael  was 
affected by the  use  (or potential  use)  of veto  opportunities.  Those  open to  Rafael 
workers could be found both inside and outside the executive;  others were internal 
and latent within the bureaucracy. In practical terms, these veto points constrained the
343CHAPTER 7 
Cross-case Comparison
The  financial  crises  at  IMI,  IAI  and  Rafael,  took  place  while  the  Rabin-led 
government was engaged in ground-breaking peace negotiations and financial crises 
in other key sectors (most notably health, with the struggling general sickness fund, 
Kupat Holim  Klalit).  As  the  losses  of the  three  state-owned  enterprises  mounted, 
Prime Minister Rabin and Finance Minister Shochat initiated a series of restructuring 
plans aimed at increasing the productivity and international competitiveness of these 
firms, reducing their running costs and providing their managements with increased 
leverage vis-a-vis the unionised labour force.
The results of this effort were mixed, at best: in the case of IMI, most targets 
were achieved; in the case of IAI, the state backtracked on major parts of its plan, and 
in the  case  of Rafael,  it failed to  meet  its  main objective  (turning  the unit  into  a 
company). This Chapter discusses the similarities and differences in the way Cabinet 
and  the  government  bureaucracy  approached  each  of  these  enterprises,  and  the 
methods used by organised interests to counter and thwart the restructuring efforts.
The View from the Top
Production overcapacity, excess labour and insufficient equity capital were hallmarks 
of all three enterprises in the early 1990s. Successive governments had not addressed 
these  deficiencies  beforehand,  and,  as  we  saw  in  previous  chapters,  the  Rabin 
government  faced  many  challenges  throughout  the  implementation  phase.  Then 
Finance  Minister  Shochat  suggested  that  agenda  congestion  was  a  major  factor 
hindering the government’s efforts:
345The Rabin government focused primarily on finding solutions for the crises at hand [in 
these firms] and easing their financial pressure, rather than aiming for a comprehensive 
restructuring of all three. We started discussing this issue at a later stage, but it did not 
top our agenda. We had other priorities at the time, and there was only so much we could 
do in one term. We simply did not find time for that as well.
Pointing to the inaction of previous administrations, he noted that Israeli governments 
tend to pass the buck to their successors when faced with financial crises that do not 
require emergency intervention. According to Shochat, ‘I think we would have acted 
exactly the same, had [the crisis in the defence industry] not occurred on our watch; 
once it did, we were compelled to act.’1
Rabin’s successor as Prime Minister,  Shimon Peres, was also convinced that 
urgent corrective measures were required, but he was unable to implement them:
It had been clear for some time that we needed to revamp and restructure the defence 
industrial base. Any bureaucratic organisation that does not change becomes inefficient 
and bloated, sooner or later, and I did not consider the defence industry so sacred  ...  I 
had some ideas,  while serving as a defence minister [after Rabin]  of consolidating the 
defence enterprises into a single entity and privatising some of their units.  But then we 
had terror attacks and other burning issues which simply consumed all our attention and 
energy, and sadly nothing happened.2
Agenda congestion on its own, however, could not account for the different outcomes 
of these three episodes. A host of factors and intermediate mechanisms were at play, 
and  therefore  no  single  factor  could  account  for  any  particular  outcome.  Each 
recovery  plan  triggered  different  protest  and  appeal  mechanisms,  which  stemmed 
from the particular organisational structure, legal privileges and composition of the 
organised interests in question (see Table 7.1).
1  Shochat interview.
2 Peres interview.
346Table 7.1: Outcome and policy implementation (June 1992-May 1996)
Indicator IMI IAI Rafael
Workforce reduction -43% -23% -15%
Factories shut down/reorganised 6 1 None
Attainment of policy objectives
Severance from public sector’s pay rises Yes Temporary No
Profit centres Yes Yes No
Pay cuts Yes Yes No
Unqualified consent for privatisation Yes No No
Consent for redundancies Yes Yes Partial
Reduced terms in severance packages Yes Yes No
Consent for outsourcing of activities Yes No No
Consent for incorporation (in Rafael) - - No
Government’s pressure tactics
Withholding of cash injection/loan support Yes Yes -
Brinkmanship threat Receivership Receivership Closure
Threat carried out? No No No
Was management circumvented? No Yes Yes
If Yes, by whom? - Ministers MoF
Organised interests’ pressure tactics
Appeals to courts No Yes Yes
Appeals via inner Cabinet Yes No No
Pressure via Knesset and its committees Yes Yes Yes
Demonstrations, cross-union collaborations Yes Yes Yes
Intimidation of management Yes Yes Yes
Use of Histadrut in the critical negotiations Yes No Yes
Political support inside government system Knesset, 
Cabinet, local 
authorities
Own MK, 
Cabinet, local 
authorities
Knesset,
local
authorities
Pressure on the back of elections? - Local General
Negotiation approach employed by union 
leaders?
cooperation
(1992-1993)
confrontation
(1994-1995)
confrontation
(1992-1993)
cooperation
(1993-1994)
confrontation
347Effects of institutional veto points
In  each  case,  a  confluence  of  factors  -   institutional  constraints,  political  cost 
calculations, agenda congestion -  all affected the policy-making simultaneously, thus 
leading to a different outcome. Yet, it is argued that the institutional configuration was 
the most influential determinant, because it set the parameters within which interests 
were defined, ideas propagated and issues addressed.
The institutional landscape was complex, as discussed earlier. No single state 
authority  was  exclusively  handling  the  state-owned  defence  industry,  and  the 
responsibility for oversight and guidance was spread among different bodies within 
the executive and the bureaucracy. The main actors represented different interests and 
were bound by internal considerations and legal requirements:
•  The  MoD  abided  by  strict  resource  allocation  practices  that  had  been 
established  in  the  mid-1970s  after the  1973  Yom  Kippur War.  Due  to 
internal considerations, it was unwilling to afford any financial assistance 
to  the  ailing  defence  enterprises,  and  it  was  also  legally  barred  from 
contracting them on an exclusive basis (under the Mandatory Tenders Law 
passed in 1992, before the recovery plans were initiated). In exercising its 
oversight  and  regulatory  powers,  the  MoD  effectively  blocked  the 
partnership  strategy of IMI  on national  security and  economic  grounds, 
even though this strategy was deemed essential for ensuring the company’s 
long term financial viability and was already endorsed by the IMI board.
•  The  MoF,  empowered by  the  1985  legislation  following  the  Economic 
Emergency Programme,  adhered to  fiscal discipline,  but its  departments 
adopted  disparate  approaches  in  their  dealings  with  the  defence 
enterprises. The Budget Department was wary of principal-agent problems
348such as ‘moral hazard’  and ‘rent-seeking’ which were likely to arise as a 
result of a dependency on state bail out. It therefore objected in principle to 
aid  requests  from  failing  enterprises  that  were  not  accompanied  by 
corrective measure in the form of structural changes (see the cases of IAI 
and IMI). The MoF’s Wage and Labour Accord Unit, on the other hand, 
was primarily interested in stable labour relations with the public  sector, 
and  therefore  sought  to  reach  compromises  with  the  employees’ 
organisations, even if these ran contrary to the interests and guidelines of 
the Budget Department (as was evident in the cases of Rafael and IAI).
•  Following the enactment of Basic Laws and the gradual empowerment of 
the  Supreme  Court  -   which  became  an  effective  policy  veto  point  -  
Cabinet  decisions  were  increasingly  subject  to  judicial  scrutiny.  This 
development  prompted  the  Prime  Minister  and  MoF  to  ask  for  legal 
clearance for the Rafael and IAI recovery plans.
Confronting the government machinery were organised interests -  employees’ 
organisations  -   whose  relationships  with  management  and  the  public  bureaucracy 
were  based  on  labour  legislation  and  on  legally  binding  but  highly  restrictive 
collective agreements. As Table 7.1  shows, during the negotiations with the IMI and 
IAI employees’  organisations,  the MoF’s Budget Department made frequent use of 
two  measures:  suspending  cash  injections  (in  the  case  of cash-flow  deficits)  and 
withholding state guarantees (against which the company could raise loans). A third 
measure -  receivership or liquidation proceedings (which might have rendered labour 
agreements null and void) -  was initiated with the backing of the ministerial level but 
eventually dropped (in both cases, the ministers in charge retracted the threat after the 
employees yielded).
349In contrast with the competing and often contradictory aims of the government 
machinery, the employees’ organisations pursued cohesive and straightforward goals: 
the  continuation  of tenured  and  organised  labour  arrangements.  They  consistently 
refused to renegotiate the terms of the collective agreements, whose special status was 
further  recognised  and  protected  by  law.  In  practice,  these  collective  agreements 
linked  the  three  enterprises’  workforces  to  salary  rises  in  the  public  sector  and 
stipulated their automatic  payment,  irrespective  of the  enterprises’  actual  financial 
situation.  This  rendered all  three  managements  rather powerless,  because  the  only 
domain over which they retained full control was marketing and orders backlog; every 
other  management  domain  -   corporate  strategy,  internal  restructuring,  and  the 
composition, size and costs of human resources -  was affected and governed by the 
terms of the collective agreement.  Yet,  even when the three enterprises  came near 
financial collapse, the MoF insisted on maintaining as far as possible the status quo 
and consensus in dealing with trade unions, rather than seeking to impose a solution.
Fearing that a unilateral approach might destabilise labour relations across the 
economy and put at risk its long-standing arrangements with the  Histadrut and the 
public sector, the MoF preferred to retain these arrangements intact -  which de facto 
galvanised and institutionalised its own dominant role in the policy-making process. It 
therefore dismissed suggestions that might have countenanced a more forceful stance 
vis-a-vis the organised interests to be taken via other routes (like the legislature). In 
the case of Rafael it rejected the MoD’s idea of disassociating Rafael from the public 
sector by legislation,  and  in that of IAI  it turned down a management proposal  to 
unilaterally suspend the company’s stifling collective agreement.
The  organised  interests’  influence  was  further  boosted  by  their  growing 
involvement in the political arena. This began shortly after the termination of the Lavi
350project in  1987, when the IAI Employees’  Organisation realised that the support of 
the Defence Minister -  on which it had counted -  could not be taken for granted, and 
anyway  would  not  guarantee  its  organisational  existence.  It  therefore  sought  new 
ways to sustain its political and electoral clout. One approach was to cultivate close 
relations  with  cabinet  ministers,  members  of  Knesset,  and  leaders  of  local 
municipalities. Close links were also formed with regional labour councils and other 
trade  unions  across  the  country,  which  helped  to  build  a  formidable  coalition  of 
political players which offset the steady decline in the Histadrut’s influence. Another 
effective route to power, direct participation in party politics, was made possible by 
the introduction of the primaries system in  1992.  Mass enrolment of employees as 
party members -  noted in the cases of IAI and Rafael -  enabled organised interests to 
form a formidable support base within the parties, and this could serve as a potential 
retaliatory weapon against politicians  seeking re-election via the party’s  candidates 
list. At least in the case of IAI, the employees’ organisation successfully inserted its 
own representative into the Knesset, which enabled it to openly promote its interests.
In all three cases, the employees’ representatives were at pains to demonstrate 
their  political  and  organisational  clout,  making  use  of all  the  legal  and  political 
avenues opened to them:
•  Rafael:  By  frequently  appeals  to  the  labour  court,  the  Rafael  unions 
effectively shelved implementation of the government’s incorporation plan 
by pushing it closer to a general elections year (during which the political 
echelon tends to postpone potentially politically costly plans, as  Shochat 
noted).  Then,  to  enhance  their  political  influence,  Rafael  employees 
emulated  IAI’s  and  embarked  on  mass  enrolment  to  the  Labour  party 
ahead of the 1996 elections. The unions’ position was further helped by the
351disorganised  and  conflicting  handling  of  the  negotiations  by  the 
bureaucracy.
•  IAI:  Taking  advantage  of  the  Labour  government’s  tenuous  coalition 
majority and looming local elections (perceived by Prime Minister Rabin 
as  an  important  indicator  of public  support  of the  peace  process)  IAI 
employees’  successfully  fended  off  a  receivership  action  against  the 
company.  They  employed  a  pincer  strategy:  the  IAI  workers’ 
representative in Knesset voted against the state budget, thus undermining 
the  very  existence  of  the  Labour  coalition,  while  the  employees’ 
organisation  caused  great  inconvenience  to  the  wider public  by  closing 
Israel’s  main  international  airport  and  major highways.  IAI  employees’ 
also vowed to lobby against the Labour party in local elections, a threat the 
party leadership did not take lightly.
•  IMI:  Here  the  employees’  organisation took a conciliatory,  cooperative 
approach,  after  a  period  of  brinkmanship  and  confrontation  with 
management culminating in a direct appeal against the management’s plan 
to  the  inner Cabinet,  and  later on to  the  Knesset’s  Finance  Committee. 
However, in both cases it realised that, given IMI’s relative weaknesses (in 
technology  and  quality  of  workforce,  compared  to  the  other  two 
enterprises)  and  the  other  financial  crises  facing  the  government  at  the 
time,  the  company’s  long-term  survival  was  at  stake  unless  it  was 
downsized and restructured. It therefore opted for a negotiated but costly 
settlement.  IMI  employees  benefited  from  the  open  and  close  relations 
between their union leadership and the Labour cabinet, which instructed 
management  and  the  MoF  to  accommodate  most  of  the  employees’
352demands.  In  turn,  the  IMI  union  agreed  to  the  most  comprehensive 
concessions among the three defence enterprises (see Table 7.1).
It  was  evident  in  the  cases  of IAI  and  Rafael  that  the  political  influence 
accumulated by organised interests  in the  defence  sector and the unions’  ability to 
delay  and  thwart policy  initiative  by  appeals  to  the  courts  or  the  inner cabinet -  
effective  policy  veto  points  -   influenced  the  government’s  negotiating  tactics.  So 
much so, that the IAI and Rafael managements were  effectively pushed out of the 
negotiations  with  the  employees,  and  replaced  by  politicians  whose  leverage  and 
bargaining power were ostensibly weaker than those of the bureaucracy. This was due 
to political cost calculations and the  short parliamentary cycle.  Furthermore,  in the 
course of the negotiations over recovery plans, some organised interests managed to 
secure explicit clauses that gave them influence over management decisions.
353GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Policy Capacities in the Israeli Defence Industry
The preceding chapters discussed the government system’s handling of the financial 
crisis in the Israeli state-owned defence industry, unearthing many underemphasised 
aspects  of  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  interest  groups.  The  detailed 
narration of the three episodes on IAI, IMI and Rafael allowed us to delve into the 
critical junctures of policy-making and try to understand what happened and why. In 
each case  similar policy objectives were pursued:  restructuring and downsizing the 
enterprise  in question,  which  involved  imposing  significant  financial  losses  on the 
organised interests involved -  the employees’ committees and organisations in each 
enterprise.  However,  the outcomes varied widely,  and in each case various  factors 
accounted for the different result.
To  explain what may account for such variation,  it was hypothesised in the 
introductory chapter that institutional rules and procedures set the terms for political 
conflicts, by providing opportunities and risks for both politicians and interest groups. 
Central  to  new-institutionalist  accounts  is  the  notion  that  political  struggles  are 
structured, and the outcome shaped, by the characteristics of the institutional settings 
within which they occur. Institutional factors can therefore shape both the objectives 
of political actors and the distribution of power among them in a given polity. Thus, 
the  institutional  framework  not  only  structures  political  conflicts  but  also  affects 
government capabilities; this, in turn, may explain divergence in policy outcomes. It 
was further argued that intermediate institutional features -  policy veto points inside 
and outside the executive, as well as the influence of the judiciary and the bureaucracy 
-   greatly  influence  government  capacity  to  implement  policy  and  impose  loss  on
354powerful  groups.  In  the  course  of  the  case  studies  discussed  here,  it  has  been 
demonstrated that the  use,  or likely use,  of veto  points  affected the  considerations 
applying to different actors and, ultimately, the policy outcome.
Yet, based on the evidence presented thus far,  one can argue that, while the 
structure of political institutions per se had an impact,  this  was but one of several 
factors  that constrained the policy-makers’  choices.  Non-institutional  determinants, 
namely past policy choices, played an important part in presenting openings for and 
impediments  to  the  imposition  of  financial  losses  on  organised  interests.  These 
determinants guided and influenced the choices made by politicians as well. Consider, 
for  example,  the  insistence  of  Prime  Minister  Rabin  and  the  MoF’s  Budget 
Department -   throughout  the  three  episodes -   on  negotiated compromise  with  the 
unions, and their adherence to consensual arrangements (which ultimately increased 
the recovery costs of all three enterprises). Or the MoD resource allocation policy of 
1975 and the emergency economic legislation of 1985 which,  each in its own way, 
determined the scope of the public bureaucracy’s autonomy, and, in turn, inculcated 
certain preferences and attitudes that surfaced years later.
The three episodes show how specific institutional mechanisms structure the 
decision process, and how, in so doing, they provide interest groups and bureaucrats 
with opportunities to influence political decisions. The author therefore proposes the 
following inferences about certain capabilities of the Israeli governmental system, as 
drawn from the evidence presented in the case studies:
•  Institutional arrangements may present impediments to and opportunities 
for  specific  governmental  capabilities,  but  they  are  contingent  upon 
political and social conditions.  Therefore,  a government that is supported 
by  a  minimum  coalition,  with  a  small  or  insufficient  parliamentary
355majority,  is  likely  to  encounter  difficulties  in  effectively  implementing 
policies and imposing losses. Indeed, the loss-imposition capability of the 
Labour government under Rabin (and later Peres) varied over time, under 
the influence  of changing political circumstances: its capability to impose 
losses was high when it had a majority coalition in its first year in office 
(as  in the case  of IMI),  but weakened  later when  it became  a  minority 
government  with  a  reduced  coalition  and  faced  an  election  in  the  near 
future (as in the cases of IAI and Rafael).
•  The institutional structure of the Israeli government, with its multiple veto 
points,  interest  groups’  access  and  short  parliamentary  cycles,  is 
susceptible  to  a high  level  of political  contestability.  Constraints  on  the 
government’s specific policy capabilities of implementation and imposing 
financial  losses  built up  gradually,  as  different  institutional  components 
(judiciary, bureaucracy) were granted more powers at different stages.
•  The  prevailing  institutional  setting  puts  the  Israeli  government  at  a 
political disadvantage when it comes to executing policies that affect large, 
organised  interests  in  the  public  sector.  Policy  implementation  is 
composed  of sequences  of actions  undertaken  at  different  institutional 
locations, and agreement is required at several points along this chain. The 
fate of policy implementation, then, rests on the opportunities for veto in 
these  locations.  As transpired from  the cases of IAI  and Rafael,  interest 
groups  sought  judicial  intervention  at  different  stages  of  the  policy 
implementation.  Use  of the  judiciary  as  a  veto  point  was  particularly 
potent -  as  the  Rafael  case  showed -   because the  state  would have no 
alternative veto point at which to override the judiciary’s rulings (save for
356enactment of new  legislation,  which  is  a  lengthy process).  Furthermore, 
Israel’s  independent judiciary can deliberate  on a case  for as  long as  it 
wishes, irrespective of the country’s relatively short parliamentary cycle. 
Hence, a verdict may become irrelevant if delivered in the next session of 
Knesset; by that time a new government with a different agenda may have 
been  elected,  and  previous  policies  could  be  altered  or  abandoned 
altogether.  (Interest  groups  used  the  judiciary  as  a  veto  point  in  two 
instances. In the first, if the Rafael workers’  attempts had succeeded, the 
government would have had no alternative veto point at which to override 
that  success.  In  the  second,  IAI  employees  challenged  an  attempt  to 
privatise one of IAI’s subsidiaries, using prolonged legal deliberations that 
effectively derailed this initiative.)
The  ability of organised  interest  groups  to  influence  the  policy  outcome  stemmed 
from their access to both the judiciary and the political system. Introducing electoral 
reforms (namely, party primaries) and the gradual empowerment of other veto arenas 
(namely, the public bureaucracy and the judiciary) effectively ended state hegemony 
over the policy-making process.  No  longer were  those  in  the  national  government 
sufficiently  autonomous  to  make  decisions;  they  were  seriously  challenged  by 
contending organised interests who made use of all the veto opportunities opened to 
them.
Theoretically,  the executive  could restrict organised interests’  access to  and 
influence on the policy-making process,  by removing veto  points,  or by outlawing 
some  or  all  of  the  interest  groups’  practices.  However,  that  might  lead  to  an 
institutional  framework  that  was  not  democratic.  It  can  be  inferred  from  the  key
357decisions  throughout  the  restructuring  process  in  the  defence  industry that policy­
makers preferred to maintain dialogue with organised interests -  so as to allow the 
implementation of policy objectives in other domains —  rather than jeopardise stable 
labour relations.  Keeping  the  current  institutional  arrangements  intact,  despite  the 
impediments  they  posed  to  the  government,  was  more  important  than  forcing  a 
particular policy  on  a  reluctant  constituency,  whatever  dividends  that  might  have 
yielded.
The implication of the policy-makers’ preference was that some government 
capabilities -  imposing losses and implementing policy -  remained impaired.  If the 
institutional arrangements in Israel -  and this could be established only with the help 
of additional studies -  do indeed lead to some capabilities that are less effective than 
others,  when  dealings  with  similar  problems  in  different  policy  areas,  then 
institutional reform needs to be considered.
A Broader Research Agenda
The  inferences  concerning  Israeli  governmental  capabilities,  as  outlined  here,  are 
tentative and by no means to be treated definitive, being based on a limited number of 
case studies. Supplementary evidence is therefore required, and the objective of this 
section is to suggest some ideas for further research which may shed light on other 
institutional and non-institutional determinants of policy-making in the Israeli context. 
For example, the role and influence of the media on the course and the decisions of 
the  actors  involved  in policy-making,  and  also  the  possible  effect  of bureaucratic 
structural  differences  between  and  within  ministries  on  policy  output  and 
coordination.
358Institutional  analysis  of policy  outcomes  in  other  sectors  (like  education, 
health, etc.) may allow for a cross-case comparison between several policy domains, 
highlighting the factors that constrain the same government actors (for example, the 
Ministry  of  Finance).  Another  relevant  subject  might  be  the  relevance  and 
applicability of the  Government  Companies  Law  to  the  government’s  handling  of 
state-owned  enterprises  experiencing  financial  difficulties,  and  in  particular  the 
practical interpretation of the law by the state actors involved.
In order to stimulate and guide such research, the author would like to suggest 
a tentative illustration of Israeli policy determinants, presented overleaf. It is based on 
the evidence gathered and is by no means exhaustive or definitive. It should be treated 
as  a  tentative  framework  that  requires  further  corroboration  through  additional 
research.
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Determinants of Government Policy Capabilities in Israel: Suggested Illustration 
Institutional Constraints_______________  ____________________________________________________________________
Electoral Rules, Norms
Parliam entary Rules: and Procedures
System PR with a low of Government
threshold Formation
Processes
Type of Government
Government: Formation:
two or more multiparty
parties coalition
Attributes of Decision-makin
• Level of party discipline in 
legislature: strong
• Recruitment of ministers from 
legislature: yes
• Degree of centralisation (cabinet vs. 
legislature and public): strong
• Cohesion of government elites: weak
• Policy veto points within government: 
inner cabinet, Knesset committees
• Autonomy of elites: weak (tenuous 
coalition and short parliamentary cycles)
• Interest group access and influence: 
strong
Policy-making Capabilities
I
Policy Choices
I
Broad Framework 
Institutions
Judiciary: judicial 
review of statutes and 
laws
Bureaucracy:
decision autonomy
Additional Non- 
institutional Influences
Corporatist-style 
arrangements 
Geo-political conditions 
Policymakers’  goals 
Socio-economic and 
demographic conditions 
Past policy choices
Policy Outcomes Source: Adapted from Weaver and Rockman, Do Institutions Matter?Interviews
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Arieh Penso (IAI Corporate Vice President for Human Resources  1992-present),  7 
October 1997 (Penso interview).
Shimon  Peres  (Prime  Minister  1984-1986,  1995— 1996;  Defence  Minister  1974—  
1977,  1995-1996; Foreign Minister 1986-1988,  1992-1995; Finance Minister 
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384Appendix A: Glossary of Financial Terms
Annual report: A report a company publishes for its stockholders at the end of each 
fiscal  year.  Includes required elements,  such as  an auditors’  report  and  the 
company's statement of earnings, statement of financial position and statement 
of cash flows. Also includes elements such as letters and articles by company 
executives, information on its financial condition, and significant events.
Assets: Anything companies own. These might be physical assets - such as buildings, 
trucks, inventories of products, equipment and cash - or intangible assets, such 
as goodwill,  trademarks, and patents.  ‘Assets’  is listed as a category on the 
balance sheet.
Balance  sheet:  A  financial  statement reporting  a  company's  assets  and  the  claims 
against them -  liabilities and stockholders’ equity -  at a set date noted on the 
statement. The term can also mean a company’s overall financial position.
Backlog: The amount of a company’s unfilled or unprocessed sales orders at the end 
of the year. When the company fills the orders the following year (or years), it 
records the revenue on the earnings report. For purposes of transparency and 
accountability, some companies (like IAI, see Chapter 5) distinguish between 
‘external  backlog’  -   that  is,  orders  from  external  clients  -   and  ‘internal 
backlog’:  orders  from units  within the  company  contracting  work  to  sister 
units.
Cash flow: A measure of a company's financial health, noting the flow of cash into 
and out of the  company.  Equals cash receipts minus cash payments  over a 
given period of time; or equivalently, net profit plus amounts charged off for 
depreciation, depletion, and amortisation.
Contract:  A  binding  agreement  between  two  or more  parties  for  performing,  or 
refraining  from  performing,  some  specified  act(s)  in  exchange  for  lawful 
consideration.  A  ‘new  contracts’  figure  represents  the  total  value  of 
agreements signed by a company in a given period or fiscal year.
Earnings  report:  A  financial  statement  that  reports  the  results  of  a  company's 
business operations (revenue and expenses) for a set period, usually one year. 
The term can also mean an income statement, statement of earnings, statement 
of operations, and statement of profit and loss.
385Equity:  The part of a company’s  assets  belonging  to  the  stockholders -   i.e.  what 
would remain if a company sold all its assets and paid off all its liabilities.
Expenses:  Costs  such  as  salaries,  rent,  office  supplies,  advertising,  and  taxes. 
‘Expenses’ is listed in the operating expenses category on the earnings report.
Gross profit:  The difference between a company's total sales and its cost of sales. 
‘Gross profit’ is listed as a category on the statement of earnings; also called 
gross income.
Loss: The reduction in the value of an investment; a condition in which a company's 
expenses exceed its revenues.
Net profit: A company's total revenue less total expenses, showing what a company 
earned (or lost, called net loss) for a set period, usually one year. ‘Net profit’ is 
listed often  literally as the  ‘bottom line’  on the  statement of earnings;  also 
called net earnings and net income.
Profit: The positive gain from an investment or business operation after subtracting 
all expenses.
Revenues: The total flow of funds into a company, mostly for sales of its goods or 
services.
Sales: Total amount collected for goods and services provided. While payment is not 
necessary for recognition of sales on company financial statements, there are 
strict accounting guidelines stating when sales can be recognised.  The basic 
principle is that a sale can only be recognised when the transaction is already 
realised, or can be quite easily realised. This means that the company should 
have already received a payment, or the chances of receiving a payment are 
high. In addition, delivery of the good or service should have taken place for 
the sale to be recognised.
Sources:
Eitav Hebrew-English Dictionary of  Banking and Finance Terms (Tel Aviv: Eitav Publishing 
House, 1994).
investorwords.com (accessed: 18 November 2005);.
IBM  Investors  Guide  to  Financials  (www.ibm.com/investor/financialguide/irgtfg.phtml, 
accessed: 18 November 2005).
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